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Introduction
Fault, failure in performance, company, prescription, reasonableness and fairness.
For (Dutch) lawyers, these concepts may seem a beacon of stability in an ever
changing legal environment. Whereas the Dutch Civil Code has been amended
many times since its entry into force in 1992, these concepts form a permanent
core. They appear to be a constant factor, the building blocks out of which the
system has been made.
However, appearances may be deceptive. These concepts today are not
what they were in 1992. E.M.Meijers, who drafted the Dutch Civil Codewrote
about the core concept of nullification:1
‘When (…) the consequences of the juridical act are first denied, after the court
has nullified that act; when the court is not allowed to do so of its own motion,
but only one or more interested parties are allowed a claim to that effect; when,
in addition, this claim is subject to prescription and the interested party can waive
its right to claim, then we have a case of nullification.’
The lawyer who in 2016 reads Article 6:233 (a) DCC with this description by
Meijers in mind, might come to the wrong conclusions. Article 6:233 (a) DCC
deals with the nullification of a term in general terms and conditions which
is unreasonably onerous. From the decision in Heesakkers/Voets by the Dutch
Supreme Court it follows that a court may, on the basis of Article 6:233 (a),
be obliged to ascertain of its own motion whether a contract term is unfair.
If it deems the contract term unfair, it must annul it.2
Although the core concepts themselves are a constant factor within the Civil
Code, themeaning of these concepts is thus not fixed. Once nullificationmeant
that action by the interested party was required in order to withhold effect
from a juridical act, nowadays it is not inconceivable that a court needs to
ascertain of its ownmotionwhether the act can be set aside. The core concepts
of the Dutch Civil Code are continuously in motion.
1 E.M.Meijers,DeAlgemene Begrippen van het Burgerlijk Recht, Leiden: Universitaire pers Leiden
1958, p. 245.
2 Dutch Supreme Court 13 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:691, NJ 2014/274, note H.B.
Krans, no 3.7.1, 3.7.3.
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This observation in itself is not new. Meijers himself warned against too
static an interpretation of the concepts within the Code:3
‘In this matter of interpretation there is again a risk of a dogmatic application of
the law; in a code of law the terms null and void and nullifiable are always to be
given the same meaning with invariable legal effects, without regard to what is
required by the object and purport of the statutory provision. In the Dutch admin-
istration of justice a clear break has fortunately been made with this manner of
interpretation regarding the concepts of null and void and nullifiable.’
New, however, is the increased influence of transnational developments on
the Dutch core concepts. In Heesakkers/Voets, the Dutch Supreme Court ex-
tensively cites the case law of the European Court of Justice before coming
to its decision.4 Not only EU Directives and Regulations and the case law of
the ECJ have an impact on Dutch concepts, but these concepts may also be
influenced by e.g. the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, by the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
and other international treaties and by instruments such as the various sets
of Principles. The interpretation of the core concepts of the Dutch Civil Code
is therefore becoming an increasingly tricky business: not only should lawyers
pay attention to Dutch sources – such as the parliamentary history, Dutch case
law and legal literature – , they should also be aware of the various trans-
national sources which may have an impact on the particular concept.
This edition of the Leiden Yearbook of Private Law aims to offer a helping
hand to confused lawyers. It analyses several core concepts within the Dutch
Civil Code and makes it clear how these concepts have been influenced by
transnational instruments. The Yearbook covers three large areas of the Dutch
Civil Code – contract, tort and institution.5
PART I – CONTRACT
Hijma analyses the concept of nullity and concludes that it shows a downward
trend. Nullity of a contract is accepted less easily and when it is, its effects
are oftenmitigated. An exception is the nullity found inArticle 101 par. 2 TFEU
on cartels; as becomes clear from the case law of the ECJ, there is not much
room for correction when this nullity is concerned. However, the consequences
of this case law for the general concept of nullity should not be overestimated.
3 Meijers 1958, p. 251.
4 See no. 3.5.1-3.6.2.
5 The translations of Dutch Civil Code provisions in this edition of the Yearbook are from
H.C.S. Warendorf, R. Thomas, I. Curry-Sumner, The Civil Code of the Netherlands, Alphen
a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2013.
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Hijma observes that cartel law is a special field of law in which motives of
deterrence and prevention play a predominant role.
One of the core concepts of the Dutch Civil Code is undoubtedly reasonable-
ness and fairness. The reliance placed on this concept is, according toCartwright,
‘part of the Dutch lawyer’s DNA.’ Cartwright explores – with a focus on the
law of contract – why ‘reasonableness and fairness’ does not match with the
common lawyer’s thinking. One of the reasons is that in common law the view
is accepted that the bargaining has to be left to the parties; therefore common
law is, in general, reluctant to intervention by the courts. Moreover, it is felt
that the freedom of the court to intervene in the contract on the mere basis
of reasonableness and fairness can undermine the certainty and security of
contracts.
The contribution of Knigge and Verhage also focuses on the concept of
reasonableness and fairness, but within the specific context of the contract of
binding advice. It follows from Article 7:904 par. 1 DCC that a decision taken
by binding advisors may be annulled if it is unacceptable to hold a party to
it according to standards of reasonableness and fairness. Knigge and Verhage
examine whether the ADRDirective influences the interpretation of the concept
of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ in the sense of Art. 7:904 par. 1. They argue
that the ADR Directive opens extensive possibilities for parties to challenge
decisions taken in a binding advice procedure covered by the Directive and
thus seems to take away a great deal of the binding force of such decisions.
Van Kogelenberg examines the concept of failure in performance of an obliga-
tion. He shows that, unlike Dutch law, most supranational legal instruments
require a ‘fundamental’ breach of contract to have access to the remedy of
termination of the contract. Van Kogelenberg argues that, despite the inter-
national ‘pressure’, this requirement should not be incorporated into Dutch
law. Dutch law contains other thresholds to limit access to termination, for
example the requirement of default. In his contribution Van Kogelenberg
furthermore analyses the consequences of the implementation of the Directive
on consumer rights for the concepts of ‘failure in performance’ and ‘default’.
PART II – TORT
De Tavernier and Van der Weide examine the concept of fault against the back-
ground of efforts to arrive at a European harmonization of tort law. They argue
that a harmonization project should take as a starting point a concept of fault
meaning ‘legal blameworthiness’. The concept should not be confused with
the concept of ‘wrongfulness’ or with a combination of wrongfulness and
blameworthiness. Moreover, De Tavernier and Van der Weide argue that the
concept of fault should be interpreted in a subjective way.
De Graaff investigates the concept of prescription in light of the right of
access to a court under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights
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(ECHR). The Dutch Supreme Court placed Dutch private law on prescription
at ‘the forefront of human rights protection’ with its ruling in theVan Hese/De
Schelde case, as De Graaff notes. The Supreme Court decided that the applica-
tion of the statutory prescription period may under certain circumstances be
set aside, because its application is contrary to ‘standards of reasonableness
and fairness.’ De Graaff analyses to what extent the possibility of setting aside
binding rules under Article 6(2) DCC can contribute to human rights protection,
given the Dutch constitutional framework. According to De Graaff, the Dutch
solution is ‘generally in line with’ recent case law of the ECHR. In the absence
of judicial review against the Dutch Constitution, the Dutch Civil Code thus
provides a legal basis to reach a result that is in conformity with the demands
of fundamental rights law.
PART III – INSTITUTION
Bruning and Florescu explore the concept of discharge of parental authority in
light of the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. On
1 January 2015, the conditions for discharging parents of their responsibilities
were relaxed. Bruning and Florescu investigate whether the new conditions
are in line with Article 8 ECHR and formulate recommendations for courts
deciding cases of discharge in order to comply with the requirements ensuing
from this provision.
De Groot investigates the interaction between two core concepts of Dutch
company law: the company and the duty of directors to be guided by the best
interests of the company. De Groot discusses established case lawwherein the
view is held that the management board has to serve the interests of the
company rather than the interests of themajority shareholder. This line of case
law, however, lacks some guidance. What are the interests of the company?
Here the Cancun case is of importance. It follows from the Cancun case that
the prime duty of corporate boards is to advance the success of the undertaking
that is connected with the company as well as to preserve the company’s other
organizational characteristics. De Groot shows that this ‘duty to advance and
preserve’ is neatly in line with a consideration by the Supreme Court of the
State of Delaware in the Selectica case.
Dijkhuizen and Nijland examine the shareholders’ right to put items on the
agenda of the general meeting. In their contribution, they focus on the influence
of both domestic and European legislative developments on this core concept.
They conclude that the regulatory developments on a national and European
level regarding the right for shareholders in a listed company to put items
on the agenda, seem to bemoving in opposite directions. The Dutch legislator
is endeavouring to counteract shareholder activism by limiting the share-
holders’ right to put an item on the agenda. On the EU level, by contrast, the
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role of shareholders as ‘watchdog’ is emphasized in the current debate on
corporate governance.
Core concepts are continually in motion. An understanding of core concepts
is necessary for an understanding of civil law. However, as Hans Nieuwenhuis
has rightly pointed out, this is not the whole picture: imagination is indispens-
able for a lawyer. As co-editor of the Leiden Yearbook of Private Law, Hans’
imagination inspired us for many years. He was editor of the Yearbook since
2005. After turning 65, he considered resigning as editor just about every year.
We praise ourselves for having convinced him to stay. Thus we continued
to profit from his wisdom and experience. Sadly, Hans passed away on 18
June 2015. In honour of Hans, the first contribution of this Yearbook is dedi-
cated to his work.
C.G. Breedveld-de Voogd
A.G. Castermans
M.W. Knigge
T. van der Linden
H.A. ten Oever
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Understanding private law. On the work of
Hans Nieuwenhuis, 1944 – 2015
Thijs Beumers, Clementine Breedveld-de Voogd, Alex
Geert Castermans, Ewout Cornelissen, Ruben de Graaff,
Matthias Haentjens, Joris Hermeling, Teun van der
Linden, Gitta Veldt, Stijn Voskamp and Jeroen van der
Weide
Hans Nieuwenhuis’ work is difficult to capture in a single sentence. It aims
to impart an understanding of private lawwhich, Nieuwenhuis says, requires
an awareness of time, space and balance. We measure his work by his own
yardstick.
INTRODUCTION
Leopold Bloom, the well-known character in James Joyce’s Ulysses, was a
readerwho derived pleasure from reading ‘literature of instruction rather than
of amusement’. He sometimes turned to Shakespeare:1
‘for the solution of difficult problems in imaginary or real life. Had he found their
solution? In spite of careful and repeated reading of certain classical passages, aided
by a glossary, he had derived imperfect conviction from the text, the answers not
bearing in all points.’
HansNieuwenhuis, professor of private law at Leiden University, wrote texts
of instruction and amusement. Initially it is the new Dutch private law that
is the focus of his work, the heart of which is formed by his thesis (1979),
inaugural lectures in Tilburg and Leiden (1980 and 1982) and a series of
All authors are attached to the University of Leiden’s Institute for Private Law. A Dutch
version of this contribution has been published in Ars Aequi: ‘Hoe begrip van burgerlijk
recht mogelijk is. Over het werk van Hans Nieuwenhuis’, Ars Aequi 65-9, pp. 835-840. The
authors wish to thank Willem van Boom, Margreet Duynstee, Jaap Hijma, Wouter den
Hollander, Marte Knigge and Henk Snijders for their input, Kath Starsmore for the trans-
lation and John Cartwright for his careful reading.
1 J.A.A. Joyce, Ulysses, Penguin Modern Classics 1969, p. 598.
2 In memoriam Hans Nieuwenhuis
inspiring annotations in the law journal Ars Aequi (1985-1992). But following
his foray to the Supreme Court (1992-1996) he concentrates more and more
on the influence of Europe, the world, other legal systems and cultures on
the development of private law. Not in order to counter distorting influences
on the structure and content of national private law, but time and again to
understand this area of law in its time and context. The culmination of his
work is formed by Een steeds hechter verbond [An ever closer union] (2015),
a triptych on enemy stereotypes, alliances and spoils of war in which he paints
a picture of Europe as a community of values.2
It is a work ‘of amusement’, thanks to the author’s literary talent and
inspiring associations. And ‘of instruction’, because of its many layers and
surprising insights. Anyone reading his work does not do so simply, like
Leopold Bloom, to find the solution to a complex problem, but does so to learn
to understand the problem and to learn to find the law, often on the basis of
ideas and images from world history and literature.
When asked, Nieuwenhuis counted his early work Legitimatie en heuristiek van
het rechterlijk oordeel [Legitimation and heuristics of judicial decisions] as one
of his three – naturally three – favourite publications. The reader has to battle
his way through a rather abstract discourse, in which the position of deduction
and heuristics in judicial decision-making is determined. Nieuwenhuis
challenges the view that the importance of deductive reasoning to a judicial
decision is no more than a ‘pious sham’:3
‘The “pious sham” does not exist. Arriving at a judicial decision involves two
different activities. On the one hand the “finding” of the decision. This is certainly
not a logical, linear activity running from the rule via the facts to the decision, but
rather a confrontation between (draft) rules, (draft) views of the facts and (draft)
decisions.
This confrontation continues until the case “fits”, i.e. until an acceptable decision
has been foundwhichmeshes with an acceptable rule which in turn is in tunewith
an acceptable view of the facts. On the other hand, there is a need to shape the
justification of the decision.’
What, then, is the correct shape?
‘Whether that shaping can be said to be a success does not depend on whether
or not it is a true reflection of the search strategy actually employed by the court,
but on the degree to which it provides insight into the extent to which the grounds
justify the decision.’
2 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Een steeds hechter verbond. Europa op weg naar Europa [An ever closer union.
Europe en route to Europe], Amsterdam: Balans 2015.
3 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Legitimatie en heuristiek van het rechterlijk oordeel’ [Legitimation and
heuristics of judicial decisions], RM Themis 1976, pp. 494-515, p. 501.
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And yet what interests him most are the substantive grounds – civil law and
civicmorals. Nieuwenhuis poses the question: what does understanding private
law require? The answer can be found in his speech to the meeting of the
Literature department of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences on 8
October 2007, his second favourite publication:4
‘spatial insight, an awareness of the passing of time and the ability to establish
the weight of things which, as far as the balance is concerned, are at first sight
imponderable.’
He is convinced that this triad actually exists in the world of law, and that
it allows legal concepts to be rendered imaginable. Lawyers need this imagina-
tion in order to arrive at a considered judgment.
Virtually all of Nieuwenhuis’ publications contributed to the substantive
strength of his readers’ work, by expanding their spatial insight and awareness
of time, and by giving clear directions for the use of bathroom scales or bal-
ance. This common thread shows him to be a man who is utterly reliable. We
have picked up the thread, in an attempt to interpret his legacy.
SPACE
According to Nieuwenhuis the spatial dimension of private law can be
depicted in three ways. Jurists should define the space by focusing on depart-
ure point and goal and then checking the line along and plane across which
the goal is to be reached.
Take the departure point of liability law that each party should bear their
own loss. Only a claimant who successfully ‘hops’ along the requirements for
liability arising from a tort reaches the other extreme of the spectrum, full
compensation.5 These requirements may be construed in different ways: as
a sharp line or as a plane with vague contours.6
Or contract law, which is:7
4 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Hoe is begrip van burgerlijk recht mogelijk? Drie vormen van voorstelling:
ruimte, tijd, gewicht [How can private law be understood? Three forms of representation:
space, time and weight], Amsterdam, KNAW Press 2008, p. 8; also in RM Themis 2007, pp.
227-240, p. 228.
5 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Hinkelspel rond de boom der kennis van goed en kwaad’ [Hopscotch
around the tree of the knowledge of good and evil], in: J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Waartoe is het
recht op aarde? [What is the purpose of justice on earth], The Hague: Boom Juridische
uitgevers 2006, pp. 5-32; also in: J.H. Nieuwenhuis & C.J.J.M. Stolker (ed.), Vooruit met het
recht [Advancing the law], The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006, pp. 1-18.
6 J.H.Nieuwenhuis, ‘Hoi topoi’, in: J.H.Nieuwenhuis,Confrontatie en compromis [Confrontation
and Compromise], Deventer: Kluwer 2007, pp. 81-90
7 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Wat mogen koper en verkoper van elkaar verwachten?’ [What can buyer
and seller expect of each other?], WPNR 1998, p. 157.
4 In memoriam Hans Nieuwenhuis
‘a forest of expectation. Sometimes the path comes to a fork: did the item sold come
up to what the buyer was entitled to expect? Yes or no? But there are also open
spaces, where the path can continue in more than two directions. Could the dis-
appointed expectation be the fault of both parties? The position of the compass
needle is in that case decided by the question of the extent to which the circum-
stances attributable to each party contributed to that disappointment.’
Nieuwenhuis leans towards the compass needle. Following his research into
the principles underlying the law of contract (Drie beginselen van contractenrecht
[Three principles of the law of contracts])8 he moves into the border regions
between contract law and property law (Uit de ban van hier en nu [Breaking
the spell of the here and now]),9 between contractual and non-contractual
liability law (Anders en eender [Different and yet the same]),10 and between
fault-based and strict liability (De ramp op het Pikmeer [The Pikmeer dis-
aster]).11 He describes the spatial planning of modern private law as a ‘system
of transitional forms’, which can be found between ownership and obliga-
tion,12 between non-performance and tort (a mixed right of action),13 but also
between general termination and annulment.14 He traces rules back to prin-
ciples which in turn are determined by the space in which they operate: by
how the world is arranged and by how it should be arranged.15
The principal task of private law according to Nieuwenhuis is to ‘regulate
legal relationships’, not to confer subjective rights which an interested party
can use as it sees fit.16 He is interested in coordination between rules of law,
8 J.H. Nieuwenhuis,Drie beginselen van contractenrecht (dissertation, Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer
1979.
9 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Uit de ban van hier en nu. Ontwikkelingen op het gebied van de overdracht
van roerende zaken bevattende tevens enige beschouwingen omtrent de status van overgangsvormen
in het privaatrecht [Breaking the spell of the here and now. Developments in the field of
the transfer of movable goods, also containing some thoughts on the status of transitional
forms in private law] (inaugural lecture Tilburg), Deventer: Kluwer 1980.
10 J.H. Nieuwenhuis,Anders en eender. Beschouwingen over samenloop van wanprestatie en onrecht-
matige daad [Different yet the same. Thoughts on the convergence of non-performance and
tort] (inaugural lecture Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 1982.
11 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, De Ramp op het Pikmeer. Bezwaren tegen de geest van het postmoderne
aansprakelijkheidsrecht [The Pikmeer disaster. Objections to the spirit of post-modern liability
law] (inaugural lecture Groningen), Deventer: Kluwer 1997.
12 Uit de ban van hier en nu, p. 112. In Nieuwenhuis’ view there are various types of ownership
transfer of movable goods, with transfer and actual handover being ‘decoupled’. He refers
to transfer by means of ‘traditional papers’ (bill of lading, warehouse warrant), retention
of title and delivery in advance. See Uit de ban van hier en nu, p. 8.
13 Nieuwenhuis supports the view that in the event of convergence between non-performance
and tort there is a ‘mixed right of action’. See Anders en eender, pp. 27-30.
14 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Vernietigen, ontbinden of aanpassen (I),Wat is het lot van teleurstellende
overeenkomsten?’ [Nullify, terminate or modify (I), What is the fate of disappointing
contracts?], WPNR 1995, pp. 23-26, part II (and conclusion), WPNR 1995, p. 37-41.
15 Drie beginselen van contractenrecht, p. 41.
16 Anders en eender, p. 15.
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not simple solutions. He opposes both the unconditional exclusivity of contract
law and the unlimited competence of a claimant to rely on the rule most
favourable to him.17 He describes the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali
as a ‘totally unreliable compass’: a specific rule does not automatically override
a general rule.18 The sharp distinction between fault-based and strict liability
is ‘totally unsound’: ultimately it is a question of whether a person could have
acted in a manner other than he did,19 based in Nieuwenhuis’ view on the
tort category of ‘infringement of a right’.20 The landscape of remedies too
has become ‘less rough’. Instead of general termination and annulment, modi-
fication of the agreement is preferred, e.g. by lowering the purchase price or
reducing reciprocal performances:21
‘So, dissolution and annulment only if the tears of the disappointed contracting
party cannot be dried in any other way.’
Yet Nieuwenhuis himself also has to make choices. In Uit de ban van hier en
nu he introduces the concept of ‘contractualising the transfer of ownership’
in Dutch private law.22 Nieuwenhuis’ aim with this concept is to entice the
legislator to scrap the requirement of the transfer of possessionwhen delivering
movable goods and to embrace the so-called real agreement, so as to create
as great a degree of flexibility as possible for the parties: ‘in with the real
agreement, out with the requirement of handing over possession.’23 Brunner
praises Nieuwenhuis’ ability to let off brilliant fireworks, but adds that they
may dazzle the reader.24 The tide is against Nieuwenhuis. When the new
Dutch Civil Code was introduced the legislator stuck to the acquisition of
possession as the form of delivery of movable goods and the legitimating
function of possession.25 Nonetheless, the additional requirement of a real
agreement is still defended by many, even if this requirement is not explicitly
laid down in the law.
17 See also J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘They still rule us from their graves’, WPNR 2007, p. 5.
18 See later also J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Fraudulent thoughts. On the position of the general and
the particular in law’,RMThemis 1997, pp. 41-42; J.H.Nieuwenhuis, ‘The fraudulent transfer
seen as a claim under tort’, in: L. Timmerman (ed.), Vragen rond de faillissementspauliana
[Questions concerning the action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance] (Insolad Yearbook
1998), Deventer: Kluwer 1998, pp. 51-64.
19 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘De tuinman en de dood’ [Death and the gardener ], RM Themis 1989,
pp. 193-201, also in J.H. Nieuwenhuis,Confrontatie en compromis. Recht, retoriek en burgerlijke
moraal, [Confrontation and compromise. Law, rhetoric and bourgeois morality] Deventer:
Kluwer 2007, pp. 129-140.
20 De ramp op het Pikmeer, pp. 19-22.
21 Vernietigen, ontbinden of aanpassen (I), p. 25.
22 Uit de ban van hier en nu, p. 18.
23 Uit de ban van hier en nu, p. 9 and 83.
24 C.J.H. Brunner, ‘J.H. Nieuwenhuis/Uit de ban van hier en nu, inaugural lecture Tilburg
University’, RM Themis 1982, pp. 36-43.
25 Sec. 3:90(1) BW.
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In Anders en eender Nieuwenhuis formulates three points of view to
coordinate the convergence of non-performance and tort: a gap in the one
regulation should be plugged by a norm from the other cause of action, a
general rule should defer to a concrete rule, in the case of two concrete provi-
sions the contractual rule should prevail.26 After all, problems of concurrence
are encountered more often at a fork in the road than in an open space in the
woods. Even thoughNieuwenhuis stresses that it is ‘a typology and not a chest
of drawers’, it again meets with criticism from Brunner, who argues that
Nieuwenhuis is in danger of ending up in the ‘camp of the exclusive’, if he
isn’t already in it.27
So can we expect no sharp lines from Nieuwenhuis? Far from it. Not
everything can bemixed andmerged. His criticism is severewhen the Supreme
Court fails to settle a point or draw a sharp line but instead uses the plane
for the figure of precontractual liability28 and for the figure of proportional
liability.29 Two inclined planes, according to Nieuwenhuis, that are at odds
with the system of the law, which after all allows an offer to be retracted and
prohibits the award of damages if the requirement of causality is not met, or
at least not in full.30
The requirement of causality presented a problem for the DES daughters
as well. They were unable to prove which manufacturer had supplied the
medication their mothers had taken during pregnancy and which later in life
caused cancer in these daughters. In their case it is not the plane, liability
according to market share, but the sharp line that is appropriate: reversal of
the burden of proof, applying section 6:99 of the Dutch Civil Code (BW). Even
though this solution too, just like proportional liability, undermines ‘one of
the traditional pillars of the law of liability, the requirement that it be estab-
lished that the defendant did actually cause the damage’.31 The line of reason-
26 Anders en eender, pp. 32-40.
27 C.J.H. Brunner in his discussion of Nieuwenhuis 1982, WPNR [weekly journal] 1983, p.
659.
28 HR [Supreme Court] 18 June 1982, ECLI:NL:HR:1982:AG4405,NJ [Dutch Case Law] 1983/723
(Plas/Valburg).
29 HR [Supreme Court] 31 March 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU6092, RvdW [Judicial decisions
online] 2006/328 (Nefalit/Karamus).
30 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Point of no return’, RM Themis 1989, pp. 467-468; J.H. Nieuwenhuis,
‘Disproportionele aansprakelijkheid’ [Disproportional Liability], RMThemis 2006, pp. 177-178.
31 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Alternatieve causaliteit en aansprakelijkheid naar marktaandeel’ [Altern-
ative causality and liability according tomarket share], in:Productenaansprakelijkheid. Preadvie-
zen uitgebracht voor de Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht [Product Liability. Preliminary recom-
mendations issued for the Dutch Society for Private Law], Koninklijke Vermande publishers:
Lelystad 1987, p. 15.
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ing can be discerned in the Supreme Court’s ruling,32 much to the author’s
satisfaction.33
So with Nieuwenhuis legal rules have both an open and a closed dimen-
sion. Open, because they are ‘responsive to external influences and imper-
fect’.34 For example, the impact of social, medical and technological devel-
opments has been to bring agreements on surrogacy into the spatial domain
of contract law.35 But closed as well, part of and confined by the system and
the systematics of the law. An embryo created through in vitro fertilisation
is not a natural person outside the womb and according to Nieuwenhuis is
not covered by the fiction of section 1:2 BW.36 A woman cannot be a little bit
pregnant; section 1:2 BW contains a – literally – spatial boundary. For the time
being at least, because private law is a living thing.
TIME
Understanding private law is impossible without a conception of time. After
all, the law matures. It is the work of man, like the construction of cathedrals.
Through increasing ingenuity people were able over the centuries to raise
cathedrals higher and make them lighter. In the same way ideas in the law –
like freedom of contract – are the work of man, in which growth, maturity
and decay can be discerned.37
It is in literature, among other places, that Nieuwenhuis finds the views
held by society. To be precise, in the books that have found a sustained re-
sponse, with the number of reprints counting more than high sales figures.
It is a
‘list of narrative prose which every jurist should read and re-read, not because it
will benefit their general development and speaking and writing skills, but more
so because this canon constitutes the foundation of unwritten law: reasonableness
32 HR [SupremeCourt] 9October 1992, ECLI:NL:HR:1992:ZC0706,NJ [DutchCase Law] 1994/
535.
33 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Eenzame hoogte: het DES-arrest’ [Lonely Heights: the DES ruling],Ars
Aequi 2010, pp. 417-419.
34 Anders en eender, p. 13.
35 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Promises, promises. Over contracten en andere afspraken’ [On contracts
and other agreements], NJB [Journal for Dutch lawyers] 2001, edition 37, pp. 1795-1799.
36 ‘Het kindwaarvan een vrouw zwanger is wordt als reeds geboren aangemerkt, zo dikwijls
zijn belang dit vordert [The child a woman is expecting shall be deemed to have already
been born whenever its interests so dictate].’
37 Hoe is begrip van burgerlijk recht mogelijk [How can private law be understood], p. 18.
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and fairness as pillars of the law of contract and the unwritten duty of care as a
cornerstone and touchstone of the liability arising from an unlawful act.’38
We do not come across Ulysses in the list, but we do find Greek tragedies.
Where the ‘tragic core of the law’ demands a response to injustice that has
been done, the Oresteia turns out to be an exercise in revenge imposed by the
gods.39 The Laws of the Twelve Tables dictate an eye for an eye, a tooth for
a tooth. These days it is the acknowledgement by the tortfeasor that his actions
were wrong, whether or not accompanied by compensation for the damage
caused. So Leopold Bloom assessed the possible responses to his wife’s adult-
ery:40
‘What retribution, if any? Assassination, never, as two wrongs did not make one
right. Duel by combat, no. Divorce, not now. Exposure by mechanical artifice
(automatic bed) or individual testimony (concealed ocular witnesses), not yet. Suit
for damages by legal influence or simulation of assault with evidence of injuries
sustained (selfinflicted), not impossibly.’
We are clearly dealing with advancing human insight which, as always, needs
perfecting.
Timeless works help us in formulating social views and in the process of
fleshing out unwritten law. Furthermore, they sharpen the empathy we need
to pass judgement in concrete cases. The Old Testament – you cannot get more
timeless – is a source often consulted, for example, to gain an understanding
of the tensions between fault and risk. In his valedictory address, Cain – Am I
my brother’s keeper? – and Abel form the introduction to a discourse on the
increasing role of strict liability and the decreasing role of fault.41 Previously,
Job had been discussed in order to be able to understand the ‘claim culture’,
just as Deuteronomy 23:20 – Youmay not charge interest if you lend something
to a brother – stood model for views held in society, together with the Koran
and Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, incidentally.42
European private law too is a living thing, which in Nieuwenhuis’ work
shows itself through the canon of literature. In his last book Nieuwenhuis
38 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘De zeven zuilen van het ongeschreven recht’ [The seven pillars of
unwritten law],NJB 1999, p. 2130. This theme is also the focus of J.H. Nieuwenhuis,Orestes
in Veghel. Recht, Literatuur, Civilisatie [Law, Literature, Civilisation], Amsterdam: Uitgeverij
Balans 2004, see pp. 7-10.
39 Orestes in Veghel, pp. 13-26.
40 James Joyce, Ulysses, Penguin Modern Classics 1969, p. 654
41 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Paternalisme, Fraternalisme, Egoi¨sme. Een kleine catechismus van het contrac-
tenrecht [Paternalism, Fraternalism, Egoism. (valedictory speech Leiden), Leiden: Leiden
University 2009, p. 11; also inNJB 2009/1711. Cain andAbel also feature (more extensively)
in Orestes in Veghel, pp. 57-76.
42 J.H. Nieuwenhuis,Het vierspan, Eigendom, Contract, Persoon, Staat, [The team of four, Owner-
ship, Contract, Person, State] Zutphen: Paris 2013, pp. 155-161.
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searches for the pillars on which the European community of values rests.
In the first part, enemy stereotypes, he focuses on armed struggle as the father
of the peoples of Europe. Some enemies came from outside:
‘These enemies were after European territory. Persians demanded land and water
from the Greek city states as a mark of subjection. Carthaginians stood before the
gates of Rome (Hannibal ad portas), Huns and Moors got as far as Paris in the fifth
and eighth centuries respectively.’43
Other enemies were chosen by the peoples of Europe:44
‘In 326 BC the Indian king Poros was forced to battle against Alexander the Great
and his allies. In the first century AD the Berber kingdom of Mauretania was
annexed by the Roman Empire. In 1521 Hernan Cortes defeated the Aztec army
of king Cuauhtemoc. Mexico City rose out of the ashes of the conquered capital
Tenochtitlan.’
These centuries of conflict marked the continent and, according to Nieuwen-
huis, should be cherished. War constitutes the cradle of European art and
literature, which depicts and describes the public enemies of olden times.
Through these we get to know others, and hence ourselves and our allies:45
‘Literature is an essential deepening of language, understood to be our temple.
Dreverhaven, Boorman and Havelaar are as much a part of our idiom as the
grammatical rule that brands “Them are right.” as unconventional and the semantic
convention that determines the meaning of “snigger” (half-concealed mocking
laugh). Literature is our window onto the outside world, our neighbours’ temples
of language. “Many cities did he visit, and many were the nations with whose
manners and customs he was acquainted.” As an armchair traveller with Crime
and Punishment in our handwe get to know St. Petersburg in the nineteenth century
through the eyes of Raskolnikov better than with the aid of a Baedeker of that
period.’
Through imagination we acquire an understanding of the shared values of
the European community, a spoil of war cherished and defended by Nieuwen-
huis:46
‘Values constitute the foundation of the Europesan Union, but they are also
windows offering a view of an alluring prospect: an earthly paradise of freedom,
equality and fraternity. The fact that the horizon is beyond reach is no reason not
43 Een steeds hechter verbond, p. 23.
44 Een steeds hechter verbond, p. 23.
45 Een steeds hechter verbond, p. 146.
46 Een steeds hechter verbond, p. 19.
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to continue along the path taken in 1957 in Rome towards an ever closer union
between the peoples of Europe.’
A passionate plea for Europe, and even for a European Civil Code – and that
in spite of the spirit of the time, which is dominated by euroscepticism and
deregulation. It is characteristic of Nieuwenhuis, whowas especially interested
in the follow-up questions. Howdowe putmeat on the bones of the European
integration project? How can European private law be understood?
WEIGHT
An awareness of space and time is not enough. Ultimately lawyers need to
balance interests. And that is what they really do. Interests have a real
weight:47
‘The weight of an interest is the argumentative force that interest develops in a
legal dispute.’
In many places in his work Nieuwenhuis searches for seemingly imponderable
interests. His attention is drawn by new reproduction techniques. How should
the law deal with agreements on surrogate motherhood? Is an agreement to
give birth to a child and to hand it over to someone else immoral and hence
void (art. 3:40 BW)?
‘The conclusion that handing over the child is an immoral act is difficult tomaintain
in an era in which fertility clinics engage in implanting embryos from commission-
ing couples into surrogate mothers with the approval of the minister of health.
Indeed, the unmistakeable purpose of this socially accepted form ofmedical service
is that after birth the child will be handed over to the commissioning couple.’48
As a result of all the progress made it is no longer even certain who the mother
of the child is: the genetic mother or the birth mother? But have we come to
the point where the performance of agreements on surrogacy can be enforced
at law?49
A considered judgement regarding the enforceability of surrogacy agree-
ments comes down to the weight and the balancing of the interests of the child
and of all its parents concerned at the time the surrogate mother changes her
mind. If there has been no performance at all of the agreement, it will be
impossible to hold the surrogatemother to the agreement. Obliging thewoman
to undergo implantation of the embryo is going too far for Nieuwenhuis. But
47 Hoe is begrip van burgerlijk recht mogelijk, p. 24.
48 Promises, promises, p. 1797.
49 Promises, promises, p. 1797-1798.
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the situation changes if implantation has resulted in pregnancy, due to the
genetic relationship of the embryo and the commissioning parents. The situ-
ation changes againwhen the pregnancy is full-term and the child has already
been handed over to the commissioning parents and grows up with them.
As Nieuwenhuis writes, in that case a court ruling holding the woman to her
original promise deserves serious consideration.50
Nieuwenhuis regularly turns his attention to the Valkenhorst case law, in
which the Supreme Court decided that the right of a child that had come of
age to know from whom it was descended was not absolute, but that its
interest did in principle weigh heavier than the interest of the mother to respect
for her private life.51 When during lectures he talked about the Evans case,
he invariably lowered his voice and said: ‘On any view the 10th October was
a terrible day in Natallie Evans’ life’. He continued by saying that it was not
the opening sentence of a novel by Jane Austen, but the first sentence, literally,
of the judgment in the said case, in which the Court had to rule on the ques-
tion of whether Natallie Evans, contrary to her ex-partner’s wishes, could have
the embryo they had created implanted.52
In his essay ‘Who fathered me?’ Nieuwenhuis wonders whether genetic
selection should be allowed, starting with gender selection. Should parents
be given the right to determine what the gender of their next offspring should
be? Or have we here reached the boundary of human interference in the
domain of life and death? Nieuwenhuis is clear on this point: it should be
allowed. He considers the risk of mass selection of one of the two genders
to be extremely small; family balancing will in most cases be the motive, as
for most people having a child feels like receiving a gift:53
‘This is countered by the fact that future spouses have an interest in to some extent
regulating the stream of gifts. Three gourmet sets is too much of a good thing. A
wedding list placed on internet (…) offers a solution. So why not open up the
possibility (…) on the occasion of IVF treatment of opting for a son?’
Three daughters and three gourmet sets. Of course they are disparate quant-
ities, but that does not mean that the choice of ‘not another daughter’ is
imponderable. Will allowing ‘deselection’ of an embryo on the grounds of
gender lead to other selections, on grounds of the risk of breast cancer, of
intelligence or athletic abilities? On this point Nieuwenhuis takes the quickest
exit: this type of selection is for the time being pure science fiction, we will
50 Promises, promises, p. 1798.
51 HR [Supreme Court] 15 April 1994, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC1337,NJ 1994/608, with noteWH-S.
Cited in inter alia: J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Kant & Co, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans 2011, pp.
58-60; J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Kinderwens’ [Desire to have children], RM Themis 1999, p.73-74;
De zeven zuilen van het ongeschreven recht, [The seven pillars of unwritten law] pp. 2134-2135.
52 Kant & Co, pp. 11-15.
53 Kant & Co, pp. 64-73, p. 70.
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cross that bridge when we come to it. Anyone reading Nieuwenhuis will not
always be given the solution, but will always be handed arguments.54 Im-
ponderables, interests that cannot be weighed, do not exist for a lawyer, as long
as the right questions are asked.
Thus Nieuwenhuis writes about the Baby Kelly ruling, in which the ques-
tion arises as to whether there is any such thing as the right not to be born,
and whether it is possible to bring a claim for a handicapped life:55
‘Is Kelly suffering a loss? Is living, with or without a handicap, not more valuable
than not living? I am fairly certain that this question, put in this way, cannot be
answered, at least not in a way that can count on broad support. I myself retain
the best of memories of the years prior to my birth.’
Anyone who misses out on income as a result of an unlawful act committed
by another is entitled to compensation for loss of income. Their lost working
capacity is calculated in concrete terms. From the traditional point of view this
requires a truthful prediction of the person’s hypothetical working capacity
and hence an investigation into all relevant personal circumstances. In the case
of a 50-year-old paving contractor with incipient knee complaints the losswill
probably be considerably lower than in the case of a young woman with an
academic education. But does this do justice to the position of the victim? The
victim not only has an interest in remaining ignorant of intimate information
concerning his or her hypothetical life: an increased risk of cancer, a predis-
position to psychological disorders, their chances on the matrimonial market.
It could also be that the victim would benefit far more from maximising the
possibilities after the accident, than from a claim based on a picture of the
victim’s life if the accident had not happened.56 In this way an understanding
of the interests to be balanced and their weight will ultimately lead to an
alternative to the previously standard solutions.
Once in a while Nieuwenhuis appears to have little time forweight watchers.
In his research into the possibilities of multicultural law he advises the working
members of theNetherlands Lawyers Association not to weigh precisely interests
based on religion or ideology. Multicultural law would benefit more from
54 Other examples: freedom of contract and human dignity, justice and welfare, and written
and unwritten law. See J.H. Nieuwenhuis,Waartoe is het recht op aarde?, The Hague: Boom
Juridische uitgevers 2006, p. 27 and 46-48, and Orestes in Veghel, pp. 39-56, respectively.
55 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Hellend vlak, Kelly en de claimcultuur’ [Inclined plane, Kelly and the
claim culture], NJB 2003, p. 1381.
56 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Wat is waarheid?Waarheidsvinding en privacy in het letselschaderecht’
[What is truth? Establishing the truth and privacy in personal injury law], in: D.H.M.
Peeperkorn (ed.), Waarheidsvinding en privacy [Establishing the truth and privacy], The
Hague: Sdu uitgevers 2005, pp. 83-95.
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mutual acknowledgement as a fully fledged participants in society, which
confers rights and obligations that are the same for everyone.57
HIS SEASON WAS SPRING
In the end everything has its basis in his third favourite, Hoofdstukken Ver-
mogensrecht [Chapters on private law]. From the foreword:58
‘A first acquaintance with positive law requires a firm line of reasoning. Time and
again questions of law are answered with yes or no, words many a mature lawyer
has long forgotten.’
To continue:
‘Putting things into perspective is the next step. We need to pave a way for transi-
tional forms of, for example, ownership and right of action, unlawful acts and non-
performance. This is only possible after the contours of these legal concepts have
first been sufficiently sharply defined. The emphasis here is totally on this preparat-
ory work.’
To the last Nieuwenhuis was involved in educating and training young law-
yers. For more than forty years first-year students of law have been reading
his Hoofdstukken. Shortly before his death foreign master’s students followed
him on a cycling tour of the bulbfields north of Leiden, after taking a course
on Comparative Tort Law. He had planned another tour with young colleagues
to Louvain, Belgium. Two days after his death on 18 June 2015 they went,
following his directions.
What have we gained from this preparatory work and from putting it into
perspective? The question of valorisation can be answered by the decision of
judge Woolsey who eleven years before Nieuwenhuis was born had to pass
judgment on the morality ofUlysses, the book written by James Joyce. Should
this book full of obscenities be suitable for the eyes of the judge’s youngest
daughter? Should it be judged by themore liberal standards of LearnedHand?
Woolsey was convinced that the time was ripe for according greater weight
to the integrity of the author. Although the decision does not reveal how he
arrived at this judgment – with ‘something stronger than sherry’ and ‘a
57 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Multicultureel recht: hoe is het mogelijk? [Multicultural law: how is it
possible?] (Handelingen Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging 2008-I), Deventer: Kluwer 2008,
p. 164.
58 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Hoofdstukken vermogensrecht (11th edition, edited byM.C.I.M. Duynstee
and O. Nieuwenhuis), Deventer: Kluwer 2015, Foreword to the first edition.
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dripping razor in his left hand’59 – the grounds bear witness to spatial under-
standing, awareness of time and an ability to balance:60
‘The words which are criticized as dirty are old Saxon words known to almost
all men and, I venture, to manywomen, and are such words as would be naturally
and habitually used, I believe, by the types of folk whose life, physical andmental,
Joyce is seeking to describe. In respect of the recurrent emergence of the theme
of sex in the minds of his characters, it must always be remembered that his locale
was Celtic and his season spring.’
Hans Nieuwenhuis: his season was spring.
Further reading
Otto Nieuwenhuis has placed the annotations, articles, books, lectures and
reports of Hans Nieuwenhuis on a special website at Leiden University. The
majority is open access. The readers are cordially invited to visit <www.law.
leidenuniv.nl/nieuwenhuis>.
59 K. Birmingham, The most dangerous book, The battle for James Joyce’s Ulysses, New York:
Penguin Books 2014, pp. 319-328.
60 District Court for the Southern District of New York 6 December 1933, 5 F.Supp. 182 (United
States/One Book Called ‘Ulysses’).
PART I
Contract

1 The concept of nullity
Jaap Hijma
1 INTRODUCTION
At the close of the nineteenth century the concept of nullity was hardly dis-
cussed. Contracts were either valid or theywere null and void. Void contracts
were considered non-existent, so the juridical effects intended by the parties
simply did not occur. The concipients of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
(BGB) concisely gave voice to this idea:
§ 108. Ein nichtiges Rechtsgeschäft wird in Ansehung der gewollten rechtlichen
Wirkungen so angesehen, als ob es nicht vorgenommen wäre.
In the BGB as enacted in 1900 this provision is not to be found. The underlying
rea-son is not that the authors disagreed, but rather that they considered the
provision to be superfluous. In legal doctrine the concept of nullity (Nichtigkeit)
was considered an established fact, so that the legislator saw no need to insert
a precise definition in the code after all.1 The views of Dutch legal scholars
of that time fitted this understanding seamlessly.2
More than one hundred years later the situation has changed fundament-
ally. The concept of nullity is no longer self-evident. In the place of the simple
observation that the juridical effects which the parties intended fail to occur,
a question has emerged: how ‘(null and) void’ is ‘(null and) void’ actually?3
This question is the result of the gradually developed awareness that a nullity
should not interfere beyondwhat is justified by its rationale. In this twenty-first
Jac. Hijma is professor of civil law at Leiden University (j.hijma@law.leidenuniv.nl). He
is grateful to Mrs A.I.J. (Inge) Visser LLM for her assistance in the preparation of (the
international aspects of) this essay.
1 Protokolle der Kommission für die zweite Lesung des Entwurfs des Bürgerlichen Gesetsbuchs, Band I,
Allgemeiner Theil und Recht der Schuldverhältnisse, Berlin: J. Guttentag 1897, p. 125.
2 See e.g. G. Diephuis, Het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Regt, Tweede Deel, Groningen: J.B. Wolters
1872, p. 190; N.K.F. Land, Verklaring van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, Vierde deel (Boek III, Titel
1-4), revised by W.H. de Savornin Lohman, Haarlem: Erven F. Bohn 1907, p. 492. Further
on 19th-century nullity: A.C. van Schaick,Contractsvrijheid en nietigheid (diss. Brabant), Zwolle:
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1994, pp. 214-221.
3 E.g. Jac. Hijma,Hoe nietig is nietig?, Beschouwingen omtrent het nietigheidsbegrip in het contrac-
tenrecht (lecture Ghent), Thorbeckecollege 22, Antwerpen: E. Story-Scientia 1998.
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century the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden)
explicitly gives voice to – and applies – this ‘starting point of the new Civil
Code that nullities in principle do not extend further than their purpose
justifies’.4 In the modern way of thinking the qualification ‘null and void’ no
longer indicates a total rejection. A null and void juridical act is not considered
non-existent; it exists, but it is burdened with a problem which makes the
attribution of juridical effects questionable. Surely Dutch law does not stand
alone in this development. For Germany, Beer observed even in 1975 that the
doctrine of nullity had become the doctrine of the limitation of nullity.5 The
recently published contract law ‘principles’ also display the wish to refrain
from interventions which surpass what is really necessary.6
The purpose of this essay is to analyse the current status of the concept
of nullity, also with a view to international developments.7 Although the
doctrine of nullity applies to all juridical acts, for reasons of compactness the
text will focus predominantly on contracts.
2 EXPLORATION
As a starting point I still hold for valid the definition presented by Eggens
in 1939: a juridical act is void, if and insofar as the lawwithholds the intended
juridical effects.8 At this basic conceptual level little seems to have changed
in the course of three quarters of a century. In the elaboration, however, there
appears to be a lot going on. In the first place, positive law turns to the nullity
verdict less quickly. In the second place, when a juridical act is null and void
after all, the law appears to be inclined to smooth over the edges of this
verdict.9 Both aspects come forward prettily in recent HR 28 November 2014
(Snippers q.q./Rabobank), in which decision the Dutch Supreme Court refers
to – and concurs with – ‘the legislator’s endeavour to push back nullities and
4 HR 17 February 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU9717,NJ 2006/378, with commentary fromM.M.
Mendel (Royal c.s./Universal Pictures), sub 4.7; likewise HR 5 January 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:
AZ2221, NJ 2008/502 (AVM/X), sub 3.4.2.
5 H. Beer, Die relative Unwirksamkeit, Eine Darstellung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des
Interessen- und Wertungsjurisprudenz, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1975, p. 77.
6 See infra, par. 6-7.
7 A nullity can be the result of an annulment, e.g. on the basis of error (art. 6:228 DCC). This
essay, however, concentrates on juridical acts which are automatically null and void. Earlier
publications on nullity (and annullability) by the author include Jac. Hijma, Nietigheid en
vernietigbaarheid van rechtshandelingen (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 1988; Hijma 1998;
Jac. Hijma, ‘Nietigheden in het vermogensrecht’, RM Themis 1992, pp. 403-417.
8 J. Eggens, ‘Vormen van nietigheid en vernietigbaarheid van rechtshandelingen’, WPNR
1939/3629, p. 325; also recorded in J. Eggens, Verzamelde Privaatrechtelijke Opstellen, Deel
2, Alphen aan den Rijn: N. Samsom 1959, p. 31.
9 Likewise Van Schaick 1994, pp. 255-313 (‘Nietigheidsrelativering en nietigheidsecartering’).
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their consequences’.10 In my opinion these two aspects are inextricably inter-
woven;11 therefore they jointly constitute the object of this study.
3 VIOLATION OF GOOD MORALS OR PUBLIC POLICY
Contracts contrary to good morals or public policy are null and void. The
Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) (DCC) ordains so in art. 3:40 (1);12 other
codifications contain similar provisions.13 By this means the legislator grants,
in thewords of Neuner, an ‘ethical minimum’, which should be borne inmind
when discussing the inclination to avoid nullities.14
The answer to the question what good morals and public order prescribe,
varies according to place and time. Developments in this – basic – part of the
law are mostly gradual. However, the observation seems appropriate that
nowadays people tend to conclude less quickly to an infringement of good
morals or public policy than they did in the past. On the issue of prostitution
for instance the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) notes a change in
the sentiment of people, thus that ‘die Prostitution überwiegend nicht mehr
schlechthin als sittenwidrig angesehen wird’.15 Such a development will not
leave (the validity of) contracts in such a domain untouched.16 In the Nether-
lands we can also point at the erosion – to be discussed below17 – of the idea
that a contract leading to performance violating a mandatory statutory provi-
sion will be void because it is contrary to public policy.
10 HR 28 November 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:3460, RvdW 2015/3 (Snippers q.q./Rabobank), sub
3.6.2.
11 Cf. A. Tenenbaum et al., in: B. Fauvarque-Cosson & D. Mazeaud (eds.), European Contract
Law, Materials for a Common Frame of Reference: Terminology, Guiding Principles, Model Rules,
Munich: Sellier 2008, pp. 144-145 (‘The sanction brings us back to the notion: ‘The choice
is not only technical, it also affects the notion. […]’).
12 On this subject: V. van den Brink, De rechtshandeling in strijd met de goede zeden (diss.
Amsterdam (UvA)), Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2002; A.S. Hartkamp & C. Sie-
burgh, Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht, 6,
Verbintenissenrecht, Deel III, Algemeen overeenkomstenrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2014, nr. 330-
347g; C.C. vanDam, in: Jac. Hijma (ed.),Rechtshandeling en Overeenkomst, Deventer: Kluwer
2013, nr. 154-158; H.J. van Kooten, in: Jac. Hijma (ed.),Groene Serie Vermogensrecht, Deventer:
Kluwer (loose-leaf and online), Art. 3:40, nr. 7.1-12.
13 E.g. § 138 BGB (good morals) and art. 1133 of the French Code civil; see also art. II.-7:301
DCFR (and art. 15:101 PECL) regarding ‘contracts infringing fundamental principles’.
14 M. Wolf & J. Neuner, Allgemeiner Teil des Burgerlichen Rechts, München, C.H. Beck 2012,
§ 46, nr. 1.
15 BGH 13 July 2006, I ZR 241/03, NJW 06, 3490, sub 21.
16 Further infra, par. 13.
17 Par. 5.
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4 CONTRACT FORMATION VIOLATING A MANDATORY STATUTE
Art. 3:40 (2) DCC provides that a juridical act which violates a mandatory
statutory provision becomes null and void;18 if, however, the provision is
intended solely for the protection of one of the parties to amultilateral contract,
the act may only be annulled; in both cases this applies to the extent that the
provision does not otherwise provide.19 Art. 3:40 (3) DCC adds that statutory
provisions which do not purport to invalidate juridical acts in conflict
therewith, are not affected by the preceding paragraph. As paragraph 3 shows,
Dutch law knows provisions which prohibit the formation of contracts, but
have no repercussions for the validity of a contract concluded anyway. Some-
times they are (only) sanctioned by means of a penalty or punishment, some-
times they are not sanctioned at all (leges imperfectae).20 Awell-known example
is the sale in a shop after opening hours (violation of art. 2 Trading Hours
Act (Winkeltijdenwet)): the shopkeeper may be fined, but the validity of the
concluded sales is not at stake.21 Paragraph 3 appears to be meant for ex-
ceptions, but has a considerable potential. Besides, in some cases the violated
statutory provision itself mentions explicitly that it does not purport to inval-
idate infringing contracts.22
It is interesting to observe that the partition between art. 3:40 (2) and art.
3:40 (3) DCC is not in a fixed place. Sometimes, as a consequence of develop-
ments in society, certain contracts can shift from paragraph 2 to paragraph
3 so that the sanction is lost. An example is produced by HR 7 September 1990
(Catoochi). On the Caribbean island of Aruba (part of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands) Gomez buys a ticket in a so-called catoochi lottery; taking part
in this kind of lottery is prohibited by the local Lottery Ordinance (Loterijveror-
dening).23 Gomez wins a considerable prize. He demands payment by Ruiz,
but Ruiz refuses, arguing that the ticket sale is forbidden and void. The Dutch
Supreme Court establishes that this sale is indeed forbidden by a statutory
provision. But the Supreme Court also finds that, as the Court of Appeal
18 For the (limited) scope of this provision see also infra, par. 5.
19 On this subject: Asser/Hartkamp&Sieburgh 6-III 2014/314-329; VanDam 2013, nr. 146-158;
H.J. van Kooten, in: Groene Serie Vermogensrecht, Art. 3:40, nr. 6.1-9.
20 TM, in: Van Zeben et al. (ed.), Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek,
Boek 3, Vermogensrecht in het algemeen, Deventer: Kluwer 1981, p. 191.
21 An overview of court judgments on parapraph 3 is presented byH.J. vanKooten, in:Groene
Serie Vermogensrecht, Art. 3:40, nr. 6.7.
22 Examples are art. 1:352 DCC, regarding transactions by a guardian, and art. 1:23 Financial
Supervision Act (Wet financieel toezicht), regarding juridical acts contrary to this Act. Cf.
art. 7:902 DCC: ‘A settlement […] is valid, notwithstanding that it proves to be in breach
of mandatory law, unless it would also, as to content or necessary implication, be in breach
of good morals and public policy’.
23 HR 7 September 1990, NJ 1991/266, with commentary from C.J.H. Brunner (Catoochi). The
judgment was made according to the old Civil Code (art. 1371/1373 old DCC), but would
have read the same under the present Code.
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observed, in broad sections of Aruban society the organisation of this kind
of lottery is no longer felt to be socially undesirable, illegal or deserving of
punishment and is therefore tolerated by the government. Such being the case,
it can no longer be said that the sole violation of a statutory provision at
present still entails the nullity of the sale of tickets in such a lottery. This
judgment actually registers a ‘loss of purport’: the Lottery Ordinance may have
entailed nullity in the past, but in view of the changed perceptions in society
nowadays it no longer does so.24
5 CONTRACT PERFORMANCE VIOLATING A MANDATORY STATUTE
The legislator intended art. 3:40 (2) and (3) DCC solely for cases in which the
conclusion of the contract as such is prohibited by a statutory provision. Cases
in which the contracting itself is not affected but ‘only’ the content or the
necessary implication of the contract is prohibited, are not governed by these
paragraphs 2 and 3. They are actually passed on to art. 3:40 (1) DCC, which
provides that a contract which by its content or necessary implication is
contrary to good morals or public policy is null and void. With regard to that
‘passing on’ the past decades have witnessed an interesting development.
Meijers’ Commentary (1954) mentions that if a performance to which the
contract by its content or necessary implication obliges is prohibited by a
statutory provision, the contract will be null and void under paragraph (1);
taking on an obligation to perform in defiance of a statute can be deemed to
violate public order.25 In the Memorandum of Reply (1971) the Minister,
keeping a low profile but meaningfully, inserts into this opinion the words
‘in principle’.26 On the occasion of the introduction of the Civil Code (1987)
a next step is taken. The government commissioner emphasises that many
(higher aswell as lower) legislators in their rulemaking simply do not consider
the private law consequences; the decisionwhether the contract is void or valid
must therefore be left to the court.27
A similar liberalisation is noticeable in legal practice. In a first phase the
Dutch Supreme Court showed on a casuistic basis that the mere fact that a
statutory provision prohibits the content or necessary implications of a contract
does not necessarily entail the nullity thereof because of (a violation of) public
24 Evidence of a similar line of thought, on the crossroads of statutory law and good morals,
is given by HR 2 February 1990,NJ 1991/265 (Club 13), regarding the sale of goodwill and
inventory of a sex club (violation of the ‘ban on brothels’ of art. 250bis old Penal Code).
25 TM, in: Parl. Gesch. NBW, Boek 3, p. 191.
26 MvA II, in: Parl. Gesch. NBW, Boek 3, p. 192.
27 VC II Inv. and Lijst v. Antw. II Inv., in: Van Zeben et al. (ed.), Parlementaire Geschiedenis
van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek, Invoering Boeken 3, 5 en 6, Boek 3, Vermogensrecht in het
algemeen, Deventer: Kluwer 1981, pp. 1138-1141.
22 1 – The concept of nullity
policy.28 In HR 1 June 2012 (Esmilo/Mediq) the Supreme Court takes a second,
more fundamental, step. The decision concerns a cooperation contract in the
medicine sector; its performance implies the infringement of several statutory
provisions.29 Is this contract null and void? According to the Supreme Court,
the view that the sole fact that the contract obliges to a performance prohibited
by a statutory provision implies a violation of public order and thus leads
to nullity is no longer valid.30
‘A contract infringing such a statutory prohibition does not necessarily violate
public order. Therefore, if a contract obliges to a performance infringing a statutory
provision, the judge who has to decide whether the contract violates public order
for that reason, in any case shall take into consideration which interests are served
by the infringed provision, whether the infringement violates fundamental prin-
ciples, whether the parties were aware of the infringement, andwhether the provi-
sion supplies a sanction; and the judge shall render account thereof in the reasons
stated in the judgment.’
This consideration contains two elements which are important to the doctrine
of nullity. In the first place the Supreme Court fundamentally opens up the
assessment. It does not declare the contract void and even does not declare
it void in principle; the decision is left to the judge. In the second place it
should be noted that the Supreme Court introduces an approach in terms of
(a number of) ‘perspectives’. It is left to the judge to decide, but in motivating
his decision the judge is obliged to run through (at least) the four indicated
perspectives and must report on his findings in his verdict. Any automatism
is off; nullity has to settle for less than before.
6 VIOLATION OF A STATUTE ACCORDING TO THE DCFR
These Dutch legal developments do not stand alone in the least. In the Draft
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),31 published in 2009, the following article
is devoted to the infringement of mandatory rules:
28 HR 22 January 1999, NJ 2000/305 (Uneto/De Vliert); HR 7 April 2000, ECLI:NL:HR:2000:
AA5401, NJ 2000/652, with commentary from Jac. Hijma (Parkeerexploitatie/Amsterdam).
29 HR 1 June 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BU5609, NJ 2013/172, with commentary from T.F.E.
Tjong Tjin Tai (Esmilo/Mediq).
30 See Esmilo/Mediq, sub 4.4.
31 Chr. von Bar & E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions andModel Rules of European Private Law,
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Full Edition, Volume I, Munich: Sellier 2009, Art.
II.-7:302. The accompanying commentary runs largely parallel to an essay by H.L. Mac-
Queen, ‘Illegality and Immorality in Contracts: Towards European Principles’, in: A.S.
Hartkamp et al. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, Alphen aan den Rijn & Nijmegen:
Kluwer Law International & Ars Aequi Libri 2011, pp. 555-570.
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Art. II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules
(1) Where a contract is not void under the preceding Article but infringes a
mandatory rule of law, the effects of that infringement on the validity of the
contract are the effects, if any, expressly prescribed by that mandatory rule.
(2) Where the mandatory rule does not expressly prescribe the effects of an in-
fringement on the validity of a contract, a court may;
(a) declare the contract to be valid;
(b) avoid the contract, with retrospective effect, in whole or in part; or
(c) modify the contract or its effects.
(3) A decision reached under paragraph (2) should be an appropriate and pro-
portional response to the infringement, having regard to all relevant circum-
stances, including:
(a) the purpose of the rule which has been infringed;
(b) the category of persons for whose protection the rule exists;
(c) any sanction that may be imposed under the rule infringed;
(d) the seriousness of the infringement;
(e) whether the infringement was intentional; and
(f) the closeness of the relationship between the infringement and the contract.
The cited article should be read in combination with the preceding article II.-7:
301 DCFR, which provides that contracts infringing fundamental principles are
void. Because these ‘heavy’ cases are withdrawn from art. II.-7:302 DCFR (see
paragraph 1), only ‘lighter’ cases remain.32 Against that background the article
does not aim at nullity. It offers the judge an array of possibilities: he can
declare the contract valid (paragraph 2 sub a), he can avoid the contract, with
retrospective effect, in whole or in part (paragraph 2 sub b), or he can modify
the contract or its effects (paragraph 2 sub c).
The judge is granted a discretionary power tomake a choice between those
options,33 provided that his solution is ‘an appropriate and proportional
response to the infringement’ (beginning of paragraph 3). The article closes
with a non-exhaustive enumeration of six relevant perspectives, starting with
‘the purpose of the rule which has been infringed’ (paragraph 3 sub a-f).
The DCFR article is largely derived from art. 15:102 of the Principles of
European Contract Law (PECL), formulated by the Lando Commission.34 The
32 Von Bar & Clive 2009, Art. II.-7:302, Comments, A.
33 Von Bar & Clive 2009, Art. II.-7:302, Comments, D.
34 The commentary too is largely copied from the PECL: cf. O. Lando et al. (eds.), Principles
of European Contract Law, Part III, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International
2003, pp. 213-221. A compact comparison of the PECL-regime with that of the Dutch art.
3:40 DCC is made by A.C. van Schaick, in: D. Busch et al. (eds.), The Principles of European
Contract Law (Part III) and Dutch Law, A Commentary II, TheHague: Kluwer Law International
2006, ad Art. 15:102, pp. 248-251.
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UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) contain related
– but not identical – provisions.35
7 CONTINUATION; SOME OBSERVATIONS
The interesting DCFR article induces me to four – dissimilar – observations.
To start with, it is conspicuous that the greater part of the perspectives
the Dutch Supreme Court mentions in the Esmilo/Mediq case36 are found in
this DCFR provision (as well as in its predecessor in the PECL): which interests
are served by the infringed provision (cf. paragraph 3 sub a-b), whether the
infringement violates fundamental principles (cf. paragraph 1),37 whether
the parties were aware of the infringement (cf. paragraph 3 sub e), whether
the provision provides a sanction (cf. paragraph 3 sub c). It is plausible that
this relationship is no coincidence; the Supreme Court has probably been
inspired by PECL and/or DCFR.38
Secondly it should be observed that the framework is fundamentally
different from the Dutch one. Under article 3:40 DCC the question has to be
answered whether the contract is automatically null and void (because of a
violation of good morals or public order) or valid.39 According to art. II.-7:302
DCFR, however, the contract is simply valid; when the case is never brought
before a judge (or arbitrator) the infringement of the statute stays without
consequences.40 Only when a party takes legal action and forces a judge to
choose between the options mentioned in paragraph 2 can a sanction follow.
An automatic nullity is principally not in order. It is strange to see that this
‘pending approach’ was propagated enthusiastically in theNetherlandsmore
than a century ago, by Van Hamel,41 without success. The most significant
counter argument is that this opinion distinguishes insufficiently between
35 Art. 3.3.1 PICC. SeeUNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010, Roma:
UNIDROIT 2010, pp. 124-133 (text and commentary), on which M.J. Bonell, ‘The New
Provisions on Illegality in the UNIDROIT Principles 2010’, Uniform Law Review/Revue de
droit uniforme 2011, pp. 517-536. A notable difference with the DCFR is that UNIDROIT
does not grant the judge a discretionary power to modify the contract (cf. par. 7).
36 Supra, par. 4.
37 Art. II.-7:302 (1) refers to art. II.-7:301 DCFR (Contracts infringing fundamental principles).
38 In his advisory Opinion preceding Esmilo/Mediq Advocate-General Wissink refers to the
DCFR article: ECLI:NL:PHR:2012:BU5609, sub 3.19. See also T.F.E. Tjong Tjin Tai,NJ 2013/
172, commentary, sub 3.
39 I.e. valid on the understanding that no judge will sentence a party to display forbidden
behaviour; HR 11 May 1951, NJ 1952/128, with commentary from Ph.A.N. Houwing
(Burgman/Aviolanda).
40 Thus explicitly Von Bar & Clive 2009, Art. II.-7:302, Comments, D.
41 J.A. van Hamel, De leer der nulliteiten in het burgerlijke recht (diss. Amsterdam (UvA)),
Amsterdam: J.H. de Bussy 1902. Similar for France: R. Japiot, Des nullités en matière d’actes
juridiques, essai d’une théorie nouvelle (thèse Dijon), Paris: Rousseau 1909.
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substantive and procedural private law. Substantive private law – including
the nullities – takes effect automatically, without (the need for) a court judg-
ment. The parties who studied the nullities profoundly after Van Hamel, like
Tieleman, the Nypels Commission and Eggens, all accept that the law of
nullities is effective automatically.42 In Germany too this is considered ob-
vious.43 It seems to me that wherever it can be avoided (which is the case
here), juridical situations should not be kept ‘pending’, in particular because
it then becomes necessary to start a legal procedure to reach the desirable legal
status. There is good reasonwhy the trend is exactly opposite, in the direction
of ‘deformalisation’. In theNetherlands the number of situations inwhich court
intervention is required to create certain legal effects has considerably
decreased since the adoption of the new Civil Code (1992).44
A third observation concerns the array of options. The option to ‘declare
the contract to be valid’ of paragraph 2 sub a fits in with the possibility
recognised in art. 3:40 (3) DCC that no invalidity occurs.45 In my opinion, the
retroactive avoidance mentioned in paragraph 2 sub b is in essence not a
voidability (to be invoked by a protected party); it is rather a regular nullity,
with the peculiarity that it only occurs if and insofar as a judge so decides.
The most important difference with Dutch law is that instead of this validity
or invalidity a third type of solution can follow: a modification of the contract
or of its effects by the judge (paragraph 2 sub c). The latter option implies
various possibilities:46
‘The power to modify would include power to dispense with future performance
of obligations under the contract but to let matters otherwise rest as they are,
without any restitution. Equally, the contract may be given some but not complete
future effect: for example, it may be made enforceable by one of the parties only,
or only in part, or only at a particular time. It may be that some remedies, such
as an order for specific performance, are not to be available, while others, such
as damages for non-performance, are to be.’
42 Further Hijma 1988, nr. 3.34, pp. 113-116.
43 Wolf/Neuner 2012, § 55, nr. 4.
44 E.g. the annulment of a juridical act (art. 3:49 DCC) or the termination of a contract (art.
6:267 DCC) no longer requires the intervention by a judge. Cf. former articles 1485 (‘eene
regtsvordering’) and 1302DCC. In France the nullity verdict is still considered ‘constitutive’;
see, concise, Von Bar & Clive 2009, Art. II.-7:302, Notes, II, 10. The French view has its
origins in the strong influence Japiot’s dissertation (mentioned above) got there. In the new
French contract law, to be enacted in 2015/2016, termination no longer requires a judgment
(art. 134), but nullity still does: ‘La nullité doit être prononcée par le juge’ (art. 86). See
Ministère de la Justice, Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations, Document de travail,
23 octobre 2013.
45 Supra, par. 4.
46 Von Bar & Clive 2009, Art. II.-7:302, Comments, D.
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A fourth striking aspect is that under the DCFR the judge has a discretionary
power to choose between the various results mentioned. The DCFR Commentary
stresses this judicial power.47 ‘The intention behind these norms is obviously
to confer upon the judge the broadest possible discretion’, as Zimmermann
– apparently sighing – observes.48 Meanwhile it should be noted that inside
the Commission there were serious doubts about this approach.49
The trio constitutive judgment, array of sanctions and judicial power
produce a flexible system, which is advantageous in principle. On the other
hand it can be argued that very much is left for the judge to decide. The
possibility of a contract modification too is allotted to him in a general manner,
the only directive being that hemust choose ‘an appropriate and proportional
response’, accompanied by six perspectives of a largely general nature. In the
Dutch Code the judicial modification of contracts is not an unknown pheno-
menon; see art. 3:54 (2) DCC (undue influence), art. 6:230 (2) DCC (error) and
art. 6:258 DCC (unforeseen circumstances). However, this phenomenon is
limited to a few specific situations, and the judge is given as much guidance
as possible (‘to remove the detriment’; thus art. 3:54 (2) DCC and art. 6:230 (2)
DCC). Against this background I wonder, with Van Schaick,50 whether art.
II.-7:302 DCFR does not leave the matter too broadly and too easily to the
judge’s discretion. Therefore I am somewhat less enthusiastic than Hartkamp
and Sieburgh, who recently converted to the system of art. 15:102 PECL,51 from
which art. II.-7:302 DCFR is derived.
8 NULLITY IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW
European Union (EU) law contains, in various types of instruments,52 all kinds
of nullity provisions. A general European nullity doctrine is not perceptible,
though. The most prominent location is probably art. 101 lid 2 TFEU (cartel
47 Von Bar & Clive 2009, Art. II.-7:302, Comments, D.
48 R. Zimmermann, ‘Restitutio in integrum: The Unwinding of Failed Contracts under the
Principles of European Contract Law, The UNIDROIT Principles and the Avant-projet d’un
Code Européen des Contrats, Uniform Law Review/Revue de droit uniforme 2005-4 (hereinafter:
Zimmermann 2005), pp. 725-726.
49 With ‘Commission’ I here allude to the LandoCommission, which designed the predecessor
in the PECL. See MacQueen 2011, pp. 562-563. The then proposals of the Law Commission
of England and Wales seem to have been a decisive factor: Consultation Paper No. 154,
Illegal Transactions: The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts, 1999 (see MacQueen 2011,
ibidem; Zimmermann 2005, ibidem). By now the British Government has communicated it
does not intend to implement the LawCommission’s proposals: Report on the Implementation
of Law Commission proposals, March 2012, sub 52.
50 A.C. van Schaick, in: Busch c.s. 2006, Art. 15:102, p. 251. Critical also Zimmermann 2005,
pp. 725-726.
51 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III 2014/309.
52 Treaties, Regulations, Directives.
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ban), which provides that ‘[a]ny agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant
to this Article shall be automatically void’.53 Some scholars observe with
astonishment that this provision, ‘in spite of its crucial importance […] has
not spurred much doctrinal interest, to say the least’.54 The European Court
of Justice has repeatedly had the occasion to give shape to its view on this
nullity. All in all the following picture arises.
Firstly, as the article provides explicitly, the prohibited contracts are ‘auto-
matically void’. Therefore neither a party activity nor a judgment is required
for the nullity to occur.
Secondly the European Court has decided that the nullity concerned is
absolute, so that ‘an agreement which is null and void by virtue of this provi-
sion has no effect as between the contracting parties and cannot be set up
against third parties’.55
Thirdly the article is amatter of public policywhichmust be automatically
applied by national courts.56
Fourthly the European Court has indicated that such nullity ‘is capable
of having a bearing on all the effects, either past or future, of the agreement
[…], and consequently […] is of retroactive effect’.57 For a general civil lawyer
it seems strange to come across an automatic nullity with retroactive effect;58
retroaction only seems fit in situations commencing with validity, as is the
case with voidabilities.59 The retroaction the Court has in mind is probably
not meant in a ‘technical’ sense; it rather seems to paraphrase that the nullity
has been there right from the start.60 Moreover, it should be noted that com-
petition law is a special field of law, where contracts can be prohibited (and
void) during some periods and can be tolerable during other periods;61 in
53 Formerly art. 81 EC Treaty (initially numbered 85).
54 A. Lamadrid de Pablo, L. Ortiz Blanco, ‘Nullity/Voidness: An overview of EU and national
case law’, e-Competitions, nr. 49199, sub 2 (www.concurrences.com). The nullity of art. 101
TFEU is e.g. discussed by M. Fallon & S. Francq, in: J. Basedow, S. Francq & L. Idot (eds.),
International Antitrust Litigation, Oxford and Portland:Hart 2012, pp. 82-90; under the terms
of art. 81 EC E.-J. Zippro, Privaatrechtelijke handhaving van mededingingsrecht (diss. Leiden),
Deventer: Kluwer 2008, pp. 47-84.
55 ECJ 25 November 1971, C 22/71, ECLI EU:C:1971:113 (Béguelin), sub 29.
56 ECJ 13 July 2006, C 295-298/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461 (Manfredi et al.), sub 31.
57 ECJ 6 February 1973, C 48/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:11 (Brasserie de Haecht II), sub 26-27.
58 Cf. J. Appeldoorn, ‘Ex nihilo nihil fit? De vlottende nietigheid van artikel 81 lid 2 EG’, VrA
2006/3, p. 66 (‘gebrekkig geformuleerd’ (‘defectively formulated’)).
59 Cf. Art. 3:53 lid 1 DCC.
60 ECJ 6 February 1973, C 48/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:11 (Brasserie de Haecht II), sub 24.
61 Appeldoorn, o.c., speaks of ‘vlottende nietigheid’ (‘floating nullity’). In England a doctrine
of ‘transient nullity’ has been developed; see inter alia G. Monti, in: C. Twigg-Flesner (ed.),
The Cambridge Companion to European Private Law, Cambridge: University Press 2010, pp.
291-293. On retroactive effect in this connection J. Appeldoorn, Eenheid in verscheidenheid:
de gespreide toepassing van artikel 81 EG (diss. Groningen), w.p. 2004, pp. 232-242; Zippro
2008, pp. 68-70.
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such an atypical field the thought of retroactivity is less strange than it is in
a more general context.
From all this the picture arises that we are dealing here with a ‘traditional’
nullity, which by its purpose does not leave much room for mitigation.62 On
the other hand it should be noted that the European Court does not demarcate
the problem area more widely than necessary: a contract ‘becomes null and
void in so far as its object or effect is incompatible with the prohibition’.63
The words ‘in so far’ are fundamental and essential. The prudence they
embody already appears in early judgments of the Court:64
‘Article 85 (2) provides that “any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to
this article shall be automatically void”. This provision, which is intended to ensure
compliance with the treaty, can only be interpreted with reference to its purpose
in community law, and it must be limited to this context. The automatic nullity
in question only applies to those parts of the agreement affected by the prohibition,
or to the agreement as a whole if it appears that those parts are not severable from
the agreement itself. Consequently any other contractual provisions which are not
affected by the prohibition, and which therefore do not involve the application
of the treaty, fall outside community law.’
Partial nullities65 therefore are definitely possible; the question whether the
nullity should be only partial can and must be answered according to the
relevant national law.66 The follow-up question whether a conversion67 is
possible too is less easy to answer.68 With regard to the parallel of art. 101
TFEU in the national law, art. 6 of the Competitive Trading Act (Mededingings-
wet) (CTA), the Dutch Supreme Court holds the view that conversion is incom-
patible with the present absolute nullity, which is aimed at the expulsion of
contracts which illicitly reduce competition.69 To that end the Supreme Court
refers on the one hand to the deterrent purpose of the cartel ban and on the
other hand to the judgments of the European Court of Justice regarding art.
62 Cf. A.S. Hartkamp, Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk
Recht, 3, Vermogensrecht algemeen, Deel I, Europees recht en Nederlands vermogensrecht,Deventer:
Kluwer 2011, nr. 46.
63 ECJ 25 November 1971, C 22/71, ECLI EU:C:1971:113 (Béguelin), sub 26.
64 ECJ 30 June 1966, C 56-65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 (Société Technique Minière). Accordingly EFTA
Court 1 April 1998, E-3/97, IIC 1998, 681 (Jæger), sub 77.
65 The concept of partial nullity is discussed infra, par. 9-10.
66 See also ECJ 14 December 1983, C 319/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:374 (Société de Vente de Ciments
et Bétons de l’Est), sub 11-12.
67 See (concise) infra, par. 10.
68 Negative, among others, M.R. Mok, with reference to ECJ 13 July 2006, NJ 2007/34 (Man-
fredi), commentary, sub 3; E.-J. Zippro, ‘Conversie onverenigbaarmet de absolute nietigheid
van ongeoorloofde kartelafspraken’, MvV 2010/3, pp. 29-35.
69 HR 18 December 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BJ9439, NJ 2010/140 (Prisma/Slager), with comment-
ary from M.R. Mok; HR 20 December 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:2123, NJ 2014/347, with
commentaries from M.R. Mok and Jac. Hijma (BP/Benschop), sub 3.6.2.
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101 TFEU. The fact that the SupremeCourt follows the example of the European
Court is only logical, considering the close relationship between art. 6 CTA
and art. 101 TFEU. The question remains, however, whether the Supreme Court
does not construe the qualification ‘absolute’, as used by the European Court,
too strictly. The label ‘absolute’ contains information regarding the issue to
whom the nullity applies (namely: towards everybody);70 materially speaking
it does not make the nullity so intensive as not to tolerate any restraint. In
Germany the question whether art. 101 TFEU tolerates a geltungserhaltende
Reduktion is debated;71 to me it seems that with regard to ‘lighter’ infringe-
ments there is no necessity to exclude any conversion in advance.72
I wind up this paragraph with the observation that cartel law is a special
field of law, inwhichmotives of deterrence and prevention play a predominant
role. As a result thereof the judgments of the European Court with respect
to art. 101 TFEU do not produce many clues for (the development of) the
concept of nullity in its general civil law sense.
9 PARTIAL NULLITY
The Dutch legislator embedded three nullity-limiting doctrines in the 1992
Civil Code: partial nullity (art. 3:41 DCC),73 conversion (art. 3:42 DCC)74 and
ratification (art. 3:58 DCC).
Regarding partial nullity for a good length of time the Dutch Supreme
Court utilised the criterion of the hypothetical choice: is it plausible, either
because of the nature of the contract or on the basis of certain actual circum-
stances, that the contract would not have been concluded without the void
clause?75 This criterion was abandoned with a view to the new Code, in
favour of the ‘inextricably related so as not to be severable’ test embodied in
art. 3:41 DCC.76 A hypothetical-subjective approach (what would the parties
have done otherwise?) has thus evolved into a more objective one (what
connections does the contract show?).77 In a recent procedure these two
approaches were put face to face and were thus brought before the Dutch
70 Thus explicitly ECJ 25 November 1971, C 22/71, ECLI EU:C:1971:113 (Béguelin), sub 29;
see also ECJ 13 July 2006, C 295-298/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461 (Manfredi et al.), sub 56-59.
71 Further P. Stockenhuber, in: E. Grabitz, M. Hilf & M. Nettesheim (ed.), Das Recht der
Europäischen Union, Band I, Munich: C.H. Beck 2014, Art. 101 AEUV, nr. 234.
72 Likewise Advocate-General Keus, Opinion before HR 20 December 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:
875, NJ 2014/347 (BP/Benschop), sub 2.31.
73 On partial nullity in general: Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III 2014/645-647; S.A.M. de
Loos-Wijker, in: Groene Serie Vermogensrecht, Art. 3:41.
74 See infra, par. 10.
75 HR 18 April 1941, NJ 1941/940, with commentary from E.M. Meijers (Van der Molen/Erven
De Lange Klaasz).
76 HR 16 November 1984,NJ 1985/624, with commentary from C.J.H. Brunner (Buena Vista).
77 Further Hijma 1988, p. 262 ff.
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Supreme Court as conflicting options.78 The case is about a contract for the
operation of a petrol station, which contains a void exclusivity clause.79 The
Court of Appeal followed an objective course. It examined whether the re-
mainder of the contract embodied an arrangement which was meaningful for
both parties and by which the aims of the contract were still partly realised;
it reached a positive conclusion.80 Before the Supreme Court BP argues that
such a line of thought shows an incorrect view of the law, because the codified
demand of an ‘inextricable relation’ refers to what the parties would have done
without the forbidden exclusivity clause. The Advocate-General agrees with
BP,81 but the Supreme Court sides with the Court of Appeal. The Supreme
Court considers that whether such a relation exists is a matter of interpretation
of the juridical act, taking into account the nature, content and necessary
implication of the juridical act, the extent to which the different parts are
related, and what the parties intended. In the light of these factors the judge
will have to decide, the Supreme Court argues, whether – considering also
the further circumstances of the case and the interests of all parties involved –
there is or is not enough justification for the partial upholding of the juridical
act.82 To the said perspectives, one should add ‘nature, content and purpose
of the violated provision’. The judgment is not only interesting because it
abandons the old hypothetical approach, but also because it shifts the juridical
construction: the place of one criterion is taken by a number of perspectives
(which fill in the ‘inextricable relation’).83
With regard to the point of departure, too, the doctrine of partial nullity
is moving. The German § 139 BGB, dating from 1900, provides that ‘das ganze
Rechtsgeschäft nichtig [ist], wenn nicht anzunehmen ist, dass es auch ohne
den nichtigen Teil vorgenommen sein würde’. Here the starting point is
Gesamtnichtigkeit.84 Art. 3:41 DCC is formulated in a more neutral way (‘to
the extent that’). Finally in art. 15:103 (1) PECL we read that ‘the remaining
part continues in effect unless […] it is unreasonable to uphold it’. In the latter
text validity of the remainder is the point of departure (‘unless’).85 With
regard to consumer contracts the European Court of Justice follows, more
78 HR 20December 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:2123,NJ 2014/347,with commentaries fromM.R.
Mok and Jac. Hijma (BP/Benschop).
79 The exclusivity clause is automatically void under art. 6 par. 2 of theDutchMededingingswet.
Likewise art. 101 (2) TFEU.
80 Court of Appeal Amsterdam 26 June 2012, sub 2.32, included in the judgment of the
Supreme Court, sub 3.7.1.
81 Advocate-General Keus, Opinion before HR 20 December 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:875,
NJ 2014/347 (BP/Benschop), sub 2.33-34.
82 See sub 3.7.3.
83 This technique fits in with the one used in HR 1 June 2012, NJ 2013/172 (Esmilo/Mediq),
discussed supra, par. 5.
84 Wolf/Neuner 2012, § 56, nr. 1.
85 The DCFR does not mention this rule for nullity, but does so for annulment: art. II.-7:213
DCFR (‘the avoidance is limited to those terms unless […]’).
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explicitly, the latter course: if one or more contract clause(s) is/are unfair, the
remainder of the contract must continue to exist, in principle, without any
amendment other than that resulting from the deletion of the unfair terms,
in so far as, in accordance with the rules of domestic law, such continuity of
the contract is legally possible.86 It should be kept in mind that this view of
the European Court is nourished by considerations of consumer protection.
10 CONVERSION
With respect to conversion, unlike partial nullity, the hypothetical choice of
the parties has the status of a codified guideline (see art. 3:42 DCC).87 Never-
theless I would be surprised if the Dutch Supreme Court, confronted with a
conversion issue, would fall back on the dry hypothetical choice it side-tracked
at partial nullity. I rather expect that the course plotted at partial nullity will
be extendable towards the conversion doctrine.88
In the field of unfair clauses in consumer contracts the European Court
of Justice holds the opinion that a judge, in a case where he finds that an unfair
term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is
void, is not allowed to modify that contract by revising the content of that
term. Otherwise sellers and suppliers would be tempted to keep using such
clauses, to the detriment of consumers.89 Under Dutch law the latter subject
is located on the interface between partial nullity, conversion and the general
effect of the requirements of reasonableness and fairness (art. 6:248 DCC).
11 CORRECTION BY MEANS OF GENERAL DOCTRINES
A void contract lacks the juridical effects intended by the parties. It therefore
does not bind the parties. If a party performs by paying nevertheless, there
is no legal ground for this performance. According to Dutch lawwe then have
86 ECJ 14 June 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, NJ 2012/512, with commentary from M.R. Mok
(Banesto), sub 65; ECJ 30 May 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:341, NJ 2013/487, with commentary
from M.R. Mok (Asbeek Brusse et al.), sub 57. A refining is brought by ECJ 30 April 2014,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:282, NJ 2014/355, with commentary from M.R. Mok (Kásler et al.)
87 On conversion in general: Asser/Hartkamp& Sieburgh 6-III 2014/648-658; S.A.M. de Loos-
Wijker, in: GS Vermogensrecht, Art. 3:42.
88 See Jac. Hijma, ‘Gezichtspunten bij nietigheid’, WPNR 2014/7034, p. 930.
89 ECJ 14 June 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, NJ 2012/512, with commentary from M.R. Mok
(Banesto), sub 58-72; ECJ 30May 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:341,NJ 2013/487, with commentary
from M.R. Mok (Asbeek Brusse et al.), sub 54-60.
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a case of undue payment;90 on that basis the performing party has a right
to restitution by the receiving party (art. 6:203 ff. DCC).
The fact that, in spite of the nullity, a party did perform creates a com-
plicated situation. Exactly then it appears that things are not as straight as
they look; both the legislator and the judiciary devote themselves to knocking
the rough edges off the idea that the contract is worthless and without any
juridical effect.91 In the Code itself this is shown by art. 6:211 DCC:92
Art. 6:211. (1) Where a performance made on the basis of a contract which is null
and void cannot by its nature be reversed and where this performance ought not
to be valued inmoney, a claim to reverse a counter-performance or reimbursement
of its value is also barred, to the extent that such claim would, for that reason,
offend reasonableness and fairness.
The situation resulting from this provision is in agreement with that which
would have been the case if the contract were considered valid. The provision,
written for the special situation that a performance ought not to be valued
in money,93 actually shows the tip of the iceberg. Court decisions reveal more
of that iceberg. In that respect the courts utilise several of the general doctrines
of the law of obligations, like torts (‘unlawful acts’, art. 6:162 DCC) and reason-
ableness and fairness (art. 6:248 DCC).
HR 13 May 1977 (Ziekenhulp/Brilmij) concerns a cooperation contract in
health care which is void because the required permit was not obtained.94
On the basis of this contract Brilmij sold numerous spectacles at a reduced
price to persons insured by Ziekenhulp. When Brilmij claims the agreed
compensation, Ziekenhulp invokes the nullity of the contract. The Dutch
Supreme Court considers that it is possible that a health insurance breaches
a duty imposed by a rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct
by first inducing a supplier to deliver his merchandise at a low price and by
later not being prepared to pay the promised compensation. If this situation
occurs the health insurance thus on the basis of tort law (art. 6:162 DCC) is
obliged to pay the agreed amount, just like it would have been obliged to do
– on a contract law basis – if the contract were considered valid.
90 TM, in: Van Zeben et al. (ed.), Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek,
Boek 6, Algemeen gedeelte van het verbintenissenrecht (hereinafter: Parl. Gesch. NBW, Boek 6),
Deventer: Kluwer 1981, pp. 805 and 821; likewise HR 28 June 1991, NJ 1992/787, with
commentary from C.J.H. Brunner (Verkerk/Van der Veen q.q.).
91 This part of the subject is also discussed in my Ghent lecture, Hijma 1998, nr. 12 ff.
92 Another example (for specific situations) is art. 6:278 DCC, which by means of its second
paragraph also applies to nullities and voidabilities; MvA II, Parl. Gesch. NBW, Boek 6, pp.
1042-1043.
93 Which is not easily accepted: HR 13 April 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB1055, NJ 2001/581,
with commentary from Jac. Hijma (Polyproject/Warmond).
94 HR 13May 1977,NJ 1978/154, with commentary fromA.R. Bloembergen (Ziekenhulp/Brilmij).
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HR 5 November 1982 (Ziekenfonds/Klijsen) deals with a tariff contract
between health insurance companies and pharmacists which is void because
the required permit is lacking.95 Although the insurance companies are famil-
iar with the problem, for years and years they pay the pharmacists on the basis
of the said contract, which is favourable to the pharmacists. Afterwards the
insurances demand restitution of the surplus, on account of undue payment.
The Court of Appeal dismisses the claim because it clashes with reasonableness
and fairness: after having paid without reservation for so many years, the
insurances cannot go back on their long-lasting attitude and the confidence
they thus established with the pharmacists. The Supreme Court rejects the
appeal in cassation. As a result we detect a void contract which does not give
rise to the normally present restitution claim; materially speaking this situation
cannot be distinguished from the situation inwhich the contract would simply
have been valid. Instrumental in this case is the doctrine of ‘forfeiture of rights’
(rechtsverwerking), a special application of the general doctrine of the derogating
power of reasonableness and fairness (art. 6:248 (2) DCC).
In HR 28 June 1991 (Verkerk/Bouwservice) the Dutch Supreme Court observes
in a general way that with void contracts, too, sustaining a claim for restitution,
in the circumstances of the case, can be unacceptable according to standards
of reasonableness and fairness.96 Sometimes it turns out impossible to redress
a performance, just as if the contract had been valid.97 In addition, the
Supreme Court has indicated that under certain circumstances the invocation
of (a violation of) good morals can as such be blocked by reasonableness and
fairness.98
12 STRUCTURAL EXTENUATION
Bymeans of such general doctrines as torts (art. 6:162 DCC) and reasonableness
and fairness (art. 6:248 DCC), void contracts can materially go in the direction
of valid contracts. These are incidental interventions, however, which
demonstrate that the traditional concept of nullity soon leads to undesirably
drastic consequences. From the same background emerges the idea that the
provisions of art. 3:54 (2) DCC and art. 6:230 (2) DCC, which create the possibil-
ity of a judicial contract modification in cases of (voidability because of) undue
95 HR 5 November 1982, NJ 1984/125, with commentary from C.J.H. Brunner (Ziekenfonds/
Klijsen).
96 HR 28 June 1991,NJ 1992/787,with commentary fromC.J.H. Brunner (Verkerk/Van der Veen
q.q.), regarding building activities performed without a permit.
97 Further on this matter H.J. van Kooten, Restitutierechtelijke gevolgen van ongeoorloofde overeen-
komsten/Restitutionary Consequences of Illegal Contracts (diss. Utrecht), Deventer: Kluwer 2002,
p. 33 ff. (summary pp. 118-123).
98 HR 19 December 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:3650, RvdW 2015/137 (B./H. et al.), sub 3.4, with
respect to an invocation by a third party.
34 1 – The concept of nullity
influence or error, can be used per analogiam with respect to automatic nul-
lities.99
On consideration of the development of the nullity concept, the utilisation
of these and similar remedies does not come as a surprise. The starting point
that nullities in principle do not extend further than their purpose justifies,
endorsed by the Dutch Supreme Court,100 is a crucial finding. If that principle
is taken seriously, the extenuation cannot come to an end when the contract
is labelled ‘null and void’. Alsowithin that label a structural space for restraint
can and must be allowed, like the Code itself demonstrates in regulating
conversion and ratification and in denying restitution claims in certain situ-
ations.101
In my opinion that structural space for restraint should be elaborated thus
that the qualification ‘(null and) void’ means that, guided by the rationale of
the violated rule, we will have to decide for every juridical effect separately
whether or not it can be accepted. In this way a claim for specific performance
can be treated differently than a claim for damages or termination, and these
again can be treated differently than a claim for restitution. In this way the
results which as yet are reached by means of incidental corrections gain a
logical position within the – differentiated – nullity concept.102
13 CONTINUATION; COMPARATIVE LAW EXCURSIONS
The desirability of a (structural) qualification in terms of the juridical effects
also emerges during two comparative law excursions.
The first one takes us back to the Draft Common Frame of Reference.103 One
of the various possibilitiesmentioned in the commentary on art. II.-7:302 DCFR
is that ‘some remedies, such as an order for specific performance, are not to
be available, while others, such as damages for non-performance, are to be.’104
Although I made a few critical remarks above regarding the broad (modifica-
tion) powers which the DCFR bestows upon the judge, it may be clear that
precisely this differentiation – which can be easily separated from discretionary
power and constitutive judgment – strongly appeals to me.
The second excursion leads to Germany. The German legislator recently
pondered over the prostitution contract, i.e. the contract whereby one party
undertakes to perform sexual activities and the other party undertakes to pay
99 See Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III 2014/644; Eindverslag I, Parl. Gesch. NBW, Boek 3,
pp. 240-241.
100 See the quotation given in par 1.
101 See supra, par. 10-11.
102 Further Hijma 1988, pp. 51-120; likewise M.W. Scheltema, Onverschuldigde betaling (diss.
Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 1997, pp. 235-236.
103 See par. 6-7.
104 Von Bar &Clive 2009, Art. II.-7:302, Comments, D. Almost identicalMacQueen 2011, p. 562.
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a price therefor. Generally speaking, as the Bundesgerichtshof states, prostitution
is nowadays no longer considered a violation of good morals.105 Entering
into an agreement ‘sich gegen ein Entgelt geschlechtlich hinzugeben’ stays problem-
atic nevertheless, because the creation of such an obligation violates human
dignity.106 On the other hand the legislator considers it unacceptable that
the customer (der Freier), once the pursued activities have been performed,
can escape from his obligation to pay the price by simply referring to the
nullity of the contract. The result of these considerations is the following
provision:107
Prostitutionsgesetz
§ 1. Begründung eines Forderungsrechts
(1) Sind sexuelle Handlungen gegen ein vorher vereinbartes Entgelt vorgenommen
worden, so begründet diese Vereinbarung eine rechtswirksame Forderung.
According to this approach the prostitution contract does not oblige the prosti-
tute, but it does establish an obligation to settle the bill as soon as the sexual
services have been rendered.108 For the Netherlands Van den Brink suggests
the same – attractive – solution.109 The German documentary history makes
mention of a unilaterally binding contract,110 which qualification seems in-
accurate. Ellenberger speaks of a contract becoming (partly) valid after-
wards,111 whereas Neuner accepts validity right from the start.112
This is not the place to labour this German legislation. I present it as a
further foundation of the position that nullity law has a need for the possibility
to differentiate between the individual juridical effects. In the given example
a claim against the prostitute should not be granted, but a (later) claim against
the customer should. This can be elaborated in the law for a specific context,
as was done in the Prostitutionsgesetz. This result can also be reached in amore
fundamental and structural way, by accepting that a contract labelled ‘null
and void’ will lack some of the intended juridical effects but can still produce
some of the other. In this way the attribution of effects is structurally guided
by the rationale of the violated rule, against the background of the general
interest.
105 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/5958, p. 4; see also supra, par. 3.
106 J. Ellenberger, in: Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, München: C.H. Beck 2012, Anhang zu
§ 138, ProstG 1, nr. 2, mentioning further sources.
107 Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse der Prostituierten (Prostitutionsgesetz) 2001, BGBl.
I S. 3983.
108 J. Ellenberger, ibidem.
109 Van den Brink 2002, p. 227.
110 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/5958, p. 6 (‘einseitig verpflichtender Vertrag’).
111 J. Ellenberger, ibidem.
112 Wolf/Neuner 2012, § 46, nr. 36.
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14 A LAST STEP
I propose one more step. The principle that a nullity does not extend further
than its purpose justifies is closely connected with an even more fundamental
principle: the freedom of contract.113 This contractual freedom implies that
wemust approach every contract from a positive starting point. In my opinion
this also applies to contracts which are labelled ‘null and void’. There is no
reason to accept that, as if by magic, this qualification shifts the tone from
white to black. In a legal systemwhich takes the freedom of contract seriously
and in which nullities do not extend further than necessary, it is not plausible
to start at ‘nothing’ and seewhether things turn out less drastic than expected.
On the contrary, it is logical to start at ‘everything’ and consider which effects
are specifically unacceptable (and, conversely, which ones can simply be
accepted).114
15 CONCLUSION
The findings of the research conducted in this essay are, on the main issues,
as follows.
1. Nowadays the nullity of a contract is accepted less easily than before. This
decrease is apparent with the violation of good morals or public policy
(par. 3) as well as with the violation of statutory provisions (par. 4-5), and
also – though this was not discussed in this essay – with the violation of
statutory formal requirements (art. 3:39 DCC).115
2. Traditional criteria make way for a ‘weighing’ approach, taking into
account a number of perspectives, which aremainly of an objective nature
(par. 5 and 9-10).
3. PECL and DCFR suggest an expansion of the array of sanctions, in such a
way that instead of being declared valid or invalid the contract can also
be modified, in various respects, by the judge (par. 6-7).
4. Where a nullity is established, legal practice appears inclined to smooth
over the edges of that qualification with respect to performance or restitu-
tion (par. 11).
5. The curbing tendency can be pursued within the concept of nullity too,
in such a manner that within this concept the rationale of the violated rule
rings through structurally. In this approach some of the intended juridical
113 On freedom of contract in general: Asser/Hartkamp& Sieburgh 6-III 2014/40-64; T. Hartlief
& C.J.J.M. Stolker (eds.), Contractvrijheid, Deventer: Kluwer 1999.
114 Further Hijma 1988, pp. 51-120.
115 See for a – rather spectacular – relativistic judgment regarding a formal requirement HR
9 December 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BU7412, NJ 2013/273 (cassation in the interest of the
law), on the requirement of writing in art. 7:2 (1) 1 DCC (sale of residential accommodation).
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effects can and will be treated differently than other of these effects (par.
12-13). A positive starting point is plausible, as a result of which the lack
of an effect becomes an exception instead of being the rule (par. 14).
6. In some fields of law there is relatively little room for the said tendencies.
The cartel ban of Art. 101 TFEU, with its deterrent purpose, provides an
illustration (par. 8).
If we try to bring all these things together in a covering observation, this
observation would read as follows.
As a result of the combined efforts of legislator, judiciary and legal scholar-
ship, nullity is showing a downward trend. It is not threatenedwith extinction,
but a new heyday is improbable.

2 Redelijkheid en billijkheid: a view from
English law
John Cartwright
1 INTRODUCTION
Amongst the core concepts in the Civil Code of The Netherlands, redelijkheid
en billijkheid (‘reasonableness and fairness’) marks one of the most fundamental
differences from the common law. The principle of ‘reasonableness and fair-
ness’ appears to be part of the Dutch lawyer’s DNA; and it is as surprising
– perhaps even shocking – to the Dutch lawyer to find that it is not matched
in the common lawyer’s thinking, as it is to the common lawyer to discover
the reliance placed on ‘reasonableness and fairness’ in Dutch law. The purpose
of this paper is to explore why the common lawyer does not see a similar place
for such a principle.
It is not unusual for a legal system to use an objective norm of ‘reasonable-
ness’ or ‘fairness’ in a variety of contexts. English law is no exception: much
use is made of the standard of ‘reasonableness’ in both private law and public
law, at common law and in statute. To give just a few examples: the standard
of ‘reasonableness’, often personified as a hypothetical ‘reasonable person’,1
is used in both tort and contract in a range of matters, such as defining the
standard of conduct which constitutes negligence,2 the extent of recoverable
J. Cartwright is professor of Anglo-American Private Law, University of Leiden and
professor of the Law of Contract, University of Oxford.
1 See also J. Cartwright, ‘The Fiction of the “Reasonable Man”’ in: A.G. Castermans, Jac.
Hijma, K.J.O. Jansen, P. Memelink, H.J. Snijders & C.J.J.M. Stolker (eds), Ex libris Hans
Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 143.
2 Court of Exchequer 6 February 1856, Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Exch. 781,
p. 784 (Alderson B: ‘Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do’); House
of Lords 16 April 1943, Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [1943] AC 448, p. 454, 457, 468; High
Court 26 February 1957, Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582,
p. 586 (situation involving special skill or competence: ‘the ordinary skilledman exercising
and professing to have the special skill’).
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loss,3 how to interpret the contract,4 and how to determine the price where
the contract is silent on the matter.5 Whether a decision of an administrative
authority can be challenged may depend on whether it is so ‘unreasonable’
that no reasonable authority could properly have made it;6 and whether a
decision of a fact-finding jury or court can be re-opened on appeal may depend
on whether no reasonable jury or court could have come to such a decision.7
Legislative provisions use tests based on ‘reasonableness’, and ‘(un)fairness’
to determine the validity of certain contractual or non-contractual exemption
clauses and notices,8 or other contract terms;9 and sometimes a court has
3 The test of ‘remoteness of damage’, based on whether the loss suffered was of the kind
that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen when he com-
mitted the wrong (tort): Privy Council 18 January 1961,Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Morts
Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd (The Wagon Mound) [1961] AC 388, p. 423, 426; or would have
had in contemplation at the time of formation of the contract (contract): House of Lords
17 October 1967, Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd [1969] 1 AC 350, p. 385.
4 In the case of a contract constituted by (written or oral) offer and acceptance, ‘an offer falls
to be interpreted ... objectively, by reference to the interpretation which a reasonable man
in the shoes of the offeree would place on the offer’: Court of Appeal 4 March 1983,
Centrovincial Estates plc v. Merchant Investors Assurance Co [1983] Com. LR 158, p. 158 (Slade
L.J.). In the case of a contract contained in a single written document agreed by the parties,
the courts look for ‘themeaningwhich the document would convey to a reasonable person
having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the
parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract’: House of Lords 19
June 1997, Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1WLR
896, p. 912 (Lord Hoffmann).
5 The ‘reasonable price’ for the goods or services in question: e.g. Court of Appeal 16 March
1934, Foley v. Classique Coaches Ltd [1934] 2 KB 1; Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 8; Supply of
Goods and Services Act 1982, s. 15.
6 So-called ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’: Court of Appeal 10 November 1947, Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223; W. Wade &
C. Forsyth,Administrative Law, 11th edn, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press 2014, p. 302-305.
7 See, e.g., House of Lords 24 October 2002 Grobbelaar v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002]
UKHL 40, [2002] 1WLR 3024, par. 66, 73, 74 (jury in civil proceedings in defamation trial).
8 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which applies only to non-consumer contracts and non-
consumer notices, and uses in ss. 2(2), 3(2), 6(1A), 7(1A) and 7(4) ‘the requirement of
reasonableness’, defined in s. 11 by reference to whether the contractual term was ‘a fair
and reasonable one to be included’ in the contract, or, in the case of a non-contractual notice,
whether it is ‘fair and reasonable to allow reliance on it’. Further guidance on the operation
of this test is given in s. 11 and Sched. 2.
9 Consumer Rights Act 2015 Part 2, providing in s. 62(1) that an ‘unfair term of a consumer
contract is not binding on the consumer’ (but, in so far as it is transparent and prominent,
excluding by s. 64 the assessment of a term for fairness to the extent that it specifies the
main subject matter of the contract, or the assessment is of the appropriateness of the price
payable). The Act implements Council Directive 93/13/EC on unfair terms in consumer
contracts, and in consequence defines a contract term as ‘unfair’ if ‘contrary to the require-
ment of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations
under the contract to the detriment of the consumer’: s. 62(4), following the language of
art. 3(1) of the Directive. There were earlier implementations of the Directive in 1994 (Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994, S.I. 1994No. 3159) and 1999 (Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999 No. 2083).
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power by statute to determine an issue by reference to what the court judges
to be ‘just’ and/or ‘equitable’, classic terminology indicating a judicial dis-
cretion.10
In the Dutch Civil Code there are many references to ‘reasonableness’
(redelijkheid), or to ‘fairness’ (billijkheid), often in situations which will sound
familiar to the English lawyer.11 However, here we are concerned not with
such instances but with the composite term, ‘reasonableness and fairness’
(redelijkheid en billijkheid), which is referred to as a set of ‘standards’ or ‘require-
ments’.12 The pervasive role of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ in Dutch private
law is demonstrated by its reference in many articles throughout the Civil
Code,13 but we shall focus on its use within the general law of contract. In
that context, two provisions are relevant as the starting-point.14 First, amongst
the general provisions governing obligations in general, at the start of Book 6
(General Part of the Law of Obligations) the Dutch Civil Code provides:15
‘1. An obligee and obligor must, as between themselves, act in accordance with
the requirements of reasonableness and fairness.
2. A rule binding upon them by virtue of law, usage or a juridical act does not
apply to the extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be unacceptable
according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.’
10 LawReform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1(2), (3); LawReform (ContributoryNeglig-
ence) Act 1945, s. 1(1); Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, s. 2(1).
11 E.g. where a decision hangs on whether a price or another term of a contract meets a
standard of ‘reasonableness’ or ‘fairness’ (e.g. DCC Book 7, art. 618: remuneration under
an employment contract where the rate is not settled by the parties’ agreement or by
custom); or where ‘fairness’ requires a particular solution in the circumstances of the case,
such as the reduction or increase of the sum to be paid under a penalty clause (Book 6,
art. 94), the reduction of damages to take account of the claimant’s own fault (Book 6, art.
101) or the departure from the general rule requiring equal contribution to damages by
joint tortfeasors (Book 6, art. 166)). Occasionally, ‘fairness’ is also used in a similar context
to the general principle of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ discussed in this paper (e.g. Book 7,
art. 440 and 685: termination of commercial agency contract or employment contract where
‘fairness’ so requires as a result of change of circumstances).
12 See esp. DCC Book 6, art. 2:2 and 248:2 (maatstaven – standards) and Book 6 art. 2:1 and
248:1 (eisen – requirements), set out below.
13 DCCBook 1 (Family Law and the Law of Persons), art. 137, 141, 157, 159, 401; Book 2 (Legal
Persons), art. 8, 15, 322, 334r, 444; Book 3 (Law of Property), art. 12, 30, 298; Book 4 (Inherit-
ance Law), art. 123, 133, 139; Book 5 (Rights in rem), art. 78, 80, 97; Book 6 (General Part
of the Law of Obligations), art. 2, 23, 211, 248, 258; Book 7 (Specific Contracts), art. 176,
269, 333, 394, 613, 904, 906, 909; Book 7A (Specific Contracts, continued), art. 1686; Book
8 (Law of Carriage and Means of Transportation), art. 28, 68, 88, 89, 162, 396, 524, 525, 912,
914, 1116, 1162, 1163, 1193, 1363, 1407, 1408.
14 See also DCC Book 6, art. 258 (below, section 3) for change of circumstances; and Book 3,
art. 12 (below, section 4) for a definition of ‘reasonableness and fairness’.
15 DCC Book 6, art. 2.
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This general provision generates a particular applicationwithin the provisions
governing contracts in general:16
‘1. A contract not only has the juridical effects agreed to by the parties, but also
those which, according to the nature of the contract, apply by virtue of law, usage
or the requirements of reasonableness and fairness.
2. A rule binding upon the parties as a result of the contract does not apply to the
extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be unacceptable according to
standards of reasonableness and fairness.’
The purpose of this paper is not to examine these provisions in detail, nor
to attempt to give a detailed account of the use of ‘reasonableness and fairness’
within Dutch law. Rather, drawing on the general approach to ‘reasonableness
and fairness’, and some particular illustrations of its use, we can identify some
significant points of contrast with English law: contrasts both of principle and
in the substantive law of contract in the two systems.
In the provisions of the Civil Code set out above, we can see two distinct
uses of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ which contrast with the common law
approach. First, ‘reasonableness and fairness’ is set as a general standard of
conduct within the law of obligations, imposed by the law as a positive general
(andmutual) duty on the parties to an obligation (and therefore on the parties
to a contract). Secondly, ‘reasonableness and fairness’ is used as a standard
by reference to which the terms of the contract can in certain circumstances
be judged, and in particular to fill out the terms and to justify themodification
of the effects of the contract or the disapplication of rules that would otherwise
be binding on the parties as a result of the contract.
2 THE GENERAL STANDARD OF CONDUCT BASED ON ‘REASONABLENESS AND
FAIRNESS’
One of the most striking things for the English lawyer is the provision that
‘an obligee and obligor must, as between themselves, act in accordance with
the requirements of reasonableness and fairness’17 – that is, that the law
should impose a general legal duty of this kind on obligors and obligees, and
therefore on parties to a contract. Whatever the analysis of this legal duty
within Dutch law – as a norm for judicial decision-making (addressed to the
court in order to resolve disputes in particular cases) or as a mandatory norm
addressed to the parties in their mutual dealings, itself based on a broader
societal norm of ‘reasonableness and fairness’;18 and even if it does not create
16 DCC Book 6, art. 248.
17 DCC Book 6, art. 2:1.
18 P.S. Bakker, Redelijkheid en billijkheid als gedragsnorm (thesis Amsterdam VU), Deventer:
Kluwer 2012 (there is an English summary at p. 147-153).
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a directly actionable private law obligation in itself but operates more in the
nature of a pervasive fundamental principle, underlying and justifying other
more particular legislative rules19 and allowing the development of new
particular rules by the courts20 – this general approach to the use of general
principle and generally-stated duties is not the way in which English law
works, nor does a general duty, or principle, of ‘reasonableness and fairness’
fit with the general approach to obligations, or contracts, in English law.
2.1 The use of general principle
English lawyers do refer to ‘principles’ of the law of contract: most commonly,
freedom of contract;21 and sanctity of contract22 or the binding force of con-
tract.23 Chitty on Contracts,24 the leading practitioner work on the law of con-
tract, even containswithin its opening chapter a section headed ‘Fundamental
Principles of Contract Law’, identifying a number of legal normswhichmight
be given the label of ‘principle’25 although it is made clear that there is no
19 E.g. DCC Book 6, art. 248, itself a broad provision which allows the contract to be both
supplemented and derogated from in a range of contexts, and Book 6, art. 258 (see below,
section 3).
20 E.g. the development of the principles of precontractual liability by the Dutch Supreme
Court beginning in HR 15 November 1957, ECLI:NL:HR:1957:AG2023 (Baris/Riezenkamp)
(by entering into negotiations with a view to concluding a contract, the parties come into
‘a special legal relationship, governed by good faith’: een bijzondere, door de goede trouw
beheerste, rechtsverhouding; M. Hesselink in J. Cartwright & M. Hesselink, Precontractual
Liability in European Private Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 46-49);
and the development by the Dutch Supreme Court of the judicial power to modify the
contract in light of unforeseen circumstances, in anticipation of the legislative provision
in Book 6, art. 258 of the new Civil Code: J. Chorus, P.-H. Gerver & E. Hondius (eds)
Introduction to Dutch Law for Foreign Lawyers, 4th revised edn, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer
Law International 2006, p. 139. Before the new Civil Code of 1992, the legislature and the
courts referred in such contexts to ‘good faith’ (goede trouw) which had both an objective
sense and a subjective sense. The newCode replaces this terminologywith ‘reasonableness
and fairness’ (redelijkheid en billijkheid) when it is used in the objective sense: Chorus, Gerver
& Hondius 2006, p. 138.
21 J. Beatson, A. Burrows & J. Cartwright (eds), Anson’s Law of Contract, 29th edn, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2010, p. 4-5; E. Peel (ed.), Treitel’s Law of Contract, 14th edn, London:
Sweet & Maxwell 2015, par. 1-005; H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 32nd edn, London:
Sweet & Maxwell 2015, par. 1-026 to 1-027.
22 Beatson, Burrows & Cartwright 2010, p. 7-8.
23 Beale 2015, par. 1-036 to 1-038.
24 Beale 2015, par. 1-025 to 1-056.
25 Beale 2015, par. 1-025: ‘There are a number of norms of the English law of contract of a
generality, pervasiveness and importance to have attracted the designation of principle,
though such a designation does not have a technical legal significance. A number of legal
norms could be advanced as included within such a category of principle, including the
principle of privity of contract, the principle of “objectivity” in agreement, and principles
of contractual interpretation. However, two linked principles remain of fundamental
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technical legal significance to the notion of underlying principles, but that by
the two principles of freedom of contract and the binding force of contract:26
‘English law has expressed its attachment to a general vision of contract as the free
expression of the choices of the parties which will then be given effect by the law.
However, while the modern law still takes these principles as the starting-point
of its approach to contracts, it also recognises a host of qualifications on them, some
recognised at common law and some created by legislation.’
The language here is significant. Even if we can identify underlying ‘principles’
of contract law, they do not equate to general duties imposed by the law on
the parties, but form the philosophical basis of the law in this area: the ‘general
vision’ of contract, the ‘starting-point’ of the law’s ‘approach to contracts’. This
reflects a matter of legal technique in the common law which contrasts in
general with the civil law: the reluctance to use general principle as a source
of legal duties, and the preference for particular, concrete rules.
Given that the English law of obligations is essentially contained in the
common law (case law) rather than statute, it is not surprising that it should
not be expressed in broad general principles. The common law of contract
is found in the body of cases which have decided particular points arising
in litigation between particular parties. Decisions are fact-specific, and the ratio
decidendi of a case – the legal rule which develops the law and forms a
precedent for future cases – is grounded in the facts of the case. Judges may
make broad statements of principle and general rules to support their decision,
but do not generally formulate the decisions themselves in terms of principle
– and so although we can state the general rules of the English law of contract
or of tort,27 the way in which we find the rules in the common law is by a
process of inductive reasoning from the decided cases, rather than there being
a general statement of a rule such as onemight expect to find in the text issued
by the civil law legislator. This different approach between the traditions is
importance, viz the principles of freedom of contract and of the binding force of contract’.
26 Beale 2015, par. 1-025.
27 The English textbooks on the law of contract, or the law of tort, necessarily contain general
statements of the relevant principles of the law, in a form not dissimilar to that which one
might find in a textbook on the law of obligations in a civil law system. There is, however,
a significant difference in the authorities which lie behind the general statements in the
text in an English law textbook: in effect, the difference lies in the footnotes. In the common
law the authorities from which the textbook writers derive their general statements are
usually cases, and often very particular cases for particular points rather than any authorit-
ative general statement of principle for which the cases stand as evidence.
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well known and has often been commented upon: for example,28 Roscoe
Pound wrote that the common lawyer:29
‘prefers to go forward cautiously on the basis of experience from this case or that
case to the next case, as justice in each case seems to require, instead of seeking
to refer everything back to supposed universals’
and Lord Cooper wrote from the perspective of the Scottish judge:30
‘The civilian naturally reasons from principles to instances, the common lawyer
from instances to principles’.
This difference, and its practical effects, must not be overstated, but it remains
true to the extent that the English judges do not normally expect to start from
general principles but from particular cases; and there is still a natural tend-
ency to use the specific rule, often derived from a specific case, rather than
to abandon the specifics in favour of some broader general principle even if
it can be derived from the earlier cases.
An illustration can be found in the law of torts. English law does not have
a single general principle of tort law, such as that found in art. 162 of the
Dutch Civil Code,31 but a series of particular torts which have their own
28 The quotations from Roscoe Pound and Lord Cooper are both given by K. Zweigert & H.
Kötz,An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn, translated by T.Weir, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1998, p. 259, with a caveat that ‘it would certainly be wrong to make out that there
was an unbridgeable opposition between the [Common Law]’s method of inductive prob-
lem-solving and the [Civil Law]’s method of systematic conceptualism. Such an antithesis
would emphasize the dominant trends and tendencies in the Common Law and Civil Law
but, in its absolute form, it would be an increasingly inaccurate and incomplete reflection
ofwhat can actually be seen happening in these two great legal families todaywhen lawyers
set about the task of discovering the law.’ Zweigert & Kötz 1998, ch. 18 contains a valuable
general comparative discussion of the different approaches of common law and civil law
legal systems to finding the law, also giving many useful references to other accounts.
29 R. Pound, ‘What is the Common Law?’ in: R. Pound (ed), The Future of the Common Law,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School 1937, p. 19. Pound was Professor at Harvard Law
School, and Dean from 1916 to 1936.
30 T.M. Cooper, ‘The Common Law and the Civil Law – A Scot’s View’ Harvard Law Review
(63) 1950, p. 471. Lord Cooper was Lord Justice General and Lord President of the Court
of Sessions of Scotland. Scotland is a ‘mixed’ legal system with influences of both the civil
law tradition and the English common law: not codified, but still based heavily on the
principles of law set out in the texts of institutional writers of the 17th, 18th and 19th
centuries (Stair, Erskine and Bell), and now developed by the courts which have adopted
the common lawdoctrine of precedent: Cooper 1950, p. 472-473; R. Zimmermann, D. Visser
& K. Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective – Property and Obligations
in Scotland and South Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 8-12.
31 Liability under art. 162 requires proof of unlawfulness, fault, damage and a causal link
between the act and the damage; but there are also separate provisions imposing liability
for the acts of other persons and for damage caused by things: see Chorus, Gerver &
Hondius 2006, p. 145-149. There is no common view amongst civil law systems about the
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historical roots.32 In the modern law, the most general of the torts is negli-
gence, although even that tort does not have a single general principle. We
can say that that a person is liable for (reasonably foreseeable) damage caused
by a breach of a duty of care, but the devil is in the detail, and in particular
in the fact that there is no single general test for the existence of a duty of care:
the courts begin by considering whether the case in question falls within an
established category of duty, for which the authority can be found in particular
cases; and they develop beyond those existing categories only cautiously. There
are some apparently wide statements of general principle: for example, in
Donoghue v. Stevenson, the case which is now seen as the origin of the modern
tort of negligence Lord Atkin said:33
‘Youmust take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neigh-
bour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected
by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so
affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called
in question.’
However, this was nomore than an explanation of the common thread uniting
the existing cases in the context of the case in hand – the claim by a consumer
in respect of personal injury caused by a defective product. Lord Atkin built
on the general idea that a person should be liable for foreseeable harm to
persons whom he ought reasonably have had in contemplation, but by articu-
lating a very precise rule for the type of case in hand:34
‘if your Lordships accept the view that this pleading discloses a relevant cause
of action you will be affirming the proposition that by Scots and English law alike
a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he
intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him
appropriate structure for tortious liability: French lawhas a very broad principle of liability
for damage caused by fault (with in addition strict liability for damage caused by persons
and things for which one is responsible) (French Civil Code, art. 1382-1384; the provisions
in the old Dutch Civil Code were based on this, and have been developed into the new
form of art. 162 ff. of the new Code); German law defines liability for intentional and
negligent harm by reference to protected interests (life, body, health, freedom, property
or other rights of another person) and for other losses generally requires their intentional
infliction contrary to public policy (German Civil Code, s. 823, 826). See generally C. van
Dam, European Tort Law, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, ch. 3 (France),
4 (Germany); W. van Gerven, J. Lever & P. Larouche, Tort Law (Ius Commune Casebooks
for the Common Law of Europe), Oxford: Hart Publishing 2001, p. 57-68.
32 See generally van Dam 2013, ch. 5; van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2001, p. 44-57; W.E. Peel
& J. Goudkamp (eds),Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 19th edn, London: Sweet &Maxwell 2014,
p. 35-40, 49-54.
33 House of Lords (Scotland) 26 May 1932 Donoghue v. Stevenson [2032] AC 562, p. 580.
34 House of Lords (Scotland) 26 May 1932 Donoghue v. Stevenson [2032] AC 562, p. 599.
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with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, andwith the knowledge
that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products
will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the
consumer to take that reasonable care.’
This decision was later applied by analogy to similar cases involving defective
products where the defendant was not a manufacturer but was a repairer of
a product whose defective workmanship resulted in a risk of injury to the user
of the product35 or to a third party;36 or the seller of a second-hand product
which resulted in injury to the user.37 Moreover, the decision in Donoghue
v. Stevensonwas later extended beyond the case of products, and in particular
from the 1960s onwards it came to be seen as the basis of a general develop-
ment of the tort of negligence. However, it was still not simply a broad general
principle under which a duty of care is based on foreseeability of harm, but
was taken as the basis of the development of a series of very carefully
particularised duties, which are defined by reference to types of factual situ-
ation – duties in relation to statements giving rise to economic loss,38 but not
duties in relation to economic loss generally;39 duties to exercise control over
third parties;40 duties in relation to psychiatric (as opposed to bodily) harm,41
and so on.42 The ‘categories of negligence’ are not closed, as Lord Macmillan
said inDonoghue v. Stevenson43 – but although general tests have been devised
to ascertain when a duty of care is owed,44 there are still categories of duty;
and the categories are defined by different types of factual situation, and above
all their application depends on the particular facts of the case in hand.45
35 Court of Appeal 31 July 1941 Haseldine v. C.A. Daw & Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343.
36 High Court 10 March 1939 Stennett v. Hancock [1939] 2 All ER 578.
37 High Court 23 October 1939Herschtal v. Stewart and Ardern Ltd [1940] 1 KB 155; High Court
30 July 1956 Andrews v. Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229.
38 House of Lords 28 May 1963 Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465;
House of Lords February 8 1990 Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.
39 House of Lords 14 July 1988 D. & F. Estates Ltd v. Church Commissioners for England [1989]
AC 177; House of Lords 26 July 1990Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398.
40 House of Lords 6 May 1970 Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004.
41 House of Lords 28 November 1991 Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992]
1 AC 310, building on House of Lords 5 August 1942 Bourhill v. Young [1943] AC 92.
42 See generally Peel & Goudkamp 2014, ch. 5.
43 [1932] AC 562, p. 619.
44 e.g. House of Lords February 8 1990 Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2AC 605, p. 617-
618 (Lord Bridge: ‘in addition to the foreseeability of damage, necessary ingredients in any
situation giving rise to a duty of care are that there should exist between the party owing
the duty and the party to whom it is owed a relationship characterised by the law as one
of “proximity” or “neighbourhood” and that the situation should be one inwhich the court
considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a given scope
upon the one party for the benefit of the other’).
45 See also J. Cartwright, Contract Law: An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the
Civil Lawyer, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013, p. 34-42.
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The same general approach can be seen in the law of contract. Judges will
sometimes refer explicitly to general principles to explain their reasoning: for
example, judges who reject an extension of the scope of mistake as a vitiating
factor in contracts may explain that this reflects an underlying principle of
the binding force of contract.46 But they will not apply the general principle
as a primary source of the decision. Even where a judge derives a general
principle from a group of established cases which might then be applied in
place of the particular cases there is a marked reluctance in the courts to accept
the move from the specific to the general. Lord Denning sought to replace
certain specific instances of contractual invalidity by a general principle of
‘inequality of bargaining power’:47
‘There are cases in our books in which the courts will set aside a contract, or a
transfer of property, when the parties have not met on equal terms – when the
one is so strong in bargaining power and the other so weak – that, as a matter of
common fairness, it is not right that the strong should be allowed to push theweak
to the wall. Hitherto those exceptional cases have been treated each as a separate
category in itself. But I think the time has come when we should seek to find a
principle to unite them. I put on one side contracts or transactions which are
voidable for fraud or misrepresentation or mistake. All those are governed by
settled principles. I go only to those where there has been inequality of bargaining
power, such as to merit the intervention of the court. ...
Gathering all together, I would suggest that through all these instances there runs
a single thread. They rest on “inequality of bargaining power.” By virtue of it, the
English law gives relief to one who, without independent advice, enters into a
contract upon termswhich are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration
which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired
by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled
with undue influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit
of the other.’
This was rejected, however, by Lord Scarman in a later case on the basis that
undue influence – one of the existing categories referred to by LordDenning –
is sufficiently developed not to need the support of a general principle; and
he doubted ‘whether there is any need in the modern law to erect a general
principle of relief against inequality of bargaining power. Parliament has
undertaken the task – and it is essentially a legislative task – of enacting such
restrictions upon freedom of contract as are in its judgment necessary to relieve
46 House of Lords 15 December 1931 Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161, p. 224.
47 Court of Appeal 30 July 1974 Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Bundy [1975]QB 326, p. 336-337. The specific
instances were duress of goods, unconscionable transactions, undue influence, undue
pressure and salvage agreements.
Cartwright 49
against themischief’.48 Those legislative provisions are all specifically targeted;
even legislationwithin the field of contract law is normally specific rather than
laying down general principles.
2.2 No general duty of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ in English contract
law
Aswe have seen above, English courts do not usually apply general principles
in deciding cases in private law. In the particular context of contract law, we
can add that there is no general principle of ‘reasonableness and fairness’, and
certainly no general duty of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ of the kind stated
in art. 2.1 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code. This can be seen in Chitty on
Contracts which, having discussed the ‘fundamental principles’ of freedom
of contract and the binding force of contract,49 goes on to note that, by con-
trast with civil law jurisdictions, and EU law, and even with some other com-
mon law systems, English common lawdoes not recognise a general principle
of ‘good faith’, or ‘good faith and fair dealing’.50 The standard of ‘reasonable-
ness’ or the ‘reasonable man’ is used within the law of contract; but it is used
for particular purposes, or in particular contexts, and not as an overarching
general principle nor can it be translated into a general duty of ‘good faith’
or ‘reasonableness and fairness’.
The standard of ‘reasonableness’ is used in interpreting contracts and
contractual communications. A person is held to have intended not what he
in fact meant his words to say, but what a reasonable person in the position
of the recipient would have understood them to mean.51 But this does not
mean that there is any overriding general rule the terms of the contract must
in themselves be ‘reasonable’ or ‘fair’. There is such a rule for certain types
of clause, in particular types of contract – the most general being the require-
ment for terms (except the definition of the main subject matter and the
adequacy of the price) not to be ‘unfair’ within the legislation governing
48 House of Lords 7March 1985NationalWestminster Bank Ltd v.Morgan [1985]AC 686, p. 708.
See also Privy Council 9 April 1979 Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, p. 634, where
Lord Scarman rejected an argument that therewas a rule of public policy bywhich unequal
bargaining could be controlled in the absence of duress proved in accordance with the
established cases: ‘Such a rule of public policy as is now being considered would be
unhelpful because it would render the law uncertain. It would become a question of fact
and degree to determine in each case whether there had been, short of duress, an unfair
use of a strong bargaining position’.
49 Beale 2015, par. 1-025, quoted above, n. 25.
50 Beale 2015, par. 1-025, 1-039 to 1-056.
51 For the interpretation of communications between negotiating parties, the ‘reasonable man’
is placed in the position of the other party; for the interpretation of written instruments
the ‘reasonable man’ is rather more external, reading the instrument with knowledge of
its context but not of what the parties themselves intended by their words: above, n. 4.
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consumer contracts;52 but even this broad category is a targeted protection
of a class of contracting parties (consumers), and is effected by a particular
legislative rule, rather than by a rule of the common law: the courts may find
ways to protect parties against unfair terms in certain situations, but they have
rejected the idea that the common law should have a general rule requiring
the terms to be reasonable, or giving the courts the power to strike down terms
on the basis of substantive unfairness.53 As we have already seen, the courts
have rejected a general principle of ‘inequality of bargaining power’ in favour
of the application of particular rules regulating specific forms of misconduct
between parties negotiating a contract. There are specific categories of mis-
conduct, such as misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence: but these
have their own individual rules and have not become generalised into a
broader principle.54 Sometimes the common law does require a particular
type of term to be ‘reasonable’: for example, a term in an employment contract
restricting the employee’s work for third parties after the employment is
terminated must be reasonable in both its physical scope and the time of its
operation if it is not to be unenforceable as being in restraint of trade.55 Such
cases are the exception, however, rather than the rule.
A general duty on contracting parties to act in good faith, or ‘reasonably
and fairly’, can be translated into duties to act in good faith in the negotiation,
performance and enforcement of the contract. Dutch law is not alone in
recognising such duties, which (in particular ways and with differences of
detail and of nuance) are generally known and accepted amongst continental
civil law jurisdictions.56 English law, however, admits neither the general
duty to act in good faith nor the more particular duties to negotiate, perform
and enforce one’s contractual rights and remedies in good faith. There are
particular types of contract where the courts have determined that the nature
of the relationship between the parties is such that they should owe each other
general duties of good faith in the negotiation and performance of the contract:
52 Consumer Rights Act 2015, Part 2; above, n. 9. For the control of exemption clauses in non-
consumer contracts by a test of ‘reasonableness’ see Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; above,
n. 8.
53 Privy Council 22 May 1985 Hart v O’Connor [1985] AC 1000, p. 1018 (‘Equity will relieve
a party from a contract which he has been induced to make as a result of victimisation.
Equity will not relieve a party from a contract on the ground only that there is contractual
imbalance not amounting to unconscionable dealing’).
54 See the rejection of Lord Denning’s approach in Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Bundy [1975] QB 326,
above, n. 47, by Lord Scarman in National Westminster Bank Ltd v. Morgan [1985] AC 686
(preferring to apply the rules of undue influence); Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614
(duress); above, n. 48.
55 House of Lords 8 February 1916 Herbert Morris v. Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688.
56 In relation to precontractual duties, see generally Cartwright & Hesselink 2008 with case
studies of 16 jurisdictions, and esp. p. 461-470 discussing English law and Dutch law as
the two European jurisdictions with apparently the most marked differences of approach.
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most obviously, a contract of partnership,57 but also traditionally this was
also applied to insurance contracts which are described as contracts uberrimae
fidei – of ‘utmost good faith’.58 However, these are the exception rather than
the rule; and the courts do not accept a general principle that the parties must
act reasonably, fairly or in good faith in their negotiations for a contract. In
Walford v. Miles Lord Ackner said:59
‘the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant
to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party
to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he
avoids making misrepresentations.’
If one party commits a recognised, actionable wrong during the course of the
negotiations, such as a misrepresentation, then the other party will have a
remedy. But there is no general positive duty of good faith.60
Similarly, in English law61 there is no general positive duty of good faith
during the performance of a contract, although recently a trial judge has said
that he sees no reason why the courts could not more easily find an implied
term of good faith in contracts, even commercial contracts:62
‘Under English law a duty of good faith is implied by law as an incident of certain
categories of contract, for example contracts of employment and contracts between
57 Court of Appeal 20 December 2006 Conlon v. Simms [2006] EWCA Civ 1749, [2008] 1 WLR
484.
58 Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 17; King’s Bench Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr. 1906, p. 1909-
1910. The parties’ mutual duties of disclosure which flowed from this duty of good faith
have however now been removed (for consumer insurance contracts) or replaced by more
particularised duties (for commercial insurance contracts): Consumer Insurance (Disclosure
and Representations) Act 2012, s. 2; Insurance Act 2015, s. 14 and Part 2.
59 House of Lords 23 January 1992 Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, p. 138.
60 Nor does English law impose other positive duties during the negotiations which might
be derived from a general duty of good faith, such as duties of disclosure: the general rule
is that there is no liability for non-disclosure unless there is a particular duty of disclosure
by reason of the type of contract or the relationship between the parties: Beatson, Burrows
& Cartwright 2012, p. 332-347.
61 This is an even stricter approach than in some other common law jurisdictions: e.g. in the
United States the Uniform Commercial Code (2002) §1-304 provides that ‘Every contract
or duty within the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance and enforcement’, ‘good faith’ being defined as generally meaning ‘honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing’: §1-201(b)(20).
See also Restatement of Contracts Second (1981) §205; E.A. Farnsworth, Contracts, 4th edn,
New York: Aspen 2004,§7.17, noting that ‘some courts, concerned lest the doctrine of good
faith get out of hand, have imposed a judicially fashioned restriction under which the
doctrine does not create “independent” rights separate from those created by the provisions
of the contract’, although ‘not all courts have been so respectful of the express provisions
of the contract’.
62 High Court 1 February 2013 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v. International Trade Corp. Ltd [2013] EWHC
111 (QB), [2013] 1 CLC 662, par. 132 (Leggatt J.).
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partners or others whose relationship is characterised as a fiduciary one. I doubt
that English law has reached the stage, however, where it is ready to recognise
a requirement of good faith as a duty implied by law, even as a default rule, into
all commercial contracts. Nevertheless, there seems to me to be no difficulty,
following the established methodology of English law for the implication of terms
in fact, in implying such a duty in any ordinary commercial contract based on the
presumed intention of the parties.’
This statement does not go so far as to argue for a general principle of good
faith in contracts, and apart from the context of ‘relational contracts’63 it has
been received with some scepticism.64
3 ‘REASONABLENESS AND FAIRNESS’ AS A STANDARD TO FILL OUT THE TERMS
OF A CONTRACT, OR TO MODIFY ITS EFFECTS OR DISAPPLY OTHERWISE
BINDING RULES
In the context of contracts, by virtue of art. 248 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil
Code, the general principle of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ has both a ‘supple-
menting’ function, and a ‘derogating’ function: it can be used as the justifica-
tion for filling out the terms of the contract, and for modifying the effects of
63 High Court 2 July 2014 Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Whittingham [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch), par.
196, following the reference of Leggatt J. to relational contracts in Yam Seng [2013] EWHC
111 (QB), [2013] 1 CLC 662, par. 142: ‘a longer term relationship between the parties which
they make a substantial commitment. Such “relational” contracts, as they are sometimes
called,may require a high degree of communication, cooperation and predictable perform-
ance based on mutual trust and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty which are
not legislated for in the express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties’ under-
standing and necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements. Examples of such
relational contracts might include some joint venture agreements, franchise agreements
and long term distributorship agreements’. In High Court 13 February 2015 D & G Cars
Ltd v Essex Police Authority [2015] EWHC 226 (QB), par. 175 Dove J. preferred to use the
term ‘integrity’, rather than ‘good faith’, ‘to capture the requirements of fair dealing and
transparency’ in a long-term relational contract.
64 See, e.g. Court of Appeal 15 March 2013 Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v. Compass
Group UK and Ireland Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 200, par. 105, 150 (discussing an express term
to co-operate in good faith); High Court 8May 2013 TSG Building Services plc v. South Anglia
Housing Ltd [2013] EWHC 1151 (TCC), par. 46 (Akenhead J.: ‘Because cases and contracts
are sensitive to context, I would not draw any principle from this extremely illuminating
and interesting judgment which is of general application to all commercial contracts’); High
Court 31 October 2013 Hamsard 3147 Ltd v. Boots UK Ltd [2013] EWHC 3251 (Pat), par. 86
(Norris J.: ‘I do not regard the decision in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v. International Trade Corporation
as authority for the proposition that in commercial contracts it may be taken to be the
presumed intention of the parties that there is a general obligation of “good faith”’).
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the contract or disapplying rules binding on the parties as a result of the
contract.65
All legal systems need some form of ‘supplementing’ function in their law
of contract, if only because the parties to a contract will often not fully arti-
culate their intentions, or will fail to considerwhether certain provisionsmight
be necessary which turn out to be important in the performance of the contract.
English lawyers see this in a doctrine of implied terms, but there is a certain
restraint. Terms are implied into contracts on the facts to give effect to the
intentions of the parties, or to what the parties can (objectively) be taken to
have intended,66 and sometimes terms are implied by law by reason of the
nature of the contract, often to protect one party to such a contract;67 and
as a rule a term cannot be implied which would contradict an express term,
so the parties’ freedom of contract is the clear starting-point (and often the
end-point).68 But there is no general principle by which a termwill be implied
on the facts into a contract simply on the basis that the termwould be ‘reason-
able’;69 and, as we have seen above, there is no term implied by law into all
contracts requiring the parties to perform the contract in good faith.70
In relation to the ‘derogating’ function of the principle of ‘reasonableness
and fairness’ within Dutch law we see a sharply different view in England.
Indeed, when the courts have been faced with arguments that a party should
be dispensed from a general rule of contract law on the basis that to do so
would be ‘fair’, or ‘reasonable’, or ‘equitable’, there has been a clear tendency
to reject the argument on the basis that it undermines the security of contracts.
The rules of ‘Equity’ – those devised by the Courts of Equity from the fifteenth
century onwards, to mitigate the strict rules applied by the Common Law
65 DCC Book 6, art. 248: 1 (supplementing), 248: 2 (derogating), quoted above, section 1. See
generally Chorus, Gerver & Hondius 2006, p. 137-140; A.S. Hartkamp, M.M.M. Tillema
& A.E.B. ter Heide, Contract Law in the Netherlands, 3rd edn, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters
Kluwer Law & Business 2011, par. 32.
66 See, e.g. Privy Council 18 March 2009 Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Ltd [2009]
UKPC 10, [2009] 1WLR 1988, par. 27 (Lord Hoffmann: ‘the fact that the proposed implied
term would be inequitable or unreasonable, or contradict what the parties have expressly
said, or is incapable of clear expression, are all good reasons for saying that a reasonable
man would not have understood that to be what the instrument meant’).
67 E.g. terms in leases requiring landlords tomaintain property in favour of residential tenants:
House of Lords 31 March 1976 Liverpool City Council v. Irwin [1977] AC 239; Landlord and
Tenant Act 1985, s.11.
68 The exceptions are where by statute a party is not permitted to exclude or restrict liability
for breach of a particular kind of term implied by law, usually designed to protect a type
of contracting party (such as consumers).
69 House of Lords 31March 1976 Liverpool City Council v. Irwin [1977]AC 239, p. 253-254 (Lord
Wilberforce, rejecting such a principle stated by Lord DenningM.R. in the Court of Appeal
on the basis that it would ‘extend a long, and undesirable, way beyond sound authority’).
70 High Court 1 February 2013 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v. International Trade Corp. Ltd [2013] EWHC
111 (QB), [2013] 1 CLC 662, par. 132 (Leggatt J.); above, n. 62.
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Courts71 – may have been motivated by the desire to inject fairness into the
body of legal rules in our legal system, including the law of contract.72 But
they have crystallised into rules in the modern law, and there is no general
power in the courts to ‘do equity’ in individual cases.73
A good illustration of this is Union Eagle Ltd v. Golden Achievement Ltd
where the Privy Council rejected an argument that the seller of a flat in Hong
Kong should not be entitled to forfeit the buyer’s deposit and rescind the
contract of sale where the buyer missed by only ten minutes the deadline set
in the contract to tender the balance of the purchase price. The argument was
that the court should have power to dispense from the strict terms of the
contract where their operation would be ‘unconscionable’. Lord Hoffmann
noted that there are circumstances when the courts can relieve against for-
feiture of property rights, but rejected the argument here and as a matter of
general principle:74
‘The notion that the court’s jurisdiction to grant relief is “unlimited and unfettered”
(per Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding75) was rejected as
a “beguiling heresy” by the House of Lords in Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. AB
v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade).76 It is worth pausing to notice why
it continues to beguile and why it is a heresy. It has the obvious merit of allowing
the court to impose what it considers to be a fair solution in the individual case.
The principle that equity will restrain the enforcement of legal rights when it would
be unconscionable to insist upon them has an attractive breadth. But the reasons
why the courts have rejected such generalisations are founded not merely upon
authority (see per Lord Radcliffe in Campbell Discount Co. Ltd v. Bridge77) but also
upon practical considerations of business. These are, in summary, that in many
forms of transaction it is of great importance that if something happens for which
the contract has made express provision, the parties should know with certainty
that the terms of the contract will be enforced. The existence of an undefined
discretion to refuse to enforce the contract on the ground that this would be “un-
conscionable” is sufficient to create uncertainty. Even if it is most unlikely that
a discretion to grant relief will be exercised, its mere existence enables litigation
71 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History London: Butterworths LexisNexis 2002,
ch. 6.
72 Equitable doctrines and rules in contract law include the remedies of specific performance
and injunction, and rectification of a written contract; and a broader right to rescission of
a contract in equity for misrepresentation (even innocent: the common law required fraud)
and undue influence (the common law allowed rescission only for the more narrowly-
defined duress): Beatson, Burrows & Cartwright 2010, p. 575-584, 262-265, 311, 349.
73 Cartwright 2013, p. 5-8.
74 Privy Council 3 February 1997 Union Eagle Ltd v. Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514,
p. 518-519.
75 House of Lords 13 December 1972 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] AC 691, p. 726.
76 House of Lords 30 June 1983 Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. AB v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana
(The Scaptrade) [1983] 2 AC 694, p. 700.
77 House of Lords 25 January 1962 Campbell Discount Co. Ltd v. Bridge [1962] AC 600, p. 626.
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to be employed as a negotiating tactic. The realities of commercial life are that this
may cause injustice which cannot be fully compensated by the ultimate decision
in the case.’
This is evidence against the proposition that a party must act reasonably and
fairly, or in good faith, in exercising his contractual rights and the remedies
provided by the law or expressly by the contract for the other party’s breach.
It does not mean that the courts cannot sometimes find solutions which lean
in favour of finding a ‘fair’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘equitable’ result where they are
able to use the established general rules of contract law in order to achieve
a specific targeted result in an individual case.78 Our judges are not immune
to feeling that the law needs sometimes to be softened at the edges. But they
reject the idea that there is a general power to allow them to dispense a party
from the contract simply on the basis of a principle of reasonableness or
fairness.
Similarly, the courts have rejected the idea that a party who makes a
mistake about the subject-matter of the contract should be able to avoid the
contract on the basis of a judicially-operated principle of fairness. Lord
Denning proposed an approach to mistake based on fairness;79 but this was
contrary to an earlier clear statement by Lord Atkin in the House of Lords:80
‘All these cases involve hardship on A. and benefit B., as most people would say,
unjustly. They can be supported on the ground that it is of paramount importance
that contracts should be observed, and that if parties honestly comply with the
essentials of the formation of contracts – i.e., agree in the same terms on the same
subject-matter – they are bound, and must rely on the stipulations of the contract
for protection from the effect of facts unknown to them. ...
The result is that in the present case servants unfaithful in some of their work retain
large compensation which some will think they do not deserve. Nevertheless it
is of greater importance that well established principles of contract should be
78 For example, they may be able to interpret a contract term so as to achieve a fair result,
even if it appears to be drafted to the contrary: Court of Appeal 30 June 2000 Rice v. Great
Yarmouth Borough Council (2001) 3 LGLR 4 (clause allowing local authority to terminate 4-year
contract with sole trader if ‘the contractor ... commits a breach of any of its obligations under
the contract’ was construed as referring only to breaches sufficient to allow termination
of a contract under the general law); S. Whittaker, ‘Termination Clauses’ in: A. Burrows
& E. Peel (eds), Contract Terms Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, p. 253.
79 Court of Appeal 25 November 1949 Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671, p. 692 (‘the court of
equity would often relieve a party from the consequences of his own mistake, so long as
it could do so without injustice to third parties. The court, it was said, had power to set
aside the contract whenever it was of opinion that it was unconscientious for the other
party to avail himself of the legal advantage which he had obtained’).
80 House of Lords 15 December 1931 Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd [1932]AC 161, p. 229 (discussing
both hypothetical cases of mistakes and the facts of the case itself, in which the House of
Lords held that the parties’ mistake was not sufficient to avoid the contract).
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maintained than that a particular hardship should be redressed; and I see no way
of giving relief to the plaintiffs in the present circumstances except by confiding
to the Courts loose powers of introducing terms into contracts which would only
serve to introduce doubt and confusion where certainty is essential.’
The stricter approach set out by Lord Atkin was reasserted, and Lord
Denning’s broader approach was rejected, by the Court of Appeal in 2002.81
The Court noted that Lord Denning’s preferred equitable jurisdiction to grant
rescission formistake would give greater flexibility than the narrower common
law doctrine of mistake but thought that the courts could not develop it,
although there was scope for legislation on the point – but, as always, what
the Court clearly had in mind was a specific legislative provision for mistake,
and not any broader general legislative principle of reasonableness and fair-
ness.82
In addition to the general provision relating to ‘reasonableness and fairness’
in contracts under art. 248 of the Dutch Civil Code, there is also a more par-
ticular provision relating to change of circumstances in art. 258, where the
court has power tomodify the terms of the contract on the basis of ‘reasonable-
ness and fairness’:83
‘1. Upon the demand of one of the parties, the court may modify the effects of a
contract or it may set it aside, in whole or in part, on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances of such a nature that the other party, according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract to be maintained in
unmodified form. The modification or setting aside may be given retroactive effect.
2. The modification or the setting aside shall not be pronounced to the extent that
it is common ground that the person invoking the circumstances should be account-
able for them or if this follows from the nature of the contract.
3. For the purposes of this article, a party to whom a contractual right or obligation
has been transmitted, is treated as a contracting party.’
Every legal system needs to determine the appropriate provision to be made
in the case of a significant change of circumstances during the performance
of a contract, whether such a change has the drastic effect of rendering per-
formance accordance with the terms entirely (physically) impossible, or merely
makes some change in the nature or value of the contractual performance.
The English common law developed the doctrine of ‘frustration’ for this case:
if the performance of the contract becomes impossible, illegal, or ‘radically
different’ as a result of an unforeseeable change of circumstances for which
81 Court of Appeal 14 October 2002 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v. Tsavliris Salvage (International)
Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, [2003] QB 679, par. 156-157, 160.
82 Court of Appeal 14 October 2002 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v. Tsavliris Salvage (International)
Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, [2003] QB 679, par. 161.
83 DCC Book 6, art. 258.
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the contract makes no provision, the contractual obligations of both parties
are automatically discharged in so far as they had not yet fallen due for
performance;84 and there is provision by statute for the court to have the
power to make limited financial orders for repayment of money already paid
under the contract, and for a party to pay for benefits already received under
the contract.85 The point to notice for present purposes, however, is that the
court’s role in the doctrine of frustration is limited: in the event of dispute
it can adjudicate on whether the test for frustration has been satisfied; and
it has a statutory power to determine (on a discretionary basis) certain parti-
cular aspects of the financial consequences of the discharge of the contract.
But it has no power to intervene so as to change the terms of the contract itself.
There are cases where a court has found a way of intervening indirectly, not
by changing the terms but by interpreting the contract, or by implying terms,
so as to decide that the contract in fact (objectively) provided for the change
of circumstances.86 But the idea that the court should have an express power
to modify the contract or its effects, in the broad way described in art. 258
of the Dutch Civil Code, is simply unthinkable. The contract is for the parties;
and even in the most extreme cases where performance becomes impossible
or radically different, the most that the law can do is to terminate the contract
to discharge the parties and leave them to re-negotiate their transaction in the
light of the changed circumstances. Indeed, that is what the doctrine of frustra-
tion does within English law: it encourages the parties either to make provision
within their contract for future events, in so far as they can do so; or to sort
out the consequences of the change by renegotiation when the change
occurs.87 And in such a renegotiation – unlike in Dutch law88 – the parties
are free to act in their own interests: there is no general duty to negotiate in
good faith, or to take the other party’s interests into account in the negotiations;
nor is there any duty to re-negotiate in good faith in light of change of circum-
stances.89 This further highlights the different understanding of English and
Dutch law in relation to the positions of the parties, as well as the role of the
court, in solving the problems which arise in such cases.90
84 Beale 2012, ch. 23; Beatson, Burrows & Cartwright 2010, ch. 14; Cartwright 2013, ch. 11.
85 Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.
86 E.g. Court of Appeal 2 May 1978 Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South Staffordshire
Waterworks Co. [1978] 1WLR 1387 (long-term contract to supply water at fixed price could
be terminated by notice, either on basis of interpretation of the contract, or implied term).
87 E. McKendrick, ‘Force Majeure Clauses: The Gap between Doctrine and Practice’ in: A.
Burrows & E. Peel (eds), Contract Terms Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, p. 233.
88 cf. HR 15 November 1957, ECLI:NL:HR:1957:AG2023 (Baris/Riezenkamp), above, n. 20.
89 House of Lords 23 January 1992Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, p. 138 (above, n. 59). Even
an express term of the contract requiring the parties to renegotiate is not effective in English
law, although the courts are uncomfortable with this: Court of Appeal 15 July 2005 Petromec
Inc v. Petroleo Brasileiro SA [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 121, par. 121.
90 Bakker 2012, ch. 4 argues that DCC Book 6, art. 258 expresses the parties’ own duty to act
reasonably and fairly to solve the problems arising from the change of circumstances.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
The use of a general standard, or norm, of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ feels
natural – indeed, instinctive – to the Dutch lawyer; and both its articulation
as a general duty, and its translation into particular rules of contract law, seem
to be equally natural and instinctive. The Dutch Civil Code identifies the
content of the requirement of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ in the general
provisions at the start of Book 3 (Property Law):91
‘In determining what reasonableness and fairness require, generally accepted
principles of law, current judicial views in the Netherlands and the societal and
private interests involved in the case must be taken into account.’
Dutch lawyers explain this further in different ways, but it is not out of line
for one to write:92
‘Society cannot do without reasonableness and the legal community cannot do
without the principle of reasonableness and fairness, which is based on this societal
norm.’
English law does not share the same vision, at least in the context of the legal
duties owed by parties in private law. We have seen that this results from
a number of different factors. In the first place, English law prefers to use
particular rules to identify particular legal responses, rather than deriving the
answer for a case from a broad general principle. This may be a natural
consequence of a case-lawmethod such as typifies the common law, but even
legislative intervention in England tends to be particular rather than laying
down general principles as the source of legal rules.
Secondly, in the context of contracts the approach of the courts to inter-
vention is generally rather restrained. There is a general view that it is for the
parties to determine their bargain rather than for the courts, and as long as
there is no particular misconduct by either party (such as fraud or duress in
its formation) the parties should be free to regulate their own affairs. There
are exceptions, often to protect particular classes of contracting parties (the
broadest class being consumers) or where the contract is of a type which
justifies closer judicial control. But these are exceptions to the general rule,
which is based on the parties’ freedom of contract.
Thirdly, there is a clear view that if the courts had the freedom to intervene
in contracts on the basis of some general principle such as ‘reasonableness
and fairness’ this would undermine the certainty and security of contracts.
91 DCC Book 3, art. 12.
92 Bakker 2012, p. 153.
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Even the power to intervene only in extreme cases93 would be enough to open
the door to parties claiming that their case was the one in which the court
should exercise the power in their favour; so it is better to take a tough line
for all at the expense of a few individual hard cases.
We cannot simply weigh these different views of the two legal systems
against each other and conclude that one is right, the other wrong. The reality
is that they represent different visions of contract, but we must not make the
mistake of placing our systems in direct opposition, as if English law did not
see any place for reasonableness and fairness, or Dutch law failed to respect
freedomof contract, and certainty and sanctity of contract. The law of contract
in any legal systemmust contain aspects of both views: there will be contracts
where certainty is paramount, and the courts should not only hesitate to
intervene but should simply not intervene on the basis that it is for the parties
to determine their own affairs–such cases are typically those between com-
mercial parties who negotiate at arm’s length and for whom no paternalistic
intervention is appropriate. But in all systems there are other cases where the
contract is of a kind where the parties (or, generally, one of the parties) needs
some protection by the courts’ intervention, and one way for the courts to do
this is to apply some overriding general rule based on fairness or reasonable-
ness which can allow it to intervene in cases which do not have to be contained
within the straightjacket of particular rules. However, in formulating its rules
of contract law, a legal system needs to adopt a paradigm case: is a contract
seen at its core as a co-operative venture between parties who in the creation,
formation and enforcement of their venture can be expected to meet certain
objectively-definable standards of behaviour? Or is it an arm’s length com-
mercial transaction, in which the parties are in principle entitled to determine
their own risks and rewards, free from external intervention? English law has
protective rules, for individual types of contract and individual types of
contracting party – and in themodern law the range and scope of such protect-
ive rules, particularly in the case of non-commercial contracts, has grown very
significantly. But the paradigm case of a contract in English law remains the
arm’s length commercial transaction; and given the general reluctance of the
English courts to abandon particular duties in favour of a general principle
as a source of legal obligation, it seems inherently unlikely that the English
courts would wish to turn the particular protective rules within the sphere
of contract law into an overriding general principle so as to reverse the para-
digm business model.
93 In Dutch law the ‘derogating’ function of the principle of reasonableness and fairness under
DCC Book 6, art. 248:2 can be applied only where the rule otherwise binding on the parties
is ‘unacceptable’ (onaanvaardbaar): this ‘indicates that such a decision should be reserved
for exceptional situations, but even so the provision is frequently applied by the courts’:
Chorus, Gerver & Hondius 2006, p. 138.
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Why does this difference in the two systems’ vision of contracts matter?
It is of course significant for parties negotiating a contract in relation to choice
of law in cross-border transactions. But it may also help to explain the coolness
(to say the least) of the reaction in England to proposals in recent years to
harmonise the law of contract in Europe. For example, article 2 of the proposed
Common European Sales Law provided:94
‘1. Each party has a duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing.
2. Breach of this duty may preclude the party in breach from exercising or relying
on a right, remedy or defence which that party would otherwise have, or may
make the party liable for any loss thereby caused to the other party.
3. The parties may not exclude the application of this Article or derogate from
or vary its effect.’
The Dutch lawyer should see no difficulty with this: it fits the Dutch model
of contract and its use of general principle as a source of legal duties to give
effect to a basic underlying principle of the law. It is not so, however, for the
English lawyer.
94 COM(2011) 635 final Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on a Common European Sales Law, Annex 1, art. 2 (‘Good faith and fair dealing’). See also
O. Lando & H. Beale, Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, The Hague, Kluwer
Law International 2000, art. 1:201; C. von Bar & E. Clive (eds), Principles Definitions and
Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) Full Edition
Munich: Sellier 2009, III.-1:103.
3 The impact of the ADR Directive on article
7:904 par. 1 DCC explored
What is ‘unacceptable according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness’ after the implementa-
tion of the Directive?
Marte Knigge & Eline Verhage
1 INTRODUCTION
‘Reasonableness and fairness’ can undoubtedly be reckoned among the ‘core
concepts’ of the Dutch Civil Code (hereafter: ‘DCC’). The important role this
concept plays within the law of obligations is made clear by art. 6:2 and art.
6:248 DCC.1 Next to these more general provisions, the Dutch Civil Code
contains several specific applications of the concept.2 One of the provisions
in which the concept of reasonableness and fairness is applied is art. 7:904
par. 1 DCC. This specific application forms the central theme of this contribu-
tion.
Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC is part of the title on the contract of settlement. A
species of the contract of settlement is the contract of binding advice. Binding
advice is amethod of Alternative Dispute Resolution (hereafter: ‘ADR’) inwhich
an independent third party (one or more ‘binding advisor(s)’) gives a binding
decision that resolves the dispute between the parties.3 Especially in consumer
disputes, this method of alternative dispute resolution is used very often. The
Netherlands has a successful system of consumer dispute resolution through
binding advice by e.g. ConsumerComplaints Boards (‘Geschillencommissies’).4
Binding advice resembles arbitration to some extent, but it differs from it in
M.W. Knigge is assistant professor of Private Law, Leiden University. E.N. Verhage is PhD
candidate at the department of Civil Procedural Law, LeidenUniversity. The authorswould
like to thank prof. mr. W.H. van Boom and prof. mr. H.J. Snijders for their comments on
an earlier version of this contribution. This contribution was completed in August 2015.
1 See also the contribution of Cartwright to this yearbook.
2 Cartwright gives an overview; see footnote 13 of his contribution.
3 Binding advice can also be used in situations where there is no legal dispute between the
parties, butwhere the third party supplements ormodifies the rules governing the juridical
relationship between the parties; P.E. Ernste, Bindend advies (diss. Nijmegen), Deventer:
Kluwer 2012, p. 1; B. van der Bend, M. Leijten & M. Ynzonides (eds.), A guide to the NAI
Arbitration Rules, Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2009, p. 46.
4 See on the Dutch consumer dispute resolution system further section 2.
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that its procedure is much less regulated and a grant of execution (‘exequatur’)
for the decision cannot be obtained. Since binding advice is based on a contract,
the decision has the force of an agreement between the parties. A party can
request performance before a court.5 Although its name is somewhat am-
biguous, binding advice is thus a binding form of ADR. From art. 7:902 DCC
it follows that a decision taken to terminate an uncertainty or dispute in the
field of the law of property, proprietary rights and interests is valid, notwith-
standing that it proves to be in breach of mandatory law, unless it would also
be in breach of good morals and public policy. The DCC holds very limited
grounds on which a decision taken by binding advisors can be challenged.
Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC states:
‘A decision of a party or third person may be annulled if it would be unacceptable
to hold him6 to it in connection with the content or manner of its establishment
in the given circumstances, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.’
Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC introduces a marginal review of the decisions of binding
advisors. Only if it is unacceptable to hold a party to it according to standards
of reasonableness and fairness, may the decision be annulled.7 The case law
makes it clear that this can only be assumed in exceptional circumstances.8
However, it is questionable whether this limited possibility of review can
be maintained with the implementation of Directive 2013/11/EU on consumer
ADR (hereafter: ADR Directive) in tandem with Regulation (EU) 524/2013 on
consumer ODR (hereafter: ODR Regulation; ODR stands for ‘Online Dispute
Resolution’).9 Directive 2013/11/EU aims to facilitate access for consumers
to ADR procedures and establishes several quality requirements for ADR Proced-
5 Binding advice is a typical Dutch legal construct. For foreign structures that are to some
extent comparable, see Ernste 2012, pp. 11-12. See on the construct of binding advice further
section 2.
6 This translation of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC suggests that it is the party or the third person
who has taken the decision that may annul the decision. Obviously, it is the parties that
are bound by the decision that have this authority. ‘Him’ refers to the parties that have
brought their dispute to ADR, not to the binding advisor who has decided their case.
7 Toelichting Meijers, Vierde gedeelte, Boek 7, pp. 1146-1147; C. Hodges, I. Benöhr & N.
Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2012, p. 142; Ernste
2012, p. 73; Dutch Supreme Court 15 June 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW0727 (PWC/x), par.
3.5.2.
8 Dutch Suptreme Court18 June 1993, NJ 1993/615 (Gruythuysen c.s./SCZ), par. 4; Dutch
Supreme Court 25 March 1994, NJ 1995/23 (Midden Gelderland/Lukkien), par. 3.3; Dutch
Supreme Court 12 September 1997, NJ 1998/382, note M.M. Mendel (Confood/Zürich), par.
3.5; see also Ernste 2012, p. 73; Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 163.
9 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC; Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer
disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC.
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ures.10 Member states need to ensure that disputes covered by the Directive
can be submitted to an ADR entity which complies with these requirements.11
The aim of the ODR Regulation is to create an online ADR platform, which
should increase access for consumers and traders online to ADR procedures
and make the online resolution of consumer disputes possible.12
This contribution examines the impact of the ADR Directive on the inter-
pretation of the concept of reasonableness and fairness within the context of
art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. If a binding advice procedure does not comply with the
quality requirements set out in the Directive, will this make it ‘unacceptable
according to standards of reasonableness and fairness’ to hold a party to the
decision? Does the ADR Directive require that the decision can be annulled
in such a case? These questionswill be addressed in this contribution (sections
6-7), after a further analysis of the Dutch system of resolving consumer dis-
putes by means of binding advice is given (section 2) and the aims of the ADR
Directive (section 3), its quality requirements (section 4) and the implementa-
tion in the Dutch legal system (section 5) are described. This contribution closes
with suggestions for alternative ways to enhance the quality of consumer ADR
(section 8).
2 RESOLVING CONSUMER DISPUTES THROUGH BINDING ADVICE IN THE
NETHERLANDS
In the Netherlands, alternative resolution of consumer disputes is well devel-
oped. Different institutions that provide out-of-court resolution for consumer
disputes co-exist. Characteristic of the Dutch Consumer Dispute Resolution
system (hereafter: ‘Dutch CDR system’) is the triad of the Foundation for the
Consumer Complaints Boards (the ‘Stichting Geschillencommissies voor
Consumentenzaken’, hereafter: ‘SGC’), the Financial Services Complaints
Tribunal (‘Klachteninstituut Financiële Dienstverlening’, hereafter: ‘Kifid’) and
the Health Insurance Complaints and Disputes Board (‘Stichting Klachten en
Geschillen Zorgverzekeringen’, hereafter: ‘SKGZ’). The SGC, Kifid and SKGZ use
a variety of ADR procedures that range from an ombudsman scheme to medi-
ation. However, central part of the dispute resolution scheme of almost all
of these institutions is a binding advice procedure.13
Binding advice is an informal method of ADR. Binding advice is based on
a contract between the parties. This contract is seen as a species of the contract
10 See for example recital 7 of the ADR Directive.
11 See art. 5 ADR Directive.
12 See art. 1 ODR Regulation; recital 18 ODR Regulation.
13 See on the Dutch CDR system Hodges, Benöhr & Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012, pp. 129-165. By
way of exception, arbitration is used instead of binding advice. This is the case at the
Geschillencommissie Garantiewoningen.
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of settlement (‘vaststellingsovereenkomst’), governed by title 15 of book 7 of
the Dutch Civil Code. By this contract, parties agree in advance to be bound
by the decision given by one or more binding advisors. An important differ-
ence with arbitration is that the decision taken by binding advisors cannot
acquire the force of res judicata and a grant of execution (‘exequatur’) cannot
be obtained. However, the decision does have the force of an agreement
between the parties. Non-compliance is seen as breach of contract and a party
can request performance before a court.14 In practice, enforcement is not
problematic for the consumer when binding advice at the SGC is concerned.
The Consumer Complaints Boards under the umbrella of the SGC are estab-
lished after negotiations between trade associations and consumer asso-
ciation(s). The trade association guarantees payment of the claim if the trader
fails to do so.15
There are limited grounds on which the validity of a decision taken by
binding advisors can be challenged. A decision may be annulled on the basis
of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC if it would be unacceptable to hold a party to it accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness. Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCCmentions
two grounds for review. It may be unacceptable to hold a party to a decision
either in connection with the content of the decision or in connection with the
manner of its establishment. Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC also makes it clear that the
given circumstances should be taken into account while making the assessment.
When is it unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and
fairness to hold a party to a decision in connection with the content of this
decision? Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC should be read in conjunction with art. 7:902
DCC. This provision makes it clear that a decision is binding on the parties
even if it is in breach of mandatory law. This is different when the decision
is also in breach of good morals and public policy:
‘A settlement to terminate an uncertainty or dispute in the field of the law of
property, proprietary rights and interests is valid, notwithstanding that it proves
to be in breach of mandatory law, unless it would also, as to content or necessary
implication, be in breach of good morals and public policy.’
Art. 7:902 DCC has implications for art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. Since art. 7:902 DCC
makes it clear that a decision is even valid if it is in breach of mandatory law,
it is not possible to annul a decision on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC on
14 See for English legal literature on binding advice Van der Bend, Leijten & Ynzonides 2009,
pp. 46-47; J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver & E.H. Hondius (eds.), Introduction to Dutch law,
Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2006, pp. 239-240, p. 268; M. van Hooijdonk
& P. Eijsvoogel, Litigation in the Netherlands. Civil Procedure, Arbitration and Administrative
Litigation, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International 2012, pp. 149-150.
15 Hodges, Benöhr & Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012, p. 140, p. 144; Chorus, Gerver &Hondius 2006,
pp. 240, 268.
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the sole ground that it is in breach of mandatory law.16 An error in the de-
cision is not enough to challenge the decision.17 Only serious defects in the
decision will justify the conclusion that it is unacceptable to hold a party to
it.18
Art. 7:902 DCC in combination with art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC thus makes it
possible for the SGC to apply a different standard for deciding their cases than
the rules of law. Instead, they decide the disputes submitted to them according
to ‘reasonableness and fairness, while taking into account the contract between
the parties and the conditions included therein’.19 These conditions are usually
the conditions bilaterally agreed between trade associations and consumer
association(s).20 Research shows that these conditions play a role in a sub-
stantial number of decisions of the SGC.21 The decisions by the SGC are there-
fore not necessarily in accordance with (mandatory) law.22 Art. 7:902 DCC
approves this possible deviation from the law, as long as goodmorals or public
policy are not breached.
A decision may also be annulled on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC in
connection with the manner of its establishment. Themanner of establishment
of a decision may for example be contested when the principles of a fair trial
have not been observed. However, the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court
makes it clear that the principles of a fair trial are not applicable in full in
every binding advice procedure. Binding advice can also be used in situations
where there is no legal dispute between the parties, but where binding advisors
supplement or modify the rules governing the juridical relationship between
the parties.23 For example, in case of a leasehold the parties may agree not
to determine the amount of the ground rent payable by the leaseholder in the
16 Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 163; see Dutch Supreme Court 12 September 1997,
NJ 1998/382, note M.M. Mendel (Confood/Zürich) and the opinion of Advocate General
Bakels, no 3.26-3.29.
17 Dutch Supreme Court 18 June 1993, NJ 1993/615 (Gruythuysen c.s./SCZ), par. 4; Dutch
Supreme Court 25 March 1994, NJ 1995/23 (Midden Gelderland/Lukkien), par. 3.3; Dutch
Supreme Court 12 September 1997, NJ 1998/382, note M.M. Mendel (Confood/Zürich), par.
3.5.
18 Dutch Supreme Court 12 September 1997,NJ 1998/382, noteM.M.Mendel (Confood/Zürich),
par. 3.5; Dutch SupremeCourt 15 June 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW0727 (PWC/x), par. 3.5.2.
19 See for example the rules of procedure of the Geschillencommissie Afbouw, art. 16.1;
Geschillencommissie Reizen, art. 15.1. See also Ernste 2012, pp. 61-63.
20 See on the process of negotiating conditions and establishing aConsumerComplaints Board
Hodges, Benöhr & Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012, pp. 137-139.
21 J.M.P. Verstappen, W.H. van Boom, M.B.M. Loos & J.G.J. Rinkes, Onderzoek naar de rol van
algemene voorwaarden in de praktijk van de geschillencommissies SGC, Ministerie van Economi-
sche Zaken 2007, in particular pp. 4, 16.
22 See alsoM.B.M. Loos, ‘Verboden exoneraties in energieleveringsovereenkomsten en vernieti-
ging van met de wet strijdige bindende adviezen’, Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht en
handelspraktijken 2006, pp. 3-6, in particular pp. 3-4.
23 See also footnote 3.
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contract itself, but to leave the determination to binding advisors.24 In such
a case, laxer standards apply. By contrast, if the binding advice procedure
comes closer to a judicial procedure, the principles of a fair trial become more
important.25 This contribution focuses on binding advice procedures in which
consumer disputes are being resolved. Since these procedures resemble judicial
procedures, the principles of a fair trial will play a more important role.
However, even if the judge establishes that one of the principles of a fair trial
was breached in a binding advice procedure, this will not necessarily mean
that the decision may be annulled. The Supreme Court has held that if a
procedural fault has been made in the establishment of a decision, one of the
factors that should be considered in assessing whether the decision should
be set aside is whether, and if so, to what extent, the procedural fault has
disadvantaged the other party .26 There are cases in which the principle of
audi alteram partem was breached during the binding advice procedure, but
where annulment was rejected on the basis of this ‘disadvantage criterion’.27
The standard set by art. 7:904 par 1 DCC for the annulment of decisions
given by binding advisors is thus very strict. Annulment is only possible if
it is unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness for a
party to be held to the decision. There are good reasons for this strictness.With
regard to arbitration procedures, the Dutch Supreme Court considers that an
annulment procedure may not be used as a de facto appeal of the decision by
arbitrators. The general interest of an effectively functioning arbitral procedure
entails that the civil courts should only intervene in arbitral decisions in
striking cases.28 Similar reasons apply when binding advice procedures are
concerned. Parties turn to binding advice to put an end to their conflict. This
aim cannot be achieved if the decision taken by binding advisors can be
challenged too easily. However, the question is whether this strict standard
can still be maintained with the implementation of the ADR Directive in the
Dutch judicial system.
24 This was for example the case in Dutch Supreme Court 20 May 2005, NJ 2007/114, note
H.J. Snijders under NJ 2007/115 (Gem. Amsterdam/Honnebier).
25 For example, the Dutch Supreme Court has considered that a decision should be better
motivated as the binding advice procedure is more in the nature of a judicial procedure.
See Dutch Supreme Court 20May 2005,NJ 2007/114, note H.J. Snijders underNJ 2007/115
(Gem. Amsterdam/Honnebier), par. 3.4; Dutch Supreme Court 24 March 2006, NJ 2007/115,
note H.J. Snijders (Meurs/Newomij), par. 3.4.2.
26 Dutch Supreme Court 20 May 2005, NJ 2007/114, note H.J. Snijders under NJ 2007/115
(Gem. Amsterdam/Honnebier), par. 3.3; Dutch Supreme Court 24 March 2006, NJ 2007/115,
note H.J. Snijders (Meurs/Newomij), par. 3.4.4; Dutch Supreme Court 1 July 1988, NJ 1988/
1034 (Delta Lloyd/N.), par. 3.2.
27 Dutch Supreme Court 24 March 2006, NJ 2007/115, note H.J. Snijders (Meurs/Newomij),
par. 3.4.4; Dutch Supreme Court 1 July 1988, NJ 1988/1034 (Delta Lloyd/N.), par. 3.2.
28 Dutch Supreme Court 17 January 2003, NJ 2004/384, note HJS (IMS/Modsaf c.s. I), par. 3.3;
Dutch Supreme Court 9 January 2004,NJ 2005/190, note HJS (Nannini/SFT), par. 3.5.2; Dutch
Supreme Court 24 April 2009,NJ 2010/171, note H.J. Snijders (IMS/Modsaf c.s. II), par. 4.3.1.
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3 THE ADR DIRECTIVE AND ODR REGULATION: AN INTRODUCTION
On 21May 2013 the European legislator passed the ADR Directive and the ODR
Regulation; both published in the Official Journal of the EU on 18 June 2013.
The ADR Directive and ODR Regulation, two interlinked and complementary
legislative instruments, promote and facilitate the simple, fast and digital (out-
of-court) resolution of consumer disputes.29
The ADR Directive aims to assure that consumers can submit complaints
against traders to ADR entities offering independent, impartial, transparent,
effective, fast and fair alternative dispute resolution procedures.30 The ODR
Regulation on the other hand establishes an ODR platform at Union level in
the form of an interactivewebsite, offering a single point of entry to consumers
and traders seeking to resolve their dispute out of court.31 The Regulation
and the Directive are complementary in the sense that the EU framework of
ADR entities and ADR procedures covered by the ADR Directive32 will be linked
to the ODR platform.33 The availability of ADR entities and procedures across
Europe qualified according to the ADRDirective is a precondition for the proper
functioning of the ODR platform.34 The ADR Directive should have been imple-
mented in the Member States no later than 9 July 2015.35 The ODR Regulation
has gone into effect on 15 February 2016.36
Asmentioned the ADRDirective aims to assure that consumers can submit
complaints against traders to ADR entities offering ADR-procedures.37 To qual-
ify as an ADR entity under the Directive, an entity (regardless of its name or
how it is referred to) should be established on a durable basis and offer dispute
resolution by means of an ADR procedure.38 Currently the ADR procedures
and in a wider sense the ADR systems still differ a lot across the Union. How-
ever, the ADR Directive allows such diversity (even post-implementation) as
it states that on a Member States level different forms of ADR procedures to
resolve consumer disputes co-exist or that a combination of two or more ADR
procedures are being used.39 The ADRDirective builds on existing ADR proced-
29 Recital 12, 15 ADR Directive.
30 Art. 1 ADR Directive.
31 Recital 18 ODR Regulation.
32 Which means that the ADR entity and the ADR procedure both comply with the (quality)
requirements set out in the ADR Directive (recital 24 ADR Directive).
33 Recital 12 ADR Directive.
34 Recital 12 ADR Directive.
35 Art. 25 ADR Directive.
36 Art. 22 ODR Regulation, with the exceptions specified therein.
37 Art. 1 ADR Directive.
38 Art. 4 par. 1 sub (h) ADR Directive. The entity that qualifies as an ADR entity under the
Directive shall be listed in accordance with art. 20 par. 2 ADR Directive.
39 Recital 21 ADR Directive.
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ures in the Member States and respects their legal traditions.40 The Directive
therefore has a spacious scope, which also follows from art. 2 par. 1 ADR
Directive:
‘This Directive shall apply to procedures for the out-of-court resolution of domestic
and cross-border disputes concerning contractual obligations stemming from sales
contracts or service contracts between a trader established in the Union and a
consumer resident in the Union through the intervention of an ADR entity which
proposes or imposes a solution or brings the parties together with the aim of
facilitating an amicable solution.’
Hence the Directive is without prejudice to the form that ADR procedures take
within theMember States and applies horizontally to all types of ADR proced-
ures.41 However, the scope of the ADR Directive is restricted by par. 2 of art. 2.
The ADR Directive is most notably not applicable to procedures initiated by
a trader against a consumer.42 Dutch binding advice imposes a solution on
the parties (sections 1 and 2) and, as the Dutch implementation legislation
proves to be true, binding advice falls within the scope of ADR procedures
covered by the ADR Directive.43 Therefore, binding advice (as the ADR proced-
ure chosen by the ADR entity under the scope of the ADR Directive) should
comply with different requirements, i.e. access to and quality of ADR entities
and ADR procedures, information and cooperation on national and EU level
and enforcement.44
As this contribution addresses the question whether the breach of the quality
requirements put forward in the ADRDirectivemakes it ‘unacceptable accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness’ to hold a party to the decision
taken by binding advisors, the next section will highlight the various quality
requirements set out in the ADR Directive and, where applicable, of the ODR
Regulation.
40 Recital 15 and 24 ADR Directive. This means that if no ADR procedure is yet available
in a Member State this Member State is free to choose the form of the ADR procedure
preferred to comply with the ADR Directive.
41 Recitals 19 and 21 ADR Directive.
42 Art. 2 par. 2 ADR Directive.
43 Wet van 16 april 2015 tot implementatie van de Richtlijn 2013/11/EU van het Europees
Parlement en de Raad van 21mei 2013 betreffende alternatieve beslechting van consumen-
tengeschillen en tot wijziging van Verordening (EG) nr. 2006/2004 en Richtlijn 2009/22/EG
en uitvoering van de Verordening (EU) nr. 524/2013 van het Europees Parlement en de
Raad van 21 mei 2013 betreffende onlinebeslechting van consumentengeschillen en tot
wijziging van Verordening (EG) nr. 2006/2004 en Richtlijn 2009/22/EG (Implementatiewet
buitengerechtelijke geschillenbeslechting consumenten), Stb. 2015, 160.
44 Chapters II, III, IV and V ADR Directive.
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4 QUALITY REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN THE ADR DIRECTIVE
Chapter II of the ADR Directive (arts. 6-11) contains a set of quality require-
ments which ADR entities and ADR procedures must comply with to be
accredited as ADR entities respectively ADR procedures under the Directive.45
The applicability of certain quality principles to both ADR entities and ADR
procedures ismeant to strengthen consumers’ and traders’ confidence in such
entities and procedures.46 A designated ADR entity will be under the super-
vision of a competent authority to ensure that in practice the quality standards
set out in the ADR Directive are met.47 The development of the set of quality
requirements laid down in the Directive took place in a couple of stages.48
For example, certain quality principles of the Directive derive from soft legal
measures taken at Union level in Recommendations 98/257/EC and 2001/310/
EC.49 Bymaking some of these (soft legal) principles (e.g. effectiveness, liberty,
transparency) binding in the ADR Directive, the Directive itself ‘establishes a
set of quality requirements which apply to all ADR procedures carried out by
an ADR entity […]’.50 All ADR entities that wish to be accredited must comply
with the following six quality requirements:
I Expertise, independence and impartiality
To enhance trust in out-of-court redress mechanisms for consumer complaints
a minimum level of procedural safeguards is built into the Directive. Art. 6,
par. 1 of the ADR Directive requires that ‘the natural persons in charge of ADR
possess the necessary expertise and are independent and impartial’. A third
neutral party should thus be competent, which means it should possess the
necessary knowledge and skills in the field of alternative or judicial resolution
of consumer disputes, as well as a general understanding of the law.51 Fur-
thermore the persons in charge of ADR should be independent and impartial:
they should have no conflict of interests and should be appointed for a term
of office of sufficient duration to ensure independence.52
45 Also recital 24 ADR Directive.
46 Recital 37 ADR Directive.
47 Art. 20 par. 2 ADR Directive and recital 55.
48 See for a broader description of these stages: N. Creutzfeldt, ‘How Important is Procedural
Justice for Consumer Dispute Resolution? ACase Study of anOmbudsmanModel for Euro-
pean Consumers’, Journal of Consumer Policy: Volume 37, Issue 4 (2014), p. 532.
49 Recommendation 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes and Recommendation 2001/310/EC on the
principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer
disputes.
50 Recital 37 ADR Directive.
51 Art. 6 par. 1 (a) ADR Directive, recital 36 ADR Directive.
52 Art. 6 par. 1 (b), (c), (d) ADR Directive, recitals 32, 33, 34, 35.
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II Transparency
To build consumer trust in both ADR and ODR as means of dispute resolution,
ADR schemes and ADR proceduresmust be transparent. In respect thereof art. 7
ADR Directive aims to ensure that information about the ADR entity, its proced-
ures, and other data are easy to obtain by both parties via an up-to-date
website or on a durable medium upon request.53 The information provided
by the ADR entity must be easy to understand in order to give parties the
opportunity to deliberately engage in an ADR procedure.54 Furthermore, ADR
bodies make publicly available on their websites, or by any other means they
consider appropriate, annual activity reports.55 The principle of transparency
laid down in the Directive contains elements of its prior non-binding pre-
decessor expressed in art. II of Recommendation 98/257/EC. It can be seen
as a point of reference to both parties in their quest for information about e.g.
preliminary requirements they have tomeet before initiating an ADR procedure
in front of an ADR entity. The use of the term ‘transparency’ in the light of
the ADR Directive is thus quite broad and obliges ADR entities to disclose
‘practical’ information or formal requirements such as cost of procedures and
languages in which complaints can be submitted.56 Therefore, the definition
of transparency under the ADR Directive should not be confused with the use
of the term in a mere procedural sense, e.g. under art. 6 ECHR (hearings being
open to the public or the result of procedures being published).
III Effectiveness
The quality requirement of effectiveness set out in art. 8 ADRDirective contains
different compartments. First of all the ADR procedure must be available and
easily accessible online and offline to both parties; irrespective of where the
parties are. The online access to the ADR procedure is a precondition for
resolving disputes that arise out of e-commerce transactions (ODR context).
Furthermore effectiveness means: no obligation to retain a lawyer or legal
advisor; the ADR procedure is free of charge or at moderate costs for con-
sumers; and disputes are resolved within a short period of time (within 90
calendar days from the date onwhich the ADR entity has received the complete
complaint file).57
53 Art. 5 par. 2 ADR Directive.
54 Recital 39 ADR Directive.
55 Art. 7 par. 2 ADR Directive.
56 Art. 7 (1)(a),(h) and (l) ADR Directive.
57 In case of highly complex disputes the 90-calendar-day period may be extended by the
ADR entity in charge (art. 8 (e) ADR Directive).
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IV Fairness
According to art. 9 ADR Directive the ADR procedure to resolve a consumer
dispute should be fair, which means that both parties are fully informed about
their rights and the consequences of the decisions they make in the light of
and during an ADR procedure.58 Parties should also be granted the possibility
to express their point of view and be provided by the ADR entity with the
arguments and the evidence of the other party (adversarial process).
V Liberty
The principle of liberty is laid down in art. 10 ADR Directive. The first para-
graph ensures that an agreement between a consumer and a trader to submit
a complaint to an ADR entity is not binding on the consumer if this contractual
agreement was concluded before the dispute arises and the agreement has
the effect of depriving the consumer of his right to bring the dispute before
the courts.59 Paragraph 2 of art. 10 reads as follows: ‘(…) in ADR procedures
which aim at resolving the dispute by imposing a solution, the solution
imposed may be binding on the parties only if they were informed of its
binding nature in advance and specifically accepted this.’
VI Legality
The quality requirement of legality, as set out in art. 11 ADR Directive, entails
in short that in ADR procedures which aim at resolving the dispute by imposing
a solution on the consumer, the solution imposed should not result in the
consumer being deprived of the protection guaranteed by mandatory law of
the Member States where the consumer is habitually resident.60
The ADRDirective is a framework Directive whichmeansminimumharmoniza-
tion is intended by the EU legislator. The quality principles of arts. 6-11 ADR
Directive are thereforeminimum requirements. Recital 38 states that the Direct-
ive ‘should not prevent Member States from adopting or maintaining rules
that go beyond what is provided for in this Directive’. Thus, more stringent
national legislative measures are possible.61 In this respect the Directive does
58 Recital 42 ADR Directive.
59 Recital 43 ADR Directive. Important fact: ‘Agreements to go to arbitration must be carried
out post-dispute’ P. Cortes, A.R. Lodder, ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution goes online:
reflections on the evolution of European law for out-of-court redress’, Maastricht Journal
of European and Comparative Law 2014/1, p. 26.
60 See also recital 44 ADRDirective. Art 11 ADRDirective distinguishes between three different
situations and is thus somewhat difficult to read. See on the corresponding categories in
the Implementation Act Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 3, pp. 21-22.
61 See also art. 2 par. 3 ADR Directive.
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not specify how Member States should implement the quality principles in
their national context. However, art. 20 ADR Directive clarifies that it is the
task of the competent authority (art. 18 ADR Directive) to assess whether the
dispute resolution entities accredited as ADR entity comply with the quality
requirements.62 If they do not, according to art. 20 par. 2 ADR Directive the
competent authority shall ‘contact that dispute resolution entity, stating the
requirements the dispute resolution entity fails to comply with and requesting
it to ensure compliance immediately.’ If the dispute resolution does not fulfil
the requirements after a period of threemonths, the competent authority shall
remove the entity from the list of ADR entities notified to the Commission.
However, sections 6 and 7 of this contribution examine whether the non-
compliance of an ADR entity with the quality standards set out in the ADR
Directive also makes the decision taken by binding advisors (in the Dutch
scenario) unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness
and subject to a possible annulment.
5 IMPLEMENTING THE ADRDIRECTIVE IN THENETHERLANDS: A FRAMEWORK
LAW
As put forward earlier the ADR Directive should have been implemented by
the Member States no later than 9 July 2015.63 The Dutch Implementation
Act (hereafter: ‘Implementation Act’) to transpose the ADR Directive into Dutch
law was published in the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees on 30 April 2015 and
entered into force on 9 July 2015.64 The Dutch government chose to implement
the ADRDirective via a framework law instead of implementing the provisions
of the Directive into different existing laws like the Civil Code, the Code of
Civil Procedure and the Law on the Enforcement of Consumer Protection.65
According to the Dutch government, most of the provisions laid down in the
Implementation Act are of a public-law nature. The ImplementationAct contains
requirements which dispute resolution entities need to comply with in order
to be designated as ADR entities under the Directive. These provisions by their
nature would not fit in with the aforementioned existing laws.66 Furthermore,
the government is of the opinion that framework legislation is the designated
solution for the Netherlands because the scope of the provisions of the ADR
Directive (‘ADR/ODR for consumers’) is broad but not generally applicable.
62 Creutzfeldt 2014, p. 532.
63 Art. 25 ADR Directive.
64 Stb. 2015, 160.
65 Kamerstukken II, 2014/15, 33 982, no. 3, p. 8.
66 Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 3, p. 8; Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 4, p. 4;
Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 6, p. 9. The Council of State (‘Raad van State’) was
of a different opinion, see Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 4, pp. 3-4.
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Also, a framework law offers the benefits of accessibility, clarity and coher-
ence.67
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the SGC, Kifid and SKGZ
wished to be accredited as ADR entities under the ADR Directive.68 The status
of accredited ADR entity under the Implementation Act has been granted to
the SGC, Kifid and SKGZ by the designated Dutch competent authorities (the
Minister of Security and Justice (SGC), theMinister of Finance (Kifid and SKGZ)
and the Minister of Public Health, Welfare and Sport (SKGZ)).69
6 ANNULMENT OF A DECISION IN CONNECTION WITH THE MANNER OF ITS
ESTABLISHMENT
As discussed in section 4, the ADR Directive formulates several procedural
requirementswhich ADR procedures governed by theDirective should comply
with.
What is the consequence if these procedural requirements are not met in
a particular ADR procedure? If the ADR procedure was a binding advice pro-
cedure (as will be the case in the Netherlands most of the time), will the
decision taken by binding advisors be subject to annulment on the basis of
art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC in connection with the manner of establishment of the
decision?
The Dutch government does not devote much attention to these possible
private-law consequences of non-compliance with the quality requirements.
As discussed before, the government holds the opinion that the act implement-
ing the ADRDirective is largely of a public-law nature. The consequence of non-
compliance with the procedural requirements is that theMinister will withdraw
the accreditation as an ADR entity under the Directive.70 It is questionable
whether this conclusion is correct. The Dutch government itself does not
entirely preclude a possible effect of the quality requirements set out in the
ADRDirective on the private relationship between the parties. Asked bymem-
bers of parliament what means parties have if they are of the opinion that the
ADR entity did not follow the procedural rules, the government answers that
the decision may be annulled if it would be unacceptable to hold parties to
it according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.71
67 Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 3, p. 8.
68 Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 3, p. 7 and Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 6, pp. 3
and 6.
69 Stcrt. 2015, 45980 (SGC), Stcrt. 2015, 19487 (Kifid), Stcrt. 2015, 19094 and Stcrt. 2015, 19487
(SKGZ). The activities of the SKGZ fall within the scope of both the Ministry of Finance
and theMinistry of Public Health,Welfare and Sport. Hence, the SKGZ has been designated
as an ADR entity by two competent authorities.
70 See art. 17 par. 4-5 of the implementation Act.
71 Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 6, p. 17.
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The conclusion that non-compliance with the quality requirements may
sometimes lead to annulment is not surprising. Under national law, it is clear
that the fact that a binding advisor is subject to instructions from one of the
parties (art. 6 par. 1 (c) of the ADR Directive) or the fact that the parties did
not have the possibility of expressing their point of view (art. 9 par 1 (a) of
the ADR Directive), may be a reason to conclude that it is unreasonable to hold
a party to the decision according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.72
In this respect, the inclusion of these procedural requirements in the ADR
Directive adds nothing new. A much more interesting question is whether
the ADRDirective implies that non-compliancewith these requirements should
make the decision non-binding on the parties. Although the Directive sees
the procedural requirements as preconditions for the qualification as an ADR
entity (see art. 20 par. 1-2 of the ADR Directive), it is not unthinkable that the
ADR Directive requires more. The ADR Directive provides that Member States
shall ‘ensure’ that the procedural requirements are met.73 According to the
case law of the European Court of Justice the obligation of Member States to
implement a directive involves the adoption of all the measures necessary to
ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective
which it pursues.74 Have Member States done enough to ‘ensure’ the observ-
ance of the quality requirements of the ADR Directive, if their only sanction
in case of non-compliance is the withdrawal of the accreditation as an ADR
entity under the Directive?
This withdrawal does not in all cases seem a very effective means of
enforcement. It will not be easy for the competent authorities to assesswhether
the ADR entities comply with the quality requirements. It will for example be
difficult to determine whether an ADR entity in practice always gives parties
the possibility to comment on the arguments, evidence, documents and facts
put forward by the other party (see art. 9 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive). In
this respect it is interesting to note that the provision implementing art. 9 par. 1
(a) only requires ADR entities to make sure that their procedural rules provide
for the possibility of parties to comment on each other’s arguments et cetera.
The wording of art. 9 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive suggests that parties
should in practice be able to comment on each other’s arguments. This point
aside, even if a competent authority succeeds in showing that an ADR entity
does not comply with one of the quality requirements, the sanction – with-
drawal of the accreditation as an ADR entity – seems rather severe, certainly
whenminor deficiencies are concerned. Since ADR entities will first be notified
72 See for example Dutch Supreme Court 30 October 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BK1548, JBPr
2010/16 note P.E. Ernste; Dutch Supreme Court 20May 2005,NJ 2007/114, note H.J. Snijders
under NJ 2007/115 (Gem. Amsterdam/Honnebier).
73 See for example art. 6, art. 5 par. 2 and 5 and art. 7- 9 ADR Directive.
74 See ECJ 17 June 1999, C-336/97 (Commission/Italy), par. 19; ECJ 8 March 2001, C-97/00
(Commission/France), par. 9; ECJ 5 December 2002, C-324/01 (Commission/Belgium), par. 18.
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and given a period of threemonths to fulfil the requirements (see art. 20 par. 2
of the ADR Directive and art. 17 par. 4 of the Implementation Act), it is ques-
tionable whether it will ever be imposed. Other, more subtle, enforcement
mechanisms thus do seem desirable.
For some of the procedural requirements, it does not seem problematic
if the ADR Directive implied that non-compliance makes the decision subject
to annulment. One could for example argue that the fact that a binding advisor
is remunerated in a way that is linked to the outcome of the procedure (art. 6
par. 1 (d) of the ADR Directive), constitutes such a grave deficiency in the
procedure that the decision should be non-binding on the parties in all circum-
stances. The same can be said of the fact that the ADR entity did not provide
the parties with the arguments, evidence, documents or facts put forward by
the other party (art. 9 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive). The courts would thus
need to deviate from the case law that even in case of breach of the principle
of audi alteram partem, one of the factors that should be considered in assessing
whether the decision should be set aside is whether and if so, to what extent,
this fault has disadvantaged the other party (the ‘disadvantage criterion’).
For other quality requirements included in the ADR Directive, it seemsmore
problematic to conclude that the mere breachwouldmake the decision subject
to annulment. Should the mere fact that a binding advisor was appointed for
too short a term of office (art. 6 (d) of the ADRDirective), make all the decisions
that he has taken during his appointment subject to annulment? Does the fact
that parties were obliged by the ADR entity to retain a lawyermake it unaccept-
able for a party to be held to the decision taken by that entity (see art. 8 par.
1 (b) of the ADR Directive)? May a decision be annulled purely because a party
shows that the ADR entity did not make publicly available on a website infor-
mation on the natural persons in charge of ADR (art. 7 par. 1 (a) of the ADR
Directive)? Problematic in these examples is that it is difficult to see in what
way a party is affected by the deficiency. In what way is a party affected by
the circumstance that a binding advisor was appointed for too short a term
of office? Although the requirements mentioned are important to guarantee
the quality of ADR procedures in general, it is more problematic to make the
connectionwith the quality of a specific procedure. In these examples, it seems
important for the other party to be able to invoke the fact that the party was
not disadvantaged by the procedural fault.
However, if the ‘disadvantage criterion’ can still be relied on, there seems
to be no effective remedy for the parties against breach of one of these require-
ments. It will be very difficult to show that a party has been disadvantaged
by the fact that a binding advisor was appointed for too short a term of office
or by the fact that the ADR entity did not make publicly available on a website
information on the natural persons in charge of ADR. This conclusion is not
much altered by the fact that it is likely that disadvantage should be presumed
and that it is for the other party to show that the party was not disadvantaged
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by a deficiency.75 If a party provides no indication at all in what way it was
disadvantaged, the other party may easily bear this burden.
Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC does not seem to provide a very effective means to
enforce the procedural requirements included in the ADR Directive when the
‘disadvantage criterion’ can still be relied on. Should the conclusion thus be
that the ADR Directive implies that the ‘disadvantage criterion’ can no longer
be applied when cases covered by the ADR Directive are concerned? Let’s hope
not. In our opinion this criterion is necessary to select those cases in which
annulment is appropriate. To abandon the criterionwouldmean that decisions
can be set aside too easily. This would, for example, make all the decisions
of a binding advisor who, as it turns out, does not possess a ‘general under-
standing of law’ (6 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive), subject to annulment, even
if this particular binding advisor is part of a collegial body and othermembers
havemore than enough knowledge to compensate for his deficiency. If parties
could so easily challenge the validity of decisions taken in binding advice,
the aim of providing them with a ‘simple, efficient, fast and low-cost way’
of resolving disputes will not be achieved.76 The risk of having to follow a
court procedure after the completion of the ADR track, will become very high.
This risk may be especially high for the consumer. Since compliance with the
procedural requirements is in the interest of both parties to the ADR procedure,
not only the consumer, but also the trader has the possibility to invoke the
fact one of these requirementswas breached. It may be expected that the trader
will make use of this possibility more often than the consumer, since the
threshold of going to court will in many cases be lower for the trader. It is
therefore likely that the consumer will more often be dragged into a court
procedure after completing an ADR procedure which ended favourably for
him than the trader. In our opinion, the ‘disadvantage criterion’ is therefore
necessary to select those cases in which annulment is appropriate. However,
we shall have to await the case law of the European Court of Justice on the
ADR Directive to know for certain whether this criterion can still be relied on.
In conclusion, in our opinion breach of one of the quality requirements
included in the ADRDirective should not automaticallymake the decision taken
in a binding advice procedure subject to annulment. That does not mean that
non-compliance with the quality requirements included in the ADR Directive
is of no significance in the setting of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. The breach of these
requirements is an important argument that it is unacceptable according to
standards of reasonableness and fairness to hold a party to the decision in
connection with the manner of its establishment. Therefore, the courts may
sometimes come to a quicker annulment of the decision by binding advisors
75 Snijders in his note for Dutch Supreme Court 20 May 2005, NJ 2007/114 (Gem. Amsterdam/
Honnebier) and Dutch Supreme Court 24 March 2006, NJ 2007/115 (Meurs/Newomij), no.
2e; Ernste 2012, pp. 74-75; Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 163.
76 Recital 4 ADR Directive.
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than in the situation before implementation of the ADRDirective. For example,
the mere fact that one of the parties was not provided by the ADR entity with
the arguments, evidence, documents or facts put forward by the other party
(art. 9 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive), may be sufficient reason to conclude
that the decision should be annulled on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC.
The fact that one of the procedural requirements included in the ADR
Directive was breached might even be used as an argument when ADR pro-
cedures not covered by the Directive are concerned. Since the quality require-
ments mentioned in the ADR Directive are of a general nature, it is not excluded
that they have an indirect effect in such cases. An indirect effect seems certainly
likely in the situation in which a trader starts an ADR procedure against a
consumer. Since such a procedure falls outside the scope of the ADR Directive
and of the Implementation Act, the procedural requirements do not apply.
However, it is not clear what can justify this lower level of protection offered
to the consumer. It is thus quite defendable that in this situation, the fact that
a procedural requirement mentioned in the ADR Directive was breached can
be used as an argument that it is unacceptable according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness to hold a party to the decision.
The procedural requirements of the ADRDirective and the law implement-
ing them thus do influence the concept of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ in art.
7:904 par. 1 DCC. In ADR procedures covered by the ADR Directive, the mere
fact that one of the procedural requirements is breached should not automatic-
ally make the decision of binding advisors subject to annulment on the basis
of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. However, the non-compliance with these requirements
is a very serious indication that it is unacceptable according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness to hold a party to the decision in connection with
the manner of its establishment. Outside the scope of application of the ADR
Directive, the procedural requirements may have an indirect effect.
7 ANNULMENT OF A DECISION IN CONNECTION WITH ITS CONTENT
As was seen in the previous section, the procedural requirements mentioned
in the ADR Directive may influence the standard for annulment of a decision
in relation with its manner of establishment. Does the ADR Directive have an
influence on the possibility of annulment of a decision in connection with its
content as well?
As was pointed out before, art. 11 of the ADR Directive requires Member
States to ensure that in ADR procedures which aim at resolving the dispute
by imposing a solution on the consumer, the solution imposed shall not result
in the consumer being deprived of the protection afforded to him by the
78 3 – The impact of the ADR Directive on article 7:904 par. 1 DCC explored
mandatory law of the Member State where the consumer is habitually res-
ident.77 This provision is implemented in Dutch law by means of art. 10 of
the Implementation Act. Art. 10 par. 1 of the Implementation Act tries to
ensure that the protection of mandatory law is afforded to the consumer by
simply stating that the solution imposed on the consumer shall not deprive
him of it. What are the consequences in the event a decision is taken that does
deprive the consumer of the protection afforded to him by mandatory law?
What happens, for example, when binding advisors have refused to annul
a term in the general terms and conditions of the trader in a case where the
trader gave these terms and conditions to the consumer after the time of entry
into the contract (this in contradiction with art. 6:233(b) and 6:234 DCC)?
Although the Implementation Act is not entirely clear on this point, the non-
compliance with this quality requirement is probably a reason to withdraw
from the entity that has taken the decision the accreditation as an ADR entity
under the Directive (see art. 20 par. 2 of the ADR Directive and art. 17 par. 4
of the Implementation Act). However, it follows from art. 10 par. 2 of the
Implementation Act that the non-compliance has consequences for the parties
as well. This provision states that art. 7:902 DCC does not apply to ADR pro-
cedures governed by the Directive.78
As was seen in paragraph 2, it is not possible to annul a decision on the
basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC on the sole ground that it is in breach of
mandatory law. The reason is that art. 7:902 DCC makes it clear that a decision
to terminate an uncertainty or dispute in the field of the law of property,
proprietary rights and interests is valid, notwithstanding that it proves to be
in breach of mandatory law, unless it would also, as to content or necessary
implication, be in breach of good morals and public policy.79 Art. 10 par. 2
of the Implementation Act abolishes art. 7:902 DCC when ADR procedures
covered by the Directive are concerned. A decision in breach of mandatory
law will in those cases no longer be valid.
One could wonder whether the abolishment of art. 7:902 DCC was really
necessary. First of all, it is questionable whether the Directive requires that
breach of mandatory law has consequences for the validity of the decision
taken by the ADR entity. It might be sufficient for a Member State to withdraw
the accreditation as an ADR entity when this entity imposes solutions on
consumers which are not in accordance with mandatory law. However, this
method of enforcement appears to be rather ineffective. It will be very difficult
for a competent authority within a Member State to verify whether the de-
77 See section 4.
78 ‘Op procedures tot buitengerechtelijke geschilbeslechting die beslecht worden door een
vaststelling als bedoeld in artikel 7:900 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek is artikel 7:902 van het
Burgerlijk Wetboek niet van toepassing.’
79 Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 163; see Dutch Supreme Court 12 September 1997,
NJ 1998/382, note M.M. Mendel (Confood/Zürich) and the opinion of Advocate General
Bakels, no. 3.26-3.29.
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cisions of an ADR entity are in accordance with mandatory law. Art. 20 par. 1
ADR Directive provides that a competent authority makes the assessment
whether an entity complies with the quality requirements in particular on the
basis of information it has received from the ADR entity itself in accordance
with art. 19 ADR Directive. Art. 19 ADR contains a list of information that ADR
entities need to notify to the competent authority, but information on the
content of the decisions taken by the ADR entity is missing from this list. Since
the ADR Directive requires minimum harmonization, the Dutch legislator can
impose farther-reaching duties on ADR entities to provide information, but
the legislator did not make use of this possibility (see art. 17 par. 1 and 18
Implementation Act). The competent authorities within the Netherlands will
therefore not have the data necessary to verify effectively whether the decisions
of an ADR entity are in accordance with mandatory law. Therefore, additional
measures to ensure that the ADR entities apply the mandatory law correctly
seem necessary.
One could also wonder whether decisions in breach of mandatory provi-
sions for the protection of the consumer were not already invalid without the
abolition of art. 7:902 DCC. It could be argued that such mandatory provisions
for the protection of the consumer can be seen as rules of public policy which
fall under the exception of art. 7:902 DCC.80 However, although somemandat-
ory rules for the protection of the consumer may indeed be qualified as rules
of public policy, it is not likely that this is true for all the provisions covered
by art. 11 ADR Directive. Art. 11 ADR Directive uses the words ‘provisions that
cannot be derogated from by agreement’ (par. 1 (a) and (b)) and ‘mandatory
rules’ (par. 1 (c)), by which reference is made to the Rome I Regulation respect-
ively the Rome Convention.81 As regards the Rome I Regulation, it is assumed
that the words ‘provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement’ in
art. 6 par. 2 do not only cover rules that specifically aim to protect the con-
sumer, but also more general private-law rules that may have the effect of
offering protection to the consumer.82 These words should be distinguished
from the concept of ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ mentioned in art. 8
of the Rome I Regulation, which should be construed more restrictively.83
It therefore does not seem likely that all the ‘provisions that cannot be de-
80 Case law of the European Court of Justice may support this view; see ECJ 6 October 2009,
C-40/08, NJ 2010/11, note M.R. Mok (Asturcom/Rodríguez Noguiera), par. 52-53, 59; ECJ 16
November 2010, C-76/10 (Pohotovost’/Korèkovská), par. 50-54. ECJ 1 June 1999, C-126/97,
NJ 2000/339 (Eco Swiss/Benetton), par. 36-37.
81 See also Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 3, pp. 21-22.
82 M. McParland, The Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2015, no. 12.185, p. 551; F. Ragno, ‘The LawApplicable to Consumer
Contracts under the Rome I Regulation’, in: F. Ferrari & S. Leible (eds.), Rome I Regulation.
The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe, München: Sellier 2009, p. 152.
83 See recital 37 of the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). See also
McParland 2015, no. 12.185. p. 551.
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rogated from by agreement’ in the sense of art. 11 ADR Directive can be qual-
ified as rules of public policy. In order to make sure that the consumer is not
bound by a decision in breach of mandatory law, the legislator could therefore
not leave art. 7:902 DCC unamended.
As a consequence of the abolition of art. 7:902 DCC, decisions in breach
of mandatory law taken in a procedure covered by the Implementation Act
are no longer valid on the basis of art. 7:902 DCC. But if they are no longer
valid, what regime does apply to them? Are the decisions null and void? Are
they subject to annulment? The parliamentary papers accompanying the
Implementation Act do not offer clarity. They only state that with the abolition
of art. 7:902 DCC in these situations, there is no longer any room for departure
from mandatory law.84 Various theories may be developed. First of all, a
decision in breach of mandatory law may simply be null and void. Legal
literature points in this direction, since the same is assumed in other situations
falling outside the scope of art. 7:902 DCC. For example, decisions in breach
of mandatory law in disputes outside the field of the law of property, pro-
prietary rights and interests (such as disputes in the field of family law) are
seen as null and void. This would follow a contrario from art. 7:902 DCC.85
The downside of a solution in which the decision is simply null and void, is
that it also makes it possible for the trader to invoke the invalidity of the
decision. Art. 11 ADRDirective, by contrast, seemswritten solely for the benefit
of the consumer.
From the explanatory memorandum accompanying the preliminary draft
of the Dutch Civil Code, another view may be deducted. Here it is stated that
the normal rules apply to cases falling outside the scope of art. 7:902 DCC.86
The question is obviously what these ‘normal’ rules are. Possibly, reference
is made to art. 3:40 DCC, which offers a general arrangement for acts in breach
of statutory provisions. Paragraph 3:40 par. 2 DCC states that a juridical act
which violates a mandatory statutory provision becomes null and void; if,
however, the provision is intended solely for the protection of one of the
parties to a multilateral juridical act, the act may only be annulled; in both
cases this applies to the extent that the provision does not otherwise provide.87
Art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC thus makes it possible to take into account which party
the mandatory law intends to protect. Therefore, the trader may not be able
to invoke the invalidity of the decision because mandatory law protecting the
84 Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 3, p. 22.
85 According to Van Schaick, no obligations arise for the parties from the binding advice
agreement in such circumstances. He does not make it clear why this is so. See Asser/Van
Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 153, no. 156. According to Ernste, if a decision is not only in
breach of mandatory law, but also in breach of goodmorals and public policy, the decision
is null and void. In her opinion, this follows a contrario from art. 7:902 DCC.
86 Toelichting Meijers, Vierde gedeelte, Boek 7, p. 1141.
87 See on art. 3:40 DCC A.S. Hartkamp, M.M.M. Tillema & A.E.B. ter Heide, Contract Law in
the Netherlands, Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2011, nos. 93-95, pp. 87-89.
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consumer was breached. It is problematic, however, that art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC
offers the possibility to take the purpose of the mandatory provision into
account only in case of a multilateral juridical act. The decision by binding
advisors is seen as a unilateral juridical act.88A literal interpretation of art. 3:40
par. 2 DCC would therefore mean that the decision in breach of mandatory
law is simply null and void; the second sentence of art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC does
not apply. Although a different interpretation of art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC is certainly
defendable, the above shows that application of this provision is not entirely
unproblematic in the specific situation of binding advice, in which the parties
are bound by a juridical act performed by another party (the binding
advisor(s)).
A last possibility is to assess decisions in breach of mandatory law on the
basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. It could be argued that with the abolition of art.
7:902 DCC, the mere fact that mandatory lawwas breached is sufficient reason
for annulment of the decision. The non-compliance withmandatory lawmakes
it unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness for a
party to be held to the decision in connection with its content. The advantage
of this solution is that art. 7:904 DCC offers an arrangement specifically adapted
to binding advice. The validity of decisions taken in binding advice will be
covered exclusively by art. 7:904 DCC. Another advantage is that art. 7:904 par.
1 DCC makes the decision subject to annulment. One could therefore argue
that only the consumermay invoke the invalidity of the decision if mandatory
law protecting the consumer was breached. The trader would not be able to
annul the decision in such circumstances.
In our opinion, this last option is preferable. Since art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC
specifically deals with the situation of binding advice, this provision can be
seen as a lex specialis to art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC. Even in this solution, the abolition
of art. 7:902 DCC for ADR procedures covered by the Directive has far-reaching
consequences. First of all, it means that it will be difficult for the SGC to use
‘reasonableness and fairness’ as a standard for deciding their cases instead
of the rules of law, since the Complaints Boards will at least need to apply
mandatory law. But even if an ADR entity uses the rules of law as a standard,
its decisions are in danger of being subject to annulment. A decision by an
ADR entitymay easily be in breach ofmandatory law. Large areas of consumer
law are of a mandatory nature. Many disputes submitted to ADR will thus
require the application of mandatory rules. Since these rules are not always
clear, an ADR entity may easily give an incorrect interpretation of such a
provision. Even if the ADR entity (as it later turns out) interprets the provision
in the correct way, a party may be of a different opinion and contest this
interpretation in court. The validity of many decisions taken in ADR is thus
up for discussion. In this respect it is interesting to note that the explanatory
88 Ernste 2012, pp. 59-60.
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memorandum accompanying the preliminary draft of the Dutch Civil Code
makes it clear that since decisions in a dispute not pertaining to the field of
the law of property, proprietary rights and interests, can be examined
unrestrictedly for compatibility with mandatory law, it will make little sense
to submit such a dispute to binding advice.89 Art. 10 par. 2 of the Implementa-
tion Act in connection with art. 11 of the ADR Directive thus seems to take
away a great deal of the binding force of a decision taken in a binding advice
procedure covered by the Directive. This would be the case even more so if
not only the consumer, but also the trader could invoke the invalidity of a
decision in breach of mandatory law protecting the consumer. A solution in
which only the consumer can in those circumstances invoke this ground is
preferable.
A disadvantage of the fact that art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC makes the decision
subject to annulment may be that the consumer would actively need to annul
the decision taken by binding advisors. If he does not, he remains bound by
it.90 It is questionable whether the law thus complies with art. 11 ADR Direct-
ive. If the consumer does not actively annul the decision, he will be deprived
of the protection afforded to him by mandatory law. An interpretation in the
light of the ADR Directive might lead to the conclusion that the court may annul
the decision of its own motion in such cases.91
It is important to note that art. 10 par. 2 of the Implementation Act is not
confined to mandatory law protecting the consumer, but abolishes art. 7:902
DCC altogether. If mandatory law that – in the particular circumstances of the
case – protects the interests of the trader is breached, this will thus have
consequences for the validity of the decision as well. By contrast, art. 11 of
the ADR Directive is confined to mandatory law protecting the consumer. The
binding force of decisions taken in binding advice is thus reduced further by
the Implementation Act than was strictly necessary under the ADR Directive.
As was observed before, it seems likely that the trader will more often make
use of the possibility to set aside a decision unfavourable to him in court than
the consumer.
Added to this is the fact that art. 11 of the ADR Directive and art. 10 par. 1
of the Implementation Act do not seem to be confined to the breach of mandat-
ory law. They state that the solution imposed ‘shall not result in the consumer
being deprived of the protection afforded to him’ bymandatory law. If binding
advisors establish the facts in another way than a regular court would have
done, this obviously can have consequences for the application of mandatory
law. The difference in the established facts may for example result in the ADR
89 Toelichting Meijers, Vierde gedeelte, Boek 7, p. 1141.
90 Hartkamp, Tillema & Ter Heide 2011, no. 100, pp. 92-93; Chorus, Gerver & Hondius 2006,
p. 154.
91 Cf. Dutch Supreme Court 13 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:691, NJ 2014/274, note
H.B. Krans (Heesakkers/Voets), par. 3.7.1-3.7.3.
Knigge & Verhage 83
entity concluding that a certain mandatory rule is not applicable, where a
regular court would have applied that rule. In this situation, one could say
that the consumerwas ‘deprived of the protection afforded to him’ bymandat-
ory law. Do art. 11 of the Directive and art. 10 of the Implementation Act thus
imply that the decision should not be valid in such a situation? If this con-
clusion is correct, it would offer parties the opportunity to challenge the
establishment of the facts by binding advisors at the regular court. The proced-
ure on the validity of the decision at the regular courts will thus come very
close to a full appeal.
Another point is worth mentioning in connection with art. 10 par. 2 of the
Implementation Act. It is interesting to see that this provision only abolishes
art. 7:902 DCC in binding advice procedures governed by the ADR Directive.92
This choice implies that the decision taken in a procedure started by the
consumer against a trader can be scrutinized for compatibility with mandatory
law, whereas a decision taken in a procedure started by the trader against a
consumer, cannot. In this latter situation, art. 7:902 DCC still applies and the
decision is valid notwithstanding the fact that it is in breach of mandatory
law protecting the consumer. This difference in the way the interests of the
consumer are protected, depending onwhich party started the ADR procedure,
is difficult to defend. In some instances, this difference might be avoided by
the fact that the provision protecting the consumer can be seen as a rule of
public policy, so that the exception of art. 7:902 DCC applies. In other instances,
it might be possible to find a solution by making use of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC.
The fact that the decision was in breach of mandatory law protecting the
consumer may be reason to conclude that it is unacceptable according to
standards of reasonableness and fairness for the consumer to be held to the
decision in connection with its content. In order to come to this conclusion,
the courts would need to deviate from the case law that it is not possible to
annul a decision on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC on the sole ground that
the decision is in breach of mandatory law. This deviation might be justified
by thewish to avoid a different treatment of the consumer depending onwhich
party started the ADR procedure. Whether courts are willing to take this
approach remains to be seen. This approach would mean that art. 7:902 DCC
is de facto of little meaning in those cases.
As has become clear in this section, art. 11 of the ADRDirective in combina-
tion with art. 10 of the Implementation Act has an influence on the binding
force of decisions taken in binding advice. Here again, it is questionable
whether the extensive powers of the court to scrutinize the decisions by
binding advisors are desirable. Parties turn to ADR to put an end to their
conflict. If decisions taken in binding advice can be challenged too easily, all
that parties achieve by turning to ADR may be adding an extra stage to their
92 See art. 2 of the Implementation Act.
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proceedings. If the risk of having to follow a court procedure after the comple-
tion of the ADR procedure becomes too high, parties will turn away from ADR.
This raises the question whether there are alternative ways in which the
compatibility with mandatory law of decisions taken in binding advice can
be enhanced.
8 SAFEGUARDS TO ENHANCE COMPATIBILITY WITH MANDATORY LAW UNDER
ART. 11 ADR DIRECTIVE
To enhance compatibility with mandatory law of decisions taken in binding
advice, certain safeguards on both the national and the European level could
be introduced. In this section two possible national safeguards and a European
one will be touched upon.93
Asmentioned in section 4, the ADR Directive is a framework Directive that
allows Member States to introduce rules that go beyond those laid down by
the Directive.94 The Dutch legislator was given some policy latitude to decide
whether the national ADR entities that use binding advice as an ADR procedure
should comply with an extra information duty that goes a little beyond the
list of requirements as set out in art. 19 par. 3 ADR Directive, laid down in art.
18 Implementation Act. One could add to art. 18 Implementation Act an extra
duty for ADR entities to communicate data to the competent authority on cases
where mandatory law has been applied in the dispute resolution process. Via
the construction of a specific IT application, which e.g. recognizes provisions
of mandatory law in the documents it screens, it should be possible for Dutch
ADR entities to build a database of decisions taken in binding advice where
mandatory law has been applied. The content of this database should be sent
to the competent authority every two years.95 However, this safeguard could
result in extra costs in the sense that this IT application should be developed
(by either the government or the ADR entities themselves) and integrated into
the workflow systems of the appointed Dutch ADR entities. Furthermore, this
extra information duty could increase the workload of the secretariat of the
competent authority96 as it should test if the mandatory law has been applied
properly in the decisions given by binding advice. The Dutch legislator did
not use the policy latitude given by the European legislator to include a more
93 Amore in-depth analysis of the illustrated safeguards is subject to further studies and goes
beyond the scope of this contribution.
94 Art. 2 par. 3 ADR Directive.
95 Every two years the ADR entities are obliged to send information to the competent author-
ity. See art. 19 par. 3 ADR Directive, art. 18 Implementation Act.
96 Art. 18 ADR Directive, art. 1, par. 1(i) in conjunction with art. 16 Implementation Act.
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stringent information duty in art. 18 of the Implementation Act. However,
this might be a future option when the ADR Directive is evaluated.97
Which leads to the illustration of a different national safeguard. Since 2012
it has been possible to address a prejudicial question to the Supreme Court
at (one of the) parties’ request or ex officio by the judge of first instance via
articles 392-394 Code of Civil Procedure. The prejudicial question addressed
to the Supreme Court could be a valuable option to checkwhethermandatory
law is applied correctly in decisions taken in binding advice. Grounds for
addressing a prejudicial question are a multiplicity of claims based on similar
facts and/or questions of law.98 Both are not unlikely to occur in consumer
cases.99 For the realization of this safeguard binding advisors should be
granted the possibility to address a prejudicial question to the Supreme Court
about how to apply mandatory law correctly.100 This new competence of
binding advisors could be a liaison between ADR and the courts, which might
be an argument for the Supreme Court to allow the aforementioned questions
addressed as an alternate safeguard.101 This option too has a downside
though, since addressing a prejudicial question would put the binding advice
procedure on hold and the binding advisors therefore might struggle to reach
a decision within the period of 90 calendar days from the date on which the
ADR entity has received the complete complaint file (art. 8(e) ADR Directive).
Further research on the feasibility of this safeguard is therefore necessary.
Last but not least, a safeguard at European level might be an option. Art.
16 ADRDirective emphasizes thatMember States shall ensure that ADR entities
cooperate and exchange best practices with regard to the settlement of disputes.
In line with this European push to cooperate would be the establishment of
a European judicial committee that monitors a selection of ADR decisions on
legality and gives advice to ADR entities on how mandatory law could be
applied best in the various European CDR models.
97 By 9 July 2019, and every four years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee a report
on the application of the ADR Directive, art. 26 ADR Directive.
98 Art. 392 par. 1(a), (b) Code of Civil Procedure.
99 See recital 30 ADR Directive and art. 19 par. 3 (e) ADR Directive.
100 Arbitrators are not permitted to address a prejudicial question to the Court of Justice of
the European Union (See ECJ 23 March 1982, C-102/81, NJ 1983/149 (Nordsee)). The route
to address a prejudicial question to the Supreme Court is therefore likely not to be open
to binding advisors either.
101 The relation between the prejudicial question addressed to the Supreme Court and ADR
is not clarified in literature and practice and thus the feasibility of this default option is
subject to further studies.
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9 CONCLUSION
In this contribution, we addressed the question whether the ADR Directive
influences the interpretation of the core concept of ‘reasonableness and fairness’
within the context of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. If a binding advice procedure does
not comply with the quality requirements set out in the Directive, does this
make it ‘unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness’
for a party to be held to the decision taken by binding advisors? Can the
decision therefore be annulled in such a case? It was argued that the ADR
Directive to a certain extent does influence the interpretation of this concept.
When the manner of establishment of the decision is concerned, the fact
that one of the procedural requirements of the ADR Directive was breached
forms a very serious indication that it is unacceptable according to standards
of reasonableness and fairness to hold a party to the decision. However, this
contribution argued that the breach of one of these requirements should not
automatically make the decision subject to annulment. If a party was not
disadvantaged by the deficiency, the decision may, depending on the circum-
stances, be upheld. It would be undesirable if the ADR Directive implied
otherwise. In binding advice procedures falling outside the scope of application
of the ADRDirective, the procedural requirementsmay have an indirect effect,
in the sense that the fact that one of the procedural requirements mentioned
in the ADR Directive was breached, can be used as an argument that the
decision should be annulled. Such an argument seems especially strong in
cases in which a trader started an ADR procedure against a consumer.
With regard to the content of the decision it is clear that the ADR Directive
(and the Implementation Act) has an influence on the standard of art. 7:904
par. 1 DCC, although it is not entirely certain in what way. Art. 10 par. 2
Implementation Act abolishes art. 7:902 DCC for ADR procedures covered by
the ADR Directive, so that decisions in breach of mandatory law are no longer
valid on the basis of this provision. However, it is not clear what regime does
apply to them. This contribution argues that decisions in breach ofmandatory
law are subject to annulment on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. If a manda-
tory provision protecting the consumer is breached, it will be unacceptable
for the consumer to be held to the decision according to standards of reason-
ableness and fairness. In this view, the trader will not be able to invoke the
fact that a mandatory provision protecting the consumer was not applied.
However, even in this view art. 10 par. 2 of the Implementation Act has far-
reaching consequences. Consumer law is to a large extent mandatory by nature.
A decision may easily entail a wrong interpretation of mandatory law and
thus be subject to annulment. In cases in which a trader starts an ADR pro-
cedure against a consumer (and in which the ADR Directive thus does not
apply), art. 7:902 DCC remains unaltered. However, the desire to afford the
consumer the same protection in those cases as is given to him in situations
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in which he himself turns to ADR may bring the court to a quicker annulment
of the decision on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC as well.
The ADRDirective in combinationwith the Implementation Act does seem
to take away a great deal of the binding force of decisions taken in a binding
advice procedure covered by the Directive. Since the ADR Directive opens such
extensive possibilities for parties to challenge the decisions imposed on them,
the risk of having to follow a court procedure after the completion of the ADR
track will become high. Thus, the aim of the ADR Directive of providing parties
with a ‘simple, efficient, fast and low-cost way’ of resolving disputes might
not be achieved. Therefore, this contribution has examined alternative ways
in which the quality of consumer ADR can be enhanced. Two national safe-
guards and a European one have been touched upon. In the Dutch CDR system
one could think of a future extra information duty for ADR entities with regard
to the legality requirement in art. 18 of the Implementation Act. Furthermore,
binding advisors might be granted the opportunity to address a prejudicial
question to the Supreme Court. Finally, at the European level a European
judicial committee thatmonitors a selection of ADR decisions on legalitymight
enhance compatibility with mandatory law in binding decisions throughout
Europe.

4 Failure in performance of an obligation in
Dutch law
A confusing mix of national, transnational and
linguistic interpretation
Martijn van Kogelenberg
1 INTRODUCTION
In this contribution the Dutch notion of ‘tekortkoming in de nakoming van
een verbintenis’ – i.e. failure in performance of an obligation: hereafter also
‘failure in performance’ –will be examined from a European and transnational
perspective. Only the obligations arising from a contract are subject to research.
This contribution focuses on the relationship between the notion ‘failure in
performance’ and the concept of default (verzuim) on the one hand and setting
aside the contract or termination (ontbinding) on the other hand.
This contribution starts with an exploration of the notion of ‘failure in
performance’ and its context in Dutch law. This step is necessary before dealing
with the two following issues, which are both from a transnational origin and
are relevant for the interpretation of the relevant notion in Dutch law.
First, the connection between failure in performance and the notion of
default deserves attention. The already delicate balance between these terms
in Dutch law is complicated further by the recent implementation of the
Directive on consumer rights, resulting in the new provision in art. 7:19a DCC
on default and written notice in a consumer sales contract.1
Second, the relationship is discussed between the Dutch notion of failure
in performance and the notion of fundamental non-performance – a notion
returning in several jurisdictions surrounding theNetherlands and in practic-
ally all European and transnational instruments regarding contract law. Is there
M. van Kogelenberg is assistant professor at the Molengraaff Institute for Private Law,
Utrecht University.
1 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011
on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC
and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (PbEU L 304/64);
see also Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 520, no. 2 (legislative proposal) and no. 3 (explanatory
memorandum). The provision entered into force on 13 June 2014; Stb 2014,140.
90 4 – Failure in performance of an obligation in Dutch law
any sign of acceptance of this notion in the Dutch jurisdiction, implicitly or
explicitly, and should Dutch law be more in line with ‘Europe’ on this point?
Finally, this contribution pulls some threads together in a conclusion,
focusing on a common denominator which returns when attempting to dis-
cover the positive and negative aspects of European and transnational influ-
ences on national law: language and translation.
2 FAILURE IN PERFORMANCE: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW
2.1 Positioning the term and language problems
Failure in performance of an obligation is a key notion in the Dutch Civil Code.
It is a central requirement for establishing liability in contract leading to the
availability of remedies to the obligee or creditor. The link with liability and
the connection to the various remedies contributes to the legal relevance of
this notion. Consequently, failure in performance of an obligation cannot be
interpreted and commented on – certainly not from a European and trans-
national perspective – without linking this notion to various other relevant
notions in this respect, in particular the notions of possibility or impossibility
to perform ((on)mogelijkheid van nakoming), attribution (toerekenbaarheid), default
(verzuim) and written notice (ingebrekestelling). Knowledge of these terms is
necessary to come to better understanding of the implications of ‘failure in
performance of an obligation’ and how this term and its connected termsmay
be influenced by European or transnational instruments.
First, it is necessary to address a common problem for any research with
comparative connotations. If a Dutch element from the Civil Code or one or
several provisions from that Code have to be translated into and analysed
in the English language, one should be very careful to avoid linguistic con-
fusion.
The phrase ‘failure in performance’ returns several times in the Dutch Civil
Code, especially to indicate which remedial options the obligee or creditor
may have when he is faced with such a failure in performance.2 A concrete
and logical starting point to start from is art. 6:74 par. 1 DCC. This provision
represents the Dutch way of approaching the idea of failure in performance
of an obligation and one of the most logical consequences: damages.
Art 6:74 par. 1 DCC:3
2 See for example articles 6:263 and 265 DCC on suspending performance and setting aside
the contract.
3 All translations of Dutch Civil Code provisions are from H.C.S. Warendorf, R. Thomas,
I. Curry-Sumner,The Civil Code of the Netherlands, Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International
2013.
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‘Every failure in performance of an obligation shall require the obligor to repair
the damage which the obligee suffers therefrom, unless the failure is not attributable
to the obligor.’
According to Dutch law, the concept of ‘failure in performance of an obligation’
ismore limited than the notion of non-performance in general.4 Non-perform-
ance is a purely objective assessment – the debtor did not or not fully perform
the obligation for any reason. For example, the justifiable suspension of per-
formance of an obligation can be qualified as non-performance, but not as a
failure to perform. The notion of failure to perform is still a neutral term, but
nevertheless more specified. This notion implies that the performance of the
obligation is not what may be expected from the debtor. Failure to perform
implies non-performance, delayed performance and defective performance.5
It may be that the failure to perform cannot be attributed to the debtor – there-
fore the term itself is still neutral – but the evidentiary threshold to be over-
come by the debtor is high.6 The debtor may exonerate himself from facing
the consequences of failing to perform, but he has to prove that the failure
cannot be attributed to him in any way.
The translation used of the aforementioned provision is not without diffi-
culties, because it may give awrong impression of its meaning. The termwhich
may cause a certain level of confusion is the term ‘repair’. This term has two
meanings. The most common translation in Dutch is ‘herstellen’,7 an English
synonym is ‘to mend’. However, an obligation to ‘mend’ is not what the
provision in Dutch intends to impose on the obligor. The obligor is not
required to physically repair or mend the damage caused by the failure to
perform, at least not according to art. 6:74 par.1 DCC. The obligor is required
to compensate the obligee for the damage suffered as a result of the failure in
performance. This is a monetary sanction.8 ‘To repair’ may also imply ‘to
compensate financially’, but it is certainly not themost straightforwardmean-
ing.
However, this linguistic confusion coincidentally points at a strong system-
atic presumption of Dutch contract law, which is characteristic of most legal
4 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-I* 2012/317; GS Verbintenissenrecht, art. 74 Boek 6 BW,
note 2 (Broekema-Engelen).
5 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-I* 2012/370.
6 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-I* 2012/345 et seqq.
7 VanDaleOnlineWoordenboekEngels-Nederlands;http://surfdiensten2.vandale.nl/zoeken/
zoeken.do (18 February 2015).
8 In theory, a creditor may demand ‘performance in kind’, but this exception is still ‘specialis’
of monetary damages and , furthermore, only available if the court uses its discretionary
power to award a specific form of damages. The full text of the relevant provision (art.
6:103 DCC) is as follows: ‘Damages shall be paid in money. Nevertheless, upon the demand
of the person suffering the loss, the court may award compensation in a form other than
payment of a sum ofmoney.Where such judgment is not compliedwithwithin a reasonable
period, the person suffering the loss shall recover the right to claim damages in money.’
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systems with a ‘civil-law’ background. The presumption is that the law en-
courages performance of contractual obligations, because contractual obliga-
tions should be performed (pacta sunt servanda). This well-known maxim pro-
vides for a system which gives the obligee not merely a remedy, but a right
to performance of the contractual obligation.9
The right to performance of contractual obligations is not codified, although
some would say it should be, but the idea is that the right to performance
– self-evidently – follows from the underlying principle that parties are bound
to their contractual obligations.10 Therefore, codification is not strictly
necessary.
In case of failure in performance, the obligeemay in theory choose between
performance, damages or termination. However, the gateway to the remedy
of damages (and, for that matter, the gateway to termination as well, see art.
6:265 DCC), requires the obligor to be in default according to art. 6:74 par.2
DCC.11
In most cases, the obligor should provide written notice in order to put
the obligee into default (arts. 6:81 and 6:82 DCC). Giving written notice is in
fact nothingmore than giving the obligor a second chance to perform correctly.
This requirement underlines the level of significance given to eventual perform-
ance of the contractual obligation. Notice has to be given accompanied with
a clear moment, until which the obligor has the opportunity to perform correct-
ly. If he does not, the obligor will be in default, and only if the other require-
ments of art. 6:74 par. 1 are fulfilled, will the obligor be liable for damages.
Therefore, although the translation of art. 6:74 par. 1 DCC is not the most
convenient one in my opinion, it unintentionally points at this important
feature of Dutch contract law.
2.2 Failure in performance, default, written notice, impossibility and attri-
bution
Following the justification of the requirement of default – giving the obligor
the opportunity to perform correctly – it is logical that the obligormust be able
9 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-I* 2012/380.
10 D. Haas, De grenzen van het recht op nakoming (diss. Amsterdam), Deventer: Kluwer 2009,
pp. 49, 50. Moreover, the ‘right in action’ is codified in art. 3:296 DCC s.1: ‘Unless it other-
wise follows from the law, the nature of the obligation or a juridical act, the person obliged
to give, to do or not to do something as regards another may be ordered to do so by the
court upon the demand of the person to whom the obligation is owed.’ This provision is
more of a procedural nature and, if anything, may indirectly imply a substantive right to
performance of a (contractual) obligation.
11 ‘To the extent that it is established that performance is and will remain impossible, para-
graph (1) shall apply only if in accordance with the provisions of §2 regarding the default
of obligors.’ See also art. 6:81 DCC.
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to perform correctly. If performance has become impossible,12 default is not
required, because it is useless to give the obligor more time to perform.
If a debtor delivers 50 lorries instead of the promised 100, he fails to
perform the contractual obligation. However, it is not impossible for the obligor
to perform and to deliver the remaining 50 lorries. When a debtor has to
deliver a painting that has been destroyed by a fire, it is impossible for the
debtor to perform the original obligation.
The law also provides for situations where performancemay be theoretical-
ly possible butwhere the requirement of default automatically applieswithout
the requirement to give notice (art. 6:83 DCC). In this respect, the most import-
ant category is the obligation with a set term. If the term expires, default is
not required.13 Performance of the obligation may still be possible – the
remaining 50 lorries can be delivered – but not within the term set in the
contract. A theoretical discussion arises on the topic whether the term set in
the contract is part of the obligation or not. If so, one could also argue that
performance is impossible – and default is not required in that case – or that
performance is possible, but default applies automatically. Because legal
consequences do not differ substantially, this discussion does not have any
substantive relevance in this respect.14
Another theoretical discussion is whether the requirement of default and
the term failure in performance are really distinguishable. In other words, can
a failure in performance in the sense of art. 6:74 DCC exist without liability
because the obligor is not (yet) in default? The Dutch Supreme Court rules
that these terms are not distinguishable, because it asserts that the situation
before being in default gives the obligor the opportunity to perform without
failing to perform.15
The connections between failure in performance and default and between
failure in performance and impossibility in Dutch law have been briefly
12 The distinction between absolute and temporary impossibility will not be discussed in this
contribution (see the difference on this point between art. 6:74 par. 2 and art. 6:265 par. 2
DCC).
13 Case law on this issue is quite extensive. See e.g. Dutch Supreme Court 6 October 2000,
NJ 2000/691 (Verzicht/Van Eijndhoven); Dutch SupremeCourt 4 February 2000,NJ 2000/258
(Kinheim/Pelders); Dutch SupremeCourt 4 October 2002,NJ 2003/257 (Fraanje/Götte); Dutch
SupremeCourt 22October 2004,NJ 2006/597 (Endlich/Bouwmachines); Dutch SupremeCourt
13 January 2012, RvdW 2012/107 (Cubeware/A-line).
14 See Dutch Supreme Court 27 June 2008, NJ 2010/ 83 (Moerings/Mol), note J. Hijma; A.C.
van Schaick, ‘Blijvende onmogelijkheid’,Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht (NTBR)
2012/40.
15 Dutch Supreme Court 20 September 1996, NJ 1996/748 (Büchner/Wies): ‘Daarbij verdient
nog aantekening dat een ingebrekestelling niet de functie heeft om ‘het verzuim vast te
stellen’, doch om de schuldenaar nog een laatste termijn voor nakoming te geven en aldus
nader te bepalen tot welk tijdstip nakoming nog mogelijk is zonder dat van een tekort-
koming sprake is, bij gebreke van welke nakoming de schuldenaar vanaf dat tijdstip in
verzuim is.’ Legal doctrine does not agree unanimously with this line of reasoning. See
e.g Asser/Hijma 7-I* 2013/421-422.
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indicated. A last thread in this respect is the link between failure in perform-
ance and the requirement of attribution in relation to the remedies available
to the obligee.
As stated earlier, the obligee has a self-evident right to performance of the
contractual obligation. This right is more than a remedy in reaction to failure
in performance. This right can be exercised not only after failure in perform-
ance of the obligor, but in any case, provided that the applicable obligation
is due. The right to performance naturally evolves from the contract. The
circumstances of an eventual failure to perform are therefore not relevant.
Whether the failure in performance can be attributed to the obligor is not
relevant for access to the right to performance. The only impediment to invoca-
tion of the right to performance is an impossibility to perform, but the interpre-
tation of the notion of impossibility is quite strict, because the right to perform-
ance should not be limited more than strictly necessary.16
In conclusion, theDutch concept of failure in performance has its peculiar-
ities, which mainly evolve from the principles underlying the Dutch Civil
Code. In practice, failure in performance simply means that performance is
not up to standard according to the obligation agreed upon in the contract.
However, the notion of failure in performance can only be understood when
it is connectedwith other notions such as impossibility, attribution and default
on the one hand and with the remedies triggered by failure in performance,
such as damages and termination on the other hand. The next section analyses
two specific sources of influence on the national interpretation of the notion
of failure in performance.
3 FAILURE IN PERFORMANCE: A EUROPEAN AND TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Failure in performance and default in Directive 2011/83/EU and 7:19a
DCC
On a European level, instruments regarding general contract law are in general
not binding, such as the PECL and DCFR.17 In that sense, it does not directly
affect national contract law.
However, the good exception is the area of consumer law, including the
part of consumer law regarding the law of contract. The European Union is
concerned about the position of consumers and strives to protect consumer
16 See art. 3:296 DCC and also Dutch Supreme Court 5 January 2001, NJ 2001/79 (Multi
Vastgoed/Nethou)
17 The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common
European Sales Law (COM/2011/635) (CESL) is themost recent project whichwas cancelled
in February 2015.
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interests via Directives, which should be implemented on a national level.18
The influence on national law is therefore considerable.
In 2011, the European Parliament issued a new Directive in order to
harmonise and improve regulations from previous directives concerning
consumer law. The development of the Directive was not without problems,
because the Parliament wanted to adopt a Directive with maximum
harmonisation.19 This objective caused severe problems – an earlier proposal
for a much more ambitious Directive did not survive, mainly because of the
maximum harmonisation objective20 – and the predictable result was that
the newDirective in 2011 did not containmany substantive provisions chang-
ing the level of consumer protection substantively, except for incorporating
a range of information obligations on the side of the seller.
An exception is formed by art. 18 of the Directive. This provision is specific-
ally drafted for sales contracts. The most relevant parts of the provision are
the first section and the first part of the second section:
‘1. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise on the time of delivery, the trader
shall deliver the goods by transferring the physical possession or control of
the goods to the consumer without undue delay, but not later than 30 days
from the conclusion of the contract.
2. Where the trader has failed to fulfil his obligation to deliver the goods at the
time agreed upon with the consumer or within the time limit set out in para-
graph 1, the consumer shall call upon him to make the delivery within an
additional period of time appropriate to the circumstances. If the trader fails
to deliver the goods within that additional period of time, the consumer shall
be entitled to terminate the contract. (…)’
The highlights of this provision are the following. The trader should deliver
the goods within a period of 30 days or within a time of delivery. If the trader
fails to do so, the consumer gives the trader an additional period of time
appropriate to the circumstances. If the trader fails to deliver within that
additional period of time, the consumer is entitled to terminate the contract.
At first glance, the rationale behind this rule seems to be a guarantee to
a quick delivery by the trader. If quick delivery cannot be triggered, the
consumer may terminate the contract. The implementation of this provision
causes problemswhich have a direct effect on the notion of failure in perform-
ance in Dutch law.
18 Art. 169 TFEU.
19 See art. 4 of the Directive. See e.g. A.L.M. Keirse, S.A. Kruisinga & M.Y. Schaub, ‘Nieuws
uit Europa: Twee nieuwe wetgevingsinstrumenten: de Richtlijn Consumentenrechten en
het gemeenschappelijk Europees kooprecht’, Contracteren 2012/1, pp. 11-26; M.B.M. Loos
& J.A. Luzak, ‘De nieuwe Richtlijn consumentenrechten’, Tijdschrift voor Consumenten-
recht 2011/5, pp. 184-191.
20 C.A.N.M.Y. Cauffman,M.G. Faure& T.Hartlief, ‘Het richtlijnvoorstel consumentenrechten:
quo vadis?’, Contracteren 2010-3, pp. 71-78.
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A first hint at problematic implementation is that the scope of the provision
is slightly blurred by section 53 of the Preamble. This section says that
‘in addition to the consumer’s right to terminate the contract where the trader has
failed to fulfil his obligations to deliver the goods in accordance with this Directive,
the consumer may, in accordance with the applicable national law, have recourse
to other remedies, such as granting the trader an additional period of time for
delivery, enforcing the performance of the contract, withholding payment, and
seeking damages.’
This sentence may imply that the rule of art.18 of the Directive does not only
trigger termination as a remedy, but also, amidst other remedies, damages,
but this recourse is only possible if it is in accordance with national law.
Art. 18 Directive is implemented via art. 7:19a DCC.21 The relevant part
of the provision says:22
‘If, in the case of a consumer sale, a seller fails to perform the contract within a
prescribed or agreed period as referred to in Article 9 (4) (the 30-day period, MvK),
he shall be in default if he is given notice of default by the buyer in which he is
allowed a further reasonable period for delivery but still fails to perform within
this period.’
Several authors have already criticized this provision.23 One of the most
problematic issues is the use of the terms ‘default’ (verzuim) and ‘notice’
(ingebrekestelling). Both terms are already embedded in a Dutch context, so
a lawmaker should be extremely careful when using these terms in another
context.
First, a translation issue hides an obvious dichotomy in Dutch law.Within
the context of arts. 6:74 BW and 6:265 BW, the obligee has to provide written
notice in order to put the obligee into default. The Dutch term is ‘ingebrekestel-
ling’. However, in the case of art. 7:19a DCC, the Dutch term ‘ingebrekestelling’
is translated to notice: without the adjective ‘written’. In other words, apparent-
ly the consumermay give notice over the telephone or in person. This situation
causes problems, for according to Dutch law, an obligee can only be notified
21 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 520, no. 2 (legislative proposal) and no. 3 (explanatory memo-
randum).
22 ‘Komt de verkoper bij een consumentenkoop de in artikel 9 lid 4 gestelde of overeengeko-
men termijn niet na, dan is hij in verzuim wanneer hij door de koper in gebreke wordt
gesteld bij een aanmaning waarbij hem een redelijke termijn voor de aflevering wordt
gesteld, en nakoming binnen deze termijn uitblijft.’
23 A.G. Castermans, ‘Verzuim en ingebrekestelling bij consumentenkoop: de beperkte reikwijd-
te van artikel 7:19a BW’, NTBR 2014/38; H.N. Schelhaas, ‘In verzuim’, NTBR 2013/37.
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correctly, if written notice is provided.24 The term ‘ingebrekestelling’ implies
that the notice given is written. Through the incorporation of the new art. 7:19a
DCC themeaning of the term ‘ingebrekestelling’ is not certain anymore, because
two manifestations of the term now exist in the Civil Code.
A second issue is the introduction of the term ‘default’ in combinationwith
the requirement of giving notice. In section 2 of this contribution it has been
made clear that the notion of default is one with a very specific meaning
especially in combination with the notion of written notice and failure in
performance. One of its features, laid down in the law (art. 6:83 DCC), is that
giving written notice is unnecessary when a set term expires. In this situation,
the obligor is automatically in default after expiry of the set term. Art. 7:19a
DCC confuses this system, because this provision always requires giving notice
to the obligor, even when a set term is agreed upon. The only exception is
when timely performance is essential for the performance because of the nature
of the contractual obligation – e.g. in case of the delivery of a wedding dress
on a specific date. Again, the use of the terms default and notice is question-
able, because of the incongruent meaning of the terms.
A third matter is the scope of the provision in the DCC compared with the
scope of art. 18 in the Directive. The scope of the provision in the Directive
is clearly limited. The obligee has access to termination when the obligor fails
to deliver. As mentioned before, the consumer may have access to other
remedies, but only if in accordance with national law. In art. 7:19a DCC the
connection with termination is not clearly made. This omission suggests that
this provision may also be applicable in case a creditor claims compensation
via art. 6:74 DCC. The European legislator did not prescribe this elaboration,
because now it is slightly unclear whether the ‘national’ default rules apply
or the ‘European’ rules. The aim of this contribution is to establish any influ-
ence of transnational law on the interpretation of Dutch law. Since this provi-
sion has been implemented quite recently, it is difficult to assess the degree
of influence, especially because there is no case law yet. However, a few
predictions can be made.
First, the relationship between the new art. 7:19a DCC and the concepts
of default and (written) notice needed to trigger damages and termination
in general (arts. 6:74 DCC and 6:265 DCC) need to be clarified. The practical
result could be, as Castermans already suggested, always to remain on the
safe side and send a written notice in any case in which the buyer-consumer
would like to get access to a remedy.25 To be fair, the Dutch system of default
24 There are exceptions (Dutch Supreme Court 22 October 2004, NJ 2006/597 (Endlich/Bouw-
machines)), where the Dutch Supreme Court allows other forms of notice, but the law is
clear on this point.
25 Castermans 2014.
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and notice is in itself quite hard to understand: the advice to practitioners has
always been to give written notice in any situation.26
Second, although the national system is not without flaws either, an im-
portant ‘tool’ in the law of obligations to prevent unfair solutions is the applica-
tion of the principle of good faith (or reasonableness and fairness). This
principle is not without significance in the area of failure of performance,
default and notice. For example, notice is by law only valid when it is written,
but in exceptional circumstances, good faith may imply that notice may be
given in another form (e.g. by telephone).27 Art. 7:19a DCC provides a strict
application of giving notice in every applicable case, but in practice one may
want to deviate from this legal principle in exceptional circumstances. The
absence of a general principle of good faith to deal with such situations may
hamper the smooth application of this new provision.28
Most importantly, implementation of the new provision seems to have a
negative influence on the internal coherence of the Dutch Civil Code. The
Dutch Supreme Court aligns the concepts of failure in performance and default,
but the new provision seems to disentangle these two concepts. Avoidance
of these specific terms in the concepts would have been preferable, but maybe
this new provision provides a trigger to review the complete system of default
andwritten notice. Then, the concept of failure in performance will be affected
too.
3.2 Failure in performance, non-performance and fundamental non-per-
formance
According to Dutch law, failure in performance is required to have access to
damages and to termination. As far as termination is concerned, art. 6:265 DCC
applies. It is necessary to take a closer look at this provision, par. 1:
‘Every failure of one party in the performance of one of its obligations gives the
other party the right to set aside the contract in whole or in part, unless the failure,
given its special nature or minor significance, does not justify the setting aside of
the contract and the consequences flowing therefrom.’
For the purpose of this contribution, the focus lies on the phrase ‘unless the
failure, given its special nature or minor significance, does not justify the
setting aside of the contract’. This phrase suggests that the obligee cannot set
aside the contract in every case of failure in performance. As a remedy, termina-
26 See e.g. V. van den Brink, ’Verzuim en ingebrekestelling (deel I/II)’, Maandblad voor Ver-
mogensrecht 2005-10/11.
27 Dutch Supreme Court 22 October 2004, NJ 2006/597 (Endlich/Bouwmachines).
28 Castermans 2014.
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tion is considered to be severe. Therefore, apart from the requirement of ‘failure
in performance’ in general – and default according to par. 2 – an extra thres-
hold is applicable.
Nevertheless, the Dutch Supreme Court decided that applicability of the
exception of minor breach is exceptional and that in virtually all cases of failure
in performance, termination is available as a remedy.29 On the other hand,
it should be taken into account that seriousness of the failure is a factor which
is taken into account in assessing the availability and extent of remedies in
contract and possible defences of the party that fails to perform.30
Most European or supranational bodies of law or legal instruments, as well
as many national legal systems, also recognize a qualified level of breach
necessary to have access to the remedy of termination, but not in the same
way.31 Most commonly, the term ‘fundamental breach of contract’ is intro-
duced. The instruments mentioned all have their own specific provision on
fundamental breach of contract.
Art. 25 CISG states:
‘A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results
in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he
is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee
and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not
have foreseen such a result.’
Art. 8:103 PECL states:
‘A non-performance of an obligation is fundamental to the contract if:
(a) strict compliance with the obligation is of the essence of the contract; or
(b) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what i[t]
was entitled to expect under the contract, unless the other party did not foresee
and could not reasonably have foreseen that result; or
(c) the non-performance is intentional and gives the aggrieved party reason to
believe that it cannot rely on the other party’s future performance.’
29 Dutch Supreme Court 4 February 2000, NJ 2000, 562 (Mol/Meijer). See for a dissertation
on a possible reshuffling of availability of traditional remedies, taking into account serious-
ness of the breach M.M. Stolp, Ontbinding, schadevergoeding en nakoming: De remedies voor
wanprestatie in het licht van de beginselen van subsidiariteit en proportionaliteit (diss. Leiden),
Deventer: Kluwer 2007.
30 See for an example Dutch Supreme Court 25 March 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:BP8991, NJ 2013,
5, note T.F.E. Tjong Tjin Tai (Ploum/Smeets II); T. Hartlief, Ontbinding (diss. Groningen),
Deventer: Kluwer 1994; F.B. Bakels,Ontbinding van wederkerige overeenkomsten (diss. Leiden),
Deventer: Kluwer 1993.
31 M.B.M. Loos & H. Schelhaas, ‘Commercial Sales: The Common European Sales Law
Compared to the Vienna Sales Convention’, European Review of Private Law 2013 (21), Issue
1, pp. 105–130; G. Dannemann & S. Vogenauer (eds.), The Common European Sales Law in
Context, Interactions with English and German Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013.
The practical value of the CESL provisions has naturally declined due to its cancellation.
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Art. III.3:502 (2) DCFR states:
‘A non-performance of a contractual obligation is fundamental if
(a) it substantially deprives the creditor of what the creditor was entitled to expect
under the contract, as applied to the whole or relevant part of the performance,
unless at the time of conclusion of the contract the debtor did not foresee and could
not reasonably be expected to have foreseen that result; or
(b) it is intentional or reckless and gives the creditor reason to believe that the
debtor’s future performance cannot be relied on.’
Art. 7.3.1 (2) Unidroit PICC states:
‘In determining whether a failure to perform an obligation amounts to a funda-
mental non-performance regard shall be had, in particular, to whether
(a) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what it was
entitled to expect under the contract unless the other party did not foresee and
could not reasonably have foreseen such result;
(b) strict compliancewith the obligationwhich has not been performed is of essence
under the contract;
(c) the non-performance is intentional or reckless;
(d) the non-performance gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it cannot
rely on the other party’s future performance;
(e) the non-performing party will suffer disproportionate loss as a result of the
preparation or performance if the contract is terminated.’
The CESL also contains a provision on the meaning of fundamental non-per-
formance. Art. 87 par. 2 reads:32
‘Non-performance of an obligation by one party is fundamental if:
(a) it substantially deprives the other party of what that party was entitled to expect
under the contract, unless at the time of conclusion of the contract the non-perform-
ing party did not foresee and could not be expected to have foreseen that result;
or
(b) it is of such a nature as to make it clear that the non-performing party’s future
performance cannot be relied on.’
Before analysing the meaning of the term ‘fundamental breach of contract’,
it is relevant to note that the different instruments use different terms forwhat
in Dutch law is called ‘failure in performance of an obligation’. The terms used
are ‘breach of contract’ (CISG) and, more commonly, ‘non-performance’.
The CISG tends slightlymore towards the common-law terminology, where
‘breach of contract’ is also used to indicate a ‘failure to perform’. This term
32 See for an elaboration of this term M. von Kossak, ‘The Remedial System under the Pro-
posed Common European Sales Law (CESL)’, European Journal of Commercial Contract Law
2013-1, p. 9.
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does not take into account the notion of fault or ‘attribution’. Under English
lawmany contractual duties are strict. Especially in cases where a buyer cannot
pay the price or where the deliverer of generic goods cannot deliver the
promised goods due to non-performance of his own supplier or for another
reason, in general the other party does not have to establish fault to obtain
a remedy due to breach of contract.33 Strict liability can be considered as the
starting point instead of fault liability. However, it is very dangerous to make
general statements like this when referring to English law, as the bottom-up
structure of English contract law seldom allows one to generalize solutions
and approaches chosen in specific cases.34
The other instruments all use the term ‘non-performance’. According to
Dutch law, as mentioned before, this term is more neutral than the term ‘failure
in performance’, because non-performance can be justified, for example in case
of a justified withholding of the performance.
The general idea is that termination of the contract should not be available
as a remedy without a good reason. Terminating the contract is considered
to be a severe remedy, which on the one hand cancels contractual obligations
of the parties and on the other hand forces the parties to undo what they
already did under the previously existing contract. A small breach of contract
is not sufficient to make termination available, but even a ‘normal’ breach is
not. Only a fundamental breach is sufficient to trigger the remedy of termina-
tion. The CISG, the DCFR, the PICC and the CESL all incorporated this notion one
way or another. The question iswhat fundamental breachmeans exactly.When
is a breach fundamental? As shown by the three provisions mentioned, the
three instruments use different definitions.
All instruments in general recognize that fundamental breach occurs when
the aggrieved party is substantially deprived of the very object of the contract.
The PICC contains the clearest explicated notion of fundamental breach and
devotes explicit attention to the notion of intentional breach as a form of
fundamental breach. However, the importance of this notion is immediately
downplayed a bit by the official comments on the PICC.35 In case a breach
is intentional, but insignificant, the principle of good faith can block the non-
performance from becoming fundamental.
33 E. Peel & G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (13th ed.), London: Sweet &Maxwell 2011, p. 834.
34 For example, according to the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, it can be said with
some restrictions that liability for a contractwhich exclusively supplies for services is based
on fault.
35 www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples
2004-e.pdf, art. 7.3.1, p. 222. See also S. Vogenauer & J. Kleinheisterkamp, Commentary on
the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press 2009, pp. 827-828: ‘The isolated focus on the ‘state of mind’ of the non-performing
party as suggested by Art. 7.3.1(2)(c) should therefore be given less weight than the other
factors in Art. 7.3.1(2).’
102 4 – Failure in performance of an obligation in Dutch law
The PECL and the DCFR are also very brief about the connection between
fundamental breach and intentional breach.36 Seriousness of the breach gets
a lot of attention, but this factor is not directly linked to the intention of the
party in breach. It should be mentioned that an intentional breach as men-
tioned in the provisions of the PECL and DCFR does not qualify directly as a
fundamental breach. A second requirement next to the deliberateness of the
breach is that the aggrieved partymust have reason to believe that the debtor’s
future performance cannot be relied on. In my opinion, an intentional breach
by its very nature causes a justified lack of confidence in the debtor’s future
performance. The connectionwith future performancemay therefore not only
be a requirement but also a justification to qualify intentional breach as funda-
mental. In addition, there may be cases where a party intentionally withholds
performance, e.g. because he is angry about another, unrelated transaction.
In such cases the additional requirement may have added value. Although
the wording of the provision in the CESL is similar to the wording of the
comparable provision of the DCFR, the reference to intentional non-performance
is omitted. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the minimal difference in
formulation now implies that intentional breach is also covered by referring
to the ‘nature’ of the breach.
The provision in the CISG does not mention that intentional breach may
also constitute fundamental breach. The definition of fundamental breach
reveals the most important precondition – substantial deprivation of what is
to be expected from the contract, but leaves out several others.
From this exercise it may be derived that termination should not be easily
available, but only in case of a serious breach. The difference between the
threshold in Dutch law and the requirement of fundamental breach is not a
theoretical one. In principle, every failure in performance should give access
to termination.37 The refusal to incorporate the ‘fundamental’ requirement
into Dutch law is not an accidental, but a conscious decision by the lawmaker,
mainly because the requirement was thought to be too vague.38 Although
the available transnational or European instruments show that the requirement
is interpreted in different ways, I am not certain that this argument alone is
sufficiently convincing to deny incorporation of this requirement. In my
opinion, the relevant question should be whether Dutch law recognizes the
principle behind the ‘fundamental’ requirement, in particular that termination
should not be accessible too easily.
36 See for a more in-depth analysis on this point M. van Kogelenberg, Motive matters! An
exploration of the notion of ‘deliberate breach of contract’ and its consequences for the application
of remedies, Cambridge: Intersentia 2013, Chapters 2 and 4.
37 Dutch Supreme Court 4 February 2000, NJ 2000, 562 (Mol c.s./Meijer Beheer BV); Asser/
Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III* 2014/671.
38 Asser/Hijma 7-I* 2013/425 with references.
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At first glance, the Dutch Supreme Court seems to deny this principle by
stating that ‘a failure in performance justifies termination of the contract’.39
However, it is too simple to conclude that Dutch law does not at all recog-
nize the idea behind the requirement of fundamental breach. First, the require-
ment of default already mentioned also applies in order to acquire access to
termination. Default is not by definition a requirement in every transnational
instrument. The objective of a ‘default’ requirement – an attempt to ‘save’ the
contract – is comparable with the objective of the requirement of fundamental
breach. Second, in transnational instruments the requirement of fundamental
breach is not always necessary when the obligee/buyer wants price reduction.
Price reduction is notmuchmore than partial termination, which is a possibil-
ity under Dutch law (art. 6:270 DCC). Third, the provision itself already
excludes the possibility of terminating the contract due to minor failures.
Taking into account this systemic approach, the addition of a requirement
such as ‘fundamental non-performance’ is not really necessary in Dutch law,
if not causing the wrong idea that termination is a last resort option. It is not
the vagueness of the term itself, but the systemic vagueness caused by adding
this requirementwhich leadsme to the conclusion that international ‘pressure’
should not lead to incorporation of this term into Dutch law.
The purpose of this contribution is to analyse whether transnational inter-
pretations of well-known concepts influence the interpretation of a comparable
concept in Dutch law and if so, how. As far as the idea of fundamental non-
performance is concerned, one could say that until now Dutch law has held
firm in refusing to incorporate this concept into its own legal system. The law
allows the court to rule that failure is too minor to have the contract termin-
ated. However, a simple circumvention by limiting the access to termination
via the principle of reasonableness and fairness is not going to work. This
principle does not stretch the exception laid down in art. 6:265 significantly
further.
The provisional conclusion is slightly ambiguous. Dutch law recognizes
a higher threshold for termination – there is an extra requirement added to
failure in performance alone – but the requirement of fundamental non-per-
formance is not accepted in Dutch law.
4 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this contribution is to consider whether the Dutch concept of
‘failure in performance of an obligation’ has been influenced by European and
transnational developments and/or instruments. Two specific developments
have been discussed. First, the recent implementation of art. 7:19a DCC has
39 Dutch Supreme Court 22 July 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4122,NJ 2007/343 (Fisser/Tycho),
par. 5.2.
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been discussed. Second, the widely accepted notion of fundamental non-
performance and its possible effects on Dutch law have been analysed.
Both issues show that the term ‘failure in performance’ cannot be under-
stood and analysed in isolation. The term ‘failure in performance’ and its
European and transnational counterparts ‘breach of contract’ and ‘non-perform-
ance’ have close relationships with concepts such as attribution, default,
impossibility and the remedies performance, damages and termination.
The concept of failure in performance as used in the Dutch Civil Code in
general is not directly influenced by European or transnational developments
or instruments. Courts do not refer to European or transnational instruments
when they apply provisions in which the relevant notion returns.
Related concepts such as default and written notice are influenced by the
European Directive on consumer rights, implemented via art. 7:19a DCC. This
implementation may have its implications for the interpretation of the notion
of failure in performance.
The notion of fundamental non-performance, although present in many
other national legal systems and in European and transnational systems, has
not found its way into the Dutch Civil Code. Nevertheless, art. 6:265 DCC has
its ownway of limiting access to termination as a remedy, though the principle
of easy access to termination prevails according to the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, there is a more general way in which the influence of trans-
national and European instruments finds its way into the Dutch legal environ-
ment more and more convincingly. For many years the CISG has been applic-
able to certain contractual (sales) relationships. The scope of certain European
instruments seems to widen as the years pass and consequently, the influence
of the national codemay decline. Although the draft Regulation on a Common
European Sales Law has been withdrawn, a new, more focused, initiative on
the development of a so-called Digital Single Market is already announced,
which will be accompanied by – inter alia – rules of contract law.40 It is not
clear yet, whether these new rules will be developed on a basis of minimum
or maximum harmonisation. The most recent Directive on consumer rights
is largely based on a principle of maximum harmonisation, which leaves no
serious room for national provisions to be of added value, because they ought
to be replaced or rewritten.
Finally, the comparison and analysis of comparable concepts in national
law and transnational law always triggers language problems. It is not just
a matter of possible misunderstandings in communication. Due to linguistic
confusion, the legal interpretation of terms and its connection to other terms
and concepts can be influenced. The implementation of art. 7:19a DCC shows
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 6 May 2015,
COM(2015) 192, pp. 4, 20.
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that this well-known concern is not obsolete or outdated. This lessonmay even
be the most significant one of this contribution.

PART II
Tort

5 Harmonising tort law
Exploring the concept of fault
Pieter De Tavernier & Jeroen van der Weide
1 150 YEARS IN SEARCH OF FAULT: THE MATTERHORN TRAGEDY
After a tragic event, breaking news, headlines from newspapers and opinion
papers often start with a twofold question: First: what really happened? And
second: who was at fault or who is to blame? Sometimes, these questions do
not get a clear and convincing answer. Let us illustrate this with the following
event, which was commemorated on the 14th July 2015, during the drafting
process of this article.
In 1865, one hundred and fifty years ago, an international expedition of
French, Swiss and English climbers conquered theMatterhorn, the well-known
mountain that reigns in splendid isolation above Zermatt, in the Swiss Pennine
Alps. During the descent, the English climberDouglasHadow,who afterwards
was considered as the most inexperienced of the group, ‘knocked over his
aid and foot placer, the Chamonix guide Michel Croz. The next man up the
rope, the Rev. Charles Hudson, was dragged from his feet and so, in turn,
was Lord Francis Douglas. All of them fell to their deaths. Only three people
survived the tragedy: the Englishman EdwardWhymper and the two Zermatt
guides Old Peter and Young Peter Taugwalder, because the Englishman and
Old Peter had planted themselves firmly to try and take the strain, but the
thinner rope Old Peter had tied between himself and Douglas broke midway
between the two.’1
After the tragedy, a persistent discussion arose about the mistakes that
had beenmade during the descent. For instance, in the Alpine Journal, Arnold
Lunn, a famous English climber, wrote about the tragedy:2
P.C.J. De Tavernier is assistant professor of Private Law, Leiden University. J.A. van der
Weide is associate professor of Private Law, Leiden University.
1 See <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/matterhorn-conqueror-cleared-over-fatal-falls-
1248170.html>.
2 A. Lunn, ‘Whymper Again’, Alpine Journal 1966, pp. 228-235 and available at <http://
www.alpinejournal.org.uk/Contents/Contents_1966_files/AJ%201966%20228-
235%20Lunn%20Whymper%20Again.pdf>.
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‘Whymper did not accuse Taugwalder of deliberately using a weak rope; he dealt
with the awkward fact that such a rope was used. The Official Enquiry had also
to deal with this; it was such an obvious difficulty that any Enquiry would have
been badly at fault had it been slurred over. If Lunn will read our remarks on the
roping he will see that we agree that Croz was not blameless in the matter, nor can
Hudson, Douglas orWhymper be wholly excused of varying degrees of blame. But
Old Peter was the main offender.’
Till now, the answer to the question what really happened during the tragic
event of 14 July 1865, as well as the elucidation of the blameworthiness of one
or more of the members of the expedition, has remained a subject of fierce
debate in books, magazines and newspapers.3
2 THE NOTION OF FAULT IN THE YEAR 2015
2.1 Fault in common parlance and in the legal dictionaries
The frequent use of the notion of fault – sometimes disguised in terms such
as ‘blame’ or ‘wrong’ – after the occurrence of a tragedy, is striking. Some
illustrations: ‘That rioting in Baltimore? It’s all Our Fault’.4 Or: ‘Police: Cyclist
at fault in crash that killed him’.5 And: ‘Dubai climbing wall was ‘no one’s
fault’, says manager’.6 This brings us to the inevitable question: what does
‘fault’ actually mean?
Both in common parlance as well as in legal dictionaries, fault is defined
in many different ways. In the Cambridge Dictionary, we discovered a quite
impressive list of meanings:
‘(1) a mistake, especially something for which you are to blame; (2) a weakness
in a person’s character; (3) a broken part or weakness in a machine or system; (4)
in sport and some other games: a mistake made by a player who is beginning a
game by hitting the ball; (5) to have done somethingwrong: her doctor was at fault
for/in not sending her straight to a specialist and (6) to criticize someone or some-
thing, especially without good reasons: he’s always finding fault with my work.’7
3 See e.g. M. Taugwalder, Die Suche nach der Wahrheit. 150 Jahre Erstbesteigung Matterhorn
vom 14. Juli 1865, Visp: Rotten Verlag 2015, 204 p. H. Taugwalder & M. Jaggi, Der Wahrheit
näher (Taschenbuch) , Aarau: Glendy Verlag 2015, 220 p.; R.W. Clark, The Day the Rope Broke:
The Tragic Story of the First Ascent of the Matterhorn, Mara Books 2008, 216 p. and <http://
www.merian.de/magazin/matterhorn-schweizer-gipfel-tragoedie.html>.
4 See<http://www.nationalreview.com/article/417638/debunking-obamas-bilious-baltimore-
babble-michelle-malkin>.
5 See <http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/local/2015/08/03/police-blame-
cyclist-fatal-crash/31088263/>.
6 See <http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/dubai-climbing-wall-fall-was-no-ones-
fault-says-manager>.
7 See <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/fault>.
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With regard to legal dictionaries, Black’s Law Dictionary gives us, in its 6th
Edition, no less than eight (!) definitions of fault:
‘(1) negligence; an error or defect of judgment or of conduct; (2) any deviation from
prudence, duty, or rectitude; (3) any shortcoming, or neglect of care or performance
resulting from inattention, incapacity, or perversity; (4) a wrong tendency, course,
or act; (5) bad faith or mismanagement; (6) neglect of duty; (7) breach of a duty
imposed by law or contract; or (8) an act to which blame, censure, impropriety,
shortcoming or culpability attaches.’
In its 7th edition, these definitions are condensed into a couple of information-
packed entries. According to this version, fault is either ‘[a]n error or defect
of judgment or conduct’, or ‘any deviation from prudence or duty resulting
from inattention, incapacity, perversity, bad faith, or mismanagement.’8 A
quite kaleidoscopic picture.
2.2 The legal notion of fault in tort law: issues to be questioned
In this article, we focus on the notion of fault in tort law. Three issues will
be examined. First: what is the role of fault in tort law? Second: how is fault
legally defined and how should it be defined? And third: how does the assess-
ment of fault take place: with an objective or with a subjective yardstick?
Taking into consideration the aims of this BWKJ project, we start with a
brief description of the concept of fault in the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) (§ 3).
After an overview of the achievements and the ongoing attempts to harmonise
European tort law, in the context of which the notion of fault is challenged
(§§ 4-5), we continue with the examination of the concept of fault in the three
most representative jurisdictions of the European Union (England, France,
Germany), in a recent recodification (Estonia) and in a number of harmonisa-
tion (the PETL and the DCFR) and reform (the French Projet Terré and the
Revision of the Swiss Code of Obligations 2020) proposals (§ 6). This analysis
takes place, of course, in comparisonwith the aforementionedDutch approach.
In order to make some points of discussion more concrete, we have selected
the liability for damage caused by minor children as Leitmotiv of our exposé.
We have pursued the following aims. First of all, we will try to make a
clear choice between the different notions of fault that circulate under (Dutch)
tort lawyers. Secondly, wewould like to demonstrate that, despite some points
of convergence, there are still considerable differences between the aforemen-
tioned sources with regard to the examined notion of fault. Perhaps in the
future some points of convergence, aswell as the cautious choiceswe formulate
8 A. Calnan, ‘The Fault(s) in Negligence Law’, Southwestern Law School Working Paper No.
0712, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975695>.
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in this paper, could serve as reference point for the harmonisation of European
tort law.
3 THE NOTION OF FAULT IN DUTCH TORT LAW: A SHORT OVERVIEW
In the Dutch Civil Code, with regard to tort law, the notion of fault surprising-
ly appears in just six (!) provisions. In the first of these provisions, art. 6:162
DCC, fault refers to the legal appreciation of the actor, the (subjective) blame-
worthiness of the tortfeasor (in Dutch: schuld). In the second of these pro-
visions, art. 6:185 DCC, fault refers to circumstances that have contributed to
the damage and which can be attributed to the person suffering the loss (one
of these circumstances being fault in the meaning of (subjective) blameworth-
iness). In the other provisions, the articles 6:169, 6:170, 6:171 and 6:172, fault
(in Dutch: fout) refers to the combination of both the appreciation of the act
of the tortfeasor (the wrongful nature of the act or, in Dutch, de onrechtmatige
daad), and to one9 of the grounds of attributability of the act to the tortfeasor
(the blameworthiness or, in Dutch, de schuld). It is in the latter sense that
Willem van Boom, Professor of private law at Leiden University, has defined
the notion:10
‘This might lead to the following definition of fault: the legal blameworthiness of
the person committing a wrongful act that could and should have been avoided.’
Under the second definition of fault, i.e. the wrongful act that can be attributed
to the tortfeasor, Dutch academics remain divided about the pertinence of the
distinction:11
‘inmost cases it is unnecessary (and sometimes even impossible) to isolate the actor
from its act. In nine out of ten cases, condemning the act leads to condemnation
of the actor. Whenever wrongfulness has been established, the fault requirement
will usually not present any difficulties.’
9 According to art. 6:162, par. 3 DCC, an unlawful act can be attributed to the defendant
not only if it is due to his fault (schuld), but also if it is due to ‘a cause for which he is
accountable by law or pursuant to generally accepted principles (verkeersopvattingen).’ See
C.H. Sieburgh, Toerekening van een onrechtmatige daad (diss. Groningen), 2000, p. 262.
10 W.H. van Boom, ‘Fault under Dutch Law’, in: P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law, The
Hague: Kluwer Law International 2005, p. 170.
11 Van Boom 2005, p. 170.
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Cees van Dam agrees:12
‘It should be emphasized that the two aspects (conduct and person) are very much
intertwined.’
We will, later in this article, express an opposite point of view: when we use
the concept of fault, this term should only mean that the tortfeasor is legally
to blame for his wrongful act. Therefore, fault requires that the conduct of
the tortfeasor is subjectively wrongful. Fault should only be defined as legal
blameworthiness (schuld) and not as an attributable wrongful act (fout).
With regard to the assessment of fault, Dutch scholars are divided about
the yardstick that should be used in establishing whether the tortfeasor acted
negligently (objective or subjective assessment). Those who hold the idea that
one should not distinguish wrongfulness from attributability, argue that
unlawfulness is ‘subjectivised’, because the defendant’s specific characteristics
are taken into account.13 We do not agree with them. Wrongfulness and
attributability are two distinct requirements of tortious liability. The first
‘hurdle’ for liability – wrongfulness (onrechtmatigheid) – must provide the
answer to the question whether the tortfeasor should have acted in a different
way. The test of wrongfulness is objective. The second ‘hurdle’ for liability
– attributability based on fault (schuld) needs to be assessed in a subjective
way: could the actor, when we take his personal characteristics into account,
have acted in a different fashion.14
Under Dutch law, it is important to mention that, with regard to the
objective element of wrongfulness (onrechtmatige daad) and the subjective
element of blameworthiness (schuld) with regard to damage caused by children,
the legislator has opted for a specific solution.15 ‘If the wrongful act has been
committed by a child under the age of fourteen, the child itself is immune
for liability (art. 6:164 DCC); instead his parents can be held (strictly) liable,
provided that the child’s act would have resulted in liability of that child, had
he been older than thirteen (art. 6:169 DCC).’16
12 C. van Dam, European Tort Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 235.
13 C. van Dam, Zorgvuldigheidsnorm en aansprakelijkheid. Een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek naar
plaats, inhoud en functie van de zorgvuldigheidsnorm bij de aansprakelijkheid voor letsel- en
zaakschade, Deventer: Kluwer 1989, no. 99.
14 Sieburgh 2000, pp. 259-161. Compare Van Boom 2005, pp. 169 and 172.
15 Van Boom 2005, p. 171.
16 Van Boom 2005, p. 171.
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4 ‘FAULT’ IN CONTEXT: THE PROCESS OF HARMONISATION, RECODIFICATION
AND REFORM OF TORT LAW IN EUROPE
How does the Dutch notion of fault relate to the notion of fault that circulates
in other jurisdictions and in existing unification or reform proposals? This
question cannot be answered without painting the picture of recent develop-
ments that tort law, and thus fault, has gone through in Europe during the
last decades.
A More Coherent European Contract Law; an Action Plan (2003).17 The
way forward (2004).18 Towards a European Civil Code.19 The call to harmon-
ise the area of tort law fits into a broader trend of harmonisation initiatives
that should lead to a more coherent European system of private-law rules or
even a European Civil Code. By some legal scholars and notably also the
British House of Lords, the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)20 pub-
lished in 2009 was seen as a blueprint of a (future) European Civil Code.21
The most far-reaching harmonisation initiatives took place in the field of
contract law. The so-called Lando group started at the end of the 1970s and
in 1995 presented the first part of the Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL).22 The PECL were a source of inspiration for the proposal for a Regula-
tion on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) that was launched by the
European Commission on 11 October 2011.23 The withdrawal of this proposal
in December 2014 by the European Commission in its Work Programme for
17 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, AMore
Coherent European Contract Law; an Action Plan (2003/C 63/01), OJ 2003, C 63/1.
18 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Euro-
pean Contract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, Brussels 11 October
2004, COM(2004) 651 final.
19 A.S. Hartkamp et al., Towards a European Civil Code, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2011.
20 C. von Bar & E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law.
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Full Edition. Volume 1-6. Prepared by the Study
Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis
Group), München/Oxford: Sellier European Law Publishers/Oxford University Press 2009/
2010.
21 House of Lords, European Union Committee, Twelfth Report, European Contract Law:
the Draft Common Frame of Reference, available at < http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/95/9502.htm>.
22 O. Lando & H. Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law (Parts I and II), Prepared by
The Commission on European Contract Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2000; O.
Lando et al. (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law (Part III), Prepared by The Commission
on European Contract Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003. The PECL are also
called the ‘Lando Principles’.
23 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common
European Sales Law, Brussels, 11 October 2011, COM(2011) 635 final, 2011/0284 (COD),
available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:
en:PDF>.
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201524 led to a – temporary? – stagnation in the process of unification of
(European) contract law.25
Failure or success? Although both the PECL and the DCFR served as a source
of inspiration for and influenced the case law of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) and that of the Member States,26 a political Common Frame of Reference
(CFR) is still out of reach.
In this article, we will turn a blind eye to contract law and focus on the
harmonisation of tort law. With regard to the feasibility of such a harmonisa-
tion, we will examine a series of sources, namely (1) the existing tort law of
some EU member States (e.g. Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands and
England), (2) the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL)27 published in 2005
by the EuropeanGroup on Tort Law and BookVI of the DCFR (Non-contractual
liability out of damage caused to another) and (3) two reform proposals (the
French Projet Terré and the Revision of the Swiss Code of Obligations 2020).
This examination will make it clear that some aspects of tort law tend to
converge, while at the same time profound differences continue to exist.
In contrast with the PETL and the DCFR, the Projet Terré and the Revision
of the Swiss Code of Obligations (OR 2020) deserve a short presentation, before
starting our exploration of the concept of fault.
The French Projet Terré forms a part of a movement to reform the French
law of obligations, including tort law. A first reform proposal, TheAvant-projet
de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, the so-called
Projet Catala,28 was submitted to the French Minister of Justice on the 22nd
September 2005. The Projet Catala constitutes a comprehensive reform proposal
24 See item 60 of Annex 2 (List of withdrawals or modifications of pending proposals) to the
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, CommissionWork
Programme 2015, A New Start, Strasbourg, 16 December 2014, COM(2014) 910 final,
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2015_withdrawals_en.pdf>.
25 See, however: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4920_en.htm> andE. Clive,
Rebirth of EU contract law proposal, available at <http://www.epln.law.ed.ac.uk/>
26 ECJ: Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case ECJ 17 April 2008, C-404/06 (Quelle); Opinion of
AG Poiares Maduro in Case ECJ 10 April 2008, C-412/06 (Hamilton/Volksbank Filder eG).
Dutch case law: Opinion of AG Timmerman in Case Dutch Supreme Court 26 September
2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD7598; Opinion of AG Timmerman in Case Dutch Supreme Court
11 July 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD2406; Opinion of AGHuydecoper in Case Dutch Supreme
Court 13 November 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BJ8724; AG Langemeijer, in Case Dutch Supreme
Court 1April 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP1475. See alsoDistrict Court Zutphen 3November
2010, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2010:BQ0980;District Court ’s-Hertogenbosch 24 June 2010, ECLI:NL:
RBSHE:2010:BN0636.
27 European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law. Text and Commentary,Wien:
Springer 2005. Also available at <www.egtl.org>.
28 Named after Pierre Catala, Professor Emeritus at the Université Panthéon Assas Paris 2.
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of the general part of the law of obligations.29 Five years later, in 2010, a bill
(proposition de loi) was presented in the French Senate by Laurent Béteille. This
bill only relates to tort liability30 and is based on the tort liability section of
the Projet Catala. The Projet Terré, the subject of our examination of the
concept of fault, was proposed in 2008 and 2011 by an academic group, led
by François Terré, just like Pierre Catala, a Professor Emeritus at the Université
Panthéon Assas Paris 2.31 His research group submitted two draft proposals,
the first to reform the law of contract32 and the second to reform the law of
tort.33 Both were prepared with the cooperation of the Ministry of Justice
under the aegis of the Academy ofMoral and Political Sciences, of which Terré
is a distinguished member.34 The Terré Group took into account both the
PETL and the DCFR.35 With regard to the above-mentioned reform proposals,
it must be emphasised that, until today, ‘the reform of French tort law is not
yet on the French political agenda.’36
In the Swiss OR 2020,37 scholars of all Swiss Law faculties, supported by
the Federal Department of Justice and the Swiss Institute of Comparative
Law,38 have reviewed the provisions of the General Part of the Swiss Code
of Obligations currently in effect and adapted it to current developments.39
The draft was published in 2013 and will be the basis for an official revision
of the General Part of the Swiss Code of Obligations. Parliamentary work has
already started.40
29 O. Moréteau, ‘French Tort Law in the Light of European Harmonisation’, Journal of Civil
Law Studies, 2013, p. 762. The Avant-projet is available in English at <http://www.justice.
gouv.fr/art_pix/rapportcatatla0905-anglais.pdf>.
30 Proposition de loi portant réforme de la responsabilité civile, Sénat, no. 657 (9 July 2010),
available at <http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl09-657.html>.
31 It should be emphasised that the Projet Terré is not a prolongation of the Projet Catala.
Both Projets are to be considered as competitive drafts.
32 F. Terré, Pour une réforme du droit des contrats. Réflexions et propositions d’un groupe de travail,
Paris: Dalloz 2009, 310 p.
33 F. Terré, Pour une réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile, Paris: Dalloz 2011, 224 p.
34 Moréteau 2013, p. 763.
35 O. Moréteau, ‘France’, in H. Koziol and B.C. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law, Wien:
Springer 2005, p. 226.
36 B. Fauvarque-Cosson,The French Contract LawReform in a European Context, online available
at <http://eltelawjournal.hu/french-contract-law-reform-european-context/>.
37 Code des obligations suisse 2020. Projet relatif à une nouvelle partie générale, available
at <http://or2020.ch>.
38 The project is chaired by the professors ClaireHuegenin and RetoM.Hilty, both professors
at the Universität Zürich.
39 P. Loser, ‘Revision of the Swiss Code des Obligations (Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht,
OR) – A Vision for the Revision of the General Part’, in: European Tort Law Yearbook 2014,
Volume 3, Issue 1, p. 675.
40 Loser 2014, p. 675.
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5 A CLOSER LOOK AT THE EUROPEANISATION OF TORT LAW
5.1 EUDirectives, EU Regulations and the influence of the decisions of the
ECJ and the ECHR
The trend of ‘Europeanisation’ of tort law is set at two different levels. In the
first place by way of EU Directives and Regulations. Although this legal frame-
work of directives and regulations applies mainly in the area of contract law,
to a certain extent also tort law is subject to this type of harmonisation. An
important example is the Product Liability Directive of 25 July 1985 that created
a regime of strict liability for defective products.41 Another example is the
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive of 11 May 2005 that regulates and
harmonises unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal
market.42 In addition to the harmonisation of substantive law rules, the Euro-
pean Union has become very active in the unification of private international
law rules. An important example is the Rome II Regulation on the law applic-
able to non-contractual obligations that has applied since 11 January 2009.43
Secondly, in terms of harmonisation, the tort law systems of the several
EU Member States are influenced by the decisions of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)44 protects a basic catalogue of human
rights. The right to life (art. 2 ECHR) is the most fundamental human right.
According to art. 2 ECHR everyone’s life shall be protected by law. However,
due to the case law of the ECtHR, converging developments occur in the area
of the protection of private and family life (privacy). On a vertical and horizon-
tal level, art. 8 ECHR ensures that the right to respect for private and family
life, home and correspondence is not violated by the State, fellow citizens or
companies. In its famous decision in the case Von Hannover v Germany (No.
2)45 the European Court of Human Rights applied five considerations for
balancing the right to respect for private life (art. 8 ECHR) against the right
41 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective
products, OJ 1985, L 210/29.
42 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, OJ
2005, L 149/22.
43 Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199/40.
44 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome,
4 November 1950, available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_
ENG.pdf>.
45 ECtHR 7 February 2012, nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08 (Von Hannover v Germany (No. 2)).
See also ECtHR 24 June 2004, no. 59320/00 (Von Hannover v Germany (No. 1)) and ECtHR
19 September 2013, no. 8772/10 (Von Hannover v Germany (No. 3)).
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to freedom of expression (art. 10 ECHR), such aswhether the published informa-
tion (photos) contributes to a debate of general interest.46
Since the fundamental rights of the ECHR are primarily vertically effective
(relationship State/individual) they lack direct horizontal effect. Nevertheless
the basic human rights of the ECHR can be effective in horizontal relations
(individual/individual or corporation) but only in an indirect manner.47
Examples of this so-called ‘indirect horizontal effect’ could be found in national
case law related to open standards such as good faith and fair dealing (contract
law) and the required standard of due care (tort law). In its decision of 9
January 1987, NJ 1987, 928 the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that a violation
of art. 8 ECHR is considered to be a tortious act according to the open, required
standard of due care that underlies art. 1401 of the old Dutch Civil Code
(currently: art. 162, Book 6 Dutch Civil Code).
Another example of indirect horizontal effect at a national level is the
decision of the Dutch Supreme Court of 12 December 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:
AL8442; NJ 2004, 117.48 A dental surgeon cuts one of his fingers during an opera-
tion and is brought into contact with the patient’s blood. The patient is possibly
HIV infected. Can the dental surgeon force the patient to supply blood for an
HIV test? In its decision the Dutch Supreme Court balances the fundamental
rights of privacy and bodily integrity of the patient (articles 10 and 11 Dutch
Constitution) against the individual interest of the dental surgeon to prevent
possible damage. Subsequently the Supreme Court rules that the underlying
general principle of reasonableness and fairness49 requires that a patient, after
finishing medical treatment, should take all necessary measures to prevent
his dental surgeon from suffering damage. This includes the patient’s (forced)
participation in a blood test.
According to art. 267 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) the European Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
on references from national courts concerning the interpretation of EU acts
46 Other relevant viewpoints are: (i) how well-known is the person concerned and what is
the subject of the report?; (ii) the prior conduct of the person concerned; (iii) the content,
form and consequences of the publication; (iv) the circumstances in which the photos were
taken.
47 See for instance C. Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law. A comparison of the
impact of fundamental rights on contractual relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and
England (diss. University of Amsterdam) 2007, available at <http://dare.uva.nl/document/
2/52678>; O. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the
Weaker Party. A Comparative Analysis of the Constitutionalisation of Contract Law, with Emphasis
on Risky Financial Transactions (diss. Utrecht) 2007, available at <file:///F:/Downloads/
full%20(1).pdf>; G. Brüggemeier, A. Colombi Ciacchi & G. Comandé (eds.), Fundamental
Rights and Private Law in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010;
G. Brüggemeier, A. Colombi Ciacchi & P. O’Callaghan (eds.), Personality Rights in European
Tort Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010.
48 Available via <www.rechtspraak.nl>.
49 See artt. 2 and 248, Book 6 DCC (Law of obligations/Contract law).
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such as Directives or Regulations. More specifically in the area of tort law art.
340, par. 2 TFEU is of great relevance. The provision deals with the non-con-
tractual liability of EU institutions for damage caused. Art. 340, par. 2 TFEU
reads as follows:
‘In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the
general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any
damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their
duties.’
In order to create a liability under art. 340, par. 2 TFEU there must be a wrong-
ful act of the Union, the applicant must have suffered damage, and theremust
be a causal link between the wrongful act and the damage that has occurred.
However, the exact meaning of the provision is still unclear. The term ‘com-
mon’ probably means that the principle is accepted in a sufficiently large
number of Member States.
The ‘general principles common to the laws of theMember States’ towhich
art. 340, par. 2 TFEU refers served as a starting point in the development of
Member State liability for the breach of EU law. On this basis the ECJ developed
a form of harmonisation byway of a three-layered framework of requirements
for liability. In the famous Francovich case,50 the ECJ ruled that on the basis
of the national tort law rules a Member State is liable for the infringement
or violation of EU law when: (i) the result prescribed by the directive should
entail the grant of rights to individuals; (ii) it should be possible to identify
the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive; (iii)
there is the existence of a causal link between the breach of the State’s obliga-
tion and the loss and damage suffered by the injured parties.51
Since the two types of unification that we briefly addressed in this section
are not the main theme of this paper, we will not go into further detail at this
point.
5.2 Further steps to harmonise tort law: the long way to Tipperary
During the First WorldWar, the world famous song ‘It’s a long way to Tipper-
ary’ symbolised the longing for home of every soldier.52 The song is an ex-
pression of a wish that is attainable and unattainable at the same time. The
restrained views on the important issue of how a more coherent and/or
harmonised European private law should be achieved, can be illustrated by
50 ECJ 19 November 1991, Joint cases C-6/90 and C -9/90, ECR 1991, I-5357 (Francovich and
Bonifaci v Italy).
51 Van Dam 2013, pp. 39-44.
52 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/It%27s_a_Long_Way_to_Tipperary. Tipperary is a town
and civil parish in County Tipperary, Ireland.
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a book that has recently been published. In his book, which is entitled ‘The
Struggle for European Private Law. A Critique of Codification’, the British
scholar LeoneNiglia ‘investigates the position of codifiers and their discontents
in the shadow of the codification strategy pursued by the European Commis-
sion (...).’53
Does this observation mean that the harmonisation efforts undertaken by
the drafters of the PETL and the DCFR should be abandoned, particularly in
the field of tort law?We do not think so. Although there are many arguments
that plead against harmonisation of tort law.
Let us start with the enumeration of some pros. First, a single European
tort law might help to achieve a common area for free movement of goods,
capitals and people.54 Helmut Koziol, the famous Austrian tort law scholar
from Vienna, writes:55
‘The rationale for harmonisation is that differences between the legal systems hinder
commercial cross-border transactions in Europe. Entrepreneurs who offer their
wares or services in other Member States are disadvantaged in comparison with
competitors who are only active nationally, because while domestic providers only
have to inform themselves of the legal frameworks in their own legal system, a
foreign provider is forced to inform itself about a legal system that diverges from
its domestic law and to comply with it.’
Second, ‘a harmonised tort law regime would minimise the risk of European
businesses’ forum shopping in search of the jurisdiction with the lowest quality
and liability standard, thus fending off pressures on states to engage in a race
to the bottom.’56 Third, a harmonisation ‘would facilitate courts’ handling
of transboundary torts, decrease the length and complexity of transnational
litigation and guarantee more uniformity between judicial outcomes.’57
However, the pros have not been supported by everyone. A first counter-
argument is that there is no empirical evidence supporting the allegation that
53 L. Niglia, The Struggle for European Private Law. A Critique of Codification, Oxford: Hart
Publishing 2015.
54 U.Magnus, ‘Towards European civil liability’, in: M. Faure, J. Smits andH. Schneider (eds.),
Towards a European ius commune in legal education and research,Antwerpen: Maklu 2002, pp.
206-207. See about this pro: M. Bussani & M. Infantino, ‘Harmonization of Tort Law in
Europe’, in: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, New York: Springer 2014, p. 3.
55 H. Koziol, ‘Harmonising Tort Law in the European Union: Advantages and Difficulties’,
ELTE Law Journal 2013/1, pp. 73-74, available via < http://eltelawjournal.hu/harmonising-
tort-law-in-the-european-union-advantages-and-difficulties/>.
56 M. Faure, ‘How law and economics may contribute to the harmonisation of tort law in
Europe’, in: R. Zimmermann (ed.), Grundstrukturen des Europäischen Deliktsrechts, Baden-
Baden: Nomos 2003, pp. 47-51. See about this pro: Bussani & Infantino 2014, p. 3.
57 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007
on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), recitals nos. 16 and 20. See
on this pro: Bussani & Infantino 2014, pp. 3-4.
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fragmentation of tort laws affects the free circulation of people and goods58
and the establishment and movement of businesses in Europe.59 Second, we
should also give consideration to the costs of harmonising tort law, such as
the difficulty of changing existing rules of tort law and the abolition of regulat-
ory competition.60Third, it has been argued that ‘any top-down harmonisation
effort would put into circulation rules foreign to the tradition and heritage
of some (…) legal traditions involved’.61 Fourth, the idea of harmonisation
of tort law will have to face the same critics that were directed against a
harmonised contract law (cf. the arguments raised against a Common European
Sales Law), such as the lack of competence of the EU to harmonise private
law,62 the political legitimacy of its drafters and the desirability of a European
Civil Code in general.63
Keeping in mind the above-mentioned pros and cons, the desirability of
harmonising tort law remains highly controversial. Yet even those who would
like to continue the efforts towards such harmonisation should be aware of
the following question, dealt with in the following section: is tort law harmon-
isation feasible?
6 IS TORT LAW HARMONISATION FEASIBLE? AN EXPLORATION OF THE CON-
CEPT OF FAULT
It is beyond doubt that fault-based liability is still a cornerstone of European
tort law. However, when we take a closer look at the concept of fault in the
current European jurisdictions, the PETL, the DCFR and two current reform
proposals (the French Projet Terré64 and the Revision of the Swiss Code of
Obligations 2020), it becomes clear that unifying tort law is a race with many
hurdles that must be taken. In our research of the similarities and differences
in the legal sources examined with regard to the notion of the fault of the
tortfeasor, several issueswill be discussed. Some of themwere already a subject
58 Faure 2003, p. 44. See on this counter-argument Bussani & Infantino 2014, p. 4; W.H. van
Boom, ‘Harmonizing Tort Law. A Comparative Tort Law and Economics Analysis’, in:
M. Faure (ed.), Tort Law and Economics (Vol. 1 of the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics,
2nd ed.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2009, pp. 442-443.
59 T. Hartlief, ‘Harmonizing of European Tort Law. Some critical remarks’, in M. Faure, J. Smits
and H. Schneider (eds.), Towards a European ius commune in legal education and research,
Antwerpen: Maklu 2002, pp. 225-236.
60 Faure 2003, p. 36. See about this counter-argument Bussani & Infantino 2014, p. 4.
61 Bussani & Infantino 2014, p. 4.
62 Cf. the discussion about art. 114 TFEU and the questionable competence of the European
Union to introduce an optional instrument with regard to contract law.
63 Magnus 2002, pp. 208-212. See about this counter-argument Bussani & Infantino 2014, p. 4.
64 F. Terré (ed.), Pour une réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile, Paris: Dalloz 2011, p. 224.
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of comparative research by the European Group of Tort Law (EGTL) in 2005.65
Since the publication of that research project (the volume ‘Unification of tort
law: fault’66), the PETL and the DCFR , two model texts that ‘represent the best
reflection of contemporary approaches to, and developments in, the field of
European tort law’,67 have been published, together with the aforementioned
reform proposals in France and Switzerland. That brought us to the idea that
an update of issues of fault liability was desirable.
In the following sections, we will review the most important questions
of the EGTL project of 2005, namely: What is the role and importance of fault
in establishing tort liability (relationship between liability based on fault and
strict liability) (§ 6.1)? Is there a statutory or otherwise generally accepted
definition of fault? (§ 6.2) What kind of yardstick has to be used in establishing
fault? (§ 6.3)
The issue of liability for damage caused by childrenwill form an illustration
of the quite abstract theories that circulate within the European Union with
regard to the concept of fault in tort law.
6.1 The role and importance of fault liability68
6.1.1 Examination of the existing law and the existing reform proposals
In a recent article about the harmonisation of tort law,69 Helmut Koziol , the
Director of the European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law in Vienna, provides
uswith a very clear outline of the differences between the existing jurisdictions
with regard to the role of fault liability. According to Koziol, these differences
must be seen in relation to the aims that tort law wants to satisfy. In some
65 European Group of Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law. Text and Commentary,Wien/
New York: Springer, 2005, 282 p.
66 P. Widmer (ed.),Unification of Tort Law: Fault, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2005,
p. 391.
67 J. Lahe, ‘The Concept of Fault of the Tortfeasor in Estonian Tort Law: A Comparative
Perspective’, Review of Central and East European Law 2013, p. 142.
68 In this section, we describe the dichotomy of fault-based liability versus strict liability,
without giving a definition of fault in the legal sources we have explored. At this stage
of our contribution, we do not formulate an opinion about the definition of fault we prefer
to be used in view of a future harmonisation of tort law. As already mentioned in the
introduction to our contribution, several definitions of fault circulate, such as: fault as
identical with wrongfulness, fault as identical with blameworthiness or fault as a combina-
tion of both wrongfulness and blameworthiness. On the issue of the distinction between
fault-based liability and strict liability, we refer to the interesting contribution by J. Lahe,
Forms of Liability in the Law of Delict: Fault-Based Liability and Liability without Fault, available
at <http://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2005_1_60.pdf>.
69 H. Koziol, ‘Harmonising Tort Law in the European Union: Advantages and Difficulties’,
ELTE Law Journal 2013/1, available via < http://eltelawjournal.hu/harmonising-tort-law-in-
the-european-union-advantages-and-difficulties/>.
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European countries, the emphasis is more on corrective justice. In English law,
for instance, the emphasis is on ‘the principle of the rule ‘casum sentit
dominus’, which expresses the idea that the personwho suffers damagemust,
in principle, bear his damage himself. There must be particular reasons to
justify allowing the victim to pass the damage on to another person’, writes
Koziol.70 One of the consequences of that policy is that fault in the English
law of torts is generally based upon the fault of the defendant. Or, ‘fault takes
multiple guises in tort, but fault there must be’.71 The English legal system
is therefore very reluctant to recognise strict liability.72
In France, by contrast, tort law is essentially victim-oriented and thus
emphasises the idea of distributive justice.73 Also in the French Projet Terré,
strict liability rules remain important.74 However, fault-based rules appear
in several tort law provisions, for instance with regard to the requirement of
wrongfulness75 and the issue of liability of parents for damage caused by
their children.76 Moreover, some existing strict liability regimes are main-
tained, thoughwith extra requirements. Thus, the general provision of liability
for movable objects is limited to physical and psychological harm,77 which
is a substantial reduction of the scope of the Jand’heur II jurisprudence of the
French Supreme Court,78 through which the liability for things was turned
from a rebuttable faute into one of strict liability.79
With regard to the Revision of the Swiss Code of Obligations 2020, parti-
cular liability regimes are planned to become stricter,80 for instance the liabil-
ity of commercial enterprises.81 Furthermore, a general provision for strict
liability of persons carrying out particularly dangerous activities will be
70 Koziol 2013, p. 80.
71 H.V. Horton Rogers, ‘Fault under English Law’, in: P. Widmer (ed.),Unification of Tort Law:
Fault, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2005, p. 65.
72 Koziol 2013, p. 82.
73 Koziol 2013, p. 80.
74 Terré 2011, p. 163 ff.
75 Art. 5 Projet Terré: ‘La faute consiste, volontairement ou par négligence, à commettre un
fait illicite (…).’
76 Terré 2011, p. 155: ‘La responsabilité parentale redevient une véritable responsabilité du
fait d’autrui, à savoir une responsabilité personnelle de l’auteur du dommage (…).’
77 Art. 20 Projet Terré: ‘Le gardien répond de plein droit de l’atteinte à l’intégrité physique
ou psychique d’une personne causée par le fait de la chose corporelle dont il a la garde’.
See Moréteau 2013, p. 772.
78 Cour de Cassation ch. réun. 13 February 1930, DP 1930, I. 57, comm. Ripert, S. 1930, I. 121,
comm. Esmein.
79 Van Dam 2013, p. 60.
80 See art. 59 Swiss Code of Obligations 2020: ‘A commercial enterprise is liable for the damage
caused in connection with the enterprise’s activity, unless it proves that the organisation
of the enterprise was suitable to avoid such damage’.
81 Loser 2014, p. 676.
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introduced.82 With this provision, the Swiss draft takes up an idea of the
general revision of tort law of 2000 that has failed,83 because of the fact that
such a general provision for dangerous activities met with great resistance
from politics and businesses.84
What about the role and importance of ‘fault’ in the PETL and the DCFR?
According to Title III, Chapter 4 (Liability Based on Fault) the basic condition
of tort liability under the PETL is the liability based on fault. Art. 4:101 PETL
reads as follows:
‘A person is liable on the basis of fault for intentional or negligent violation of the
required standard of conduct.’
Chapter 5 (Strict Liability), Title III of the PETL addresses those forms of liability
which are not based on fault, but are ‘strict’ in the sense that they cover various
types of risk leading to no-fault liability, such as abnormally dangerous activ-
ities (art. 5:101 PETL)85 or other categories of strict liability (art. 5:102 PETL).
An interesting question can be raised about the relevance of fault-based liability
and the proportion of cases in practice that are resolved according to strict-
liability rules.86 With regard to that question, the PETL Commentary of 2005
argues that the basis of liability is not intended to be in a descending hierarchy.
This means that fault liability is not considered as the fundamental category
of liability and that all other forms of liability should be seen as exceptions:
both areas of liability exist side by side.87
The same consideration that fault-based liability and strict liability are two
equally important forms of liability goes for the DCFR. The basic rule of art.
VI. – 1:101 DCFR starts from the assumption that each and every claim for
reparation requires the presence of three fundamental elements: (i) damage
(Chapter 2), (ii) accountability (Chapter 3) and (iii) causation (Chapter 4).88
Subsequently, Book VI of the DCFR contains three grounds for being held
82 ‘Article 60. D. Absolute liability
1. A person who carries out a particularly dangerous activity is liable for the damage
resulting from the realisation of the characteristic risk of this activity.
2. A particularly dangerous activity is an activity which, because of its nature or the nature
of the used substances, equipment or forces, is particularly suited to cause frequent or severe
damage even if due diligence has been applied.’
83 Art. 50 Avant-Projet de loi fédérale (Révision et unification du droit de la responsabilité
civile, par P. Widmer et P. Wessner, available at <https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/
wirtschaft/gesetzgebung/archiv/haftpflicht/vn-ber-f.pdf >): ‘La personne qui exploite une
activité spécifiquement dangereuse est tenue de réparer le dommage dû à la réalisation
du risque caractérisé que celle-ci comporte, même s’il s’agit d’une activité tolérée par l’ordre
juridique.’
84 Loser 2014, p. 676.
85 Example: blasting a building in a developed area of the city.
86 Lahe 2013, p. 149.
87 Lahe 2013, p. 145.
88 Von Bar 2008, p. 35.
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accountable for damage caused to another: (i) intention (art. VI. – 3:101), (ii)
negligence (art.VI. – 3:102), (iii) accountabilitywithout intention or negligence
(art. VI. – 3:201 et seq.). Contrary to the PETL, the DCFR does not make a clear
distinction between the tortious conduct and the accountability. The basic rule
of art. VI. – 1:101, Book VI DCFR brings together in one norm liability for
intention, liability for negligence and liabilitywithout intention or negligence.
According to art. VI. – 3:101, a person acts intentionally when he deliberately
causes such damage, while negligence (art. VI. – 3:102) is at hand when the
tortfeasor does not meet the required standard of care. Despite the avoidance
of the notion of fault in the DCFR, the basic norm of art. VI. – 1:101 DCFR shows
that fault-based liability constitutes an important ground for liability, but not
in a hierarchically higher position than strict liability.
What is the role of fault in the recently enacted Estonian Law of Obligations
Act (Estonian LOA)?89 Art. 1043 Estonian LOA states that a person who unlaw-
fully causes damage to another must compensate the victim for the damage
if the tortfeasor is at fault in causing the damage or is liable pursuant to the
law.90 In an interesting comparative study about the concept of fault of the
tortfeasor, Lahe refers to a 2007 judgment of the Estonian Supreme Court,91
ruling that the element of fault is the last one to be checked in the context of
assessing general tort liability. Before that assessment, the judge has to verify
that the tortfeasor had caused damage and that his act was unlawful. The
author continues with the assertion ‘that the question of the fault of the tort-
feasor does not play a crucial role in Estonian tort law. Most liability disputes
are decided via the hurdles of causation and wrongfulness’.92
6.1.2 Fault liability versus strict liability? The case of parental liability
Let us now give a concrete illustration of the importance and the role of fault
liability with regard to a specific issue. We have chosen the issue of liability
of parents for damage caused by their minor children.93 This topic makes
it perfectly clear that the existing and proposed tort law regimes in Europe
differ to a great extent. Four models could be distinguished as far as the
liability of parents for damage caused by their minor children is concerned.
89 The Estonian Law of Obligations Act, in Estonian and English, is available at <http://
www.legaltext.ee/en/andmebaas/paraframe.asp?loc=text&lk=et&sk=en&dok=X30085K2.
htm&query=collateral&tyyp=SITE_X&ptyyp=I&pg=1>.
90 Lahe 2013, p. 144.
91 Estonian Supreme Court 31 May 2007, no. 3-2-1-54-07. The decisions of the Supreme Court
are available in Estonian at <http://www.riigikohus.ee>.
92 Lahe 2013, p. 144.
93 See on this topic M. Martin-Casals (ed.), Children as tortfeasors, Wien: Springer 2006, 476
p. and M. Martin-Casals (ed.), Children as victims, Wien: Springer 2007, 320 p.; Van Dam
2013, pp. 493-497; H. Koziol (ed.), Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective,
Wien: Jan Sramek Verlag 2015, pp. 798-801.
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Under the first model, there is no specific rule for parental liability and the
victim of the damage caused by a child has to prove the parents’ fault and
the causal connection with the harm (e.g. England).94 Under the second
regime, the parental liability (fault) is presumed, but the parents or those in
charge of the minor may be exonerated when proving that they exercised
reasonable care and diligence in the child’s supervision and education (e.g.
Germany, Switzerland and Estonia). Under the third model, persons in charge
of minors are strictly liable (e.g. France). Finally, under the fourth model the
parental liability is a mixture of fault liability and strict liability (e.g. the
Netherlands).
Since the majority of legal systems operate under the second model of the
rebuttable presumption, the drafters of both the PETL and the DCFR agreed upon
this model as a common denominator. As art. 6:101 PETL95 clearly points out,
the fault-based liability of parents or persons in charge of minors is presumed
and exoneration is possible if the duty of care to supervise children was
performed in an adequate way. The DCFR follows the same path:96
‘As far as parental liability is concerned, we decided, after a long discussion, not
to opt for liability without intention or negligence. We thought that the mere fact
that a parent has a child is simply not enough as a ground of accountability in
the law on liability for damage.’
However, art. VI. – 3:104 DCFR sets a clear age limit. According to par. 1 of
art. VI. – 3:104, parents or other persons obliged by law to provide parental
care for a person under fourteen years of age are accountable (and liable) for
the causation of legally relevant damage where that under-age person has
caused the damage by conduct that would constitute intent or negligence if
it were the conduct of an adult. Parents and other persons providing parental
care are excused for the causation of damage if they show that there was no
defective supervision of the person causing the damage. At this point, the DCFR
also makes use of the defence mechanism of the rebuttable presumption.
Although art. VI. – 3:104(1) DCFR prescribes parental liability regarding torts
committed by children under fourteen years of age, this does not mean that
the parents of children between fourteen and seventeen years of age are not
liable for the torts committed by their children.97 The liability of parents may
also be invoked with regard to damage caused by children in the said age
94 See Van Dam 2013, p. 496 and p. 499.
95 Art. 6:101 PETL reads as follows: ‘A person in charge of another who is a minor or subject
to mental disability is liable for damage caused by the other unless the person in charge
shows that he has conformed to the required standard of conduct in supervision.’
96 Von Bar & Clive 2009/2010, p. 3435.
97 Lahe 2013, p. 158.
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gap, provided that the victim proves that the parents failed to fulfil their
supervisory obligations.98
The Estonian LOA makes a distinction between provisions governing
liability for torts committed by minors who lack fault capacity and for torts
committed by minors who have full fault capacity. With respect to the first
category of minors, art. 1053(1) LOA reads as follows:
‘The parents or curator of a person under 14 years of age shall be liable for damage
unlawfully caused to another person by the person under 14 years of age regardless
of the culpability of [the] parents or curator’
With regard to the second group of minors, art. 1053(2) LOA prescribes that
‘the parents or curator of a person of 14 to 18 years of age shall also be liable
for damage unlawfully caused to another person by the person of 14 to 18
years of age regardless of the culpability of the parents or curator, unless they
prove that they have done everything which could be reasonably expected
in order to prevent the damage.’ Compared to the parental liability rules in
the DCFR and the PETL with regard to the regulation of parental liability for
children younger than fourteen, the Estonian LOA is remarkably strict. Lahe
gives the example of a child of four years of age that plays with matches and
causes a fire. According to the LOA, the parents of the child will be liable
regardless of whether they did anything objectionable in connection with the
incident.99 With regard to torts committed by a minor with full fault capacity,
a precondition is that theminor is liable for the damages, whereas in the DCFR,
a child of thirteen years old could potentially not be liable for causing damage
if the conduct causing the damage would not be objectionable for a child of
the same age. The same kind of behaviour by an adult may be objectionable,
which would be sufficient for invoking parental liability under the DCFR.100
According to French law, art. 1384, paragraph 4 Civil Code holds that a
father and a mother, insofar as they exercise parental authority, are jointly
and severally liable for damage caused by their minor101 children who live
with them. The parents only have the defence of an external cause and the
victim’s contributory negligence.102 Until 1997, parental liability was based
on a rebuttable presumption of fault in the education (faute d’éducation) and
98 Lahe 2013, pp. 158-159. Art. VI. – 3:104(1) DCFR reads as follows: ‘Parents or other persons
obliged by law to provide parental care for a person under fourteen years of age are
accountable for the causation of legally relevant damagewhere that person under age caused
the damage by conduct that would constitute intentional or negligent conduct if it were
the conduct of an adult.’
99 Lahe 2013, pp. 159-160.
100 Lahe 2013, p. 161.
101 According to French law, minors are children under the age of 18 (art. 388 of the French
Civil Code).
102 Van Dam 2013, p. 493.
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the supervision (faute de surveillance) of their child.103 In the famous Bertrand
decision of the French Supreme Court of 19 February 1997,104 this defence
was struck out and replaced by a general strict liability rule.105 Compared
to, for instance, the rules of parental liability as embedded in the DCFR, the
parental liability according to art. 1384, paragraph 4 Civil Code, is exceptional-
ly strict, because the liability of the father and the mother is not only triggered
when the child has committed an unlawful act (acte objectivement illicite), but
also when the child’s conduct was the direct cause of the damage suffered
by the victim (un acte qui soit la cause directe du dommage invoqué par la
victime).106 This solution has been criticised by several French authors,107
who consider the rule thatmakes parents strictly liable for any damage caused
by their child, regardless of his or her fault, especially problematic. One of
them, Jean-Sébastien Borghetti of the Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), has
argued that the rule is rather counter-intuitive and difficult to accept on the
basis of common conceptions of fairness:108
‘How can it be that damage caused by the normal behaviour of an adult will not
give rise to any liability, whereas, if it is caused by a child’s normal behaviour,
liability will ensue? Therefore, it was no surprise that the Projet Terré suggests
suppressing this rule and a return to the older rule,109 whereby parents should
only be liable for damage caused by their child’s tortious conduct.’
Let us end this section, in which we have illustrated the great variety of
existing and proposed tort law regimes in Europe, with the following ques-
tion:110
‘Should a future harmonised tort law follow the classical model that makes parents
only liable for damage caused by the – objectively negligent – behaviour of their
children if the parents can be held accountable for misconduct themselves, above
103 Van Dam 2013, p. 494.
104 Cour de Cassation 2e ch. civ. 19 February 1997, D. 1997. 265, comm. Jourdain, JCP 1997,
II. 22848, comm. Viney, RTDC civ. 1997, 668.
105 The Projet Terré continues this strict liability regime in art. 14: ‘Sont responsables de plein
droit du fait dumineur: – ses père et mère, en tant qu’ils exercent l’autorité parentale (…).’
106 Cour de Cassation ass. plén. 13 December 2002, D. 2003.231 , comm. Jourdain; Yearbook
on European Tort Law 2002, 199, comm. Brun. See on this landmark decision the comparative
case comments in EPRL 2003 (11) 5, pp. 691-751.
107 See e.g. J.-S. Borghetti, ‘Liability of Children as well as Persons with Reduced Abilities and
the Notion of Fault. Statements by Country Reporters. France’, in: H. Koziol (ed.), Comparat-
ive Stimulations for Developing Tort Law, Wien: Jan Sramek Verlag 2015, pp. 112-113; see on
these critics Van Dam 2013, p. 494.
108 Borghetti 2015, pp. 112-113; Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative
Perspective 2015, p. 799.
109 See art. 13 Projet Terré, ‘Dans tous les cas, cette responsabilité n’a lieu que lorsqu’est
caractérisé un délit civil au sens du présent chapitre.’
110 Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective 2015, p. 799.
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all for a breach of their supervision or at least child-rearing duties,111 or can
justification be found for how French law imposes a strict liability upon parents
and only frees them from liability in case of force majeure?’
So far parliamentary initiatives in the Netherlands112 and Belgium113 in
that sense have remained without success.
There are surely arguments in favour of the French approach. A strict
parental liability can indeed be objectively justified by the fact that it
corresponds to the general basic tendency to focus primarily on the compensa-
tion of the victim. The French system is good in accomplishing this aim.114
Furthermore, the risk of damage that emanates from children can surely be
used as an argument in favour of strict parental liability.115 Finally, the trans-
action costs are low. Claims for damages are handled by insurance com-
panies116 which treat such claims on a rational basis, defending them only
when this seems worthwhile. Because the requirements for liability of the
parents are so weak, there is little scope for defence.117
However, as the French system contrasts sharply with those of other
European jurisdictions, we must also examine the disadvantages of strict
liability of parents. First, and we agree with this criticism, tort law is not only
concerned with a redistribution of damage costs (= distributive justice) but
also aims at preventing accidents from occurring in the future (= corrective
justice). In terms of incentives to educate their children towards prudent
behaviour and supervise them accordingly, the problemwith the French system
is not strict liability by itself, but liability insurance. Parents who know that
any damage caused will be covered by an insurance company118 will have
little incentive to take precautions to avoid harm being caused by their chil-
111 Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective 2015, p. 798.
112 Initiatiefvoorstel Verruiming aansprakelijkheid voor gedragingen van minderjarigen vanaf
veertien (Proposal to Extend the Age Limit for Liability for Minors), Documents of the
Second Chamber of Parliament (2009-2010), No. 30 519.
113 Wetsvoorstel tot invoering in het Burgerlijk Wetboek van een objectieve aansprakelijkheid
van de ouders voor de schade veroorzaakt door hun minderjarige kinderen (Proposal to
Introduce a Strict Liability of Parents for Damage Caused by Their Minor Children),
Documents of the First Chamber of Parliament (2010) , No. 5-48/1.
114 G. Wagner, ‘Final Conclusions: Policy Issues and Tentative Answers’, in M. Martin-Casals
(ed.),Children in Tort Law. Part II: Children as Victims,Wien/NewYork: Springer 2007, p. 295.
115 Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective 2015, p. 800.
116 We must keep in mind that a large majority of families (in the Netherlands approximately
80%) have insurance policies that cover the liability of parents and children. These policies
are not compulsory, but are quite intensively promoted and the premiums are low.
117 Wagner 2007, p. 295.
118 In cases when there is no liability insurance or where the insurance policy does not cover
all the damage that resulted, as can happen in particular when the sums involved are very
large, Koziol proposes an unlimited social liability insurance for damage caused by children,
financed by the general public: Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative
Perspective 2015, p. 801.
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dren.119 Furthermore, strict parental liability treats children like ‘a source
of danger which the ‘owner’ keeps at his peril, while children should be seen
as human beings and be treated as such.’120 Finally, the argument that strict
liability is balanced by a cheap liability insurance does not always apply,
because such insurance is not obligatory, not every household has such an
insurance and insurance companies limit cover to a certain maximum sum.
When there is no insurance, the parents will be subject to the full harsh burden
of the very strict liability.121
We think that a compromise can be found in the Dutch Civil Code
(DCC).122 Art. 6:164 DCC states that children under the age of fourteen cannot
be held liable for their own personal conduct. In these cases, parents are strictly
liable, on two conditions: that the child’s conduct was not an omission, and
that it was objectively negligent.123 In case of torts committed by children
between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, parents are subject to a presumption
of fault.124 Once the child is sixteen years old, no special rule applies, so
parents are only liable on grounds of the general fault-based liability norm.125
At the end of our contribution, we will formulate a proposal that can be
considered as a regime of liability for damage caused by children that is, even
slightly adapted, strongly inspired by the aforementioned Dutch approach,
being a layered system.
6.2 The definition of fault in the legal instruments explored
In connection with our main findings in § 6.1, two questions should be ans-
wered: (1) Is fault defined in the sources examined ? (2) How should fault be
defined in a future harmonised tort law instrument?
Most of the legal instruments analysed do not have a statutory definition
of fault. For instance, there is no definition of fault in the French Civil Code.
The French legislator has left the interpretation of faute to the courts and the
119 Wagner 2007, p. 296.
120 Wagner 2007, p. 296.
121 Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective 2015, pp. 800-801.
122 See N. Ferreira, ‘The harmonisation of private law in Europe and children’s tort liability:
A case of fundamental and children’s rights mainstreaming’, International Journal of Children’s
Rights 2011, p. 588.
123 That is that the same conduct of the child adopted would be considered a tortious act if
it had been that of an adult: art. 6:169(1) DCC.
124 Art. 6:169(2) DCC. According to case law, parents can easily rebut this presumption, in
the light of the difficulty to control the behaviour of youth of this age. See e.g. Dutch
Supreme Court 9 December 1966, NJ 1967/69, note GJS (Joke Stapper).
125 Art. 6:162 DCC.
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doctrine.126 In England, lawyers do not speak in terms of a general concept
of fault, but in terms of negligence and intentional wrongdoing as separate
categories.127 Even in Germany, there is no general statutory definition of
fault (Verschulden) as such. But the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) makes it
clear that the meaning of fault is, such for instance in the PETL, twofold. It is
constituted by the two categories of intentional (Vorsatz) and negligent (Fahr-
lässigkeit) behaviour. Fahrlässigkeit is defined in § 276(2) BGB as the omission
of due care (Außerachtlassen der im Verkehr erforderlichen Sorgfalt).128
The Swiss OR 2020 does not use the term fault, but only indicates in art.
46129 that a person who infringes upon a duty of care without justification
is liable for damages. The proposalmakes no distinction in definition between
unlawful and careless behaviour.130 Neither does the Estonian LOA give a
definition of fault. Art. 1043 LOA131 just stipulates that:132
‘A person (tortfeasor) who unlawfully causes damage to another person (victim)
shall compensate for the damage if the tortfeasor is culpable of causing the damage
or is liable for causing the damage pursuant to the law.’
There are exceptions, however. For instance, the French Projet Terré defines
fault in art. 5:
‘La faute consiste, volontairement ou par négligence, à commettre un fait illicite.
Un fait est illicite quand il contrevient à une règle de conduite imposée par la loi
ou par le devoir général de prudence et de diligence.’
Thismeans that fault, according to the Projet Terré, corresponds to the (object-
ive) requirement of wrongfulness (illicéité), and not to the notion of attributab-
126 Many legal writers have tried to fill this gap. So did Planiol, who defined fault as the
violation of a pre-existing duty (la violation d’une obligation préexistante). This vague definition
is frequently referred to and means that faute is not only the breach of a statutory duty
which amounts to fault, but also the infringement of general duties, such as the duty to
behave, in all circumstances, in a careful and diligent way (le devoir général de prudence et
de diligence): see S. Galand-Carval, ‘Fault under French Law’, in: P. Widmer, Unification
of Tort Law: Fault, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2005, p. 92.
127 Horton Rogers 2005, p. 69, with reference to the remark by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v.
Stevenson [1932] AC 562: ‘The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat
it as in other systems as a species of “culpa” (…).’
128 U. Magnus & G. Seher, ‘Fault under German Law’, in: P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort
Law: Fault, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2005, p. 105.
129 A. General Provisions. I. Conditions of Liability.
130 Loser 2014, pp. 675-676.
131 Compensation for unlawfully caused damage. Art. 1043 LOA reads as follows: ‘A person
(tortfeasor) who unlawfully causes damage to another person (victim) shall compensate
for the damage if the tortfeasor is culpable of causing the damage or is liable for causing
the damage pursuant to law.’
132 Lahe 2013, p. 144.
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ility (imputabilité), which, in the Project, is only used as the title for a series
of strict liabilities for the acts of others, e.g. the strict liability of the parents
for the wrongful acts of their children.133
While the PETL ‘embraces’ the concept of fault, the DCFR – according to one
of its main drafters, Professor Christian von Bar – ‘deliberately avoided the
notions of fault and strict liability.’134 According to the Commentaries on
the PETL (art. 4:101), the term fault is used as a comprehensive term, embracing
intent as well as negligence. Thus, according to art. 4:101 PETL and its Com-
mentaries, the meaning of the term fault is twofold. It covers both intentional
or deliberate and negligent acts of violation of the required standard of con-
duct.135 Contrary to the regulations under the PETL, the DCFR carefully avoids
the notions of fault and strict liability. The comments on the DCFR remain silent
at this point. In his article entitled ‘Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of
Damage Caused toAnother under the DCFR’ Professor Christian von Bar sheds
some light on this issue:136
‘In the basic rule we have deliberately avoided the notions of ‘fault’ and ‘strict
liability’. Both would have been misleading in our view because negligence does
not require fault in amoral sense and also because a liability, once arisen, is always
strict in nature.’
As we will explain in the next section and as we have already pleaded for
in a former edition of BWKJ dedicated to the ‘reasonable person’ (de maat-
man),137 when we use the concept of fault, this term should only mean that
the tortfeasor is legally to blame for his wrongful act. Therefore, fault requires
that the conduct of the tortfeasor is subjectively wrongful. Fault should only
be defined as legal blameworthiness (schuld) and not as an attributable wrongful
act (fout).138 That brings us to the discussion to what extent wrongfulness
and fault are to be seen as distinct requirements and, if a distinction is to be
133 Projet Terré, § 4. De l’imputation du dommage causé par autrui.
134 C. von Bar, ‘Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another under
the DCFR’, ERA Forum 2008, p. 35.
135 The concept of the ‘required standard of conduct’ is described in art. 4:102 PETL. In here
the ‘reasonable person’ (man orwoman) is the central figure. Therefore, in order to establish
a fault-based liability according to the PETL two requirements have to be fulfilled: (i) an
intentional or negligent act; (ii) violation of the required standard of conduct. See also P.C.J.
De Tavernier & J.A. van derWeide, ‘De maatman in het onrechtmatige daadsrecht: onder-
zoek naar enkele regels van soft law’, in: A.G. Castermans et al. (eds.), De maatman in het
burgerlijk recht (BWKJ 24), Deventer: Kluwer 2008, pp. 119-148.
136 Von Bar 2008, p. 35.
137 De Tavernier & Van der Weide 2008, pp. 130-131.
138 In the same sense for Belgium: Cour de Cassation 13 October 1999, Arr. Cass. 1999, p. 528;
Cour de Cassation 16 February 1984, Arr. Cass. 1983-84, p. 750 and Pas. 1984, I, 684.
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made, what yardstick – an objective or a subjective one – is to be used when
assessing the fault of the tortfeasor.139
6.3 THE YARDSTICK IN ESTABLISHING FAULT: OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE?
6.3.1 Objective or subjective assessment of fault: the debate
In order to deal with the objective or subjective assessment of fault, we need
to make a clear statement about the requirement of wrongfulness. Although
the concept of wrongful conduct is in the heart of each fault-based (and
sometimes also strict-based140) liability system,141 different things have been
said about this term and its relation to fault has been the subject of intense
debate. It is not our ambition to reiterate this entire matter, referred to by Van
Dam as ‘the mystery only the Germans dare to speak openly about’.142 Why
not try to build a harmonised European tort law on what Koziol calls a three-
fold division into clearly distinguished terms, so that the debate could focus
on the resolution of the real issues behind the terminology? According to
Koziol, ‘the threefold division into factual elements of the offence (Tat-
bestandmäßigkeit), breach of a duty of care and subjective blameworthiness
reflects practical necessity and is ultimately significant in this respect even
in legal systems that only base the decision on fault and do not openly recog-
nise the notion of wrongfulness, for example French law.’143 Therefore, we
welcome his idea to completely avoid the ambiguous expression of wrongful-
ness and talk about factual elements of the offence (impairment of a protected
interest),144 negligence (breach of an objective duty)145 and fault (subjective
blameworthiness).146
What does this all precisely mean? Firstly, we propose that negligence,
as a breach of an objective duty, should no longer be subjectivised, because
such a test ‘would not provide a clear enough forewarning of what kind of
care will be expected.’147 Therefore, we do not agree with art. 4:102(2) PETL,
stating that ‘the above standard may be adjusted when due to age, mental or
139 See on this topic e.g. H. Koziol, ‘Liability Based on Fault: Subjective or Objective Yardstick?’,
Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 1998, pp. 111-128.
140 See for Switzerland: P. Widmer, ‘Switzerland. Function and Relevance under Swiss Law’,
in: H. Koziol (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Wrongfulness, The Hague: Kluwer Law Inter-
national 1998, p. 115 ff.
141 H. Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective, Wien: Jan Sramek Verlag
2012, p. 172.
142 Van Dam 2013, p. 138.
143 Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective 2015, p. 783.
144 Result-based.
145 Behaviour-related.
146 Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective 2015, p. 784.
147 Compare Sieburgh 2000, p. 259.
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physical disability or due to extraordinary circumstances the person cannot
be expected to conform to it’.
Secondly, we defend the idea that fault must be interpreted as being
subjective. When we decide whether someone has been at fault, we do take
the tortfeasor’s personal characteristics into account.148 Does all this sound
very revolutionary?We do not think so. It is merely a plea for amere termino-
logical and structural clarity, in order tomake court decisions in tort lawmore
coherent, so that more predictability and thus legal certainty in this complex
area in private law can be achieved. With regard to our home country, the
Netherlands, we would therefore welcome judges weighing the act (should
the actor have acted differently?) and the actor (could the actor have acted in
a different way?) in two stages. We do not agree with those who think that
the aforementioned two aspects (the conduct and the person) can be mixed
up.149
Thirdly, the assessment of the question whether the tortfeasor should have
acted differently, will no longer deal with the concept of fault, but becomes
part of the second hurdle in establishing liability, the breach of an objective
duty. Here, distributive justice is at play. This means that expressions like ‘faute
objective’ as used in French law,150 should not be used anymore. The question
whether someone could have acted differently, must be assessed in two steps.
Firstly: is there tortious capacity?151 Secondly: was the tortfeasor able to
behave in conformity with his or her capacity?152 Here, corrective justice is
at play.
6.3.2 Subjective or objective yardstick: the case of the personal liability of children
Now, what are the consequences of our proposal for the personal liability of
children? The existing and proposed solutions to the liability for their own
conduct differ ‘to an extent that is almost unbelievable.’153 Indeed, the image
of the existing and proposed legal rules and provisions is really kaleidoscopic.
Therefore, let us first present some examples taken from the instruments we
have analysed. In most of these instruments, even when an objective test of
148 See Sieburgh 2000, p. 261; P. Widmer, ‘Comparative Report on Fault as a Basis of Liability
and Criterion of Imputation’, in: P. Widmer, Unification of Tort Law: Fault, The Hague:
Kluwer Law International 2005, pp. 357-358.
149 Compare Van Boom 2005, p. 170.
150 Galand-Carval 2005, p. 90.
151 Compare with the concept of Deliktsfähigheit in current German tort law and the notion
of toerekeningsvatbaarheid under Belgian law.
152 Compare with the concept of Steuerungsfähigkeit in current German tort law.
153 H. Koziol, ‘Liability of Children as well as Persons with Reduced Abilities and the Notion
of Fault. Comparative stimulations’, in: H. Koziol (ed.), Comparative Stimulations for Devel-
oping Tort Law, Wien: Jan Sramek Verlag 2015, p. 105.
De Tavernier & Van der Weide 135
fault is the rule, a particular position is taken for children.154 Then, we will
formulate a personal choice between the existing and proposed alternatives.
In relation to tort liability of children, Section 1, Chapter 3, Book VI of the
DCFR contains two provisions. These provisions can be found in the same
Section as the provisions on intention and negligence. Art. VI. – 3:103 deals
with issues of intention and negligence on the part of persons under eighteen.
Art. VI. – 3:103 DCFR distinguishes between children and juveniles aged seven
to seventeen (par. 1) and children under the age of seven (par. 2). Par. 2 of
art. VI. – 3:103 provides for an age limit whereby children under seven years
of age are not accountable for causing damage intentionally or negligently.
A significant aim of the rule of art. VI. – 3:103 DCFR, par. 2 is to safeguard
children from premature financial burdens through liability for damage caused
by them.
According to par. 1 of art. VI. – 3:103 DCFR, persons aged seven to seventeen
are accountable for causing legally relevant damage. This accountability only
exists in so far as the person involved does not exercise such care as could
be expected from a reasonably careful person of the same age in the circum-
stances of the case. Subsequently, par. 3 of art. VI. – 3:103 DCFR contains a
counterweight to the rules of both preceding paragraphs. Paragraphs 1 and
2 of art. VI. – 3:103 do not apply when the person suffering the damage cannot
obtain reparation from another and liability to make reparation would be
equitable having regard to the financial means of the parties and all other
circumstances of the case.
Certain jurisdictions, such as Austria,155 Germany,156 the Netherlands157
and the Estonian LOA158 have decided on a determined (or presumed) limit
of age below which a tortfeasor cannot be held liable159
In the PETL this model has not been followed. The PETL adopts a so-called
‘flexible system.’160 The question whether or not a person had sufficient
insight into or control of his or her behaviour has to be answered from case
154 Van Dam 2013, p. 269.
155 § 153 ABGB fixes the limit at 14 years. However, the presumption is rebuttable, so that
the plaintiff may prove that, in a concrete situation, a younger child had enough capacity
of discernment to justify its individual liability: H. Koziol, ‘Fault under Austrian Law’, in:
P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Fault, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2005,
pp. 14-15.
156 No liability for children under 7 (§ 828 par. 1 BGB; see U. Magnus & G. Seher, ‘Fault under
German Law’, in: P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Fault, The Hague: Kluwer Law
International 2005, p. 107.
157 Tortious immunity up to 14 years of age: art. 6:164 BW.
158 Art. 1052(1) LOA provides that all children under the age of fourteen are deemed to lack
fault capacity: see Lahe 2013, p. 146.
159 See P. Widmer, ‘Comparative Report’, in: P. Widmer (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Fault,
The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2005, p. 344.
160 European Group of Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law. Text and Commentary, Wien/
New-York: Springer 2005, p. 80.
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to case, according to the mental development of that person. This is also the
case with regard to Belgian law.161
A liability on grounds of equity has been chosen in the Swiss OR 2020. Art.
57 OR 2020 reads as follows:
‘B. Haftung urteilsunfähiger Personen. 1 Wenn es der Billigkeit entspricht, kann
das Gericht auch eine urteilsunfähige Person, die Schaden verursacht hat, zum
Ersatz verurteilen.’162
This liability depends on the financial means of the child and the needs of
the victim.163
From a comparative perspective, the French system of personal liability
of children occupies a particular position. In 1984, the Cour de Cassation had
to decide about a 7-year-old boy who deliberately bumped into another boy
in a school playground, as a consequence of which the latter hit a bench and
was seriously injured.164 The French Supreme Court held the 7-year-old boy
liable, because his conduct could be qualified as a fault regardless of whether
he has reached the age of discretion.165 The Cour de Cassation decided that
the standard of reference that had to be applied to the case was not a child
of the same age but an adult, le bon père de famille.166 What do we think about
this opinion?
The French approach might be considered as ‘interesting and instruct-
ive’,167 because concerns about the imposition of liability on children who
have not reached the age of discretionmight be alleviated by the fact that such
liability has little practical significance, as the victims tend to only pursue an
action against their parents.168 The French rule of liability of infantes (very
young children) should also be interpreted in relation to the tort law culture
of France that generates as much compensation as possible for a victim for
the damage he has suffered. In other words, it fits in with the French articula-
tion of distributive justice. Furthermore, in most cases the risk of damage
caused by minors is covered by liability insurance.169 Finally, legal systems
that show regard for the restricted capacity of children provoke a contradiction
by refusing to take the subjective abilities of other persons into account.170
161 H. Cousy & D. Droshout, ‘Fault under Belgian Law’, in: P. Widmer (ed.),Unification of Tort
Law: Fault, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2005, p. 37.
162 B. Liability of persons lacking capacity. 1 On grounds of equity, the court may also order
a person who lacks capacity to compensate for the damage he or she has caused.
163 Compare with the German provision of § 829 BGB; see Van Dam 2013, p. 270.
164 See Van Dam, 2013, p. 273.
165 Cour de Cassation 2e ch. civ. 12 December 1984, Gaz. Pal. 1985, 235.
166 Van Dam 2013, 273.
167 Koziol, Comparative Stimulations 2015, p. 106.
168 Koziol, Comparative Stimulations 2015, p. 106.
169 Koziol, Comparative Stimulations 2015, p. 106.
170 Koziol, Comparative Stimulations 2015, p. 143.
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On the other hand, however, it cannot be denied that the legal position
of young children can be severely threatened if their liability is not covered
by a liability insurance.171 Applying an objective standard is not in the
interest of young children, because they are not able to meet the standard of
the reasonable adult bonus pater familias.172 It has also been argued that ‘leav-
ing (child) tortfeasors with extremely limited economic resources and depriving
them of the possibility of carrying on their lives in away held compatible with
European societies’ and legal systems’ values and minimum standards, may
also constitute a violation of their fundamental rights, namely the rights to
human dignity, development of personality, equality, private autonomy,
minimal livelihood, maximal development, and special protection of chil-
dren’.173
We agree with Koziol that, in view of a future harmonisation of European
tort lawwith regard to liability for damage caused by children, two alternatives
exist:174
‘On the one hand in developing the French system of a combination of children’s
(…) liability for objectively wrongful behaviour without taking regard of subjective
capacity (…), combined with social liability insurance and redress against super-
visors in case of negligent supervision. On the other hand, the traditional system
(…) of taking into regard of subjective capacity of children (…) in combination
with a general subjective notion of fault, also in regard to adults (…) and, thus,
not only with regard to children.’
We believe that the second option is to be preferred. However, being aware
of themajority of jurisdictions and scholars who nowadays continue to defend
the idea of an objective assessment of fault, a ‘third way’ may be considered
in order to find a solution for what Van Dam calls the dilemma between
emotional objections to the liability of children on the one hand (the element
of corrective justice) and the desirability of liability of children to protect
victims (the element of distributive justice).175
That compromise might be found in the adoption of the rules on liability
for damage caused by children as laid down in the Dutch Civil Code. The
Dutch solution combines strict liability of parents until a certain age and the
presumed fault of parents at a later age, with the lack of fault of children until
a certain age and children’s tortious liability according to the general fault-
based liability standard at a later age.176 This might be an interesting path
to follow. However, in view of the existing age limits in the current legal
171 Koziol; Comparative Stimulations 2015, p. 140.
172 Van Dam 2013, p. 269.
173 Ferreira 2011, p. 582.
174 Koziol, Comparative Stimulations 2015, pp. 145-156.
175 Van Dam 2013, p. 269.
176 Ferreira 2011, p. 588.
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systems (from the age of seven in Germany until the age of fourteen in Esto-
nia), fixing the limit of children’s personal liability at the age of twelve seems
more realistic in an attempt to harmonise the existing rules. Moreover, with
an age limit of twelve, the insurability of the risk (low premiums) would be
easier to maintain, bearing in mind the statistics with regard to criminal
behaviour committed by minors over that age. But let us stay prudent: many
scholars are not in favour of fixing children’s liability at a certain age. ‘While
the concept of legal certainty can be used for the use of rigid age limits’, writes
Koziol, ‘the counterarguments would seem to outweigh this concern: this
concerns subjective imputation and as the personal development of children
varies considerably and in diverse situations very different powers of discern-
ment are required, rigid age limits thus lead to results which in individual
cases cannot be objectively justified.’177
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have drawn some lines for a future harmonised tort lawwith
regard to (a) the importance of fault liability, (b) the definition of fault and
(c) the assessment of fault by a well-determined yardstick.
(a) Illustrated by the case of parental liability we showed that the existing and
proposed tort law regimes in Europe differ to a great extent. At both ends
of the tort law spectrum, regimes of fault liability and strict liability could
be found. In our paper we did not aim to provide an answer to the ques-
tion whether strict liability rules should, in certain cases, replace existing
fault liability rules. The choice of mere strict liability regimes rather than
preserving classical fault liability approaches is just a matter of policy:
should tort law focus exclusively on distributive justice (strict liability),
or is corrective justice (fault liability) the fundamental goal?
(b) In order to overcome the existing catastrophic Babylonian confusion about
the meaning of the concept of fault in the harmonisation and reform
projects examined, we reiterated an opinion in this contribution that we
defended already seven years ago in this BWKJ series.178 Fault should only
be defined as legal blameworthiness. An unfortunate confusion of the
concept of fault with the concept of wrongfulness179 or with a combina-
tion of wrongfulness and blameworthiness should be avoided. By taking
177 Koziol, Comparative Stimulations 2015, p. 792.
178 De Tavernier & Van der Weide 2008, pp. 119-148.
179 For a future harmonised tort law, we propose to delete the concept of wrongfulness and
to replace it by the twofold requirement of (1) the proof of the factual elements of the offence
(impairment of a protected interest) and (2) negligence (breach of an objective duty).
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Dutch law into consideration we therefore proposed in this paper to use
the current concept of fault only in a strict sense of attributability, that is
to say blameworthiness, or in Dutch: schuld (art. 6:162 DCC). Moreover,
according to our opinion, the word ‘fault’ as used in the articles 6:169, 6:
170, 6:171 and 6:172 DCC – referring to a combination of wrongfulness and
attributability – should be replaced by ‘a wrongful act that can be attributed
to the tortfeasor’. Our proposal implicates that we cannot identify with
a series of soft law and reform proposals, such as the DCFR, in which the
concept of fault has been carefully avoided, or the Projet Terré, in which
the concept of fault converges with the concept of negligence. Acceptance
of our proposal will lead to a terminological shift of the Dutch Civil Code
provisions into which the concept of fault is incorporated.180 However,
we would like to emphasise that we do not aim to adjust the requirements
for tortious liability in general.
(c) Against the background of the kaleidoscopic image of both the definition
of fault and its assessment, we have proposed that the concept of fault must
be interpreted in a subjective way. In case of the liability of children, we
therefore do not adhere to the French approach that does not take the
tortious capacity and the blameworthiness of children into consideration.
This leads us to the following question. Do we prefer to leave the assess-
ment of the tortious capacity to judicial discretion, or do we give preference
to a rigid age limit that excludes the liability of a child?We prefer the latter
solution, but by taking the insurability of the risk of damage caused by
the child into account, we propose to replace the current limit of fourteen
years of age by that of twelve years of age. In this case legal certainty and
predictability should prevail over Einzelfallgerechtigkeit.
180 With the exception of art. 6:162 DCC, where fault is used in the sense of blameworthiness
(schuld).

6 Prescription
A private-law concept at the forefront of
fundamental rights protection
Ruben de Graaff
1 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW – A TALE OF TWO ‘LIVING
INSTRUMENTS’
If the defendant successfully relies on an absolute prescription period, the
claimant has no right of action anymore. This is problematic in ‘long-tail’ cases,
when the losses are concealed and cannot be established before the absolute
prescription period lapses. The prime example is the development of lung
cancer as a result of the exposure to asbestos. As the latency period is very
long, the victim usually becomes aware of the losses after the claim is already
time-barred. Other claimants face similar problems, for example victims of
childhood abuse or victims of crimes against humanity committed by the State.
It is questionable whether they can be expected to be fully aware of the losses
and familiar with the possibility to hold the person responsible liable before
the prescription period lapses.
These are first of all problems that have to be solved within the system
of private law, under its own rules and principles, including the right to access
to a court, which is recognised as a fundamental principle of civil procedural
law. However, they can also be understood in terms of fundamental rights
law, because the right to access to a court is recognised under art. 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter: Convention or ECHR) as
well. A court that is confronted with these problems therefore has to take into
account two ‘living instruments’ of law – private law and the Convention –
each with their own distinctive developments and possibilities.
In practice, the protection of fundamental rights in the private sphere
depends very much on a construction of private-law concepts that complies
with the requirements derived from fundamental rights law. An evolution
has to come from within the system of private law in the first place, as Lord
Bingham argued in the context of the law of tort:
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‘[T]he question does arise whether the law of tort should evolve, analogically and
incrementally, so as to fashion appropriate remedies to contemporary problems
or whether it should remain essentially static, making only such changes as are
forced upon it, leaving difficult and, in human terms, very important problems
to be swept up by the Convention. I prefer evolution.’1
Against the background of the relationship between the Convention system,
national constitutional law and national private law, this contribution examines
the influence of the right to access to a court under art. 6 ECHR on the core
concept of prescription, with a focus on the prescription of ‘long-tail’ claims.
Has private law been able to fashion ‘appropriate remedies’, or has a solution
only been reached after this contemporary problem has been ‘swept up by
the Convention’?
In order to fully understand the interplay between private law and funda-
mental rights, the general constitutional framework is first analysed. As the
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: ECtHR or Strasbourg Court) has
a subsidiary role and often leaves a considerable margin of appreciation to
the national authorities, national courts are encouraged to come up with
solutions to fundamental rights problems. This task is becoming more im-
portant, because the Strasbourg Court is in crisis and transition (section 2).
However, Strasbourg jurisprudence still serves as a valuable substitute for
national constitutional arguments in theNetherlands (section 3) and the United
Kingdom (section 4), countries that do not have a separate constitutional court
and do not have a tradition of judicial review on the basis of a national consti-
tutional document.2
In this constitutional context, an important role has been preserved by and
for private law. Within Dutch private law, one instrument is of particular
importance: the possibility to set aside binding statutory rules on the basis
of art. 6:2 (2) of the Dutch Civil Code (hereafter: DCC) (section 5). It is this
provision that has been used to ‘remedy’ the problem of the prescription of
‘long-tail’ claims (section 6), before this issue reached the Strasbourg Court
(section 7). After having examined the compatibility of Dutch private lawwith
the relevant requirements arising from recent Strasbourg jurisprudence (section
8), it is argued that an evolving interpretation of the core concepts of the Dutch
Civil Code can be used to contribute to the protection of fundamental rights
in the Netherlands (section 9).
1 Lord Bingham in his dissenting judgment in House of Lords 21 April 2005, [2005] UKHL
23, at 50 (JD/East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust), a case about the possible liability
of a local authority to parents whose children had been wrongfully taken into care.
2 The United Kingdom does have a Human Rights Act, which incorporates the Convention
rights into the British legal order. See further in section 4.
De Graaff 143
2 WHAT THE STRASBOURG COURT EXPECTS FROM NATIONAL COURTS
In order to understand the interplay between the Convention and national
law, it is essential to grasp the general principles that should be followed by
national courts in matters touched on by the Convention.3 The Preamble
emphasises the importance of the ECHR as a system of ‘collective enforcement’
of fundamental rights. The national authorities have the primary responsibility
to safeguard the Convention rights, and it is up to the Strasbourg Court to
supervise their compliance and to protect fundamental rights in the last in-
stance. The Court has a subsidiary role:
‘The Court points out that the machinery of protection established by the Conven-
tion is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. (…) The
Convention leaves to each Contracting State, in the first place, the task of securing
the rights and liberties it enshrines. (…) By reason of their direct and continuous
contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle
in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact
content of these requirements as well as on the “necessity” of a “restriction” or
“penalty” intended to meet them.’4
Themargin of appreciation doctrine is a corollary of this principle of subsidiar-
ity. The scope of the margin of appreciation – between ‘wide’ and ‘narrow’ –
determines the leeway afforded to national authorities to interpret and apply
the Convention within their domestic systems. It is important to stress that
the Court uses the margin of appreciation doctrine to define the relationship
between the Convention system and the national authorities. The doctrine is
not meant to dictate the position of national courts towards the legislature
and executive bodies. In the words of the Court, the doctrine ‘cannot have
the same application to the relations between the organs of State at the
domestic level’.5
Formally, the obligations under the Convention do not go further than
remedying the breach in the instant case.6 The respondent State has ‘a legal
obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation for its conse-
quences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing
3 J.H. Gerards, ‘Samenloop van nationale en Europese grondrechtenbepalingen – hoe moet
de rechter daarmee omgaan?’, TvCR 2010, pp. 224-255; J.H. Gerards, ‘The European Court
of Human Rights and the national courts – giving shape to the notion of “shared responsib-
ility”’, in: J.H. Gerards & J.W.A. Fleuren, Implementatie van het EVRM en de uitspraken van
het EHRM in de nationale rechtspraak. Een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek (Report for the Dutch
Research and Documentation Centre WODC, 2013), Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit
Nijmegen 2013, pp. 71-124.
4 ECtHR 7 December 1976, 5493/72, at 48 (Handyside/United Kingdom); ECtHR 23 July 1968,
1474/62, at I.B.10 (Belgian Linguistic case).
5 ECtHR 19 February 2009, 3455/05, at 184 (A. and others/United Kingdom).
6 Art. 46 ECHR.
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before the breach’.7 The Court does not only decide individual cases on their
merits, though. It has the task ‘to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules
instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the
States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties’.8 When
the Court is faced with a new case, the Court considers ‘whether the national
authorities have sufficiently taken into account the principles flowing from
its judgments on similar issues, even when they concern other States’.9
From the perspective of the Court, national courts have to guarantee
compliance and the State can be held accountable before the Court if they have
not fulfilled this duty. But can national courts provide a higher level of pro-
tection than the Convention requires? art. 53 ECHR plays a central role here:
‘Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any
of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the
laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is
a party.’
This provision must be interpreted as meaning that the Convention system
guarantees a minimum level of fundamental rights protection, which has to
be observed by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the State,
also when they act in a private capacity, or when they regulate and decide
matters of private law.10 In principle, it is not problematic if national author-
ities afford a level of fundamental rights protection higher than the protection
provided under the Convention. On the contrary: the level of national funda-
mental rights protection matters, because the level of protection under the
Convention is influenced by the commonly accepted standards in the different
member States of the Council of Europe.11 The Court is informed and inspired
by these standards. It may accept a certain interpretation of the Convention
when there is a general agreement amongst themajority of the States parties.12
The minimum level of protection may be hard to determine. A certain
problemmay not yet have reached the Court, and evenwhen it has, the answer
may be ambiguous or leave a considerable margin of appreciation to the
national authorities. It may also be difficult to determine the minimum level
of protection when one fundamental right has to be weighed against another
fundamental right, or against other interests. It has to be ensured that ‘generos-
7 ECtHR 31 October 1995, 14556/89, at 34 (Papamichalopoulos and Others/Greece).
8 ECtHR 7 January 2010, 25965/04, at 197 (Rantsev/Cyprus and Russia).
9 ECtHR 9 June 2009, 33401/02, at 163 (Opuz/Turkey).
10 The latter point has been reaffirmed in ECtHR 16 December 2008, 23883/06, at 33 (Khurshid
Mustafa and Tarzibachi/Sweden), referring to ECtHR 13 July 2004, 69498/01, at 59 (Pla and
Puncernau/Andorra).
11 ECtHR 25 April 1978, 5856/72, at 31 (Tyrer/United Kingdom).
12 Gerards 2013, p. 88, with examples.
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ity for one party does not lead to a disproportionate burden for the other’.13
Take for example art. 6 ECHR. The prescription of a claim limits the right to
access to a court of the claimant in order to protect the legitimate expectations
of the defendant. Both interests are protected under art. 6 ECHR, and both
interests have to be weighed to decide whether the prescription period serves
a legitimate aim and satisfies the principle of proportionality in the case at
hand.
It is clear that in the end, the Court sets the standards and determines
whether the national authorities have compliedwith their obligations. Yet the
initial assessment has to be made by the national authorities. That task is
becoming more important, because the Strasbourg Court is in crisis and
transition. In crisis, because the Court still faces a serious backlog of admissible
applications with no prospect of a definitive solution,14 despite recent re-
forms.15 In transition, because these reforms – including the prioritisation
of applications,16 the pilot judgment procedure,17 the possibility to declare
an application inadmissible when the applicant ‘has not suffered a significant
disadvantage’18 and the future introduction of an advisory opinions proced-
ure19 – indicate that the Court focuses more of its attention on the most
serious and systemic problems, and on important questions of interpretation
of the ECHR,20 and less on the delivery of justice in each individual case.21
13 R.A. Lawson, ‘Beyond the Call of Duty? Domestic Courts and the Standards of the European
Court of Human Rights’, in: H.J. Snijders & S. Vogenauer (eds.), Content and Meaning of
National Law in the Context of Transnational Law, Munich: Sellier 2009, p. 38.
14 By the end of November 2015, 64,450 applications were still pending before a judicial
formation, compared to a total of 69,900 in January 2015 (http://echr.coe.int/Documents/
Stats_month_2015_ENG.pdf, last accessed 5 January 2016).
15 For an overview of the latest developments, consult the CDDH report on the longer-term
future of the system of the European Convention on Human Rights (CDDH(2015)R84 Addendum
I), Strasbourg: December 2015 (www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/GT-
GDR-F/CDDH(2015)R84_Addendum%20I_EN-Final.pdf, last accessed 5 January 2016).
16 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court enables the Court to have regard to the importance and
urgency of the issues raised in deciding the order in which cases are to be dealt with.
17 Rule 61 of the Rules of Court enables the Court to select one or more applications for
priority treatment, in order to be able to identify the structural problems underlying
repetitive cases and give the Government clear indications of the type of measures needed
to remedy these problems.
18 Art. 35 (3)(b) ECHR.
19 In the near future, highest national courts may ask the Strasbourg Court for an preliminary
advisory opinion (Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR). The Protocol is optional and will enter
into force if it is ratified by a minimum of 10 member States (Art. 8 of the Protocol). As
of 11 December 2015, the Protocol was signed by 16 and ratified by 6 member States.
20 Brighton Declaration, issued after the High Level Conference on the Future of the European
Court of Human Rights on 20 April 2012, at 33 (www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_
Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf, last accessed 5 January 2016).
21 S. Greer & L. Wildhaber, ‘Revisiting the Debate about “constitutionalizing” the European
Court of Human Rights’, Human Rights Law Review 2012, p. 686.
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National authorities have to follow the principles arising from the judg-
ments by the Court and have to guarantee that they are quickly and effectively
implemented in national law and judicial decision-making. The question
whether, and to what extent, national courtswill come upwith these solutions,
as opposed to the legislative or executive branch, is primarily a question of
national law.22 The answer depends on constitutional and institutional con-
siderations, such as the need for a legal basis in national law to provide
fundamental rights protection.
3 WHY NATIONAL FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IS LIMITED
When it comes to fundamental rights protection, the Netherlands forms an
exception to the European rule.23 It does not have a specialised constitutional
court that reviews legislation. On the contrary, judicial review of primary
legislation against the rights embodied in the Constitution is prohibited.24
art. 120 of the Dutch Constitution reads:
‘The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by
the courts.’25
Are the courts nonetheless entitled to review primary legislation against other
constitutional norms, notably fundamental principles of Dutch law? Reluctant-
ly, the Supreme Court decided that Dutch courts may not review primary
legislation against such legal principles either.26 Such a review is only possible
22 National courts may also provide additional protection on the basis of EU law or inter-
national human rights law, but these categories fall outside the scope of this contribution.
23 J. Uzman, T. Barkhuysen & M.L. van Emmerik, ‘The Dutch Supreme Court: A Reluctant
Positive Legislator?’, in: A.R. Brewer-Carías (ed.), Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013, p. 646.
24 Even if such a review were possible, the Constitution would be of little help, because the
right of access to a court is not embodied in the Constitution. In 2014, a draft bill was tabled
to include such a provision in the Dutch Constitution, see Kamerstukken II, 2014/15, 31 570,
no. 25, p. 5-6.
25 In Dutch:‘De rechter treedt niet in de beoordeling van de grondwettigheid van wetten en
verdragen.’ A translation of the Constitution is available onwww.government.nl. Legislation
has been proposed to allow judicial review against national constitutional rights: ‘Voorstel
van wet van het lid Halsema tot verandering in de Grondwet, strekkende tot invoering
van de bevoegdheid tot toetsing van wetten aan een aantal bepalingen van de Grondwet
door de rechter’, Kamerstukken II, 2009/10, 32 334, 2, pp. 1-2. On 5March 2015, the proposal
was discussed in the Lower House (Tweede Kamer). There is no two-thirds majority in that
house, so the future of this proposal is uncertain, see Handelingen II 2014/15, 60, item 11,
pp. 1-24.
26 HR 14 April 1989, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AD5725, NJ 1989/469, at 3.6 (Harmonisatiewet). The
Supreme Court did so reluctantly, because it made clear that it deemed the legislation at
issue to violate the legitimate expectations of the students concerned, and thus to violate
the principle of legal certainty (Harmonisatiewet, at 3.1).
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when the circumstances and interests at stake have not been considered by
the legislature during the decision-making process.27
That is not to say that Dutch courts do not review primary legislation
against fundamental rights standards. On certain conditions, treaty provisions
– such as the Convention rights – have a direct effect in the Dutch legal order,
as is stipulated in art. 93 of the Dutch Constitution.28 Individuals may
challenge legislative acts for violation of such treaty provisions on the basis
of art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution:
‘Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such
application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or of resolutions by international
institutions that are binding on all persons.’29
Dutch courts are thus caught between a ban and a command: they shall not
review primary legislation against the Constitution, but they shall review
primary legislation against international law with direct effect.30 Although
the courts do not have the power to annul legislative acts, they are empowered
to set aside a conflicting provision of national law in the instant case,31 or
to interpret that provision in conformity with the demands of international
law. On this basis, the courts have enforced – and sometimes clarified32 –
the requirements arising from the Convention and Strasbourg jurisprudence.33
27 Harmonisatiewet, at 3.9.
28 On the assessment of direct effect: HR 10October 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2928,NJ 2015/12
(Staat/Nietrokersvereniging CAN).
29 In Dutch: ‘Binnen het Koninkrijk geldende wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing,
indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar is met een ieder verbindende bepalingen van
verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties.’ This kind of review is not
the exclusive prerogative of the Dutch Supreme Court, but may be exercised by any court
in the Netherlands: Uzman, Barkhuysen & Van Emmerik 2013, p. 646.
30 Dutch courts are also obliged to ensure the effective application of EU law. From the
perspective of the Court of Justice of the EU, this is not a matter of national constitutional
law, but a matter of EU law itself: ECJ 5 February 1963, Case 26/62 (Van Gend & Loos);
ECJ 15 July 1964, Case 6/64 (Costa/E.N.E.L.); ECJ 9 March 1978, Case 106/77, at 21 (Admin-
istrazione delle Finanza dello Stato/Simmenthal SpA). A discussion on the interaction between
EU law and national constitutional law is beyond the scope of this contribution.
31 An increasing number of authors argues that the courts may also declare a provision
generally non-binding on the basis of Art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution. This should only
be possible if the courts are convinced that the statutory rule cannot be applied lawfully
to any case, which is a rare occasion and certainly not the case when it concerns the law
of statutory limitations. See for further discussion and references J. Uzman, Constitutionele
remedies bij schending van grondrechten (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2013, pp. 70-85.
32 In the context of criminal procedural law, the SupremeCourt has, for example, given further
guidance after ECtHR 27 November 2008, 36391/02 (Salduz) and subsequent judgments
by the Strasbourg Court, in: HR 30 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3079,NJ 2009/349; HR
1 April 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:770,NJ 2014/268; HR 22 December 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:
3608.
33 Gerards & Fleuren 2013, with many examples.
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In spite of its imperative wordings, art. 94 of the Constitution has its limits.
The possibility to interpret legislation in conformity with international law
is – to some extent – limited by general rules of interpretation.34 While a
consistent interpretation may therefore not be feasible, setting aside the conflict-
ing statutory rule may not be effective, because it does not remedy the under-
lying problem. The Supreme Court decided that in such a case, the need to
provide effective legal protection has to be weighed against the need for the
courts to exercise restraint when developing new rules and intervening in
existing statutory regulations.35 The courtsmay fill the resulting gap by falling
back on another statutory rule, provided that this solution is in concordance
with the statutory legal system and the rules already laid down for similar
situations.36 However, if different solutions are possible and if the choice
between those options involves considerations of public policy, the courts have
to defer the question to the legislature – at least for the time being.37
art. 94 of the Constitution is also limited when it comes to the interpretation
of the content of the Convention itself. This became clear when the Dutch
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether same-sex couples have the right
to marry under art. 1:30 DCC. Such a right could not be derived from art. 12
ECHR, which grants the right to marry to ‘men and women’ and is interpreted
by the Strasbourg Court as referring to ‘the traditional marriage between
persons of opposite biological sex’.38 According to the Supreme Court, there
was no ‘sufficient basis’ to interpret the content of art. 12 ECHR as being ‘more
dynamic’ than followed from Strasbourg jurisprudence.39
In another landmark case, the Supreme Court was asked whether the
obligation to provide for the cost of the care and the upbringing of a child
under art. 1:394 DCC only rested on ‘the man’ – as the provision stated – or
also extended to a female companion who ‘has agreed to an act which could
have resulted in the begetting of the child’.40 The right to family life under
34 S.K. Martens, ‘De grenzen van de rechtsvormende taak van de rechter’, NJB 2000, p. 750.
In practice, these limits can be stretched in order to effectively enforce fundamental rights,
see for examples Uzman 2013, pp. 60-63.
35 HR 12May 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:AA2756,NJ 2000/170, at 3.14 et seq. (Arbeidskostenforfait).
36 This part of the test essentially stems fromHR 30 January 1959,NJ 1959/548 (Quint/Te Poel).
37 See for an overview of the relevant case law Uzman 2013, pp. 119-136.
38 ECtHR 17 October 1986, 9532/81, at 49 (Rees/United Kingdom). In 2010, the Court noted
that the institute of marriage ‘has undergone major social changes since the adoption of
the Convention’, but was not prepared to decide that Art. 12 ECHR grants this right to
same-sex couples, because ‘there is no European consensus regarding same-sex marriage’.
See ECtHR 24 June 2010, 30141/04, at 58 (Schalk and Köpf/Austria)
39 HR 19 October 1990, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AD1260, NJ 1992/129, at 3.4. Since 1 April 2001,
Art. 1:30 BW has read as follows: ‘A marriage may be entered into by two persons of a
different or of the same sex.’
40 This contribution relies on the translation by H. Warendorf et al., The Civil Code of the
Netherlands, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2013.
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art. 8 ECHR did not require the State to grant the child such a claim. The
Supreme Court held:
‘Art. 53 ECHR leaves the national legislature the discretion to provide more pro-
tection than the provisions of the ECHR do. However, the Dutch courts are bound
by art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution, which states that statutory regulations in force
within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with
provisions of treaties. Such a conflict cannot be determined solely on the basis of
an interpretation by the national – Dutch – courts of the concept of “family life”,
in view of recently adopted legislation, which leads to more protection than may
be assumed on the basis of the case law of the ECtHR with regard to art. 8 ECHR.’41
On the one hand, art. 94 of the Constitution obliges the courts to enforce the
Convention rights, on the other hand the Supreme Court cautions that the
courts have to conform to the interpretation of those rights by the Strasbourg
Court. This has prompted constitutional lawyers to conclude that the Supreme
Court exercisesmore restraint when there is no ‘clearmandate by the European
Court of Human Rights’.42 In a series of judgments, the House of Lords, now
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, seems to have taken a similar
position. It is useful to take note of this debate, in order to understand the
relationship between the Convention system, national constitutional law and
national private law.
4 THE ‘MIRROR PRINCIPLE’: NO MORE, NO LESS
The United Kingdom does not have a constitutional court and does not have
a codified, but an ‘unwritten’ constitution, which is derived from a number
of sources, such as statute law, common law and constitutional conventions.43
As it is a dualist State, international law does not have any direct effect until
it is incorporated into the domestic legal order.44 Despite the fact that the
41 HR 10 August 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:ZC3598, NJ 2002/278, at 3.9: ‘Art. 53 EVRM laat
de nationale wetgever de vrijheid om een verdergaande bescherming te bieden dan de
bepalingen van het EVRM geven. De Nederlandse rechter is evenwel gebonden aan art.
94 Gr.w, ingevolge welke bepaling binnen het Koninkrijk geldende wettelijke voorschriften
geen toepassing vinden, indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar ismet een ieder verbinden-
de bepalingen van verdragen. Een zodanige onverenigbaarheid kan niet worden aangeno-
men uitsluitend op basis van een uitleg door de nationale – Nederlandse – rechter van
het begrip “family life” in het licht van recent tot stand gekomen wetgeving, die leidt tot
een verdergaande bescherming dan op grond van de rechtspraak van het EHRM met
betrekking tot art. 8 EVRM mag worden aangenomen.’
42 Uzman, Barkhuysen & Van Emmerik 2013, p. 659.
43 P. Leyland, The Constitution of the United Kingdom. A Contextual Analysis, Oxford: Hart 2012,
Chapter 2.
44 The exception to the rule being EU law, which constitutes an autonomous legal order
(footnote 30).
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United Kingdomwas amongst the founding fathers of the Convention, it lasted
until 1998 before the Convention rights were incorporated into the Human
Rights Act.
Prior to the adoption of the Human Rights Act, Lord Bingham, then Lord
Chief Justice, stated that the Act would allow British courts to make ‘a signifi-
cant contribution (…) in the development of the law of human rights’.45 In
the Ullah case, however, Lord Bingham ruled that an evolving interpretation
of the Human Rights Act was not to be preferred. Here, apparently, the law
should remain static until either the legislature or the Strasbourg Court flexes
its muscles:
‘It is of course open to member states to provide for rights more generous than
those guaranteed by the Convention, but such provision should not be the product
of interpretation of the Convention by national courts, since the meaning of the
Convention should be uniform throughout the states party to it. The duty of
national courts is to keep pacewith the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over
time: no more, but certainly no less.’46
This approach was supported by the other Lords and has been coined the
‘mirror principle’.47 The message is twofold: national courts are not obliged
to provide additional protection and they should not provide such protection,
because that would risk undermining the uniformity of the Convention and
would involve a choice that should bemade by the legislature. In theAl-Skeini
case, Lord Brown even reversed the last sentence: the courts should do ‘no
less, but certainly no more’. He added that a ‘danger’ of a more generous
interpretation of the Convention by the highest national court is that ‘the
member state cannot itself go to Strasbourg to have it corrected’.48
A number of objections have been raised against the ‘mirror principle’.49
First of all, no distinction is made between clear, unclear and non-existent
Strasbourg jurisprudence. The principle seems to prevent domestic courts from
developing the interpretation of the ECHR, even when there is no clear Stras-
bourg authority. Second, the Strasbourg Court itself does not think that the
Convention should be applied in a strictly uniformmanner. As we have seen,
the Court leaves amargin of appreciation to the national authorities, who have
45 Statement by Lord Bingham in the House of Commons on 3 November 1997: HL Deb, Vol.
582, col. 1245, referred to by LadyHale, Justice of the Supreme Court: B. Hale, ‘Argentoratum
Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?’, Human Rights Law Review 2012,
p. 70.
46 House of Lords 17 June 2004, [2004] UKHL 26, at 20 (R. (Ullah)/Special Adjudicator).
47 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’, Public Law 2007, pp. 720-747.
48 House of Lords 13 June 2007, [2007] UKHL 26, at 106 (Al-Skeini and others/Secretary of State
for Defence).
49 Lewis 2007, p. 720 et seq.; T. Rainsbury, ‘Their Lordships’ Timorous Souls’, UCL Human
Rights Review 2008, pp. 32-52; Lord Irving, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’,
Public Law 2012, p. 237 et seq.; Hale 2012.
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the primary responsibility to safeguard the Convention rights and are ‘evident-
ly better placed than an international court to evaluate, in the light of local
legal traditions, the particular context of the legal dispute submitted to them
and the various competing rights and interests’.50 Third, the result of the
‘mirror principle’ is that controversial questions are not only deferred to the
legislature, but also to another court: the Strasbourg Court.51
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has not yet overruled the
‘mirror principle’ as such, but its application has been refined in later juris-
prudence. With regard to the first point (‘no less’), the Supreme Court has
made it clear that it may refuse to follow Strasbourg authority,52 although
it would have
‘to involve some truly fundamental principle or some most egregious oversight
or misunderstanding before it could be appropriate (…) to contemplate an outright
refusal to follow Strasbourg authority at the Grand Chamber level’.53
With regard to the second point (‘no more’), the Supreme Court has shown
that it does interpret the Convention rather independently in the absence of
clear Strasbourg authority.54 Such an approach has been suggested by Lord
Wilson:
‘At any rate where there is no directly relevant decision of the ECtHR with which
it would be possible (even if appropriate) to keep pace, we can and must do more.
Wemust determine for ourselves the existence or otherwise of an alleged Conven-
tion right. And, in doing so, we must take account of all indirectly relevant de-
cisions of the ECtHR and, in particular, of such principles underlying them (...).’55
Lord Mance even warned against a ‘tendency to see the law in areas touched
on by the Convention solely in terms of the Convention rights’. He indicated
that the common law embraces many of the rights that are protected under
the Convention as well:
‘In some areas, the common lawmay go further than the Convention, and in some
contexts it may also be inspired by the Convention rights and jurisprudence (…).
50 Pla and Puncernau/Andorra, at 46.
51 Rainsbury 2008, p. 36.
52 Supreme Court (United Kingdom) 9 December 2009, [2009] UKSC 14, per Lord Phillips,
at 11 (R./Horncastle).
53 Supreme Court (United Kingdom) 16 October 2013, [2013] UKSC 63, per Lord Mance, at
27 (R. (on the application of Chester)/Secretary of State for Justice).
54 For example in House of Lords 18 June 2008, [2008] UKHL 38 (In re P. and others). See for
other examples Hale 2012, pp. 71-77.
55 Supreme Court (United Kingdom) 17 December 2014, [2014] UKSC 67, at 105 (Moohan and
another/The Lord Advocate). Lord Wilson refers to similar statements in other judgments of
the Supreme Court (at par. 104).
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And in time, of course, a synthesis may emerge. But the natural starting point in
any dispute is to start with domestic law, and it is certainly not to focus exclusively
on the Convention rights, without surveying the wider common law scene.’56
This may have been a strategic statement, in an attempt to take the wind out
of the sails of critics who claim that the Strasbourg Court imposes unwanted
policies on the United Kingdom, and to anticipate a possible retreat of the
United Kingdom from the Convention system. This threat is not at all imagin-
ary, because the Conservative Party has proposed to ‘scrap theHuman Rights
Act and curtail the role of the European Court of Human Rights’.57 However,
it is also very sensible to take domestic law as the natural starting point, as
a matter of judicial policy. Not in order to refuse to follow Strasbourg author-
ity, but to see how domestic law can contribute to the protection of funda-
mental rights. And as long as fundamental rights protection on the basis of
national constitutional law remains limited, an evolving interpretation of other
domestic rules may serve as a valuable alternative.
5 STANDARDS OF REASONABLENESS AND FAIRNESS AS A VALUABLE ALTERNAT-
IVE
In the Dutch context, it is interesting to focus the attention on one private-law
instrument that shows striking similarities with art. 94 of the Dutch Constitu-
tion: the possibility to set aside binding rules, in particular statutory provisions,
in private relationships. This possibilitywas acknowledged already under the
former Dutch Civil Code,58 but has been codified in art. 6:2 (2) DCC:
‘A rule binding upon [obligee and obligor, RdG] by virtue of law, usage or a
juridical act does not apply to the extent that, in the given circumstances, this would
be unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.’59
56 Supreme Court (United Kingdom) 26 March 2014, [2014]UKSC 20, per Lord Mance, joined
by Lord Neuberger and Lord Clarke, at 46 (Kennedy/The Charity Commission).
57 The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, pp. 58-60, available through www.conservatives.
com/manifesto.
58 Art. 1374 (3) of the former DCC stipulated that contracts had to be executed in ‘good faith’.
This provision has been used by the Supreme Court to rule that a private party may not
invoke a statutory rule in certain circumstances, for example in: HR 29 April 1983, ECLI:NL:
HR:1983:AG4579,NJ 1983/627 (Spruijt/Sperry Rand Holland); HR 1 July 1983, ECLI:NL:HR:
1983:AB7666, NJ 1984/149 (Herzfeld/Groen); HR 13 November 1987, ECLI:NL:HR:1987:
AC3287, NJ 1988/254 (X/Y); HR 20 January 1989, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AD0580, NJ 1989/322
(Wesselingh/Weisz).
59 Art. 6:2 (2) DCC. In Dutch: ‘Een tussen [schuldeiser en schuldenaar, RdG] krachtens wet,
gewoonte of rechtshandeling geldende regel is niet van toepassing, voor zover dit in de
gegeven omstandigheden naar maatstaven van redelijkheid en billijkheid onaanvaardbaar
zou zijn.’
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The ‘standards of reasonableness and fairness’ filter through the entire law
of obligations and even the law of property in general.60 They are used to
interpret, to supplement or – in this case – to correct the law. Although the
latter possibility is not considered to be a ‘review’ of the relevant rule, but
merely a derogation thereof in a specific case, the result seems hard to square
with the Wet Algemeene Bepalingen – an Act from 1829 that holds general
provisions about the applicability of the law – which stipulates in art. 11 that
‘the judge must rule according to statutory law’, and that ‘under no circum-
stances, may he judge the inner value or fairness of statutory law’.61 Just like
art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution, art. 6:2 (2) DCC is an important exception
to this old rule.
Both provisions allow the courts not to apply otherwise applicable statutory
rules to the cases presented to them, but the focal point is different. While
art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution focuses on international law, art. 6:2 (2) DCC
uses a different angle:
‘In determining what reasonableness and fairness require, generally accepted
principles of law, current juridical views in the Netherlands and the societal and
private interests involved in the case must be taken into account.’62
Standards of reasonableness and fairness can be considered to include funda-
mental rights norms,63 but their interpretation is not limited by the content
and direct effect of these international norms, as is the case under art. 93 and
94 of the Dutch Constitution. The Supreme Court has always emphasised that
art. 6:2 (2) DCC has to be applied with restraint. And in 2014, the Supreme
Court added for the first time that the instrument may not be used to interfere
with the express considerations of the legislature:
‘Because the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament may not be reviewed by the
courts against any other law than international law (art. 120 of the Dutch Constitu-
tion), the courtsmay not review the considerations of the legislature against general
legal principles or (other) unwritten law (cf. HR 14 april 1989, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AD5725,
NJ 1989/469 (Harmonisatiewet)). The same holds true when that review is placed
60 The new Dutch Civil Code contains many references, see for an overview H.J. Snijders,
‘Redelijkheid en billijkheid in het vermogensrecht van het Burgerlijk Wetboek voor en na
1992’, Ars Aequi 2012, pp. 771-778.
61 In Dutch: ‘De regter moet volgens de wet regt spreken: hij mag in geen geval de innerlijke
waarde of billijkheid der wet beoordeelen.’
62 Art. 3:12 DCC. In Dutch: ‘Bij de vaststelling van wat redelijkheid en billijkheid eisen, moet
rekening worden gehouden met algemeen erkende rechtsbeginselen, met de in Nederland
levende rechtsovertuigingen en met de maatschappelijke en persoonlijke belangen, die bij
het gegeven geval zijn betrokken.’ The list is not exhaustive: M.v.A. II, Parl. Gesch. Inv. Boek
3, p. 1035.
63 C. Mak, Fundamental rights in European contract law (diss. Amsterdam UvA), Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008, p. 41.
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in the key of the reasonableness and fairness that govern the legal relationship
between parties to a contract (art. 6:2 and 6:248 DCC).’64
In that sense, the mandate under art. 6:2 (2) DCC is perhaps more limited than
the mandate under art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution. Yet art. 6:2 (2) DCC does
have an added value. It provides a statutory basis to reach a result that is in
conformity with the demands of fundamental rights law. This is also important
for those cases that may not benefit from a review against those rights. Parties
may, for instance, not have invoked fundamental rights norms,65 while the
courts are not bound to apply such norms ex officio.66 It may also be the case
that the parties have relied on fundamental rights norms, but that these norms
do not provide enough direction, because Strasbourg jurisprudence is am-
biguous or leaves a considerable margin of appreciation, or because a certain
problem has not yet reached the Strasbourg Court.67 One of the important
examples within Dutch private law is the solution for the prescription of long-
tail claims, which is discussed in the following sections.
6 PRESCRIPTION AND THE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO A COURT IN THE NETHER-
LANDS
In some cases, the prescription of a claim is problematic, because the losses
are concealed and cannot be established before the prescription period lapses.
The prime example is the development ofmesothelioma, a type of lung cancer
that is caused almost exclusively by exposure to asbestos, when fibres are
inhaled or ingested into the body.68 The disease is very aggressive and causes
the death of most patients within the period of one or two years after diag-
64 HR 19December 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:3679,NJ 2015/344, at 3.6.1 (Bosentan): ‘In verband
met het grondwettelijke verbod wetten in formele zin te toetsen aan ander recht dan
internationaal recht (art. 120 Grondwet), kan de rechter de afweging van de wetgever niet
toetsen aan algemene rechtsbeginselen of (ander) ongeschreven recht (vgl. HR 14 april 1989,
ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AD5725, NJ 1989/469 (Harmonisatiewet)). Dat geldt ook indien die
toetsing plaatsvindt in de sleutel van de redelijkheid en billijkheid die de rechtsverhouding
van partijen bij onder meer een overeenkomst beheersen (art. 6:2 en 6:248 BW).’
65 In the Bosentan-case, concerning the question whether a health insurer should cover the
costs for an experimental medical treatment, the parties could have relied on international
law (e.g. Art. 2 ECHR), but they did not. The case was decided on the basis of Art. 6:2 (2)
DCC.
66 ECtHR 15 November 1996, 18877/91 (Ahmet Sadik/Greece).
67 HR 13 November 1987, ECLI:NL:HR:1987:AC3287,NJ 1988/254 (X/Y) is an early example.
68 There is therefore no problem of multiple causality, as may be the case with other forms
of lung cancer, caused both by asbestos and by the smoking habit of the victim itself. For
those problems, the Dutch Supreme Court has decided on a solution based on proportional
liability in HR 31 March 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU6092 (Nefalit/Karamus).
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nosis.69 In the Netherlands, approximately 330,000 employees were exposed
to asbestos in the past.70 It is expected that 12,400 of them will die as a result
ofmesothelioma in the period of 2000-2028.71 The latency period of the disease
is very long: usually thirty to forty years between initial exposure and diag-
nosis.72 This is problematic for the patients, because art. 3:310 (2) DCC stipu-
lates that ‘the right of action to compensate for the loss shall in any event be
prescribed on the expiry of thirty years from the occurrence of the event which
caused the loss’.73
The Dutch legislature offered a solution for such personal injury cases by
adding a new paragraph to art. 3:310 DCC:
‘In derogation of paragraphs 1 and 2, a right of action to compensate for damage
by injury or death is prescribed only upon the expiry of five years from the be-
ginning of the day following the one on which the person prejudiced has become
aware of both the damage and the identity of the person responsible therefor. If
the person prejudiced was a minor on the day on which the damage and the
identity of the person responsible therefor became known, the right of action is
prescribed only on the expiry of five years from the beginning of the day following
the one on which the person prejudiced became of age.’74
Since this provision has no retroactive effect and has only been applicable from
1 February 2004 onwards, many old cases are governed by the long period
of thirty years. One of those cases concernedMr. VanHese, whowas employed
as a painter with De Schelde, a shipbuilding company, from 16 March 1957
until 7 June 1963, where he was exposed to asbestos. In the course of 1996,
Van Hese was diagnosed with mesothelioma. He died shortly after, at the age
of 61. Before his death, Van Hese commenced proceedings againstDe Schelde,
claiming both material and non-material damages.
His heirs continued this lawsuit against his former employer. De Schelde
claimed that the action for damages was barred because Van Hese had been
exposed to the asbestos more than thirty years earlier.75 The heirs of VanHese
tried to convince the courts not to apply the long prescription period, mainly
on the basis that such a strict application would, in the given circumstances,
69 Gezondheidsraad,Asbest: Risico’s van milieu- en beroepsmatige blootstelling (Report no. 2010/
10), Den Haag: Gezondheidsraad 2010, p. 33.
70 Gezondheidsraad 2010, p. 30.
71 Gezondheidsraad 2010, p. 23, referring to O. Segura, A. Burdorf, C. Looman, ‘Update of
predictions of mortality from pleural mesothelioma in the Netherlands’, Occupational and
Environmental Medicine 2003, pp. 50-55.
72 Gezondheidsraad 2010, p. 41.
73 Art. 3:310 (2) DCC.
74 Art. 3:310 (5) DCC.
75 HR 28 April 2000, ECLI:NL:HR:2000:AA5635, NJ 2000/430, at 3.1 (Van Hese/De Schelde).
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be contrary to ‘standards of reasonableness and fairness’ under art. 6:2 (2)
DCC.76 Before the SupremeCourt, they raised another argument: strict applica-
tion of the long prescription period would be contrary to art. 6 ECHR, which
should have been taken into account by the lower courts.77
This was not the first time the Supreme Court had to rule on the validity
of a long prescription period. In earlier cases, the Supreme Court had been
very reluctant. Faced with a case of medical malpractice78 and a case con-
cerning childhood abuse,79 the Supreme Court admitted that it may be hard
to accept that an action is barred by prescription before there could be aware-
ness of the losses on the side of the claimant, but that the long prescription
period should be applied strictly, because of the important aim of providing
legal certainty, also in the interest of the defendant.
Faced with the case of Van Hese, the Supreme Court again acknowledged
the importance of the ‘principle of legal certainty’, but decided to provide a
window of opportunity for ‘exceptional cases’, when the losses are concealed
and cannot be established before the prescription period lapses. The Supreme
Court noted that the legislature had not considered such a possibility when
drafting the applicable law on statutory limitations.80 The Supreme Court
decided that the courts may declare the prescription period inapplicable on
the basis of art. 6:2 (2) DCC, because application would, in the given circum-
stances, be contrary to ‘standards of reasonableness and fairness’. On the basis
of certain factors, a courtmust assesswhether a case is indeed that exceptional:
a) whether it concerns the compensation of pecuniary losses or non-pecuniary
losses, and whether the amount of compensation benefits the victim him-
self, his heirs or a third party;
b) whether there exists a claim for compensation on another ground;
c) whether the defendantmay be blamed for the event that caused the losses;
d) whether the defendant calculated, or should have calculated, the possibility
that he would be found liable for the losses;
e) whether the defendant still has a chance of reasonably defending himself;
f) whether the liability is covered by insurance;
76 In the first and second instance, the heirs also argued that the moment that the tumour
starts to grow should be considered ‘the event which caused the loss’, and not the moment
of exposure (Van Hese/De Schelde, at 3.2).
77 In addition, the heirs invokedArt. 1, 3, 5 and 13 ECHR, Art. 3 and 11 of the European Social
Charter and Art. 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
The arguments raised by the heirs have been published in NJ 2000/430. These arguments
are not considered in this contribution.
78 HR 3 November 1995, ECLI:NL:HR:1995:ZC1867, NJ 1998/380, at 3.4 (Van B./Vereniging
voor Diaconessenarbeid).
79 HR 25 June 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:ZC2934, NJ 2000/16, at 5.1.
80 Van Hese/De Schelde, at 3.3.1. This may have been an implicit reference to the exception
created in Harmonisatiewet. See further in section 3.
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g) whether the claimant brought his claim within a reasonable period after
the diagnosis.81
This discretion has not only been used in cases ofmesothelioma. The Supreme
Court has reaffirmed the possibility to set aside a statutory prescription period
in a case concerning custody.82 And the District Court The Hague has set
aside the relevant prescription period in several cases concerning the liability
of the State for crimes committed by Dutch military forces in Indonesia in the
period from 1945 to 1949.83
The list of factors has been criticised for its lack of clarity: it is neither
exhaustive nor hierarchical, and some factors may be interpreted both as
favourable and as detrimental to the position of the claimant.84 Courts do
not always pay attention to all factors in their judgments,85 despite the fact
that the list is imperative.86 In practice, culpability (c), the chance of conduct-
ing a defence (e) and the expeditiousness of the claimant (g) are compelling
factors for lower courts in reaching a decision.87 The decision on factor (g)
may be regarded as preliminary: if the claimant has not actedwithin two years
after diagnosis, he has wasted his chances.88 While lower courts have thus
contributed to greater clarity and consistency,89 several authors still call on
81 Van Hese/De Schelde, at 3.3.3.
82 HR 20 June 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1492, at 3.6.2.
83 District Court The Hague 14 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BS8793, at 4.13-4.14,
and District Court The Hague 11March 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:2442, at 4.4-4.18; District
Court The Hague 27 January 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:701, at 4.4-4.24; District Court
The Hague 27 January 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:702, at 4.5-4.22.
84 J.L. Smeehuijzen, ‘Naar een scherpere gezichtspuntencatalogus bij verjaring van asbest-
zaken’, AV&S 2005, pp. 48-60; J.L. Smeehuijzen, De bevrijdende verjaring (diss. VUAmster-
dam), Deventer: Kluwer 2008, p. 256-258; J.E. Jansen, ‘Geen bevrijdende verjaring zonder
rechtsverwerking’, RMThemis 2009, p. 215.
85 J.P. Quist, Gezichtspunten in het privaatrecht (diss. Rotterdam), Den Haag: Boom Juridische
uitgevers 2014, p. 331.
86 Most lists of the Dutch Supreme Court are not imperative (Quist 2014, pp. 63-65). Quist
criticises the use of imperative lists, because it does not encourage parties and the courts
to consider other relevant factors (Quist 2014, pp. 577-578). In some mesothelioma cases,
lower courts do consider other factors, such as the fact that the victim died at the age of
87 years (The Hague Court of Appeal 25 January 2011, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BP1109), or
the exposure to asbestos during a previous employment (Subdistrict Court Almelo 25
August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBALM:2009:BJ9333).
87 M.R. Hebly & S.D. Lindenbergh, ‘Doorbreking van de absolute verjaring in geval van
mesothelioomclaims: de toepassing van de gezichtspunten uit VanHese/De Schelde’,AV&S
2013, pp. 162-172.
88 Hebly & Lindenbergh 2013, p. 171. This period of two years was advised by T. Hartlief,
Jac. Hijma & H.J. Snijders, Advies over doorbreking van de verjaringstermijn en stelplicht en
bewijslast voor aansprakelijkheid voor het Instituut asbestslachtoffers (report of 6 Februari 2009),
pp. 34-35. The report can be consulted via www.asbestslachtoffers.nl.
89 According to Wolters, case law shows more consistency than is presumed in literature:
P.T.J. Wolters, ‘Het vaste gewicht van de gezichtspunten van VanHese/De Schelde’,AV&S
2015, pp. 15-25.
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the Supreme Court to indicate the relative importance of the different
factors.90
What influence did art. 6 ECHR have on this outcome? The argument was
raised by the heirs and played a prominent role in the reasoning of the Ad-
vocate-General.91 Yet it does not seem to have influenced the decision, and
it is used by the Dutch Supreme Court to justify the outcome only in a limited
way. On the one hand, the Supreme Court noted that the long period of
prescription restricted the right to access to a court under art. 6 ECHR, but that
this restriction fell within the ‘margin of appreciation’ of the States parties,
considering the length of the period and the important aim of legal certainty.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court noted that its solution for ‘exceptional
cases’ was nonetheless ‘in line with’ the right of access to a court under art. 6
ECHR.92
7 PRESCRIPTION AND THE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO A COURT BEFORE THE ECTHR
At that time, the leading ECtHR judgment on the compatibility of limitation
periods with art. 6 ECHR was Stubbings/United Kingdom.93 The case concerned
Ms. Leslie Stubbings, born on 29 January 1957, who alleged that she had been
sexually assaulted by her adoptive father Webb on a number of occasions
between December 1959 andDecember 1971. Since 1976 Stubbings experienced
severe psychological problems (schizophrenia, emotional instability, paranoia,
depression and agoraphobia). She was hospitalised on three occasions and
attempted suicide once. Allegedly, it was only after she consulted a psychiatrist
in September 1984 that Stubbings realised her mental health problems may
have been caused by the childhood abuse. In August 1987, she brought an
action in damages against her adoptive parents and brother.
It was unclear which limitation period was applicable to the facts of the
case. Under section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980, the general period of limita-
tion for an action in tort is six years from the date on which the cause of action
accrued, or from the eighteenth birthday.94 The courts have no discretion
to extend this period in favour of the claimant. Under section 11(1), the period
of limitation for ‘any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach
of duty’ is three years from either the date when the cause of action accrued
or the ‘date of knowledge’,95 whichever is the later. Section 33(1) does give
90 Smeehuijzen 2005 and 2008, supported by Chr.H. van Dijk, ‘Kroniek verjaring en stuiting:
de praktijk blijft weerbarstig’, AV&S 2011, p. 15 and Hebly & Lindenbergh 2013, p. 172.
91 Opinion of Advocate-General Spier, ECLI:NL:PHR:2000:AA5635, at 9.1-9.9.
92 Van Hese/De Schelde, at 3.3.2.
93 ECtHR 22 October 1996, 22083/93 and 22095/93 (Stubbings/United Kingdom).
94 When it concerns an infant, the period expires after six years from the eighteenth birthday:
section 28(1) in conjunction with section 38(2) of the Limitation Act 1980.
95 As defined in section 14 of the Limitations Act 1980.
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the courts the discretion to disapply this period when ‘it would be equitable
to allow an action to proceed’. As has been the case in the Netherlands since
Van Hese/De Schelde, the courts have to take into account certain factors in
exercising this discretion. They ‘shall have regard to all the circumstances of
the case’, and in particular to:
a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the claimant;
b) the effect of this delay upon the evidence;
c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including his
or her response to the claimant’s reasonable request for information;
d) the duration of any disability of the claimant arising after the accrual of
the cause of action;
e) the extent to which the claimant acted promptly and reasonably once he
or she knew that he or she might have a claim;
f) the steps, if any, taken by the claimant to obtain medical, legal or other
expert advice and the nature of any such advice he or she may have
received.96
Unfortunately for victims of childhood abuse, the Lords unanimously decided
that section 11(1) applied in cases of accidentally inflicted injuries, and not in
cases of intentionally inflicted injuries, such as rape and indecent assault.97
As a result, claims for compensation for psychological injury caused by child-
hood abuse were subject to the general period of limitation of six years under
section 2 and the courts could not exercise any discretion on the basis of section
33(1). The Law Commission described this result as ‘anomalous’, because ‘a
claimant who has been sexually abused by her father may have longer to bring
a claim for damages against her mother for negligently failing to prevent the
abuse than to bring a claim against her father for actually committing the
abuse’.98
Four British nationals, includingMs. Stubbings, decided to lodge applica-
tions against the United Kingdom before the Strasbourg Court. They com-
plained that this construction by the House of Lords of the Limitation Act 1980
96 Section 33(3) of the 1980 Limitation Act 1980, summarised by the author.
97 House of Lords, [1993] AC 498 (Stubbings/Webb).
98 The Law Commission, Limitation of Actions (Report No. 270, laid before the Parliament on
9 July 2001), p. 2 (www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/lc270_Limitation_of_
Actions.pdf, last accessed 5 January 2016). In 2008, theHouse of Lords overruled Stubbings/
Webb in A/Hoare (House of Lords 30 January 2008, [2008] UKHL 6). From that moment on,
section 11(1) does include sexual assault, and the courtsmay exercise their discretion under
section 33 in favour of victims of childhood abuse. Art. 6 ECHR and the Human Rights
Act are not mentioned in A/Hoare.
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violated their right of access to a court under art. 6 ECHR.99 The Court recalled
that art. 6 ECHR embodies the right to institute proceedings before a court in
civil matters, but noted:
‘However, this right is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations; these are
permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for
regulation by the State. In this respect, the Contracting States enjoy a certainmargin
of appreciation, although the final decision as to the observance of the Convention’s
requirements rests with the Court. It must be satisfied that the limitations applied
do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such
an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation
will not be compatible with art. 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) if it does not pursue a legitimate
aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.’100
The Court showed restraint when applying these standards to the cases of
childhood abuse. According to the Court, limitation periods in personal injury
cases pursue ‘several important purposes’. They ensure ‘legal certainty and
finality’, protect defendants from ‘stale claims which might be difficult to
counter’ and prevent problems of ‘evidence which might have become un-
reliable and incomplete because of the passage of time’.101 The prescription
period of six years from the eighteenth birthday was ‘not unduly short’ and
could have been used by the applicants to initiate civil proceedings.102 In
addition, ‘criminal prosecution could be brought at any time and, if successful,
a compensation order could be made’.103 The very essence of the right of
access to a court had therefore not been impaired, according to the major-
ity.104
Whereas the Strasbourg Court acted with restraint in Stubbings/United
Kingdom, recent cases show that the Court is prepared to find a violation. One
of those judgments is Moor/Suisse.105 For the first time, the Strasbourg Court
had the chance to examine the compatibility of a strict application of limitation
periods to mesothelioma cases with art. 6 ECHR. The case concerned Hans
99 In addition, all of the applicants complain that the difference in the rules applied to them-
selves and other types of claimants was discriminatory, contrary to Art. 14 ECHR. Further-
more, three applicants, including Ms. Stubbings, complain that the State has failed in its
positive obligation to protect their right to respect for their private lives, by failing to
provide them with a civil remedy, contrary to Art. 8 ECHR, also in combination with Art.
14 ECHR. These complaints are not considered in this contribution.
100 Stubbings/United Kingdom, at 50.
101 Stubbings/United Kingdom, at 51.
102 Stubbings/United Kingdom, at 52-53.
103 Stubbings/United Kingdom, at 52.
104 The Court noted that this may not be a perfect solution to the underlying problem, but
found that it was up to the national authorities to consider making ‘special provision for
this group of claimants in the near future’. Stubbings/United Kingdom, at 56.
105 ECtHR 11 March 2014, 52067/10 and 41072/11 (Moor /Suisse), only available in French.
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Moor, who worked as a machine fitter with Oerlikon (now Alstom) from 1965
until 1978, where he was exposed to asbestos. In May 2004, just before his
retirement, he was diagnosed with mesothelioma. In November 2005, he died
at the age of 58.
Before his death, Moor commenced proceedings against Alstom. After his
death, these proceedings were continued by his two daughters as heirs. His
daughters also joined the proceedings commenced byMoor’s wife against the
Swiss Caisse nationale suisse d’assurance en cas d’accidents. Ultimately, the Federal
Supreme Court of Switzerland dismissed both claims, because they were
subject to a prescription period of ten years after the events which caused the
damage.106 Mother and daughters lodged an application in Strasbourg,
claiming that art. 6 ECHR had been breached. They argued that their right of
access to a court was rendered theoretical and illusory, because the prescription
period of ten years expired before they could have been aware of the
losses.107
The Strasbourg Court first reiterated its statements in Stubbings/United
Kingdom and acknowledged that limitation periods pursue the legitimate aim
of providing legal certainty. It also repeated its findings in Es¸im/Turkey, where
it stated that ‘in personal injury compensation cases, the right of action must
be exercised when the litigants are actually able to assess the damage that they
have suffered’.108 The Court then acknowledged that a strict application of
absolute limitation periods to persons suffering from diseases which could
not be diagnosed until many years after the triggering events deprives those
persons of the chance to assert their rights before the courts.109 The Court
considered that when it is scientifically proven that a person could not know
that he or she was suffering from a certain disease, as is the case withmesothe-
lioma, that fact should be taken into account (‘devrait être prise en compte’)
in calculating the limitation period (‘pour le calcul du délai de péremption ou
106 Art. 20 (1) Bundesgesetz über die Verantwortlichkeit des Bundes sowie seiner Behördemit-
glieder und Beamten: ‘Die Haftung des Bundes (Art. 3 ff.) erlischt, wenn der Geschädigte
sein Begehren auf Schadenersatz oder Genugtuung nicht innert eines Jahres seit Kenntnis
des Schadens einreicht, auf alle Fälle nach zehn Jahren seit dem Tage der schädigenden
Handlung des Beamten.’ Art. 127 Obligationenrecht: ‘Mit Ablauf von zehn Jahren verjähren
alle Forderungen, für die das Bundeszivilrecht nicht etwas anderes bestimmt.’ And Art.
130 Obligationenrecht: ‘1 Die Verjährung beginnt mit der Fälligkeit der Forderung. 2 Ist
eine Forderung auf Kündigung gestellt, so beginnt die Verjährung mit dem Tag, auf den
die Kündigung zulässig ist.’
107 Appealing to the motto of the ECtHR that the Convention must be interpreted in a manner
which renders its rights ‘practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory’. ECtHR 9
October 1979, 6289/73, at 24 (Airey/Ireland) and ECtHR 21 February 1975, 4451/70 (Golder/
United Kingdom), where the ECtHR constructed Art. 6 ECHR to include the right of access
to a court.
108 ECtHR 17 September 2013, 59601/09, at 25 (Es¸im/Turkey).
109 Moor/Suisse, at 77.
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de prescription’).110 The Court concluded, with a six-one majority, that art. 6
ECHR had been violated.
AfterMoor/Suisse, it is clear that a strict application of absolute limitation
periods on mesothelioma cases impairs the very essence of the right to access
to a court under art. 6 ECHR and does not fall within the ‘margin of appreci-
ation’ of the States parties, as the Dutch Supreme Court suggested inVanHese/
De Schelde. Moreover, it is clear that a solution has to be found for all personal
injury cases that involve losses that remain concealed and cannot be established
before the prescription period lapses. TheDutch SupremeCourt has provided
a solution under art. 6:2 (2) DCC for old cases that are not governed by art.
3:310 (5) DCC. Does this solution comply with the requirements arising from
Moor/Suisse?
8 THE COMPATIBILITY OF VAN HESE/DE SCHELDE WITH ART. 6 ECHR
The Strasbourg Court has not indicated how national authorities should take
the long latency period ‘into account’, or what it means that ‘the right of action
must be exercised when the litigants are actually able to assess the damage
that they have suffered’. The Dutch Supreme Court didmention seven relevant
factors that lower courts have to take into account when they exercise their
discretion under art. 6:2 (2) DCC. According to several authors,111 the Dutch
Minister of Justice112 and several lower courts,113 the current Dutch practice
is in conformitywithMoor/Suisse. Others call the compatibility ofVanHese/De
Schelde with art. 6 ECHR into question.114 After all, Dutch courts may still
decide not to exercise their discretion in favour of the claimant. Is that not
contrary to art. 6 ECHR?
For the Strasbourg Court, the chance of conducting a defence (factor e)
is a relevant circumstance as well. According to the Court, one of the ‘impor-
tant purposes’ of prescription periods is to
110 Moor/Suisse, at 78.
111 M.R. Hebly, ‘Werpt Straatsburg een nieuw licht op de verjaring van asbestclaims?’, Letsel
& Schade 2014, pp. 40-42; P.T.J. Wolters, ‘Het vaste gewicht van de gezichtspunten van Van
Hese/De Schelde’, AV & S 2015, pp. 24-25; J. Emaus in her case note under Moor/Suisse,
EHRC 2014/164, at 8.
112 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2013/14, 1864.
113 District Court Midden-Nederland 10 November 2014, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2014:5507, at 4.7;
District Court Den Haag 5 November 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:13593, at 4.4-4.5; Court
of Appeal The Hague 24 November 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3152, at 4.5.
114 Statement of B. Ruers in the Dutch newspaper Trouw: ‘Uitspraak Hof vergroot kans op
schadevergoeding asbest’, Trouw 3 April 2014, p. 7; Questions by the Dutch member of
parliament De Wit to the Minister of Justice, Aanhangsel Handelingen, 2013/14, no. 1758;
C.C. van Dam,Aansprakelijkheidsrecht. Deel I: Rechtsbescherming, rechtsmiddel en rechtsherstel,
Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2015, p. 49.
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‘protect potential defendants from stale claims which might be difficult to counter
and prevent the injustice which might arise if courts were required to decide upon
events which took place in the distant past on the basis of evidence which might
have become unreliable and incomplete because of the passage of time.’115
It therefore seems appropriate to take this circumstance into account, even
if this may not always have a beneficial effect on the outcome for the claim-
ant.116
The Strasbourg Court does not consider the expeditiousness of the claimant
(factor g). For Dutch courts, the decision on this point may be regarded as
preliminary: if the claimant has not acted within two years after diagnosis,
he has wasted his chances.117 It is argued that this factor is not contrary to
art. 6 ECHR. After all, the real problem in Moor/Suisse was that the claim was
time-barred before the losses could be established. The requirement that the
claimant has to bring his claim within a reasonable period after the diagnosis
does not restrict or reduce the access to a court in such a way or to such an
extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. It serves the legitimate
aims of ‘legal certainty and finality’,118 while it cannot be said that the period
of two years is ‘unduly short’.119
The Strasbourg Court does not consider whether the defendant may be
blamed for the event that caused the losses (factor c). Hebly and Lindenbergh
have shown that lower courts do examinewhether the actual defendant could
reasonably have been expected to know the health risks and take the precau-
tionary measures. The courts do find it relevant, in this context, whether the
employer produced or processed asbestos, andwhat kind of job the employee
had at the time.120 If there is little to blame the defendant, this factor may
contribute to the decision that the court will not exercise its discretion in favour
of the claimant. Hartlief, Hijma and Snijders caution that this is essentially
a question of liability, and not of prescription.121 That does not mean that
the law should regard the question of culpability as irrelevant. But the law
should deal with that problem under the question of whether the actual
defendant may be held liable. Although it cannot be said that the current
application is contrary to art. 6 ECHR, the fact that the Strasbourg Court does
115 Stubbings/United Kingdom, at 51; Moor/Suisse, at 72.
116 An additional argument may be that it is also a relevant factor under section 33(3) (b) of
the Limitations Act 1980.
117 Hebly & Lindenbergh 2013, p. 171.
118 Stubbings/United Kingdom, at 51.
119 An additional argument may be that it is also a relevant factor under section 33(3) (e) of
the Limitations Act 1980.
120 Hebly & Lindenbergh 2013, p. 166.
121 Hartlief, Hijma & Snijders 2009, pp. 35-36. Culpability is not a relevant question under
section 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 either.
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not examine whether the defendant may be blamed may constitute an argu-
ment for the Dutch Supreme Court to reconsider its case law on this point.122
The other circumstances mentioned in Van Hese/De Schelde are of minor
importance inDutch practice. Just as the Dutch SupremeCourt, the Strasbourg
Court finds it relevant to know whether the claimants have already been
compensated on another ground (factor b), but such a compensation should
not deprive them of the possibility to claim all their losses:
‘Par ailleurs, la Cour ne méconnaît pas que les requérantes ont touché certaines
prestations. Elle se demande cependant si celles-ci sont de nature à compenser
entièrement les dommages résultés pour les intéressées de la péremption ou de
la prescription de leurs droits.’123
The remaining circumstances are not mentioned in Moor/Suisse: whether it
concerns the compensation of pecuniary losses or non-pecuniary losses, and
whether the amount of compensation benefits the victim himself, his heirs
or a third party (factor a), whether the defendant calculated, or should have
calculated, the possibility that he would be found liable for the losses (factor
d), andwhether the liability is covered by insurance (factor f). As these factors
are not compelling for Dutch courts either, it is argued that they will not lead
to problems under art. 6 ECHR. It may be concluded that the solution provided
inVanHese/De Schelde for exceptional cases is generally in line with the current
requirements under art. 6 ECHR. By providing this solution under art. 6:2 (2)
DCC, private law has therefore been at the forefront of fundamental rights
protection.
9 PRIVATE LAW AT THE FOREFRONT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION
Since the European Court of Human Rights has a subsidiary role and often
leaves a considerable margin of appreciation to the national authorities,
domestic courts have an important stake in protecting fundamental rights at
the national level. Yet the possibilities to do so are limited in the Netherlands,
because judicial review of primary legislation against the rights embodied in
the Dutch Constitution is forbidden. And even though the Constitution obliges
the courts to enforce the Convention rights, constitutional lawyers claim that
the Supreme Court exercises considerable restraint when it is not backed by
the European Court of Human Rights.
This contribution has balanced this claim by pointing out a third way to
protect fundamental rights in the private sphere: an evolving interpretation
122 Provided that such a case is brought before the Supreme Court and provided that the
argument is raised.
123 Moor/Suisse, at 76.
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of the core concepts of the Dutch Civil Code. The solution to the problem of
the prescription of ‘long-tail’ claims, the object of this study, illustrates this
point. Fourteen years before the first mesothelioma case reached the Strasbourg
Court, the Dutch Supreme Court decided that an absolute prescription period
may be declared inapplicable on the basis of art. 6:2 (2) DCC. Strasbourg
jurisprudence provided some guidance at the time, but the influence of art.
6 ECHR on this outcome has been fairly limited. Still, the Supreme Court did
not defer the matter to the legislature, but used a private-law concept – the
standards of reasonableness and fairness – to provide a solution that is in line
with the requirements arising from recent Strasbourg jurisprudence, as this
contribution has shown.
In the absence of judicial review against the Dutch Constitution, the Dutch
Civil Code therefore provides a legal basis to reach a result that is in conform-
ity with the demands of fundamental rights law. This is important, also for
those cases that may not benefit from a review against those rights, because
the parties did not rely on those rights, or because Strasbourg jurisprudence
is unclear or silent on the matter. It is also important, as it is expected that
the Strasbourg Court will increasingly focus its attention on the most serious
and systemic problems, and on important questions of interpretation of the
ECHR, and less on the delivery of justice in each individual case. In this consti-
tutional context, a significant role has been preserved by and for private law.

PART III
Institution

7 Discharge of parental authority
Considerations regarding the compatibility of the
new provision of the Dutch Civil Code with the
European Convention on Human Rights
Mariëlle Bruning & Simona Florescu
1 INTRODUCTION
The notion of parental responsibilities is closely related to the evolution of
the legal position of the child. Historically, the legal position of the child has
evolved from being seen as the property of the parents, to a vulnerable indi-
vidual in need of protection to a rightholder in his/her own right.1 The initial
terminology of parental rights has also been gradually replaced by that of
parental responsibilities so as to reflect the subordination of the parents’
interests and rights to those of the children.2
It should be noted from the outset that there is no universal definition of
‘parental responsibilities’. In the EuropeanUnion ‘parental responsibility’ has
been interpreted to mean ‘all rights and duties relating to the person or the
property of a child which are given to a natural or legal person by judgment,
by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect. The term shall
include rights of custody and rights of access’.3 Pursuant to the Dutch Civil
Code (the ‘DCC’), parental authority comprises the duties and rights of parents
with regard to the care and upbringing of their child (Art. 1:247(1) DCC). Care
and upbringing include the care and responsibility for the child’s mental and
physical well-being, and fostering the development of its personality.
State authorities may limit or withdraw parental responsibilities. Such
limitations can be imposed via three different types of child protection orders,
M.R. Bruning is professor of Children and the Law, Leiden University. S. Florescu is PhD
candidate in the department Child Law, Leiden University.
1 M.A. Mason, From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights: The History of Child Custody in the
United States, Columbia University Press New York1994; J.M. Eekelaar, ‘The Emergence
of Children’s Rights, 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1986, 161.
2 S. Lifshitz, ‘The Best Interests of the Child and Spousal Laws’, in: Y. Ronen, C.W. Green-
baum (ed.), The Case for the Child, Towards a New Agenda, Intersentia Antwerp 2008, p. 46.
3 Art. 2(7) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments inmatrimonial matters and
thematters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC)No 1347/2000, OJ L338/1,
2003.
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as follows: a supervision order, a care order for the discharge of parental
responsibilities,4 and an emergency care order.
This contribution analyses the concept of discharge of parental responsibil-
ities from the perspective of the Dutch Civil Code and the ECtHR.
Important legislative amendments to the DCC with regard to child pro-
tection orders (Arts. 1:254-278 DCC) that came into force on the first of January
2015 have led to a significant shift of legal conditions for discharge of parental
responsibilities. The legal conditions for discharging parents of their responsib-
ilities have been eased, so as to facilitate the possibilities for courts to impose
such measures.
Until 1 January 2015 the legal conditions for discharge of parental respons-
ibilities were focused on parental behaviour or parental failure (is a parent
a ‘good enough parent?’). Article 1:266 DCC referred to the parent being ‘unfit
or unable to fulfil the duty of caring for the child or its upbringing’. Relevant
case law underscored the use of a discharge order as a measure of last resort.5
As long as parents accepted that their child was living in alternative care with
a supervision order, a discharge order was not legitimized.
The intention of the legislator with the recent amendments was to shift
the attention from the parent(s) to the child. It is, however, important to assess
whether the newly introduced conditions to discharge of parental rights are
in line with the right to respect for family life of parents and child as is guar-
anteed in Article 8 of the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms (the ‘ECHR’ or ‘Convention’). Does the new DCC take sufficient
account of the rights and interests of parents and children to stay together
without state interference as guaranteed under Article 8 ECHR? The assessment
of compliance with the ECHR is highly relevant from both a theoretical and
practical perspective. According to Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitu-
tion, international human rights treaties or provisions which by nature of their
content can be binding on everybody have binding power and shall take
precedence over national law. The substantive ECHR provisions are directly
enforceable in Dutch practice6 and there have been several situations where
the Netherlands had to change either its laws or its practice following negative
rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECthR’ or ‘Court’).7
4 In this contribution the term ‘discharge of parental authority’ has been used. In the case-law
of the ECtHR the terminology used is usually ‘deprivation of parental responsibilities/
authority’.
5 HR 25 April 1997, NJ 1997/596; HR 7 April 2000, NJ 2000/563.
6 J.H. Gerards & J.W.A. Fleuren, Implementatie van het EVRM en de uitspraken van het EHRM
in de nationale rechtspraak, Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit 2013 (in opdracht van het
WODC), pp. 35-36.
7 Following Salduz/Turkey (ECtHR 27 November 2008, no. 36391/02) & Panovits/Cyprus
(ECtHR 11 December 2008, no. 4268/04) the Dutch Supreme Court on 30 June 2009 ‘imple-
mented’ the relevant conditions of the ECtHR with regard to juveniles’ right to counsel
during police interrogations (ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3081) and following S.T.S./the Nether-
lands (ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 277/05) the Dutch Supreme Court overruled the established
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Section 2 of this contribution focuses on the provisions of the DCC regarding
discharge of parental responsibilities. For a clearer picture of the recent legis-
lative changes, a brief outline of the relevant provisions of the ‘old’ DCC is
provided. Section 3 presents an overview of the ECtHR’s relevant case law, with
a focus on the aspects which are likely to have an impact on the Dutch situ-
ation. Finally, section 4 assesses the impact of the European case law on the
Dutch practice in the area of discharge of parental responsibilities.
2 DISCHARGE OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UNDER DUTCH LAW
The Dutch system of child protection as regulated in the DCC provides for three
possible measures: a supervision order, a care order or an emergency pro-
tection order. A supervision order entails the temporary limitation of parental
authority to a third person, without discharging the parents of their parental
responsibilities. It may be imposed with or without the placement of the child
in alternative care for amaximum of one year with the possibility of extension
for successive one-year periods. A care order entails that the legal parents are
discharged of parental responsibilities and a third party (natural or legal
person) will be granted the custody over the child. Finally, an emergency
protection order (emergency supervision order or emergency care order) may
be imposed for a maximum duration of three months.
Bill No. 32 015, in force as of 1 January 2015, amended the DCCwith respect
to the imposition of care and supervision orders. According to the explanatory
memorandum, this bill aims – in line with the UN Convention of the Rights
of the Child (‘CRC’) – to better protect children against parents who fail to bring
them up in a healthy and balanced manner.8
This section analyses the relevant provisions of the DCC with respect to
discharge of parental responsibilities. For a better understanding of the current
legislative framework, subsection 2.1. briefly illustrates the legal provisions
in force before 2015. Subsection 2.2. highlights the new legal concept of dis-
charge of parental responsibilities that was introduced on 1 January 2015.
2.1 Discharge of parental authority before 1 January 2015
Until 1 January 2015, the Dutch care order could be ordered by a court on two
different legal grounds: (1) if the parent was ‘unfit or unable to fulfil the duty
of caring for the child or its upbringing’ (Arts. 1: 266 and 268 DCC), or (2) on
case law of the Supreme Court with regard to the inadmissibility of an appeal if the court’s
authorization to a juvenile’s placement in alternative care had in the meantime lapsed (HR
24 June 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BQ2292; HR 14 October 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BR5151).
8 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 2.
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grounds of abuse, certain irrevocable criminal convictions, an improper way
of living, the serious disregard of the directions of the foundation responsible
for the protection of the child or the existence of a well-founded risk of neglect
of the best interests of the child because of the parent reclaiming or taking
back the child from other caregivers (Art. 1:269 DCC).9 As mentioned above
the imposition of a care order resulted in the deprivation of parental responsib-
ilities. The effect of discharge of parental authority, regardless of the ground
used, was that the parent could no longer take decisions with regard to the
upbringing of the child, whichwere entrusted to a third party.Where the court
is convinced that a minor may again be confided to the discharged parent,
it could reinstate such a parent with parental authority (Art. 1:277(1) DCC).
Therefore the option to regain parental authority was always open to parents.
Further, it is important to note that discharge of parental authority did
not entail a severance of ties between a child and its parents. Parents still had
the right to (request) contact and access, children remained their heirs, the
legal ties with their blood relatives such as grandparents remained equally
unchanged, and parents’ maintenance obligation to their children remained
intact. The Dutch child protection system did not include an adoption order
as themost far-reaching form of child protection, unlike many other European
countries. Although theoretically adoption could be used as a protection
measure, in practice it hardly happened. Adoption orders were only used for
cases when parents were no longer alive or consented to an adoption.
However, it should be stressed that the Dutch courts showed reluctance
to use the aforementioned care order and preferred ordering the other, less
intrusive measure, the supervision order, which was perceived as temporary,
to be discontinued as soon as the family reunification became possible.10 Even
when it was clear that the future of the child was not with the biological family
but in foster care, case law shows that the supervision order was often used
instead of a care order as long as parents consented to the placement in care
of their child.11 Courts perceived the care order – intended by the legislator
9 Until 1983 parents who were deprived of parental authority on the basis of intentional
(mis)behaviour lost their right to vote; this reflects the punitive nature of the child protection
order ‘ontzetting’ that was established over 100 years ago; this first child protection order
was introduced in 1905. The care order ‘ontheffing’ (unintentional behaviour) was later
introduced (in 1947). The supervision order was introduced in 1922 in combination with
the introduction of the children’s court judge.
10 Art. 1:262 DCC (until 1 January 2015 Art. 1:257 DCC) states that ‘the help and support of
the foundation shall be directed to ensure that the parent vested with parental authority
shall as much as possible remain responsible for the care and upbringing (section 2) and
shall foster the family ties between the parent and the minor (section 4)’.
11 See e.g. HR 8May 1992,NJ 1992/498; HR 25 April 1997,NJ 1997/596. Several (law) reviews
have criticized the use of supervision orders for long-term foster care placements; see e.g.
Met recht onder toezicht gesteld, Evaluatie herziene OTS-wetgeving, Utrecht: Verweij-Jonker
Instituut 2000 (law review supervision order); E.C.C. Punselie, Juridische haken en ogen, Den
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for situations in which it was clear that parents had no educational role in
the future upbringing of their child – as too far-reaching, too radical, and an
unnecessary punishment for parents. This led to a child protection practice
in which permanency planning for the child was rarely ordered.12 It should
also be recalled that, as stated above, a supervision order needed to be renewed
annually. Therefore, due to the preference for this measure to the care order,
children for whom it was clear that theywould not return to their legal parents
during childhood were faced with yearly court hearings and decisions. This
led to tensions for the child and the foster parents as well as for the legal
parents. All parties were uncertain about the situation of the child after another
year of supervision by the court-appointed YouthCareOfficewhichwasmade
responsible for the implementation of the supervision order.
The Dutch Supreme Court nuanced this approach only in 2008.13 It de-
cided that a stable parental consent to placement in foster care of the child
should be taken into account when deciding about a care order. However,
such consent should not always preclude courts from imposing care orders
while taking into account the child’s best interests with regard to stability and
continuity of his/her educational environment. The Supreme Court decision
can be seen as precursory to the relevant legislative amendments that came
into force on 1 January 2015.
Further, in practice the second type of care order provided for under Art.
1:269 DCC and based on the legal ground of intentional improper behaviour
of the parents (ontzetting) was hardly used. Instead, the courts preferred to
rely on the first ground, i.e. the parents’ unfitness for or inability of the appro-
priate upbringing of the child (provided for under Art. 1:268 DCC). The exist-
ence of the two different legal grounds and provisions for a care order was
therefore being questioned.14
Haag: Trillium 2000; Werkgroep wetgeving Beter Beschermd, Kinderen Eerst!, The Hague
2006 (governmental advisory group for the revision of child protection orders).
12 Until the 1980s the number of children faced with a supervision order or a care order was
almost similar (in 1980 around 10,000 children with a supervision order and 10,000 children
with a care order). As per 30 September 2012 the number of children faced with a super-
vision order (around 30,000 children) is four times higher than the number of childrenwith
a care order (around 7,500). See www.cbs.nl (search ‘Bijna 40 duizend kinderen onder
toezicht of voogdij’).
13 HR 4 April 2008, NJ 2008/506.
14 See e.g. the CommitteeWiarda 1971 (Commissie voor de herziening van het kinderbescher-
mingsrecht, Jeugdbeschermingsrecht, The Hague: Staatsuitgerij 1971; J.E. Doek, ‘De ontheffing
van het ouderlijk gezag – enige beschouwingen over de noodzaak van bezinning op en
vernieuwing van de ontneming van gezag’, FJR 1997, nr. 5, pp. 106-114; M.R. Bruning,
Rechtvaardiging van kinderbescherming – naar een nieuw maatregelenpakket na honderd jaar
kinderbescherming (diss. VU Amsterdam), Deventer: Kluwer 2001, p. 421).
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2.2 Discharge of parental authority after 1 January 2015
As mentioned above, the care order could be imposed by courts on two
different grounds: (i) unfitness or unwillingness to adequately care for a child
or (ii) intentional misbehaviour of the parents. The effect of a care order,
regardless of the ground used was the same, i.e. discharge of parental author-
ity. Moreover, the second ground (intentional misbehaviour of parents) was
rarely used in practice. These factors contributed to the legislator’s decision
to merge the two grounds into one provision for the new care order (the so-
called ‘discharge of parental authority’). Article 1:266 DCC as in force at the
moment reads:
‘The district court may discharge a parent of parental authority
(a) if a minor grows up in a manner which constitutes a serious threat to his or
her development, and the parent is unable to take responsibility for the child’s
upbringing within a period of time deemed reasonable for the person and the
development of the minor, or
(b) if the parent abuses his or her parental authority.’
This amendment was intended as a simplification of the two different types
of care orders as described above.15 In addition, the legislator aimed to better
balance the care order and the supervision order. Until 2015, without parental
consent a care order on the basis of unfitness or unwillingness of the parent(s),
could only be imposed when a supervision order proved unsuccessful. In
practice a supervision order was only followed by a care order when parents
did not consent to or obstructed a placement in care. This led to long-term
foster care arrangements without legal certainty for the child in alternative
care, even when it was evident that the child could or would no longer go
back to the original caregivers. Since the supervision order aimed to reunite
the parent(s) and the child, the use of a supervision order for long-term foster
care situations was often incongruous and led to many uncertainties for all
parties involved.
The new care order aims at giving room for a direct discharge of parental
authority when it is clear that there is no educational prospect for the child
in the biological family within a period of time deemed reasonable for the
child. Such a situation may occur, for example, when the primary caregiver
of the child is a severe drug abuser and the child is in urgent need of care.16
In this case a supervision order may not be of an added value.
Furthermore, the newwording used for care orders and supervision orders
provides additional insight into the legislator’s intent to better balance these
two measures with the best interests of the child. Thus, a care order may be
15 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 11.
16 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), pp. 11-12.
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imposed ‘if a minor grows up in a manner which constitutes a serious threat
to his or her development, and the parent is unable to care for the child within
a period of time deemed reasonable for the person and the development of
the minor’ (Art. 1:266 DCC). Conversely, a supervision order may be imposed
if ‘a minor grows up in a manner which constitutes a serious threat to his or
her development, and the parent is able to care for the child within a period
of time deemed reasonable for the person and the development of the minor’
(Art. 1:255 DCC).
The phrasing ‘a period of time deemed reasonable for the person and the
development of the minor’ is intended to stimulate that decisions about the
proper child protection order are made from the perspective of the child
instead of the perspective of parental rights.17 Decision-makers have to give
child-specific reasons and must also deal with aspects related to the future
situation of the child, including a time line for permanency planning. It is in
line with current sociological research according to which young children need
swifter permanent decisions about their educational environment and family
situation.18
According to the explanatory memorandum, the interpretation of ‘a time
reasonable [for the child]’ is dependent on the age and development of the
child. The provision was left open intentionally, so as to allow for tailored
approaches without imposing fixed time and age limits for the use of the
supervision or care orders.19
The use of a supervision order for many consecutive years cannot normally
be considered to be in line with the condition of ‘a time reasonable for the
child’. Nevertheless, the explanatorymemorandum says that in order to adhere
to the conditions that follow from Article 8 ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law,
in most situations a supervision order should precede a care order.20 That
is, the use of a care order following an unsuccessful supervision order better
legitimizes why this far-reaching court decision is necessary in order to protect
the child: because professional support aimed at keeping the family together
or reuniting parent and child has failed and the care order thus responds to
the principle of proportionality.
The explanatory memorandum further specifically mentions four factors
that need to be taken into account when imposing a care order (discharge of
parental authority) and when the child is living in foster care:21,22
17 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), pp. 7-9.
18 See e.g. F. Juffer, Beslissingen over kinderen in problematische opvoedingssituaties. Inzichten uit
gehechtheidsonderzoek, Raad voor de Rechtspraak 2010. Download via: http://www.recht
spraak.nl (search: ‘Juffer’).
19 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 34.
20 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 35.
21 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 34.
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‘a. a foster child has the right to a full and harmonious development in foster care;
therefore especially for young children permanency planning in relation to the
educational and developmental perspective of the child is paramount;
b. if reuniting parent(s) and child is no longer feasible or realistic a yearly renewal
of a supervision order will lead to uncertainty for all parties; in principle a
long-term supervision order of several years with a yearly renewal of the court
order is not the appropriate response;
c. the interests of the child to continuity in its upbringing and an undisturbed
secure attachment relation should then prevail;
d. parents’ consent to a placement in foster care of their child should not be
decisive for an imposition of a care order.
If an authorized foundation responsible for the implementation of the super-
vision order requests a children’s court judge to extend the supervision order
with an outplacement of the child after two years, the request should comprise
a recommendation of the Child Protection Board (Art. 1:265j(3) DCC). The Child
Protection Board has been given a new legislative duty to review such requests
and to consider whether an extension of the supervision order for the child
in alternative care is indeed in his or her best interests and meets the ‘time
reasonable for the child’ requirement. The new duty to review long-term
supervision orders for children in alternative care reflects the legislator’s goal
to better respond to the child’s best interests when deciding between a super-
vision order and a care order to protect the child.
Initially, the legislator intended to include a new duty for the Child Pro-
tection Board to have compulsory periodic reviews of whether the actions taken
would best guarantee the rights of the child (Art. 1: 305(1) DCC). This com-
pulsory periodic review was meant to have parties evaluate aspects such as
the efforts made tomove children from residential care to foster care, whether
enough contact was secured between the child and its parents. However, this
legal provision was ultimately not included as it was deemed that the guar-
dianship agencywas already conducting periodic reviews, which would render
an actual legal obligation superfluous.
22 This article takes into account the legislative situation as of January 2015. Even if it does
not form the scope of the present contribution, it should be noted that Dutch case law
published after the drafting of the present contribution shows that courts continue to be
reluctant in using a care order in situations of children in foster care with parents who
cooperate. Although the Dutch legislator has clearly explained that a supervision order
is not fit for situations of permanent foster care, both courts and the Child Protection Board
that is responsible for requesting child protection orders to the court seem to be hesitant
to use a care order when parents cooperate with long-term foster care of their child, even
when it is clear that the child has no future at home; Hof Den Bosch 27 August 2015, ECLI:
GHSHE:2015:3336; Rb. Overijssel 21 April 2015, ECLI:RBOVE:2015:2652. See for a care order
decision that was not preceded by a supervision order to protect the child against further
physical abuse Rb. Amsterdam 17 June 2015, ECLI:RBAMS:2015:3778.
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It should be noted that the possibility of the district court to reinstate a
parent with parental authority remains intact. The reinstatement may occur
upon the parent’s request if the court is convinced that this is in the child’s
best interests and that the parent is able to permanently bear responsibility
for the child’s upbringing (Art. 1:277(1) DCC). The interests of the child are
paramount in these situations. Thus, sometimes, even if the parent meets the
legal requirements to be reinstated with parental authority a court may rule
against it if, for example, the child has been living in a foster family for a long
period of time. Damaging this long-standing situation would be contrary to
the child’s best interests.23
3 DISCHARGE OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY BEFORE THE ECTHR
The previous section analysed the provisions of the new DCC with respect to
discharge of parental authority. It has been shown that the DCC in force as
of 1 January 2015 has brought substantial changes to matters of parental
responsibilities especially by expanding the judges’ discretion when deciding
on discharge of parental duties. This section provides an overview of the case
law of the ECtHR on matters of parental responsibilities. The focus will be on
the requirements which may prove of specific relevance to the Dutch context.
The ECtHR has analysed cases of discharge of parental authority mainly
from the perspective of Article 8 of the ECHR (right to respect for private and
family life). Situations where applicants’ complaints related to procedural
matters such as length of proceedings24 or access to a lawyer25 which are
more typically linked to Article 6 of the ECHR (the right to a fair trial) have
been equally dealt with under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court has justified
its position by arguing that Article 8 includes implicit procedural guarantees.26
For these reasons, this contribution will focus on the ECtHR’s case law under
Article 8 ECHR.
Further, before going into the case law analysis it is worth recalling that
the main aim of the ECtHR is to secure the effective protection of individual
fundamental rights.27 The principle of effectiveness essentially entails that
‘the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or
illusory but rights that are practical and effective’.28 This aspect should be
borne in mind when analysing the compatibility of Dutch practice with the
ECtHR case law as the ECtHR will look beyond the formal definition ascribed
23 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 37.
24 ECtHR 28 June 2014, no. 40245/10 (X/Slovenia).
25 ECtHR 8 January 2013, no. 37956/11 (A.K. and L/ Croatia).
26 ECtHR 8 January 2013, no. 37956/11 (A.K. and L/Croatia), para 63.
27 ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/99 (Airey/Ireland), para 24.
28 ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/99 (Airey/Ireland), para 24.
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to certain terms but rather how the discharge of parental authority works in
practice, and what are the consequences in law and in reality of such a meas-
ure.
3.1 The scope of states’ obligations under Article 8 ECHR
Article 8 ECHR provides:
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’
The ECtHR has ruled that Article 8 primarily entails the states’ obligations to
refrain from interfering with family life (negative obligation). Whenever a state
had interfered with family life, such interference would be compatible with
Article 8 ECtHR if it was provided for by law, pursued a legitimate aim (in
these cases usually the rights of others and the protection of health), and it
was necessary in a democratic society, i.e. the reasons adduced for an inter-
ference were relevant and sufficient to the aim pursued. In the context of this
analysis the decision whether there was a violation of Article 8 ECHR or not
would depend onwhether the reasons put forward were relevant and sufficient
(the so-called proportionality analysis), notwithstanding the state’s margin
of appreciation. It is nevertheless worth mentioning that the ‘legality require-
ment’ may sometimes play a role as the ECtHR has developed an autonomous
interpretation of the term ‘provided for by law’.29 Therefore, an interference
does not only need to be provided for by national law, but the national law
in question needs to be clear, accessible and foreseeable. In cases of restriction
of parental rights, the discretion allowed to national authorities by law may
raise certain issues. This matter was raised in Olsson v Sweden where the
applicants complained that the authorities were allowed wide discretionary
powers to intervene whenever the child’s health and development were
jeopardised, without requiring any actual proof of harm.30 However, the ECtHR
did not perceive this wide discretion as incompatible with the Convention
requirements. The ECtHR emphasised that overly strict legal provisions may
29 D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle & M. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights,
Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014
30 ECtHR 24 March 1988, no10465/83 (Olsson/Sweden), para 62.
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interfere with the requirement that authorities intervene efficiently for pro-
tecting children from harm.
Further, in addition to the aforementioned negative obligation, the ECtHR will
analyse whether the decision-making process was fair and ensured due respect
for the interests safeguarded by Article 8 ECHR (procedural obligations).31
As part of this requirement, the ECtHR looks whether the parent(s) and the
children had been given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings,
if they were heard, if they had been represented by an attorney, or if there
were any other obstacles which in practice led to the impossibility to parti-
cipate adequately in the proceedings which led to the removal of parental
rights.
It should also be noted that cases of deprivation of parental rights give
rise to positive obligations of the state. In cases of separation of parents from
their children the positive obligations usually mean that the state needs to
take steps to reunite children with parents. Further, the ECtHR repeatedly stated
that the boundaries between negative and positive obligations do not lend
themselves to precise definition.32
It is worth recalling that the ECtHR’s intervention is limited by the principle
of subsidiarity. One aspect of this principle is the ‘margin of appreciation’
doctrine. The margin of appreciation is essentially used by the ECtHR to refer
to situations where the domestic authorities enjoy certain discretion in dealing
with fundamental rights (see also section 3.2. below). The ECtHR will only
intervene if the domestic authorities have overstepped this discretion.33 Fur-
ther limitation arises from the scope of review of the court. Thus, as repeatedly
stated in its case law, the ECtHR will not act as a court of fourth instance, i.e.
it will not review decisions of national courts unless there was a breach of
a Convention Article.34
The paragraphs above outlined in general lines the states’ obligationswith
respect to family cases under Article 8. The following section shall analyse
the specific principles applicable to cases of separation of children from parents
and deprivation of parental rights.
3.2 Principles for separation and deprivation of parental rights
Usually separation of parents and children precedes deprivation of parental
rights. The basic assumption in the ECtHR’s case law is that separation will
only be temporary, for the least amount of time possible.35 States shouldmake
31 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/Germany), para 94.
32 ECtHR 25 November 2004, no. 23660/02 (Vitters/The Netherlands).
33 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick 2014, on p. 11.
34 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick 2014, on p. 11
35 ECtHR 18 June 2013, no. 28775/12 (RMS/Spain), para 71.
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efforts to ensure that children are reunited with their parents as soon as
reasonably possible.36 Whenever deprivation of parental rights entails a
permanent severance of the family ties, the state must put forward extra-
ordinary compelling reasons for justifying such a measure.37 Domestic author-
ities need to take into account the child’s best interests at all stages. While the
child’s best interests are a primary consideration in cases of separation, a
permanent severance of family ties (for example by deprivation of parental
rights or putting a child up for adoption) requires an analysis of the child’s
best interests as a paramount consideration.38 Also, the ECtHR stresses that
in some circumstances the interests of children and parents do not coincide
and the best interests of the child override those of the parent(s).39
Further, for all the above measures of separating parents from children,
the states are allowed a certain margin of appreciation. The intervention of
the ECtHR is inversely proportional to the margin of appreciation: the wider
the margin of appreciation, the less intensively will the ECtHR scrutinize the
domestic decisions. In cases of separating children fromparents the ECtHR ruled
that states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the initial
decision to separate.40 However, this margin of appreciation will decrease
with the passage of time, in the sense that the longer the separation, the
weightier the reasons put forward by the state must be.41 Further, when it
comes to newborn babies, extraordinary compelling reasons must exist to
justify a separation from their mothers at birth.42
3.3 Areas of ECtHR intervention
The sections above have outlined the way the ECtHR analyses cases of family
separation and discharge of parental authority and the general principles
applicable thereto. This sectionwill zoom into sensitive areas where the ECtHR
tends to intensify its scrutiny.
36 ECtHR 18 June 2013, no. 28775/12 (RMS/Spain), para 71.
37 ECtHR 27 June 1996, no. 17383/90 (Johansen/ Norway) and ECtHR 28 October 2010, no.
52502/07(Aune/ Norway). It should be noted that these cases entailed deprivation of parental
rights and authorization for adoption of the children.
38 ECtHR 28 October 2010, no. 52502/07 (Aune/ Norway), ECtHR, 13 March 2012, no. 4547/10
(YC/ UK).
39 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/ Germany), para 93.
40 ECtHR 17 July 2012, no. 64791/10 (M.D. and Others/Malta), para 71.
41 ECtHR 17 July 2012, no. 64791/10 (M.D. and Others/Malta), para 71.
42 ECtHR 12 July 2001, no. 25702/94 (K. and T./ Finland), para 168. In this paper we do not
focus on emergency protection orders.
Bruning & Florescu 181
First, with specific relevance for Dutch practice it is worth recalling that
ECtHR has so far issued one inadmissibility decision.43 The case concerned
the relieving of a father of his parental authority due to criminal proceedings
against him and the authorities’ subsequent refusal to reinstate him to his
parental rights (following his acquittal of criminal charges). The ECtHR declared
inadmissible the complaint about the deprivation of parental rights for non-
observance of the six-month time limit. As to the complaint regarding the
restoration of parental rights, the ECtHR dismissed it asmanifestly ill-founded.
The Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the applicant had not
been denied contact with his children. It further held that the domestic de-
cisions had been fully reasoned and that the Dutch authorities acted within
their margin of appreciation.
However, notwithstanding a state’s margin of appreciation, there are
situations where the ECtHR looksmore closely at the decision-making process.
The ECtHR repeatedly noted that ‘the fact that a child could be placed in a more
beneficial environment for its upbringing will not on its own justify a com-
pulsory measure of removal from the care of the biological parents’.44 In view
of this principle ECtHR found violations where parents were separated from
their children on account of the parents’ financial situation45 or intellectual
capacity.46 In these cases it was deemed that the domestic authorities should
have looked into alternative means of overcoming these difficulties, without
resorting to (prolonged) family separation. Also, in the aforementioned cases
ECtHR stressed that there had been no allegations of ill treatment of the
children.47
Further, whenever deprivation of parental authority was applied automatic-
ally as a consequence of criminal convictions of the applicant, without domestic
courts havingweighed in concretowhether themeasurewas in the best interests
of the children concerned, the ECtHR has equally found violations of Article 8
ECHR.48
It is also important to note that even though states enjoy a wide margin
of appreciation when it comes to the initial decision to separate, this does not
mean that the ECtHRwill refrain from reviewing domestic decisions all together.
In a case where such initial decision to separate was taken against the back-
43 ECtHR 25 November 2004, no. 23660/02 (Vitters/The Netherlands). One other relevant
judgment against the Netherlands concerning separation of a child from its parents rather
than deprivation of parental rights is ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The
Netherlands). This judgment will be analysed in more detail in the paragraphs below.
44 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner/Germany), para 69.
45 ECtHR 18 June 2013, no. 28775/12 (RMS v. Spain); ECtHR 26 October 2006, no. 23848/04
(Wallova and Walla/Czech Republic).
46 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner/Germany).
47 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner/Germany).
48 ECtHR 28 September 2004, no. 46572/99 (Sabou and Pircalab/Romania), para 48; ECtHR 17
July 2012, no. 64791/10 (M.D. and Others/Malta), para 77.
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ground of an apparent conflict between a social worker and the applicants,
the ECtHR assessed whether the national authorities had been entitled ‘to
consider that there existed circumstances justifying the abrupt removal of the
child from the care of the parents without any prior contact and consultation’
of the parents.49 On the facts of the case, it found that the authorities had
not properly justified the urgency of the situation, and did not adequately
consider whether there was a risk of harm to the children.50
Moreover, as to the decision-making process, previous case law demon-
strates that particular emphasis will be placed on the domestic courts admin-
istration and evaluation of evidence as well as to the degree of the parties’
involvement into the decision making process.51 Thus, for example if the
reports administered by psychologists or psychiatrists are conflicting, regard-
less of whether some of those reports had been filed by the applicants them-
selves, the ECtHR tends to reinforce the presumption against parental sep-
aration/ deprivation of parental rights.52 It is important that decisions of social
workers and other authorities involved are scrutinized by domestic courts.53
Even if the child was heard by administrative authorities and such child was
opposed to contact with a parent, absence of a court scrutiny of the admin-
istrative proceedings is likely to tilt the balance in favour of the aggrieved
parent.54 Conversely, not hearing the parents or not involving them in the
process may trigger a violation of Article 8. The case of Venema v. The Nether-
lands is illustrative in this sense.55 In this case the Dutch authorities, suspicious
of themother suffering of amental illness imposed a supervision order where-
by the applicants’ one year old daughter was placed in foster care. The order
was issued without informing or hearing the parents. In its reasoning, the
ECtHR placed considerable weight on the absence of involvement of the parents.
In this context, it stated that it must ‘be satisfied that the national authorities
were entitled to consider that there existed circumstances to justifying the
abrupt removal of the child from the care of its parents without any prior
contact or consultation’.56 On the facts of the case, the Court did not consider
that the alleged ‘unpredictable reaction’ of the parents was on its own a
sufficient justification for excluding them from the procedure.57 It should be
stressed that the Court did not find a violation on account of the supervision
order per se, but rather as the parents were faced with such an order without
49 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/ Germany), para 93.
50 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/ Germany), para 97.
51 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/ Germany); ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99
(Kutzner v. Germany).
52 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner/Germany).
53 ECtHR 17 July 2014, no. 19315/11 (T./ Czech Republic), para 126.
54 ECtHR 17 July 2014, no. 19315/11 (T./ Czech Republic), para 126.
55 ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The Netherlands).
56 ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The Netherlands), para 93.
57 ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The Netherlands), para 96.
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having the possibility to submit their comments or evidence beforehand.58
Even if this case does not concern deprivation of parental rights as in this case
the family was eventually reunited, it nevertheless sheds light on the proced-
ural aspects the Court takes into account in its reasoning.
Furthermore, contact between a parent and child is of the utmost import-
ance to the ECtHR, as in the absence of contact, separation may lead to an
impossibility to resume family life. In this respect, the Court has also ruled
that there should be a periodic ex officio review of the situation in order to
assess whether such separation is still warranted or whether contact is
possible.59
It follows that national authorities are required to conduct careful and
personalized assessments of the individual situations bearing in mind the
principle that separation should be seen as a temporary measure and its
application necessary only whenever other measures are not suitable in the
individual circumstances of the case.
4 IMPACT OF THE ECTHR CASE LAW ON DUTCH LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE
Sections 2 and 3 above outlined the Dutch present and past legislation and
practice on matters of parental authority and the relevant ECtHR case law,
respectively. It has been shown that the beginning of 2015 marked what
appears to be a significant change in the Dutch legislation on discharge of
parental authority. The aim was to replace the current prevailing practice of
imposing temporary supervision orders in cases where the possibility to reunite
children with their biological parents is remote. Thus, the conditions for
instituting care orders have been relaxed in the sense that the current legis-
lation allows for more judicial discretion for discharge of parental authority
(i.e. the care orders). Importantly, a new criterion of ‘reasonable time’ has been
introduced which should be one determining factor for the decision-making
process. As per this new criterion, a supervision order is to be imposed if the
judge deems the parent(s) able to resume their responsibility for the child
within a reasonable time. Conversely, a care order (entailing discharge of
parental authority) should be imposed if the parents are unable to care for
the child within a reasonable time. In the absence of any legal provision it
will be for courts to determine on a case-by-case basis the amount of time
needed for the ‘reasonableness criterion’.
The ECtHR, on the other hand, has on several occasions examined matters
of separation between parents and children and discharge of parental authority.
Even if in these cases the factual context is of high relevance, several principles
and areas to which the Court tends to pay particular attention can be distilled
58 ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The Netherlands), para 96.
59 ECtHR 17 July 2014, no. 19315/11 (T./ Czech Republic), para 128.
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from its case law. In this section an attempt is made to point out the implica-
tions of ECtHR’s rulings for Dutch future practice in light of new legislation.
One aspect that merits brief attention is the ‘legality’ requirement under
the ECtHR. As discussed, interferences in private life need to be provided for
by law and the law shouldmeet conditions of clarity, accessibility and foresee-
ability. Since the newDutch care order grants significant discretion to domestic
courts in assessing the need to impose the measure, it is possible that a
challenge will be brought as to the foreseeability of this law. However, it is
not likely that such a challengewill succeed as especially inmatters of parental
authority the ECtHR perceives discretion as an inherent element in the decision-
making process.60
The core aspects which may trigger a more intensive scrutiny or potential
infringements of Article 8 on the part of the ECtHR will probably relate to the
manner of implementation of the care order and to the application in practice
of ‘the reasonable time’ requirement.
As to the manner of implementation, it should be pointed out that there
is no clear legal requirement in the new DCC to the effect that a care order
is to be applied only after unsuccessful supervision order(s).61 Therefore, since
the care order entails relief of parental authority and it is as such a more far-
reaching measure, imposing such a care order directly will be more difficult
to justify in line with the ECtHR principle that separation is to be temporary
and family reunification should be ordered as soon as reasonably possible.
Clearly, weighty reasons need to be adduced in support of the argument that
family reunification was not foreseeable in view of the concrete circumstances.
Asmentioned above, one example put forward by the legislator in the explan-
atory memorandum is that of a heavy drug user. In that case, according to
the explanatory memorandum, a care order would be better suited for the
child than a supervision order. In this regard, it should be noted that in
previous case law the ECtHR placed strong emphasis on improvements in the
situation of the parents. In those cases, the ECtHR did not accept the argument
of separation based on past conduct of the parent(s), where they showed signs
of improvement.62 The Court looked at whether the authorities made genuine
efforts aimed at family reunification. The success or failure of such a claim
will depend on the domestic arrangements for contact and on the chances of
success for the parent to regain parental authority if the situation improves.
It bears stressing that the ECtHR has always placed importance on contact
arrangements between parent and child. Put differently, regular contact should
not be withdrawn, especially if there are no allegations of violence of the
parent to the child.
60 ECtHR 24 March 1988, 10465/83 (Olsson/Sweden), discussed in section 3.1. above.
61 As discussed in section 2 above, at the moment the explanatory memorandum contains
an indication to this effect, but this is not binding on domestic courts.
62 ECtHR 12 July 2001, no. 25702/94 (K. and T./Finland), para 179.
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Further, some remarks should bemadewith respect to the ‘reasonable time’
requirement in the new DCC. Even if this is an aspect to be determined on a
case-by-case basis, national decision-makers should not lose sight of the
ultimate aim: to reunite parents with children. Thus, supervision measures
should be temporary and it must be shown that regular efforts were made
to reunite families. Also, in line with European case law, domestic authorities
are to undertake these efforts of their ownmotion, and not only at the request
of an interested party. The longer the separation, the closer will the ECtHR
scrutinize whether genuine efforts were made to bring parents and children
back together. In this vain it is worth recalling that the ECtHR has repeatedly
stressed that the best interests of the child do not always coincide with those
of the parents and that in cases of conflict the former override the latter. From
this perspective, it can be argued that the new DCC is more attuned to the
requirements of Article 8 ECtHR as successive prolongations of supervision
orders without ensuring permanency for children can hardly be considered
to serve their best interests. In these circumstances children may form bonds
with the foster family and these bonds deserve adequate legal protection. It
will be for the domestic judges to adequately balance all the interests at stake
and to ensure that the child’s best interests are observed. It is important that
throughout the duration of a supervision order authorities show that a genuine
effort wasmade to reunite families, that forensic evidence (such as psychiatric,
psychological reports etc.) was duly considered by domestic courts and that
evidence of, for example, improvement in the personal situationswas not easily
dismissed. The ECtHR has repeatedly stressed that the fact that the child is
placed in a more beneficial environment cannot on its own justify a child’s
removal from its biological family.63
One other aspect to be noted is that foster parents could also benefit from
the protection of Article 8 ECHR. This contribution focusedmainly on the right
to respect for family life of biological parents with their children who are
placed into care. However, long-term fostering agreements trigger family bonds
between foster parents and children.64 These foster parents too may claim
a breach of family life if, for example, supervision orders last unreasonably
long in spite of lack of evidence of improvement of the situation of the bio-
logical parent which triggered the placement of children into care.65 In this
sense, the aim of the new DCC to put a stop to uncertainties for foster families
is arguably more in line with the requirements of Article8, seen from the
perspective of foster parents.
63 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner /Germany), para 69.
64 ECtHR 17 January 2012, 1598/06 (Kopf and Liberda/ Austria).
65 The scenario envisaged in that situation is not that of a separation between foster parents
and children but rather a situation where they would claim that the uncertainty of a
situation (triggered for example by yearly prolongations of supervision orders or other
related measures) goes against the principle of legal certainty which is embedded in their
right to respect for family life.
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5 CONCLUSION
Aspects related to (deprivation of) parental rights are not only private family
matters. While it is mainly for national authorities to regulate how and when
intervention is necessary, such intervention needs to observe the general
principles of the ECHR, in particular Article 8. The ECtHR will exercise its
supervision in line with themargin of appreciation doctrine and the subsidiar-
ity principle. Moreover, cases of placing children into care are highly factual,
which poses certain difficulties for forecasting in abstract the implication of
the new DCC in the light of Article 8 ECHR.
However, this contribution sought to highlight themain aspects of the new
Dutch Civil Code against the principles distilled from the ECtHR case law. Even
if the ultimate assessment will be based on actual facts, it is nevertheless
important for domestic authorities to take into account these principles when
deciding on concrete cases.
Thus, in the light of the analysis above, one aspect whichmay prove highly
problematic is the possibility of imposing care orders directly, without having
them preceded by a supervision order. For such situations to comply with
the ECHR, the Dutch courts would have to show that there was clearly no
possibility for the parent(s) to improve their situation so as to resume family
life with the child. Also, if such imposition results in a lack of efforts on the
part of the authorities to assist in family reunification, it may entail a strong
adverse reaction from the ECtHR. In the same vein, the ‘reasonable time’ re-
quirement may face some scrutiny from the ECtHR, depending on how it is
assessed by national courts. Periods of separation should be accompanied by
the authorities’ efforts to reunite children with their parents. In their efforts
the authorities must show that they have effectively tried to achieve such
reunification, which was ultimately not possible. Last but not least, parties
should be offered reasonable opportunities to present their case and submit
evidence. While it may be acceptable not to involve the parents/children in
emergency situations, such justifications will be less compelling with the
passage of time. Also, the Court will most likely look into the actual circum-
stances, i.e. so as to assess whether a particular circumstance was indeed of
an emergency nature. As to the hearing of parties, both children and parents
are to be heard, but when it comes to children, aspects such as their age and
maturity will play a significant role in the Court’s review of the domestic
decision-making process.
8 The Duty of Directors to be Guided by the
Best Interests of the Company
Cees de Groot
1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The corporate form (referred to as the company or the corporation) is a core
concept in corporate law that is recognized worldwide. In its basic appearance
the corporate form is a legal person (as opposed to e.g. partnerships) with a
capital that is divided into transferable shares, that is led by a corporate board,
and inwhich neither the shareholders nor the corporate directors are personal-
ly liable for the obligations of the company. This contribution considers the
nature of the company as a statutory core legal concept in the Netherlands.
After some observations of a more general nature, the discussion of the com-
pany as a core legal concept will take place against the backdrop of another
statutory core legal concept that is firmly rooted in corporate law in the
Netherlands: the duty of corporate directors in the performance of their duties
to be guided by the best interests of the company and the undertaking that
is connectedwith it. Paragraph 2 is introductory and describes some elements
of corporate law in the Netherlands. Paragraph 3 investigates the origins of
the company in the Netherlands. Then attention shifts to the core legal concept
that corporate directors must be guided by the best interests of the company
and its undertaking. Paragraphs 4 and 5 discuss landmark cases of the Dutch
SupremeCourt on corporate law: historic case law (the Doetinchemse IJzergie-
terij and Forum-Bank cases in paragraph 4) and a more recent case (the ASMI-
case in paragraph 5) that show how the core legal concept of acting in the
best interests of the company and its undertaking has in Netherlands case law
gradually shaped thinking about the company as such. Whereas the origins
of the company are in contract law (as is also reflected in the historic case law),
both the historic and the more recent case law show that the company has
developed over time into an abstract organizational form in which (as would
be expected in such an abstract organization) the authority of the board of
directors is pre-eminent. The idea of the corporate form as an abstract organiza-
tional form in which the position of the corporate board is paramount is not
C. de Groot is associate professor of Company Law, Leiden University.
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exceptional, as is borne out by the discussion of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of Delaware (United States of America) in the Selectica case
in paragraph 6. This judgment as well as the case law discussed from the
Netherlands show that companies have similar characteristics, however
different the jurisdictions are in which they appear. However, a recent judg-
ment by the Dutch Supreme Court in 2014 in the Cancun case (discussed in
paragraph 7) may prompt a re-evaluation of the thinking on the nature of the
company. The Cancun case could be a watershed in the sense that the Dutch
Supreme Court seems to indicate that – when interpreting the core legal
concept that directors in performing their duties must be guided by the best
interests of the company and the undertaking that is connected with it – the
organizational characteristics of an individual companymay play an important
role in determining the duties of the corporate directors. Thus interpreted,
a company should no longer be regarded just as an abstract organizational
form but also as an organization whose specific organizational characteristics
determine how corporate directors should perform their duties. Interestingly,
this recent development in the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court occurred
in a situation where the company that was the object of the legal proceedings
was a joint venture company of a highly contractual nature.
2 A PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION ON THE CORPORATE FORM (IN THENETHER-
LANDS)
In the Netherlands there are two types of companies, the public limited com-
pany (or company limited by shares, in Dutch the naamloze vennootschap,
abbreviated NV) and the private limited company (or private company with
limited liability, in Dutch the besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid,
usually referred to as the besloten vennootschap for short, abbreviated BV).
Legislation on the public limited company dates back as far as 1838, in what
was then the Commercial Code, and legislation on the private limited company
dates back to 1971, also inwhatwas then the Commercial Code. Today, public
limited companies and private limited companies are regulated in the Dutch
Civil Code.
Articles 2:64 and 175 DCC are the opening articles of Title 4 and Title 5 of
the Second Book of the DCC respectively. These articles hold the definitions
of the two types of companies. Under Article 2:64, par. 1 DCC a public limited
company ‘is a legal personwith an authorized capital divided into transferable
shares’, and under Article 175, par. 1 DCC a private limited company ‘is a legal
person with an authorized capital divided into one or more transferable
shares’, to which in both provisions is added: ‘The shareholders shall not be
personally liable for acts performed in the name of the company and shall
not be liable to contribute to losses of the company in excess of the amount
whichmust be paid up on their shares’. In accordancewith Articles 2:64, par. 2
De Groot 189
and 175, par. 2 DCC both a public limited company and a private limited com-
pany may be incorporated by either one (natural or legal) person or several
(natural or legal) persons, and shall be established by a notarial deed of
incorporation. In accordance with Articles 2:66, par. 2 and 177, par. 2 DCC the
name of a public limited company and a private limited company shall begin
or end with the words Naamloze Vennootschap (or the abbreviated form NV)
or Besloten Vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid (or the abbreviated form
BV) respectively. In comparison with the public limited company the private
limited company is intended to be a ‘light’ company in the sense that the
private limited company is more ‘flexible’ than the public limited company
and is more ‘simplified’ as opposed to the public limited company.
There are several notable differences between public limited companies
and private limited companies under Netherlands company law. To note but
a few, first, both the issued share capital and the paid up part of the issued
share capital of a public limited company shall be at least 45,000 euros (and
shall be expressed in euros), whereas the issued share capital of a private
limited company shall be at least one euro cent only and the paid up part of
the issued share capital of a private limited company may be as little as zero
(and need not be expressed in euros). Second, as a general rule the directors
of a public limited company shall be appointed by the company’s general
meeting (in principle by amajority decision), whereas the directors of a private
limited company may be appointed by either the company’s general meeting
(in principle by a majority decision) or by a meeting of holders of shares of
a specific class or type (in principle by a majority decision) as opposed to the
company’s general meeting as a whole. Third, all shareholders of a public
limited company shall have both voting rights and the right to distribution
of profits, whereas a private limited companymay have shareholders that have
shares to which either no voting rights or the right to distribution of profits
are attached (with the express provision that shares cannot be devoid of voting
rights and the right to distribution of profits cumulatively). Fourth, the articles
of a public limited companymay provide that the company’s board of directors
must conduct itself in accordance with the directions of a corporate body (e.g.
the general meeting) in respect of the general policy to be pursued in areas
further specified in the articles, whereas the articles of a private limited com-
panymay simply provide that the company’s board of directors must conduct
itself in accordance with the directions of another corporate body (e.g. the
general meeting), with no limitation to only the general policy to be pursued
and without the need of specifying the relevant areas in the articles.
There are also some notable similarities between public limited companies
and private limited companies under Netherlands company law. First, on the
level of its board of directors both a public limited company and a private
limited company may be organized as a one-tier board or a two-tier board.
In a one-tier board (also: unitary board) the board of directors consists of both
executive directors and non-executive directors, the non-executive directors
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performing the internal supervisory function. In a two-tier board (also: dual
board) next to themanagement board (comprised ofmanaging directors) there
is a supervisory board (comprised of supervisory directors), the supervisory
directors performing the internal supervisory function. However, as a general
rule Netherlands company law does not require that there is an internal
supervisory function. This means that a public limited company and a private
limited companymay just have a board of directors comprised of only execut-
ive directors, or may just have a management board without having a super-
visory board. Second, under Articles 2:129 par. 5 and 239 par. 5, and 140, par.
2 and 250, par. 2 DCC all corporate directors, whether executive directors and
non-executive directors (if the latter have been appointed) in a one-tier board,
or managing directors and supervisory directors (if the latter have been
appointed) in a two-tier board, shall, in the performance of their duties, ‘be
guided by the best interests of the legal person and the undertaking connected
with it’. It is precisely this provision that has been regarded as underlining
that public limited companies and private limited companies are an abstract
organizational form. Awidely held view on this provision holds that corporate
directors should take into account and balance the interests of all stakeholders
in the company and not just the interest of the company’s shareholders.1
3 AN OBSERVATION ON THE ORIGINS OF THE CORPORATE FORM (IN THE
NETHERLANDS)
The fading years of the sixteenth century witnessed a remarkable economic
development in the Netherlands. These years saw the establishment of a
number of companies devoted to far-reaching overseas trade. Next to sailing
to the northern Baltic and Hanseatic regions, ships now also sailed in east-
bound directions to the Indies (and later in westbound directions to the
Americas aswell as to Africa).2 The first of these companieswas the Company
of Far (theCompagnie van Verre, an abbreviation ofCompagnie van Verre Reizen:
Company of Far Travels), established in the city of Amsterdam in 1594). As
successive companies in other cities followed, competition between these
companies grew. This prompted theNetherlands government to bring at least
most of these companies under the aegis of one overarching organization,
called the East India Company (the Oost-Indische Compagnie, usually referred
to as the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: the United East India Company)
1 P.J. Dortmond (main author),Handboek voor de naamloze en de besloten vennootschap, Deventer:
Kluwer 2013, no 231, J. Winter & J.B. Wezeman, Van de BV en de NV, Deventer: Kluwer
2013, pp. 27-29. Cfr. M. Olaerts, ‘De aandeelhouder en het vennootschappelijk verband:
de kwalificatie van de vennootschap en de invloed op de vennootschappelijke belangen-
afweging’, Tijdschrift voor Ondernemingsbestuur 2015-2, pp. 51-64.
2 J. de Vries & A. van der Woude, Nederland 1500-1815. De eerste ronde van economische groei,
Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans 1995, pp. 411-417, 450-462 and 462-469.
De Groot 191
in 1602.3 The modern public limited company (with legislation dating back
to 1838) and by extension themodern private limited company (with legislation
dating back to 1971) are mostly regarded as descendants of the United East
India Company. However, there are conflicting views about the way in which
the public limited company (and the private limited company) build on the
earlier United East India Company.4
As a starting point on the heritage of the public limited company, all views
recognize that the United East India Company was a company whose shares
were traded on a stock exchange (this being the Amsterdam stock exchange).
The first (majority) opinion holds that the previously existing companies were
in effect limited partnerships in which the most important partners, who also
formed the board of directors of these companies, were as general partners
jointly and severally liable for the debts of these companies, and in which the
other less important partners as limited partners were not liable for the debts
of these companies.5 Building on this analysis, this opinion suggests that the
succeeding United East India Company was a company in which none of the
partners (including the most important partners who formed the board of
directors of the United East India Company) were liable any longer for the
debts of the United East India Company. The second (minority) opinion argues
that both the previously existing companies as well as the succeeding United
East India Company were business partnerships in which all partners were
liable for the debts of the company, although not jointly and severally, but
only proportionally.6 In addition, this opinion argues that any partner in both
the previously existing companies and the United East India Company could
escape from this proportional liability by giving up his shares in the company.
This would be the effect of the so-called droit d’abandon (the right to renounce)
that allowed shareholders to give up their shares (this right being the con-
sequence of the then common idea regarding the commercial law of the sea
that ‘no one can lose more to the sea than he has entrusted to it’). A strong
point of the first (majority) opinion is that it regards the United East India
Company and thereby the later public limited company as a logical follow-up
to the concept of the limited partnership, by simply extending non-liability
3 H.M. Punt, Het vennootschapsrecht van Holland. Het vennootschapsrecht van Holland, Zeeland
en West-Friesland in de rechtspraak van de Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland,
Deventer: Kluwer 2010, pp. 100-101.
4 P.J. Dortmond (main author),Handboek voor de naamloze en de besloten vennootschap, Deventer:
Kluwer 2013, nos. 1-39.
5 Discussed by: H.M. Punt, Het vennootschapsrecht van Holland. Het vennootschapsrecht van
Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland in de rechtspraak van de Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland
en West-Friesland, Deventer: Kluwer 2010, pp. 95-107. Cfr. On the United East India Com-
pany: L.O. Petram, The world’s first stock exchange. How the Amsterdam market for Dutch East
India Company shares became a modern securities market, 1602-1700 (2011: published at http://
dare.uva.nl).
6 Advanced by:W.M.F.Mansvelt,Rechtsvorm en geldelijk beheer bij de Oost-Indische Compagnie,
Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger 1922.
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for the debts of the partnership to all members of the company. However, a
weakness of this opinion is that it introduces non-liability of any and all
members for the debts of the United East India Company into an era where
the concept of legal personality had not been thought through. The second
(minority) opinion has a strong point in that it logically connects the droit
d’abandon in the United East India Company and its predecessors to the notion
that none of the members of a public limited company needs to be liable for
the debts of the company. A weak point of this opinion is that the idea that
both themost important partners and the less important partners of theUnited
East India Company were liable (albeit proportionally) for the debts of the
company is difficult to reconcile with the United East India Company having
shares that were traded on a stock exchange, making it difficult to retrieve
the identity of the partners that were liable for the debts of the company as
long as they did not invoke the droit d’abandon.
The legislation of 1838 clearly struggled with the proper way to regulate
the public limited company. It decided to regulate the business partnership,
the limited partnership and the public limited company on a par in the Com-
mercial Code (next regulating the professional partnership in the DCC). The
opening provision of the Title called ‘On the partnership of trade’ read:7 ‘The
law recognizes three partnerships of trade: the commercial partnership, the
limited partnership or partnership en commandite, [and] the public limited
company’.8 Interestingly, the public limited company was named (as it still
is today) naamloze vennootschap (meaning anonymous company), derived from
the French term société anonyme. In this respect (and also as an explanation
of the phrase naamloze vennootschap), the opening article on the public limited
company read: ‘The public limited company shall not have a common name,
nor shall it carry the name of one or several of its partners, but shall only be
indicated by the object of its business enterprise’.9 This somewhat strange
provisionmeant that the 1838 legislation tried to distinguish the public limited
company (a novelty in terms of legislation at the time) from the commercial
partnership and the limited partnership: unlike the commercial partnership
and the limited partnership the public limited company could not carry a
‘fantasy’ company name or have the names of its partners as part of its com-
pany name (note the use of the phrase partners instead of shareholders), but
could only be named e.g.Coal Trading Company or Grain Importing Company.
This is all the more understandable as the legislation of 1838 did not require
that the name of a public limited company should include thewordsNaamloze
7 ‘Van vennootschap van Koophandel’.
8 ‘DeWet erkent drie soorten van Vennootschappen van Koophandel: De vennootschap onder
eene firma; De vennootschap bij wijze van geldschieting, anders compagnieschap en
commandite genaamd; De naamlooze vennootschap’.
9 ‘De naamlooze vennootschap heeft geen firma, noch draagt den naam van een of meer
der vennooten, maar zij ontleent hare benaming alleen, van het voorwerp harer handels-
onderneming’.
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Vennootschap or the abbreviated form N.V. The 1838 legislation further stated
that ‘The partners or holders of the parts or shares shall not be liable beyond
the full amount of those parts or shares’,10 and ‘The company shall be led
by directors, appointed by the partners, who may or may not be partners
themselves, andmay or may not receive a salary, with or without supervision
by supervisory directors’.11 The 1838 legislation also stated that ‘Themanaging
directors shall be responsible only for proper execution of the tasks they are
commissioned with; as regards third parties they shall not be liable for the
debts of the company’.12 Under the present regulation of the public limited
company and the private limited company in the DCC the fact that directors
of a company are not responsible for the debts of the company in respect of
third parties is something that is regarded as being so logical and obvious
that there is not even a provision anymore that states this in so many words.
Interestingly, nowhere did the legislation of 1838 refer to the public limited
company as a ‘legal person’.
In 1928 a major overhaul took place of the legislation on the public limited
company in the Commercial Code.13 Under the new legislation the public
limited company was referred to as a ‘legal person’ and was required to have
the indication Naamloze Vennootschap or the abbreviated form N.V. as part of
its company name.14 Also, the ban on the use of a ‘fantasy’ company name
or the use of the names of its shareholders as part of the company name was
repealed.
4 HISTORIC CASE LAW (IN THE NETHERLANDS) OBSERVED
4.1 Introduction
This paragraph discusses two older judgments of the Dutch Supreme Court
that were rendered when Netherlands corporate law was still nascent. These
judgments give insight into the way in which the Dutch Supreme Court
already at that time underlined the strong position that corporate boards have
vis-à-vis both individual shareholders and the general meeting. These judg-
10 ‘De vennooten of houders dier actien of aandeelen zijn niet verder aansprakelijk, dan voor
het volle beloop derzelve’.
11 ‘De vennootschapwordt beheerd door daartoe, door de vennooten, aangestelde bestuurders,
deelgenooten of andere, al dan niet loontrekkende, met of zonder toezigt van commissaris-
sen’.
12 ‘De bestuurders zijn niet verder verantwoordelijk, dan ter zake van de behoorlijke uitvoering
van den aan hen opgedragen last; zij zijn uit kracht der verbindtenissen van de vennoot-
schap, aan derden niet persoonlijk verbonden’.
13 Stb. 1928/216.
14 ‘De naamlooze vennootschap is rechtspersoon […]’ and ‘De naam vangt aan of eindigt
met de woorden Naamlooze Vennootschap, hetzij voluit geschreven, hetzij afgekort tot
“N.V.”’.
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ments form the basis of the later judgment in the ASMI case discussed in
paragraph 5.
4.2 The Doetinchemse IJzergieterij case (1949)
In the Doetinchemse IJzergieterij case NV Uitgevers Maatschappij C. Misset
(Misset) had been the majority shareholder of NV Doetinchemse IJzergieterij
(Doetinchemse IJzergieterij) since 1933.15 Under the articles of Doetinchemse
IJzergieterij the supervisory board had the power to issue new shares of the
company. Twomanaging directors of Misset had been members of the super-
visory board of Doetinchemse IJzergieterij but had died in 1945 and 1947
respectively, leaving Misset no longer represented in the supervisory board
of Doetinchemse IJzergieterij. During the general meeting of Doetinchemse
IJzergieterij that was held in August 1947Misset became aware of the fact that
the supervisory board had issued a large number of shares. As a consequence,
Misset had lost its position as majority shareholder (it should be noted that
Netherlands company law at that time did not give existing shareholders a
right of first refusal when a public limited company issued new shares).Misset
brought a lawsuit against Doetinchemse IJzergieterij asking the District Court
to order provisional measures that would prohibit the new shareholders from
exercising their rights on the shares they had acquired. The District Court did
not award this request, but the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of Misset.
Doetinchemse IJzergieterij appealed to the Dutch Supreme Court. On its
part, the Dutch Supreme Court annulled the Court of Appeal’s decision and
affirmed the decision of the District Court that had ruled in favour of Doetin-
chemse IJzergieterij. The main argument in the proceedings before the Dutch
Supreme Court forwarded by Misset was phrased in quite plain terms. In the
opinion of Misset ‘supervisory directors could not take a decision that contra-
venes the interests and wishes of the majority shareholder’. The Dutch Supreme
Court rejected Misset’s argument in a very short consideration:
‘Supervisory directors who exercise their powers as a corporate organ shall be
guided by the interest of the company and shall give precedence to the interest
of the company in case this clashes with the interests of whatever shareholder’.
4.3 The Forum-Bank case (1955)
In the Forum-Bank case two shareholders of NV Forum-Bank (Forum-Bank) had
proposed that Forum-Bank buy back shares these shareholders held in the
company and that the price to be paid by Forum-Bank be used mainly to
15 Dutch Supreme Court 1 April 1949, NJ 1949/465 (Doetinchemse IJzergieterij).
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reduce the amount of debt these shareholders owed to the company.16 When
this proposal was discussed by the general meeting both the management
board and the supervisory board of Forum-Bank as well as five of the eight
shareholders who attended the general meeting opposed the proposal. The
management board and the supervisory board argued that accepting the
proposal would not be in the interest of Forum-Bank itself and its shareholders,
as it would undermine the liquidity of the bank, and that in accordance with
the articles this was a matter not to be decided by the general meeting but
by the management board. When it came to a vote, the voting power of the
two shareholders who hadmade the proposal (296 and 110 shares), combined
with the votes of the one shareholder who supported the proposal (5 shares),
was enough to have the proposal accepted by amajority of 411 votes in favour
of the proposal to 117 votes against the proposal. This prompted two opposing
shareholders to bring the matter before the District Court, asking the District
Court to declare that the decision by the general meeting was null and void
as it was outside the realm of the generalmeeting’s powers. TheDistrict Court
ruled in favour of these claimants and the Court of Appeal, on the basis of
the articles of Forum-Bank, confirmed this judgment.
One of the two shareholderswho had originally proposed that Forum-Bank
buy back the shares lodged an appeal to the Dutch Supreme Court. In this
appeal, themain argument was phrased in equally plain terms as the argument
in the Doetinchemse IJzergieterij case: even if it were to be accepted that the
competence to decide on buying back Forum-Bank’s shares fell within the
powers of the management board, the decision made by the general meeting
could not be null and void because:
‘the general meeting of shareholders […] has competence to order the management
board to act in certain ways, to wit to decide to buy back shares as is debated in
this case, for which reason that decision, in any case and as such and to that extent,
was made in a competent way and is not null and void.’
The Dutch Supreme Court, however, did not accept this line of reasoning and
dismissed the appeal. The Dutch Supreme Court first interpreted the appeal
as arguing in essence that:
‘it brings to the fore that the general meeting, in spite of the fact that buying back
the company’s shares […] falls within the competence of the management board,
has the power to instruct themanagement board to buy back shares of the company
for a specified price from certain sellers because the managing directors are sub-
ordinate to the public limited company and the general meeting exercises the
ultimate power in the public limited company.’
16 Dutch Supreme Court 21 January 1955, NJ 1959/43 (Forum-Bank).
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Then the Dutch Supreme Court rebutted the appeal in – again – a very short
consideration:
‘this argument, thus read, ignores that the general meeting too shall not transgress
the powers given to it by statutory law or by the articles.’
4.4 A short comment
Interestingly, in one consideration in the Doetinchemse IJzergieterij case
(‘[Incorrectly, the] Court of Appeal took as a starting point that the nature
of the corporate contract entails as a fundamental right that shareholders have
a right of first refusal when shares are issued’) the Dutch Supreme Court
rendered a reference that the Court of Appeal had made to ‘the nature of the
corporate contract’. Apparently, the Court of Appeal at the time still regarded
the corporate form as a contractual relationship between its participants. On
its part, the Dutch Supreme Court underlined the autonomous position of the
‘[s]upervisory directors who exercise their powers as a corporate organ’.
Likewise, in the Forum-Bank case the Dutch Supreme Court underlined the
autonomous position of the management board. Both cases indicate a line of
thinking whereby the corporate form gradually developed into an abstract
organizational form inwhich the role of the corporate directors is pre-eminent.
5 A MORE RECENT CASE (IN THE NETHERLANDS) OBSERVED
5.1 Introduction
In the ASMI case the Dutch Supreme Court had the opportunity to lay down
what a modern twenty-first century company is: an abstract organizational
form wherein the duty of the directors to be guided by the best interests of
the company and the undertaking that is connected with it implies that both
shareholders and the general meeting can exert very little leverage when it
comes to influencing the company’s policies or asking directors to act in certain
ways. In a two-tier board this applies to both (the members of) the manage-
ment board and (the members of) the supervisory board.
5.2 The ASMI case (2010)
ASM International NV (ASMI) was a listed public limited company that had been
established by A.H. del Prado in 1968. ASMI held 53% of the shares in ASM
Pacific Technology Ltd (ASMPT) that was also a listed company (in Hong Kong).
A.H. del Prado held approximately 21% of the shares of ASMI. He had been
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the chief executive officer (CEO) of ASMI from its establishment in 1968 and
remained so until 1 March 2008. On that day his son, C.D. del Prado, who
had been on the management board of ASMI since 2006, became the new CEO
of ASMI. Since 2005 a number of shareholders of ASMI had been raising concerns
about the way ASMI was run. These shareholders were Fursa Master Global
Event Driven Fund LP (Fursa), an investment fund that held approximately
6% of the shares of ASMI, and a number of investment funds that operated
under the name ofHermes and together held approximately 15% of the shares
of ASMI. Their concerns concentrated on two issues. They argued that the way
in which the articles of ASMI provided for the appointment of the members
of both the management board and the supervisory board of ASMI was not
in conformity with what shareholders of a listed company would expect. In
their opinion especially the fact that since 2006 both A.H. del Prado and C.D.
del Prado had been on the management board of ASMI resulted in ‘family ties’
that raised ‘doubts and concerns that there will not be enough distance be-
tween the members of the management board’. They also commented on the
fact that the shares in ASMPT traded against approximately EUR 18 per share
whereas the shares in ASMI traded against approximately EUR 12 per share
only. In their opinion this could only mean (since ASMPT as a 53%-subsidiary
company of ASMI was being favoured more by investors than ASMI) that the
financial results of ASMI were negatively influenced by its own business that
was not profitable enough. The differences of opinion between ASMI’smanage-
ment board and supervisory board on the one hand and Fursa and Hermes
on the other hand resulted in extended talks between these parties and finally
a lawsuit against ASMI under the provisions on Right of Inquiry in Title 8 of
the Second Book of the Dutch Civil Code. In these proceedings the Enterprise
Court of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in 2009 came to the conclusion that
there were well-founded reasons to doubt ASMI’s policies.17 On appeal, how-
ever, this judgment was set aside by the Dutch Supreme Court.18 One reason
for this was that the judgment of the Enterprise Court was, as the Dutch
Supreme Court considered, flawed because ‘it follows to a sufficient degree
from the facts of the case that themanagement board did start a dialoguewith
the external shareholders, went into their arguments and dismissed these
arguments on the basis of well-founded and defendable counter-arguments,
taking into account the long-term interests of all those involved in the com-
pany.’ What follows below are two considerations of the Dutch Supreme Court
on general issues of company law:
17 Enterprise Court 5 August 2009, JOR 2009/254 (ASMI).
18 Dutch Supreme Court 9 July 2010, JOR 2010/228 (ASMI). M.M.Mendel &W.J. Oostwouder,
‘Het vennootschappelijk belang na recente uitspraken van de Hoge Raad’, Nederlands
Juristenblad 2013, no. 1776.
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‘The management board of a company, when fulfilling its obligations under
statutory law or the articles, shall give precedence to the best interests of the
company and the undertaking connected with it and shall in its decision-making
take into account the interests of all stakeholders, among whom the shareholders
are to be reckoned. Therefore, ASMI’s strategy is in principle a matter for the man-
agement board to decide on, and it shall be the management board, under the
supervision of the supervisory board, which is to judge whether and to what extent
it is desirable to discuss this with the ‘external’ shareholders. Although themanage-
ment board is under an obligation to give account to the general meeting of share-
holders it is, in the absence of arrangements under statutory law or the articles,
not obliged to involve the general meeting of shareholders in advance in matters
that fall within its competence.’
And:
‘The supervisory board shall supervise the management board’s policy as well as
the general course of affairs in the company and the undertaking connected with
it and shall advise the management board […]. This function under statutory law
does not entail an obligation for the supervisory board to intermediate in conflicts
between the management board and shareholders. Neither is the supervisory board
under an obligation to give account to the shareholders on this matter. […] The
supervisory board, when approached by shareholders requesting it to intermediate
or to take other action, will have to act adequately on the basis of its own function.
However, an obligation to intermediate actively would […] contravene themargin
of discretion that the supervisory board has in fulfilling its function.’
5.3 A short comment
The ASMI case represents the apex in the Netherlands of the line of thought
that regards the corporate form as an abstract organizational form in which
the authority of the corporate directors is pre-eminent. The Dutch Supreme
Court decided that amanagement board is in principle ‘not obliged to involve
the general meeting of shareholders in advance in matters that fall within its
competence’ and that a supervisory board is not obliged to ‘intermediate in
conflicts between the management board and shareholders’. Being the apex
of that line of thought, the Dutch Supreme Court’s judgment is also question-
able. The judgment puts extreme emphasis on the autonomous position of
both themanagement board and the supervisory board of a company vis-à-vis
the company’s shareholders. In doing so, the judgment shows little regard
for the interests of the shareholders as investors in the company. After all,
should a management board not be obliged to at least consult the company’s
general meeting on major issues that are important to the shareholders? And
likewise, what is the use of having a supervisory board that refrains from
intermediating in conflicts between themanagement board and the company’s
investors?
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6 THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN
THE SELECTICA CASE (2010)
6.1 Introduction
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware in the Selectica
case shows that the general features of the corporate form are much alike
across jurisdictions: as in the Netherlands the Delaware Supreme Court allows
corporate boards a wide margin of appreciation that shareholders are unable
to encroach upon.
6.2 The Selectica case
Selectica, Inc. (Selectica) was a listed corporation that provided enterprise
software solutions. Selectica had become a listed corporation in 2000 and had
since incurred substantial losses. The price of Selectica shares had fallen from
$ 30 per share at the time of the initial public offering to less than $ 1 per
share. The value of Selectica consisted mainly of cash reserves, intellectual
property rights, goodwill and ‘accumulated NOLs’. NOLs are ‘net operating
loss carryforwards’ that under (U.S. federal) tax law a corporation that does
not achieve a positive net income may use as a fiscal means ‘to provide a
refund of prior taxes paid or to reduce the amount of future income tax owed’.
Therefore, NOLs are a valuable asset. Selectica’s NOLs amounted to approx-
imately $ 160 million. A corporation may only make use of NOLs that it has
generated itself and under (U.S. federal) tax law the use of NOLs is limited
following an ‘ownership change’. For the purposes of applying this limitation,
an ownership change generally occurs when over a period of time of three
years 50% of a corporation’s shares change ownership; however, in this calcula-
tion only shareholders who hold 5% or more of a corporations’s shares are counted.
Selectica had employed a ‘shareholder rights plan’ (a poison pill) as a
protective measure against a possible hostile takeover since 2003. This share-
holder rights plan would become active if a Selectica shareholder would
acquire 15% (or more) of Selectica’s shares. In 2008 the board of directors of
Selectica amended this shareholder rights plan as a means of protecting the value
of its NOLs to the effect that the plan would be triggered when a shareholder
would acquire 4.99% (or more) of Selectica’s shares.
In December 2008 Trilogy, Inc. (Trilogy), together with its subsidiary
company Versata Enterprises, Inc. (Versata) intentionally surpassed the 5%
threshold (‘bought in excess of’ the threshold) by then acquiring 6.7% in total
of Selectica’s (common) shares. Its reasons for doing so were to ‘bring some
clarity and urgency’ to their relationship that had been troubled (also by
lawsuits) for a number of years. Under these circumstances the board of
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directors of Selectica in January 2009 decided to put the shareholder rights
plan into action. This meant that the shareholder rights plan ‘doubled the
number of shares of Selectica common stock owned by each shareholder of
record, other than Trilogy orVersata, thereby reducing their beneficial holdings
from 6.7% to 3.3%’. Preceding this, in December 2008, Selectica had filed suit
in the Delaware Court of Chancery ‘seeking a declaration that the NOL Poison
Pill was valid and enforceable’. On their part, Trilogy and Versata argued that
the (use of the) shareholder rights plan was unlawful. The Court of Chancery
ruled in favour of Selectica.19 Trilogy and Versata appealed to the Supreme
Court of the State of Delaware, but in its judgment of 4 October 2010 the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery.20 The
Supreme Court considered: ‘The Court of Chancery concluded that the pro-
tection of company NOLs may be an appropriate corporate policy that merits
a defensive response when they are threatened. We agree’, because:
‘The Court of Chancery found the record “replete with evidence” that, based upon
the expert advice it received, the Boardwas reasonable in concluding that Selectica’s
NOLs were worth preserving and that Trilogy’s actions presented a serious threat
of their impairment. […] Those findings are not clearly erroneous. They are sup-
ported by the record and the result of a logical deductive reasoning process’,
and because the shareholder rights plan (that was also a protective measure)
was not such that it had the effect of precluding a possible takeover of
Selectica:
‘The Court of Chancery concluded that the NOL Poison Pill and Reloaded NOL
Poison Pill were not preclusive.[21] […] The record supports the Court of Chan-
cery’s factual determination and legal conclusion that Selectica’s NOL Poison Pill
and Reloaded NOL Poison Pill do not meet that preclusivity standard.’
Furthermore, ‘The implementation of the Reloaded NOL Poison Pill was also
a reasonable response’:
‘The record indicates that the Board was presented with expert advice that sup-
ported its ultimate findings that the NOLs were a corporate asset worth protecting,
that the NOLs were at risk as a result of Trilogy’s actions, and that the steps that
the Board ultimately took were reasonable in relation to that threat.’
19 Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware 26 February 2010, CA #4241-VCN (Selectica),
at: http://courts.delaware.gov.
20 Supreme Court of the State of Delaware 4 October 2010, no. 193, 2010 (Selectica), footnotes
deleted, at: http://courts.delaware.gov.
21 The Reloaded Poisin Pill refers to the amendment of the shareholder rights plan to the
effect that the it would be triggered when a shareholders would acquire 4.99% (or more)
of Selectica’s shares.
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6.3 A short comment
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware in Selectica, like
the judgments of the Dutch Supreme Court in the Doetinchemse IJzergieterij,
Forum-Bank and ASMI cases, allows corporate boards awidemargin of discre-
tion in conducting the affairs of the corporation. That corporate boards have
this wide margin of discretion is inherent in the corporate form where share-
holders as investors entrust resources to the corporation.22 In that sense, the
judgments of the Dutch Supreme Court and the Selectica judgment of the
SupremeCourt of the State of Delaware point in the same direction. However,
the idea that corporate boards have this wide margin of discretion does not
in itself give much guidance to a corporate board as to whose interests it
should take into account in conducting the affairs of the corporation. On that
issue, the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court in Cancun may be of help.
This judgment is discussed in the following paragraph.
7 THE CANCUN CASE IN THE NETHERLANDS: IS THE PENDULUM SWINGING
IN A NEW DIRECTION?
7.1 The Cancun case (2014)
CancunHolding II BV (Cancun Holding II) had been established in August 2005
by Cancun Holding I BV (Cancun Holding I, an (investment) company of the
Lliteras family) for the purpose of realizing a hotel complex in the Mexican
city of Cancun through its (almost wholly-owned) subsidiary company Efesyde
SA de CV (Efesyde). In October 2006 Cancun Holding II became a joint venture
company between CancunHolding I and InversionesMa yMo SL (Inversiones,
an (investment) company of the Nicolau family). On 18 June 2009 Invernostra
SL (Unipersonal) (Invernostra) acquired 7% of the shares of CancunHolding II;
CancunHolding I and Inversiones each retained 46.5% of the shares of Cancun
Holding II.
22 R. Kraakman, ‘The Durability of the Corporate Form’, in: P. DiMaggio (ed.), The Twenty-First-
Century Firm. Changing Economic Organization in International Perspective, Princeton/Oxford:
Princeton University Press 2001, pp. 147-160 (150).
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The costs of realizing the hotel complex amounted to USD 140 million; the
hotel complex (‘Secret Silver Sands’) started operating inAugust 2008. During
the summer and fall of 2008 differences of opinion began to emerge between
Cancun Holding I (the Lliteras family) and Inversiones (the Nicolau family)
about the costs involved with building and operating the hotel complex.
The shares that Cancun Holding I held in Cancun Holding II were ‘A
shares’, the shares that Inversiones held in Cancun Holding II were ‘B shares’,
and the shares that Invernostra held in Cancun Holding II were ‘C shares’.
Under the articles the A, B and C shares carried with them the right to
nominatemanaging directors of CancunHolding II. The C shares carriedwith
them additional rights that implied that some decisions of the management
board could only be made in a meeting of the management board where at
least two board members were present, among whom at least one board
member who was nominated by the holder of the C shares, and that these
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decisions had to be approved also by at least one board member who was
nominated by the holder of the C shares. Since 18 June 2009 the management
board of Cancun Holding II had consisted of K.H.K.L.B. Roovers (managing
director A, on behalf of Cancun Holding I), Equity Trust Co. NV (managing
director B, on behalf of Inversiones) and J.M. Navarro Lacoba (managing
director C, on behalf of Invernostra).
Inversiones had a claim against Efesyde (that was at the time not completely
immediately due) for work it had performed on the hotel complex. When
Efesyde asked its bank to enhance its credit, the bank indicated that it would
only bewilling to do so if Efesydewas somehow able to bring its debt position
vis-à-vis Inversiones to an end. In order to accomplish this, Efesyde issued a
large number of shares to Inversiones on 1 July 2009 that Inversiones paid up
by balancing its claim against Efesyde. As a consequence of this, Inversiones
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became a 78%-shareholder in Efesyde and the participation of Cancun Hold-
ing II in Efesyde decreased from almost 100% to 22% (‘the first watering down’
of the participation of Cancun Holding II in Efesyde). This arrangement was
intended to be temporary only.
The management board of Efesyde had for a time consisted of three persons
from the Lliteras family. Of these three persons, following the issue of shares
to Inversiones, only Margarita Lliteras remained on the board, and G. Nicolau
Salleras (on behalf of Inversiones) and J.M. Navarro Lacoba (on behalf of
Invernostra) became board members.
At some point during the summer of 2009 the management board of
Cancun Holding II put forward the proposal that Cancun Holding II issue
shares to Inversiones and Invernostra (but not to Cancun Holding I). This
proposal would result in the participation of Cancun Holding I decreasing
to 0.08%, Invernostra retaining its participation of 7% and Inversiones increasing
its participation to 92.92%. The background of this proposal was to compensate
Inversiones for giving up its claim against Efesyde. Obviously, CancunHolding
I was against the proposal and did not attend the general meeting that would
decide on the issue of the shares. As a result, the shares could not be issued
because under the articles of Cancun Holding II a decision to issue shares
required the presence of all shareholders and a unanimous vote. However,
the articles also provided that in such a case a second general meeting could
be convened where a decision to issue shares could be made regardless of
the number of shareholders present and by a simplemajority. Themanagement
board of CancunHolding II convened such ameeting. This meetingwas never
held because on 21 September 2009 Cancun Holding I filed a lawsuit against
Cancun Holding II under the provisions on the Right of Inquiry in Title 8 of
the Second Book of the Dutch Civil Code. But then …
…on 1October 2009 Invernostra made over its participation in CancunHold-
ing II to Inversiones. Inversiones now held 53.5% of the shares in Cancun Hold-
ing II.
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Also, on 3 November 2009 the general meeting of Efesyde decided to issue
shares to Inversiones. The notice convening this general meeting had been
published in a local Mexican newspaper. Cancun Holding I was not repres-
ented in this general meeting because it was not aware that it had been con-
vened (the fact that the general meeting would be held had been discussed
during a meeting of the board of Efesyde but Margarita Lliteras had not
attended that boardmeeting). As a consequence, the participation of Inversiones
in Efesyde increased from 78% to 99.87% and the participation of Cancun
Holding II BV in Efesyde decreased from 22% to 0.13% (‘the second watering
down’ of the participation of Cancun Holding II in Efesyde).
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In the proceedings instituted by Cancun Holding I against Cancun Holding
II the Enterprise Court in its judgment of 28 April 2010 came to the conclusion
that there were well-founded reasons to doubt Cancun Holding II’s policies
and awarded the request of Cancun Holding I that an independent investiga-
tion be conducted into the policies and the course of affairs of CancunHolding
II.23 On the basis of the outcome of this investigation, the Enterprise Court
on 19 July 2012 concluded at the request of Cancun Holding I that there had
been mismanagement on the part of Cancun Holding II.24 The Enterprise
Court in particular held it against the management board of Cancun Holding
II that it had not done enough to protect the position of Cancun Holding I
during ‘the first watering down’ of the participation of Cancun Holding II
23 Enterprise Court 28 April 2010, ARO 2010/71 (Cancun).
24 Enterprise Court 19 July 2012, JOR 2013/7 and ARO 2012/113 (Cancun).
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in Efesyde, the transfer by Invernostra of its participation in Cancun Holding
II to Inversiones and ‘the secondwatering down’ of the participation of Cancun
Holding II in Efesyde.
Several parties involved lodged an appeal to the Dutch Supreme Court
against this judgment of the Enterprise Court. On 4 April 2014 the Dutch
Supreme Court rebutted these appeals in four judgments.25 Some of the
arguments put forward before the Dutch Supreme Court raised the question
whether the Enterprise Court could have based its judgment that there was
mismanagement on the part of Cancun Holding II on the conduct of the
company’smanagement board. In two considerations the Dutch SupremeCourt
went into the duties of the management board of a company both in general
and with a focus on a joint venture company. The first consideration reads:
‘In fulfilling their duties the managing directors are to be guided by the best
interests of the company and the undertaking connected with it […]. What these
interests are, depends on the circumstances of the case. If there is an undertaking
connected with the company, the interests of the company are normally defined
by the advancement of the continued success of this undertaking. In the case of
a joint venture company the interests of the company are furthermore defined by
the nature and the contents of the cooperation as agreed upon by the shareholders.
The nature and the contents of the collaboration in a joint venture company where
the shareholders are on an equal footing may imply that the interests of the com-
pany too are served best by the continuation of stable relationships between the
shareholders; this maymean that the relationships between the shareholders must
not be changed any further than is necessary in the light of the circumstances.’
The second consideration reads:
‘In fulfilling their duties the managing directors are furthermore […] bound to
exercise due care towards the interests of all those associated with the company
25 Dutch Supreme Court 4 April 2014, ARO 2014/71 (Cancun), Dutch Supreme Court 4 April
2014, ARO 2014/72 (Cancun), Dutch Supreme Court 4 April 2014, ARO 2014/73 (Cancun)
andDutch SupremeCourt 4 April 2014, JOR 2014/290 andARO 2014/74 (Cancun).M.J.G.C.
Raaijmakers, ‘Cancun: een joint venture klem tussen contract en instituut’, Ars Aequi 2014,
pp. 459-465.M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, ‘Bestuursautonomie in een (gezamenlijke) dochter-B.V.:
een novum in concernverhoudingen?’, Tijdschrift voor Ondernemingsbestuur 2015-1, pp. 2-12.
M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, ‘De “institutionele opvatting”: grondslag en inhoud?’,Ondernemings-
recht 2015-5, pp. 155-164. On the implications of the Cancun judgment: Autonomie van het
bestuur en haar grenzen voor en na de Cancun-uitspraak, Deventer: Kluwer 2015: M.J.G.C.
Raaijmakers, ‘Over de oorsprong, zin en betekenis van de “institutionele” opvatting’, pp.
10-29, A.F.M.Dorresteijn, ‘”Cancun”, bestuursautonomie en vennootschapsbelang, pp. 30-38,
J.B. Huizink, ‘Bestuursautonomie na Cancun’, pp. 39-48, W.J.M. van Veen, ‘Vennootschaps-
rechtelijke doorwerking, bestuursautonomie en bestuurstaak bij joint ventures na Cancun:
what’s new?’, pp. 49-66, A.F. Verdam, ‘Iets over de verhouding tussen de institutionele
opvatting, het vennootschapsbelang en de norm van redelijkheid en billijkheid, mede in
relatie tot bestuurders, commissarissen en aandeelhouders’, pp. 67-78. M.P.P. van Buuren,
‘Vennootschappelijk belang? Leg uit en pas toe’, Fiscaal Tijdschrift Vermogen 2014 pp. 13-18.
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and its undertaking. […] This duty of care may imply that managing directors in
serving the interest of the company shall ensure that the interests of all those
associated with the company or its undertaking are not being harmed unnecessarily
or disproportionately. As also follows from [the last part of] the foregoing con-
sideration, the duty of the managing directors of a joint venture company to exercise
due care towards the shareholders may involve a special duty of care towards the
position of a shareholder whose interest is watered down or threatens to be watered
down (further).’
7.2 A short comment
In the Cancun case the Dutch Supreme Court did not in so many words refer
to the corporate form as a contractual relationship between its participants.
However, the Dutch Supreme Court did refer to a joint venture company as
a company where ‘the interests of the company are […] defined by the nature
and the contents of the cooperation as agreed upon by the shareholders’, and
added to this that the management board of a joint venture company is under
an obligation to protect ‘the position of a shareholder whose interest is watered
down or threatens to be watered down’. This could be regarded as an implicit
recognition of the special organizational nature of a joint venture company
as a contractual relationship between its shareholders.
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE DUTY TO ADVANCE AND PRESERVE
For courts in adjudicating cases before them to refer to the chacteristics of a
company is not unusual and would only be expected. The Dutch Supreme
Court e.g. in a judgment of 6 December 2013 upheld a judgment of the Enter-
prise Court by considering that the Enterprise Court had not erred in consider-
ing that ‘more knowledge and insight (andmore efforts to acquire that know-
ledge and insight) may be expected on the part of a systemic bank (in view
of its duty of care […]) than from others under other circumstances’26 How-
ever, the Dutch Supreme Court had not before referred to the characteristics
of a company in connection with the duty of directors to be guided by the
best interests of the company and the undertaking connected with it. In
connection with this duty, the Dutch Supreme Court on several occasions
underlined the autonomous position of corporate directors vis-à-vis the com-
pany’s shareholders and the general meeting: corporate directors are free to
take decisions that contravene the interests of shareholders (Doetinchemse
IJzergieterij); in the absence of provisions in the articles corporate directors are
not obliged to follow instructions given to them by the general meeting (Forum-
26 Dutch Supreme Court 6 December 2013, JOR 2014/65 (Fortis).
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Bank); in the absence of statutory provisions or provisions in the articles a
management board is not under an obligation to consult the general meeting
about strategic issues; and a supervisory board is not under an obligation to
intermediate in conflicts between the management board and shareholders
(ASMI). This reasoning principally left it to corporate boards and directors
themselves to determine what is in the best interests of the company and the
undertaking connected with it. While allowing boards and directors a wide
margin of discretion, this reasoning also provided little guidance. It would
seem that for the first time such guidance is now available. It follows from
Cancun that corporate boards and directors are obliged to advance the con-
tinued success of the undertaking that is connected with the company, taking
into account the organizational specifics of the company. In Cancun these
organizational specifics were that the company was a joint venture company
in which the shareholders were, and were supposed to remain, on an equal
footing. In other cases other organizational characteristics may be relevant:
e.g. that the company is the parent company of a group, that the company
is a subsidiary company in a group, that the company has only one shareholder
or that the company is a family business. That corporate boards shall be guided
by the best interests of the company and the undertaking connected with it
means, as the Cancun judgment indicates, that their prime duty is to advance
the success of the undertaking that is connected with the company (the fact
that there is an undertaking connected with the company is certainly an
important characteristic) as well as to preserve the company’s other organiza-
tional characteristics. Thus, this is The Duty to Advance and Preserve. Interesting-
ly, this is neatly in line with a consideration of the Supreme Court of the State
of Delaware in the Selectica case on protective measures against a possible
hostile takeover: ‘Delaware courts have approved the adoption of a Shareholder
Rights Plan as an anti-takeover device […]. Any NOL poison pill’s principal
intent, however, is to prevent the inadvertent forfeiture of potentially valuable assets,
not to protect against hostile takeover attempts’ (italics added). As a conclusion
it would seem safe to say that in the Netherlands the statutory core legal
concept of the company is now being decisively influenced by another statutory
core legal concept: the duty of corporate directors in the performance of their
duties to be guided by the best interests of the company and the undertaking
that is connected with it. Whereas the company remains an abstract organ-
izational form in which the authority of the board of directors is pre-eminent,
corporate boards are now being offered guidance in deciding how they should
fulfil this duty. Corporate directors may go on the assumption that they should
regard the undertaking that is connected with the company as well as the
company’s other organizational characteristics as strong indications of what
‘their’ company is about essentially.

9 Shareholders’ right to put items on the
agenda of the general meeting
Colliding perspectives on a core right of share-
holders
Tom Dijkhuizen & Jelle Nijland
1 INTRODUCTION
The role and position of shareholderswithin a listed public company has been
a subject of debate on both the national and the international level for decades.
This debate focuses primarily on the rights that are, or perhaps, should be
conferred upon shareholders in such a company and, consequently, on the
active or effective exercise of those rights by the same shareholders. In this
contribution, we focus on one particular core concept, namely the right that
is conferred upon shareholders to put items on the agenda of the general
meeting. The right of shareholders to secure influence in the company through
a dialogue with the board can be considered as a core instrument within
company law that ensures the possibility of checks and balances within the
company. Whether under the shareholders’ or the stakeholders’ model, this
core concept is paramount for the legal structure of companies. Since the
general meeting is considered to be the traditional means through which
shareholders can exert influence in the investee company,1 the right to put
items on the agenda or to table resolutions for such a meeting can be con-
sidered to be a core right for shareholders since this is one of the few legal
possibilities though which they can exert influence if they so desire. The
exercise of this right enables shareholders to debate with the management of
the company they have invested in, but also with each other about all matters
This article draws and elaborates on forthcoming publications from the first-mentioned
author on the specific topic of shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda of the general
meeting.
T.C.A. Dijkhuizen is a PhD candidate at the Hazelhoff Centre for Financial Law and the
Department of Company Law, Leiden Law School. J. Nijland is assistant professor at the
Institute for the Interdisciplinary Study of the Law, Leiden Law School.
1 TheHigh-Level Group of Company LawExperts,Report of the High-Level Group of Company
Law Experts on a modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe, Brussels, 4 Nov.
2002, availableat<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_
en.pdf>, p. 49.
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that they deem to be of interest to their investments.2 This specific share-
holders’ right has been under scrutiny in the last two decades because of two
conflicting developments. On the one hand, the right has been introduced in
order to strengthen the position of shareholders within the public limited
company; firstlywhen it was formulated in the form of soft law and later when
it was codified on a national and European level. On the other hand, certain
parties have been looking for a way to diminish the shareholders’ influence
by counteracting the shareholders’ right to put an item on the agenda because
the corresponding shareholder activism led to alarm in certain sectors in society.3
In this contribution, we will focus on the development of this core right
for shareholders in theNetherlands, as codified in Book 2, Article 114(a) Dutch
Civil Code (hereafter: DCC), under the influence of both domestic and European
legislative developments, whichmight be conflictingwith each other.Wewill
put this specific development also within its broader context, namely within
the debate about the role and the position of shareholders in a public company.
This contribution is structured as follows. After this introduction, the
contribution will firstly address how the right to have items put on the agenda
was introduced in theNetherlands in the form of self-regulation. Subsequently,
the third section will focus on the codification of this right in the Netherlands
and the fourth section will provide an overview of the developments at EU
level that have an influence on the (wording of the) provision comprising the
right to put items on the agenda, whilst the fifth section will deal with the
domestic legislative developments regarding this Article as a response to
shareholder activism in the Netherlands. The final section will make some
concluding remarks about the influences of both developments on share-
holders’ right to put items on the agenda.
2 THE INCREASING ATTENTION FOR THE ROLE AND POSITION OF SHARE-
HOLDERS
As has been pointed out earlier, the shareholders’ right to (have the board)
put items on the agenda of the general meeting forms part and parcel of the
debate on the role and position of shareholders in listed public limited com-
panies (NV’s) in the Netherlands. Peters and Eikelboom even state that ‘the
right of listed companies to place items on the agenda appears to act in the
Netherlands as the point at which shareholders’ power andmanaging authority
2 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 49.
3 F.M. Peters & F. Eikelboom, Memorandum: the shareholders’ right to put items to the agenda
and the risk for the Dutch state of being liable due to breaches of EU law, May 2015, available
at <http://bureaubrandeis.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Artikel-Ingelse-veralgemeni
seerd.pdf?1d13cc>, p. 6.
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are balancing’.4 From the late 1980s and 1990s, the attention in the Netherlands
for this pivotal role has increased rapidly due to a growing awareness that
the role of shareholders and the general meeting in the corporate governance
of Dutch listed companies were marginalized as a consequence of the intro-
duction of the special two-tier board regime (de structuurregeling) for certain
‘big’ companies. As a result, the balance of power, or rather, the system of
checks and balances within Dutch listed companies was lost according to
some.5 The debate concerning the position of shareholders within listed com-
panies was part of a bigger corporate governance debate that took place in
Dutch society at that time. This debate was primarily focused on the viability
of the corporate governance structures of Dutch listed companies in light of
the growing internationalization of the Dutch economy and the increasing
international attention for the (marginalized) position of shareholders in listed
public companies. As a result of this wider debate, a so-called Corporate
Governance Committee was installed in April 1996.6
This committee – commonly referred to as the Peters Committee, after its
chairman – was asked to examine the viability of the then existing corporate
governance structures against the background of the continuing international-
ization of the Dutch economy and the increased international attention for
the role, position and influence of shareholders within listed companies.7 The
Committee notes, in its first interim report, that within Dutch listed companies
a great diversity of arrangements and structures exists that limits the influence
of shareholders within these companies.8 The Committee also specifies some
subjects (‘toetspunten’), including the company’s strategic policy, upon which
shareholders should, in the opinion of the Committee, be able to exert their
influence.9 The committee draws the conclusion that, in the context of the
desired dialogue and the accountability required from the board, it is pivotal
that shareholders can exert influence on the composition of the agenda of the
4 F.M. Peters & F. Eikelboom, The conflict between Boskalis and Fugro concerning the right to
place items on the agenda, available at <http://bureaubrandeis.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/08/19-05-15-Bureau-Brandeis-Engelse-vertaling-De-strijd-over-het-agenderingsrecht-
tussen-Boskalis-en-Fugro-DEF.pdf?1d13cc>, 2; F.M. Peters & F. Eikelboom, ‘De strijd over
het agenderingsrecht tussen Boskalis en Fugro’, WPNR 2015, 7061, p. 407.
5 B.F. Assink, ‘Facetten van verantwoordelijkheid in hedendaags ondernemingsbestuur’, in
B.F. Assink & D.A.M.H.W. Strik, Ondernemingsbestuur en risicobeheersing op de drempel van
een nieuw decennium: een ondernemingsrechtelijke analyse, preadvies van de Vereeniging
‘Handelsrecht’ 2009, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 20.
6 The Corporate Governance Committee was specifically set up as a result of an agreement
between the Association of Securities-Issuing Companies (de Vereniging Effecten Uitgevende
Ondernemingen) and the Amsterdam Stock Exchange Association (de Vereniging voor de
Effectenhandel). See Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 732, no. 5, p. 2.
7 The Corporate Governance Committee, Corporate Governance in Nederland. Een aanzet tot
verandering en een uitnodiging tot discussie, Amsterdam: Secretariaat Corporate Governance
1996, p. 9; Assink 2009, p. 20.
8 The Corporate Governance Committee 1996, p. 21
9 The Corporate Governance Committee 1996, p. 22.
214 9 – Shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting
general meeting. The committee also emphasizes that although only some
companies have granted the right to put items on the agenda of the general
meeting to shareholders and holders of depository receipts in their articles
of association, management boards of listed companies should in principle
honour a timely request to put an item on the agenda of the general meeting,
unless compelling circumstances dictate otherwise.10 In its final report, the
Committee formulates 40 recommendations, including a specific recommenda-
tion regarding the right of shareholders to put items on the agenda of the
general meeting. This recommendation implies that requests of investors –
either shareholders and/or holders of depository receipts, who solely or jointly
represent one per cent of the issued capital or whose shares on the date of
convening the meeting have a market value of at least ƒ500,000 to place items
on the agenda of the general meeting should be honoured by the board or
the chairman of the supervisory board if they are submitted at least thirty days
before the date of the meeting, unless, in the opinion of the management or
supervisory board, the request conflicts with substantial interests of the com-
pany.11 Moreover, the Committee also recommends that if the board refuses
such a request, this notification shall be made explicit at the beginning of the
meeting. The board should also justify why it has refused to include the item
in drawing up the agenda.12 The committee explicitly chooses not to submit
proposals to amend existing legislation, because it argues that the implementa-
tion of the recommendations, in addition to existing legislation, can reinforce
the corporate governance structures of Dutch listed companies sufficiently.13
The committee also assumes that the listed companies will voluntarily imple-
ment the recommendations.14 In short, the right or power for shareholders
and holders of depository receipts to put an item on the agenda of the general
meeting should, if it is not provided for in the articles of association, be en-
sured through self-regulation.
3 THE (PRELUDE TO THE) CODIFICATION OF THE SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHT TO
PUT ITEMS ON THE AGENDA OF THE GENERAL MEETING
After the publication of the final report of the Peters Committee, aMonitoring
Committee was installed with the responsibility to examine to what extent
10 The Corporate Governance Committee 1996, p. 26. The committee defines abuse of rights
or a legitimate expectation that the request will only disrupt the orderly conduct of the
general meeting as such compelling circumstances.
11 Recommendation 30. See The Corporate Governance Committee, Corporate Governance in
Nederland. De Veertig Aanbevelingen, 25 juni 1997, < http://commissiecorporategovernance.nl/
commissie-peters>, pp. 29 and 36.
12 The Corporate Governance Committee 1997, p. 29.
13 The Corporate Governance Committee 1997, p. 4.
14 The Corporate Governance Committee 1997, p. 4.
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the recommendationswere implemented. The committee concluded, regarding
the functioning of the general meeting and the role of the investors, that in
this domain the gap between ambition and reality was significant and that
the slight movement regarding the (re)valuation of the position of investors
in listed companies was in contrast with international developments.15 The
Dutch government soon responded to the publication by stating that boards
of listed companies should honour reasonable requests by shareholders or
holders of depository receipts to put items on the agenda of the general
meetings and, moreover, indicated that a legislative reform on this specific
subject was under way. The right or power to put items on the agenda for
shareholders will, in the opinion of the government, enhance an open and
balanced communication between the directors and the capital, which is
necessary for proper accountability by the board towards the investors.16
The continued attention for and discussion about the corporate governance
structure of Dutch (listed) companies has also prompted the government to
request the Social and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, hereafter:
SER) to review and advise on the viability of the two-tier board regime (de
structuurregeling).17 Although the shareholders’ right to put items on the
agenda of the general meeting, strictly speaking, was not part of the request
for advice, the SER also discussed the position of shareholders in this two-tier
board regime and, consequently, also the right to put items on the agenda.
In its advisory report,18 the SER called for a revaluation of the position of
investors in two-tier companies, especially against the background of develop-
ments on the international securities markets. In the opinion of the SER, these
developments required a proper corporate governance system in the sense
that this system creates balanced relations between investors on the one hand
and the management and supervisory board on the other.19 The SER believed
that this desirable revaluation could in principle be realised in two ways,
namely (i) through legislative amendments which reinstate certain powers
of shareholders that were taken away by the introduction of the two-tier board
regime; and (ii) by introducingmeasures that enhance the position of investors
within listed companies. As part of the latter, the SER argued that the manage-
ment and supervisory boards should be required to honour a request from
15 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance,Monitoring Corporate Governance in Nederland:
bericht van de Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance en de uitkomsten van het onderzoek
verricht door het Economisch Instituut Tilburg (EIT), verbonden aan de Katholieke Universiteit
Brabant, Deventer: Kluwer 1998, p. 7 and 10.
16 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 25 732, no. 8, pp. 13 and 16.
17 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179, no. 3, p. 1 (MvT). Incidentally, the Dutch Lower Chamber
(de Tweede Kamer) also sought advice from the SER concerning this topic. Zie Kamerstukken
II 1999/2000, 25 372, no. 13.
18 The Social and Economic Council,Advies over het functioneren en de toekomst van de structuur-
regeling (advies van 19 January 2001, SER 01/02), Den Haag: Sociaal-Economische Raad
2001; Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 25 732, no. 17.
19 The Social and Economic Council 2001, p. 79.
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shareholders and/or holders of depositary receipts, who solely or jointly
represent at least one per cent of the issued share capital, to have an item put
on the agenda of the general meeting, unless this request conflicts with sub-
stantial interests of the company.20
The government responded quickly to the advisory report of the SER by stating
that it would undertake legislative action in order to adapt the two-tier board
regime in accordance with the aforementioned report.21 The government also
indicated that it would undertake an initiative to codify the shareholders’ right
to put items on the agenda of the general meeting. On 8 January 2002, the
government, in accordance with earlier statements, introduced a legislative
proposal that aimed to adapt the two-tier board regime and to enhance the
role of the general meeting as a platform for exchange of information.22 The
government also introduced this proposal in order to fulfil the then felt need
to improve the relationship between the investors and themanagement board
of investee companies. In accordance with the Peters Committee and the SER,
the proposal introduces inter alia a right to have an item put on the agenda
of the general meeting for one or more shareholders who solely or jointly
represent one per cent of the issued capital. Unlike the Peters Committee,
which introduces amarket value criterion representing ƒ 500,000, the Cabinet
suggests amarket value criterion of C= 50million.23 Companies can lower these
alternative24 criteria in their articles of association.25 The right to put items
on the agenda is also granted to holders of depositary receipts for shares issued
with the company’s cooperation.26 In addition to these eligibility thresholds,
the legislative proposal introduces some formal requirements regarding the
request to put an item on the agenda. Firstly, this request must be submitted
in writing. Moreover, the request must be filed at least 60 days prior to the
general meeting.27 The deadline for lodging the request can be shortened in
the articles of association.28 If the request is made by one ormore shareholders
20 The Social and Economic Council 2001, p. 84.
21 Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 25 732, no. 18.
22 Wetsvoorstel wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met aanpassing
van de structuurregeling, Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179, no. 2.
23 The government justifies this market value criterion by stating that a shareholder shows
engagement with the investee company through the investment of such an amount, regard-
less of the corresponding percentage of the share capital. Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179,
no. 3, p. 22.
24 F.J. Oranje, ‘Convocatie- en agenderingsrecht van aandeelhouders. Toegevoegde waarde
in het systeem van checks and balances tussen bestuur en aandeelhouders’, in: P.J. van
der Kost, R. Abma & G.T.M.J. Raaijmakers (eds.), Handboek onderneming en aandeelhouder,
Serie Onderneming en Recht, deel 69, Deventer: Kluwer 2012, pp. 275-305, p. 284.
25 Article 2:114a (3) DCC.
26 Article 2:114a (4) DCC.
27 Article 2:114a (1) DCC.
28 Article 2:114a (3) DCC.
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who have a sufficient interest in the company and the formal requirements
are satisfied, the request must in principle be honoured. This does not apply
if the request conflicts with a substantial interest of the company.29 A refusal
on this ground is conceivable, as follows from the explanatory memorandum
(de memorie van toelichting), if the sole aim of the series of items to be put on
the agenda is to seriously disrupt the order of the meeting.30 From the memo-
randum of reply (de nota naar aanleiding van het verslag) it follows that a refusal
is also justified in case the request comprises of an extreme series of items.31
Moreover, the general standards of reasonableness and fairness and abuse
of rights can also be seen as ’lower limits’, but the concrete interpretation of
these statutory provisions regarding the exercise of the shareholders’ right
to put items on the agenda of the general meeting remains unclear.32 After
the legislative proposal was accepted, the shareholders’ right to put items on
the agenda was embedded in law with the introduction of the Act to amend
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code in connection with the adaptation of the two-
tier board structure regime,33 which entered into force on October 1, 2004.34
The exercise of this right can be refused if substantial interests of the company
conflict with the exercise of the right or if such exercise is in conflict with
general standards of reasonableness and fairness and is tantamount to abuse
of law. The management and/or supervisory board do not have the right of
a substantive assessment of the issues that investors – shareholders or holders
of depositary receipts – request to be put on the agenda. Consequently, the
investors could vote and/or decide on topics regarding which the general
meeting is not formally authorized to make decisions, such as the strategy
of the company, which is formally reserved for the management board. How-
ever, if the general meeting has decided on such a topic, this is to be seen as
a decision (beslissing), but not as a resolution (besluit). Consequently, the
outcome of such a vote is not binding and can be brushed aside by the man-
agement board.35
29 Article 2:114a (3) DCC. See also F.G.K. Overkleeft, ‘Het agenderingsrecht voor aandeelhou-
ders in beursvennootschappen: een aanzet tot (her)bezinning’,Ondernemingsrecht 2009, 167,
pp. 714-723, p. 715.
30 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179, no. 3, p. 21. See also Overkleeft 2009, p. 715.
31 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 179, no. 5, p. 24. See also Overkleeft 2009, p. 715.
32 Overkleeft 2009, p. 715.
33 Wet van 9 juli 2004 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met
aanpassing van de structuurregeling, Stb. 2004, 370.
34 Stb. 2004, 405.
35 Overkleeft 2009, p. 717.
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4 SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS IN MOTION: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SHARE-
HOLDERS RIGHTS’ DIRECTIVE
At European level, the attention for the role and position of shareholders in
listed companies also increased, especially after corporate scandals involving
companies such as Enron and WorldCom in the US and Parmalat, Vivendi
andMannesmann in Europe. The idea was that in a proper corporate govern-
ance system, those types of scandals would not take place. In reaction to the
corporate scandals, the European Commission extended the mandate of a so-
calledHigh-Level Group of Company Law Experts (hereafter: the High-Level
Group), chaired by Jaap Winter, to address a number of issues related to best
practices in corporate governance and auditing.36 The focus of the group is
on strengthening the – cross-border – exercise of shareholders’ rights and
solving the problems associated with cross-border voting. In its report, the
High Level Group focused inter alia on the position of shareholders within
European listed companies. The group argued that ‘in a proper system of
corporate governance, shareholders should have effective means to actively
exercise influence over the company’.37 In their perspective, the shareholders
– as the residual claimholders – needed to be able to ensure that management
pursues – and remains accountable to – their interests. The traditional means
for shareholders to exercise this influence is, in the opinion of the High Level
Group, through the general meeting, as this is the forum where shareholders
can debatewith themanagement board and each other, and vote on resolutions
put forward to them.38 Moreover, the group also stated that ‘the right for
shareholders to submit proposals for general meeting decisions plays an
important role in the corporate context’.39 However, in the opinion of the
High Level Group, the legal requirements or restrictions with respect to those
rights often prevent small shareholders from being active.40 Therefore, the
group asked, in its consultative document, whether there was a need, at EU
level, to provide for minimum standards regarding the right for shareholders
to ask questions and submit proposals for decision-making at the general
meeting. The respondents saw no ground for doing so, however, and for that
reason the group concluded by recommending that the threshold for the right
to put items on the agenda of the general meeting should not exceed 5% of
the issued capital and that the EuropeanUnion should consider imposing this
36 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 1. Until then, the High-Level
Group was requested to make recommendations on a modern regulatory framework in
the EU for company law and this group dealt in particular with issues related to the
Takeover Bids Directive.
37 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 48.
38 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 49.
39 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 51.
40 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 51.
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as aminimum rule onMember States.41 Furthermore, listed companies should
be required to explicitly disclose to their shareholders how they can ask
questions, how and to what extent the company intends to answer questions,
and how and under what conditions they can submit proposals to the share-
holders’ meeting. This should, in the opinion of the group, be an element of
the mandatory annual corporate governance statement of listed companies.42
The EuropeanCommission responded quickly to the findings of theHigh-
Level Group and in May 2003 published its ’Action Plan for Modernisation
of the corporate law and enhancement of corporate governance in the European
Union’.43 In this action plan, the Commission stated that ‘recent financial
scandals have prompted a new, active debate on corporate governance, and
the restoration of confidence is onemore reason for new initiatives at EU level.
Investors, large and small, are demanding more transparency and better
information on companies, and are seeking to gainmore influence on the way
the public companies they own operate.’44 Consequently, there is a need ‘for
enhancing the exercise of a series of shareholders’ rights in listed companies’.45
Therefore, the Commission concluded ‘that some new tailored initiatives should
be taken with a view to enhancing shareholder rights’.46 These initiatives
resulted, finally, in the adoption of the Directive on the exercise of certain
rights of shareholders in listed companies (hereafter: the Shareholders’ Rights
Directive (SRD)), which was published on July 11, 2007.47 This Directive, as
expected, was aimed at strengthening the – cross-border – exercise of share-
holders’ rights and solving the problems associated with cross-border voting.
The objective of the Directive was the effective exercise of the (voting) rights
throughout the European Community,48 as (i) effective shareholder control
is a prerequisite to sound corporate governance; and (ii) these rights are
reflected in the price to be paid at the acquisition of the shares.49 Therefore,
as follows from the same preamble, ‘certain minimum standards should be
41 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 52.
42 The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002, p. 74.
43 The EuropeanCommission.Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament. Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European
Union – A Plan to Move Forward. COM (2003), 284 final.
44 The European Commission 2003, p. 7.
45 The European Commission 2003, p. 14.
46 The European Commission 2003, p. 8.
47 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17.
48 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 14, p. 19.
49 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 3, p. 17.
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introduced with a view to protecting investors and promoting the smooth and
effective exercise of shareholder rights attaching to voting shares’.50
The Directive also paid particular attention to the right to put items on
the agenda of the general meeting. According to the preamble, shareholders
should in principle have the opportunity to put items on the agenda of the
general meeting and to table draft resolutions for items on the agenda.51 The
exercise of this right should, as follows from the preamble, be made subject
to two basic rules, namely (i) that any threshold required for the exercise of
those rights should not exceed 5% of the company’s share capital; and (ii) that
all shareholders should in every case receive the final version of the agenda
in sufficient time to prepare for the discussion and voting on each item on
the agenda.52 The shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda as such is
laid down in Section 6 of the Directive. This article requires Member States
to ensure that shareholders, acting individually or collectively, have the right
to put items on the agenda, provided that each such item is accompanied by
a justification or by a draft resolution to be adopted in the general meeting.53
Shareholders also have the right to table draft resolutions for items included
or to be included on the agenda of the general meeting.54 The requesting
shareholder should, however, hold a minimum stake in the company55 and
the request must be lodged within the time limit laid down in national legis-
lation.56
The implementation of this Directive into national legislation had the effect
that the then existing Article 2:114a DCC needed to be amended. Before the
implementation, this Article granted the possibility for the management and/or
supervisory board to refuse the request for inclusion of items on the agenda
on the ground that the request conflicted with substantial interests of the
company. This ground for refusal, with the entry into force of the Shareholders’
Rights Act57 on July 1, 2010,58 was deleted as the Directive did not contain
50 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 4, p. 17.
51 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 7, p. 18.
52 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J., L 184/17, recital no. 7, p. 18.
53 Section 6 (1)(a) SRD.
54 Section 6 (1)(b) SRD.
55 Section 6 (2) SRD. It is up to the national legislator to decide upon the minimum stake a
shareholder has to hold in a company in order to be eligible to exercise the right, but such
minimum stake, as laid down in national legislation, shall, in accordance with the recom-
mendations of the High-Level Group, not exceed 5% of the share capital.
56 Section 6 (3) SRD.
57 Wet van 30 juni 2010 tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Wet op
het financieel toezicht ter uitvoering van richtlijn nr. 2007/36/EG van het Europees Parle-
ment en de Raad van de Europese Unie van 11 juli 2007 betreffende de uitoefening van
bepaalde rechten van aandeelhouders in beursgenoteerde vennootschappen, Stb. 2010, 257.
58 Stb. 2010, 258.
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any explicit ground to refuse a request.59 In addition, the requirement to have
the request accompanied by a justification or by a draft resolution to be adop-
ted in the general meeting was added, in accordance with Section 6 (1)(a) SRD.
The new Article 2:114a DCC also provides for the shareholders’ right to table
draft resolutions for items included or to be included on the agenda of the
general meeting. Consequently, the management board and/or supervisory
board can no longer refuse a request by invoking the aforementioned ground
for refusal. The board may, however, still refuse a request where the exercise
of the right to put items on the agenda is in conflict with the standards of
reasonableness and fairness or where there is abuse of rights.60
5 SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS IN MOTION: THE RIGHT TO PUT ITEMS ON THE
AGENDA UNDER (DOMESTIC) SCRUTINY AFTER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Next to the developments at the European level as described above, therewere
also developments at the national level that put the exercise of shareholders’
rights under scrutiny. In particular, increased shareholder activism and in-
famous conflicts within Dutch listed companies between the board and share-
holders about the strategy of the company were reasons for the Corporate
Governance Code Monitoring Committee61 to reevaluate the relationship
between the company and its shareholders in theDutch corporate governance
model, including an evaluation of the exercise of the right to put items on the
agenda by shareholders.62 In December 2006, the Monitoring Committee
published a document for consultation containing several proposals regarding
the relationship between the company and its shareholders. The reactions to
this consultation indicated broad support for the Committee’s initial proposals.
Consequently, the Committee advised the government to lay down further
rules of play concerning the relationship between the company and its share-
59 F.M. Peters & F. Eikelboom 2015a, p. 4. These authors refer to the reply of the Minister
of Justice in the memorandum of reply (de nota naar aanleiding van het verslag), Kamerstukken
II 2008/09, 31 746, no. 7, p. 5.
60 In Stork, however, the Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled, by
way of injunctive relief, that the general meeting could not vote on an item put forward
by shareholders, i.e. the removal of the supervisory board, because this was in conflict with
standards of reasonableness and fairness. One could argue that the ground for refusal in
this case is also that the removal of the supervisory board conflicted with – in short –
substantial interests of the company and, consequently, the item was in conflict with
standards of reasonableness and fairness. See Court of Appeal Amsterdam (Enterprise
Division) 17 January 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZ6440, JOR 2007, 42 with commentary
from J.M. Blanco Fernández (Stork).
61 This Committee was originally installed to monitor the implementation of the first Dutch
Corporate Governance Code.
62 Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, Advisory report on the company-
shareholder relationship and on the scope of the Code, available at <http://www.corpgov.
nl/advies-kabinet-2007>, p. 8.
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holders through an elaboration of the then existing Dutch Corporate Govern-
ance Code, commonly referred to as the Code Tabaksblat, after the chairman
of the committee that drafted the Dutch Code, and also puts forth some
recommendations regarding legislative action.63 Two of the proposed rules
of play pertain to the shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda of the
general meeting. One should, however, keep in mind that the provisions of
the Dutch Corporate Governance Code are not binding and, moreover, are
predominantly addressed to the listed company.
First, the Committee introduced a so-called response time for themanage-
ment board. The Committee considers that it is good practice for shareholders
to exercise the right to put an item on the agenda only after they have raised
it with themanagement board of the company in case the proposed item could
lead to a change in the strategy of the company, such as the dismissal of the
management board members and/or supervisory board members.64 In such
an instance, the board has to be given the opportunity to formulate a reaction
during a reasonable period of time. The Committee proposes a response time
of a maximum of 180 days, since this period should suffice for the board to
have further deliberation and constructive consultation with (other) share-
holders and to form an opinion on the view of the investor and possible
alternatives.65 The proposal regarding the response period was included as
best-practice provision IV.4.4 in the revised Code Tabaksblat, which was
commonly referred to as the Code Frijns, after the chair of the Monitoring
Committee.66 A shareholder shall, in accordance with this best-practice pro-
vision, exercise the right to put an item on the agenda only after he has con-
sulted the management board about this. If one or more shareholders intend
to request that an item be put on the agenda that may result in a change in
the company’s strategy, themanagement board shall be given the opportunity
to stipulate a reasonable period in which to respond (the response time). This
shall also apply to an intention as referred to above for judicial leave to con-
vene a general meeting pursuant to Article 2:110 DCC. Moreover, the share-
holder shall respect the response time stipulated by the management board
within the meaning of best-practice provision II.1.9.67 Although the provision
is in principle addressed to the listed company,68 it limits the exercise of the
63 Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, 2007, p. 3. The Committee considers
that such further rules ‘are necessary to regulate the company-shareholder relationship
in order to ensure that the processes involving the management board, supervisory board
and shareholders (i.e. the general meeting of shareholders) pass off smoothly and that the
best possible balance is struck between the various interests’.
64 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code 2007, p. 6.
65 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code 2007, pp. 15 & 16.
66 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code, De Nederlandse corporate governance
code. Beginselen van deugdelijk ondernemingsbestuur en best practice bepalingen, 10 december
2008, http://commissiecorporategovernance.nl/download/?id=609.
67 Oranje 2012, p. 292; Overkleeft 2009, p. 721.
68 Overkleeft 2009, p. 721, under cit. 58.
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shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda since it only allows them to
exercise this right after a consultation with the board and after respecting a
possible response time the board could invoke.
The Committee’s second recommendation with regard to the right to put
items on the agenda is directed to the legislator. Although the right to put
an item on the agenda was not covered by the consultation document itself,
it became apparent from the reactions to the consultation document that there
was a need for raising the admissibility barrier. The Committee therefore
recommended to the legislator that the position with regard to the right to
put items on the agenda should be brought into linewith international practice
and that the threshold should be raised to 3%.69 The Committee is of the
opinion that the market value criterion of C= 50 million could be abolished.70
In reaction to the advisory report of the Committee, the Minister of Finance
readily accepted this specific recommendation and proceeded to an adjustment
of the then current rules accordingly. The Minister also acknowledged that
raising the threshold would mean a limitation of the shareholders’ right on
the one hand, but stressed on the other hand that without it, activist share-
holders, who represent a relatively small percentage of the voting rights, would
be able to have a significant impact on the general meeting.71 This would
put such a strain on the balance of power in the Dutch corporate governance
system72 that raising the threshold to 3 per cent and abolishing the market
value criterion were desirable.73 The government on 3 January 200874 pub-
lished a draft for an Act implementing these rules, also referred to as ‘the Act
Frijns’, which was passed on 24 July 2009.75 Article 2:114a DCC has been ad-
justed accordingly by the entering into force of the Act Frijns.76 The new
provision entered into force on 1 July 2013.77 The introduction of this Act
puts a further restriction on the shareholders’ right to put items on the agenda
of the general meeting as only shareholders and holders of depository receipts
that solely or jointly represent three per cent of the issued capital have this
right as opposed to the situation prior to the Act Frijns.
However, these domestic regulatory developments seem to be in conflict
with the objective of the European Directive, namely the effective exercise of
69 Furthermore, this 3% threshold is also in keeping with the threshold proposed by the
Monitoring Committee for control disclosure. SeeMonitoring Committee Corporate Govern-
ance Code 2007, p. 22.
70 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code 2007, p. 20.
71 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31 083, no. 1, p. 7.
72 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31 083, no. 1, p. 2.
73 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31 083, no. 1, p. 7.
74 Zie Overkleeft 2009, p. 721.
75 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 014, no. 2.
76 Wet van 15 november 2012 tot wijziging van de Wet op het financieel toezicht, de Wet
giraal effectenverkeer en het Burgerlijk Wetboek naar aanleiding van het advies van de
Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code van 30 mei 2007, Stb. 2012, 588.
77 Stb. 2012, 693.
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shareholders’ rights throughout the European Community. If the board invokes
the response time, shareholders are obliged to respect this response time and,
consequently, have to wait for at most 180 days before the issue forwarded
by them is discussed in the general meeting. One could argue that this
response time delays and therefore hinders the effective exercise of the right
to put items on the agenda. Subsequently, the increase of the threshold to 3%
can also be seen as a further limitation of (the exercise) of shareholders’ right
to put items on the agenda. The new Article 2:114a DCC, however, is in con-
formity with the Directive, as the threshold does not exceed the maximum
threshold of 5%. In short, the rules are in conformity with European legislation,
but one may doubt if the rules, and the response time in particular, are fully
in line with the underlying objective of the Directive. Although shareholders
must realize that differentiations in national approaches of member states in
the EU with regard to shareholders’ rights that are in conformity with the
Directive are allowed, (foreign) shareholders might be surprised by such ‘local
arrangements’ to the core concept of the shareholders’ right to put items on
the agenda.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The regulatory developments on a national and European level regarding the
role and position of shareholderswithin a listed public company as illustrated
with regard to the core right for shareholders in a listed company to put items
on the agenda of the general meeting, seem to be moving in opposite
directions. On a national level, theDutch legislator is endeavouring to counter-
act shareholder activism by limiting shareholders’ right to put an item on the
agenda by introducing a response period for the board in the Dutch Corporate
Governance Code during which shareholders cannot exercise this right and
by raising the threshold from 1% to 3% of the issued share capital in a listed
company. On the EU level, the role of shareholders as a “watchdog” not only
on their own behalf, but also on behalf of other stakeholders, is emphasized
in the current debate on corporate governance. Effective shareholder control
is a prerequisite to sound corporate governance and as such, a proper system
of corporate governance should ensure the effective exercise of the right for
shareholders to put items on the agenda of the general meeting in order to
have the means to actively exercise influence upon the company. The Dutch
Civil Code and accompanying legislation as discussed fall within these norms
and are in conformity with the Directive. However, since the objective of the
Directive is to allow shareholders to make effective use of their rights through-
out the Community, one may wonder whether the rules introduced are in
conformity with the objectives of the Directive.
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